Civ.	No.	
------	-----	--

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO

ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUND WATER AGREEMENT ASSOCIATION (AGWA); U.S. BORAX, INC.; BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLC; WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.; CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, GRIMMWAY ENTERPRISES, INC.; LAPIS LAND COMPANY, LLC.; A.V. UNIFIED MUTUAL GROUP; SHEEP CREEK WATER COMPANY; and SERVICE ROCK PRODUCTS CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Respondent.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40, et al.

Real Parties In Interest

Appeal from the Judgment of the Superior Court
State of California, County of Los Angeles
The Honorable Jack Komar (Ret.)
Telephone No. (408) 882-2286
Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. JCCP 4408

EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY STAY OF PROCEEDINGS EXHIBITS 9-27 [VOLUME 2 OF 3]

BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP Michael T. Fife (State Bar No. 203025) Bradley J. Herrema (State Bar No. 228976) 2029 Century Park East, Suite 2100 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Tel. No.: (310) 500-4600/Fax No.: (310) 500-4602

Attorneys for Petitioner
ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUND WATER AGREEMENT ASSOCIATION
(PLEASE SEE NEXT PAGE FOR ADDITIONAL ATTORNEYS)

EDGAR B. WASHBURN (State Bar No. 34038)
WILLIAM M. SLOAN (State Bar No. 203583)
GEOFFREY R. PITTMAN (State Bar No. 253876)
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
425 Market Street

San Francisco, California 94105-2482 Phone: (415) 268-7209 • Fax: (415) 276-7545

Attorneys for Petitioner, U.S. BORAX INC.

RICHARD G. ZIMMER (State Bar No. 107263)
T. MARK SMITH (State Bar No. 162370)
CLIFFORD & BROWN
1430 Truxtun Avenue, Suite 900
Bakersfield, California 93301-5230
Phone: 661-322-6023 • Fax: 661-322-3508

Attorneys for Petitioners, BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLC and WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.

BOB H. JOYCE (State Bar No. 84607)
ANDREW SHEFFIELD (State Bar No. 220735)
KEVIN E. THELEN (State Bar No. 252665)
LAW OFFICES OF LEBEAU THELEN, LLP
5001 East Commercenter Drive, Suite 300
Post Office Box 12092
Bakersfield, California 93389-2092
Phone: 661-325-8962 • Fax: 661-325-1127

Attorneys for Petitioners, DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, a
California corporation, CRYSTAL ORGANIC
FARMS, a limited liability company, GRIMMWAY
Enterprises, Inc., and LAPIS LAND COMPANY, LLC.

MICHAEL DUANE DAVIS (State Bar No. 93678)

MARLENE ALLEN-HAMMARLUND (State Bar No. 126418)

BEN A. EILENBERG (State Bar No. 261288)

GRESHAM SAVAGE NOLAN & TILDEN, A Professional Corporation

3750 University Avenue, Suite 250

Riverside, CA 9250 1-3335

Phone: 951-684-2171 • Fax: 951-684-2150

Attorneys for Petitioners, A.V. UNITED MUTUAL GROUP, SHEEP CREEK WATER COMPANY, and SERVICE ROCK PRODUCTS CORPORATION

LIST OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit 1	Reporter's Transcript of Proceeding and Order Granting
	Petition for Coordination - June 17, 2005, Judicial Council
	Proceeding No. 4408, Superior Court of the State of
	California for the County of Orange, the Honorable David C.
	Velasquez presiding, filed June 17, 2005.
Exhibit 2	Respondent Court's Order After Hearing on Jurisdictional
	Boundaries, entered November 3, 2006.
Exhibit 3	Respondent Court's Revised Order After Hearing on
	Jurisdictional Boundaries, entered March 12, 2007, filed
	March 16, 2007.
Exhibit 4	Plaintiff Rebecca Willis' Response to Ex Parte Application
	For Order Continuing Trial Date and to AGWA's Request for
	Order Protecting Phase 2 Findings, filed October 1, 2008.
Exhibit 5	Respondent Court's Order After Phase Two Trial on
	Hydrologic Nature of Antelope Valley, entered November 6,
	2008, filed November 12, 2008.
Exhibit 6	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings - April 24, 2009,
	Judicial Council Proceeding No. 4408, the Honorable Jack
	Komar presiding, filed April 24, 2009.

Exhibit 7	Federal Defendants' Reply to Landowner Defendants' Motion
	to Dismiss Public Water Suppliers' Cross-Complaint and
	Responses Thereto, filed June 18, 2009.
Exhibit 8	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40, Palm Ranch
	Irrigation District, Littlerock Creek Irrigation District,
	Palmdale Water District, Quartz Hill Water District,
	Rosamond Community Services District, City of Palmdale,
	California Water Service Company, City of Lancaster's
	Notice of Motion and Motion to Transfer and to Consolidate
	for all Purposes; Memorandum of Points and Authorities;
	Declaration of Whitney G. McDonald, filed July 15, 2009.
	Attachment 1: Judicial Council Order Granting Petition for
	Coordination, June 17, 2005.
	Attachment 2: Judicial Council Amended Order Assigning
	Coordination Trial Judge, August 31, 2005.
	Attachment 3: Los Angeles County Waterworks District No.
	40, Palm Ranch Irrigation District, Littlerock Creek Irrigation
	District, Palmdale Water District, Quartz Hill Water District,
	Rosamond Community Services District, City of Palmdale,
	California Water Service Company, City of Lancaster's List
	of Operative Complaints.

Exhibit 9	Federal Defendants' Response to Motion to Transfer and
	Consolidate, filed August 3, 2009.
Exhibit 10	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings - October 13, 2009,
	Judicial Council Proceeding No. 4408, the Honorable Jack
	Komar presiding, filed October 13, 2009.
Exhibit 11	U.S. Borax, Inc., Sheep Creek Water Company, Service Rock
	Products Corporation, Grimmway Enterprises, Inc., Diamond
	Farming Company, Crystal Organic Farms LLC, Bolthouse
	Properties, LLC, Lapis Land Company, LLC, A.V. United
	Mutual Group, Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc., Antelope Valley
	Ground Water Agreement Association's (Cross-Defendants)
	Peremptory Challenge to Assigned Judge (C.C.P. § 170.6),
	filed October 13, 2009.
Exhibit 12	Santa Clara County Superior Court Minute Order from
	October 13, 2009, filed October 13, 2009.
Exhibit 13	Santa Clara County Superior Court Minute Order from
	October 15, 2009, filed October 15, 2009.
Exhibit 14	Santa Clara County Superior Court Minute Order from
	October 16, 2009, filed October 16, 2009.

Exhibit 15	North Edwards Water District, Big Rock Mutual Water
	Company, Palm Ranch Irrigation District, Llano-Del Rio
	Water Company, Littlerock Creek Irrigation District,
	Palmdale Water District, Little Baldy Mutual Water
	Company, Llano Mutual Water Company, Desert Lakes
	Community Services District, City of Palmdale's Opposition
	to Peremptory Challenge to Assigned Judge (CCP § 170.6),
	filed October 19, 2009.
Exhibit 16	City of Los Angeles' Joinder in Opposition to Peremptory
	Challenge to Assigned Judge, filed October 19, 2009.
Tarbibit 17	Dholon Digon Hills Comments Comicas Districts Commities
Exhibit 17	Phelan Piñon Hills Community Services District's Opposition
	to Peremptory Challenge (C.C.P. § 170.6), filed October 19,
	2009.
Exhibit 18	Federal Defendants' Response to Peremptory Challenge to
	Assigned Judge (CCP 170.6), filed October 19, 2009.
Exhibit 19	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 and
	Rosamond Community Services District's Joinder in
	Opposition to Peremptory Challenge to Assigned Judge, filed
	October 20, 2009.

Exhibit 20	U.S. Borax, Inc., Sheep Creek Water Company, Service Rock
	Products Corporation, Grimmway Enterprises, Inc., Diamond
	Farming Company, Crystal Organic Farms LLC, Bolthouse
	Properties, LLC, Lapis Land Company, LLC, A.V. United
	Mutual Group, Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc., Antelope Valley
	Ground Water Agreement Association's (Cross-Defendants)
	Reply to Oppositions to Peremptory Challenge to Assigned
	Judge, filed October 22, 2009.
Exhibit 21	Santa Clara County Superior Court Minute Order from
	October 22, 2009, filed October 22, 2009.
Exhibit 22	Santa Clara County Superior Court Minute Order from
,	October 23, 2009, filed October 23, 2009.
Exhibit 23	Santa Clara County Superior Court Minute Order from
	October 23, 2009 (2nd), filed October 23, 2009.
Exhibit 24	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings - October 27, 2009,
	Judicial Council Proceeding No. 4408, the Honorable Jack
	Komar presiding, filed October 27, 2009.

Exhibit 25	Respondent Court's Order after Hearing re Re-Setting
	Hearing Dates for Motions to Approve Settlements and Other
	Motions; Case Management Conference being scheduled to
	February 5, 2010, entered October 28, 2009.
Exhibit 26	Order of the Court of Appeal – State of California Fourth
	District, Division Two, Antelope Valley Groundwater
	Agreement Association et al. v. Superior Court of Los
	Angeles County, E049581, filed November 19, 2009.
Exhibit 27	Respondent Court's Order Transferring and Consolidating
	Actions for All Purposes, filed February 19, 2010.
Exhibit 28	U.S. Borax, Inc., Sheep Creek Water Company, Service Rock
	Products Corporation, Grimmway Enterprises, Inc., Diamond
	Farming Company, Crystal Organic Farms LLC, Bolthouse
	Properties, LLC, Lapis Land Company, LLC, A.V. United
	Mutual Group, Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc., Antelope Valley
	Ground Water Agreement Association's (Cross-Defendants)
	Peremptory Challenge to Assigned Judge (C.C.P. § 170.6),
	filed February 19, 2010.
Exhibit 29	Los Angeles County Superior Court Minute Order from
	February 19, 2010, filed February 19, 2010.

Exhibit 30	Public Water Suppliers' Opposition to Code of Civil
	Procedure Section 170.6 Peremptory Challenge, filed
	February 26, 2010, and Joinders of City of Los Angeles,
	Phelan Piñon Hills Community Services District, and State of
	California.
Exhibit 31	Federal Defendants' Response to Peremptory Challenge to
	Assigned Judge (CCP § 170.6), filed February 26, 2010.
Exhibit 32	Minute Order from February 26, 2010 regarding late add-ons
	to Willis Class, filed February 26, 2010.
Exhibit 33	Cross-Defendants' Reply to Oppositions to Peremptory
	Challenge to Assigned Judge, filed March 4, 2010.
Exhibit 34	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings – March 8, 2010,
	Judicial Council Proceeding No. 4408, the Honorable Jack
	Komar presiding.
Exhibit 35	Order Denying the Challenging Parties' Peremptory Challenge
	pursuant to CCP section 170.6, filed March 9, 2010.
Exhibit 36	Order and Notice to All Counsel Regarding Phase 3 Trial on
	Status of Aquifer and Issue of Overdraft, filed March 10,
	2010.

PROOF OF SERVICE BY PERSONAL DELIVERY

I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action. My business address is 21 East Carrillo Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101. On March 18, 2010, I caused to be served via attorney service, First Legal Support the:

EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

EXHIBITS 9-27 [VOLUME 2 OF 3]

by delivering copies thereof to:

The Hon. Jack Komar Santa Clara County Superior Court c/o Clerk, Rowena Walker 191 North First Street San Jose, CA 95113 The Hon. Jack Komar Los Angeles County Superior Court 111 North Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90012

Further, I posted the document(s) to the website http://www.scefiling.org, a dedicated link to the Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases. This posting was reported as complete and without error.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on March 18, 2010, at Los Angeles, California.

Maria Kłachko-Blair

1		
2	R. LEE LEININGER	
3	JAMES J. DUBOIS E.	EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 6103
4	Environment and Natural Resources Division	JOVERNIVIENT CODE SECTION 0103
5	Natural Resources Section 1961 Stout Street, Suite 800	
6	Denver, Colorado 80294 lee.leininger@usdoj.gov	
7	james.dubois@usdoj.gov	
8	Phone: 303/844-1364 Fax: 303/844-1350	
9	Attorneys for the United States	
10	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE ST.	TATE OF CALIFORNIA
11	COUNTY OF LOS	
12	Coordination Proceeding) Judicial Council Coordination
13	Special Title (Rule 1550(b))) Proceeding No. 4408
14	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES	S)
15	Included actions:) FEDERAL DEFENDANTS') RESPONSE TO MOTION TO
16	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co., et al.	v.) TRANSFER AND CONSOLIDATE)
17	Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. BC 325 201	5)
18	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co., et al.	<u>.</u> (
19	Kern County Superior Court, Case No. S-1500-CV-	·-)
20	254-348) }
21	Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of Lancaster Diamond Farming Co. v. City of Lancaster	
22	Diamond Farming Co. v. Palmdale Water District Riverside County Superior Court, Consolidated Action	ı,)
23	Case nos. RIC 353 840, RIC 344 436, RIC 344 668	
24	AND RELATED CROSS ACTIONS	_ }
25		
26		
27		
28		

The United States respectfully submits its response to the City of Palmdale's, *et al.* (collectively the "Public Water Suppliers or PWS"), Notice of Motion and Motion to Transfer and to Consolidate for All Purposes; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Whitney G. McDonald ("*PWS Consolidation Motion*"), filed July 15, 2009. The PWS state that "consolidation will allow for the entry of single statements of decision in subsequent phases and a single judgment [and] . . . permit the Court to handle these already coordinated and complex proceedings as a single action." *Id.* at 4.

1. Overview.

As an initial matter, the United States not only supports the goals of consolidation, but maintains that these goals are imperative. To retain jurisdiction over the United States the litigation must achieve a mutually binding adjudication of all rights to water in the groundwater basin. As we stated in our June 18, 2009 brief on this matter, the present coordination of complex cases may lead to separate and non-mutually binding determinations of rights and interests entered in separate decrees. Federal Defendants' Reply to Landowner Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Public Water Suppliers' Cross Complaint and Responses Thereto, at 2-3. This has the potential to produce only piecemeal adjudication of limited rights that are neither binding on all users nor enforceable by all users. Such an amalgam of decrees would not effect a comprehensive adjudication of the rights to water in the Antelope Valley aquifer and would fail to satisfy the requirements of the McCarran Act which provides the waiver of immunity for the United States to be joined in this action. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976); see also Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 569 (1983).

Consolidation, therefore, provides a mechanism to unify the case, result in a single decree binding on all parties, and potentially satisfy the McCarran Amendment. To that end, and because the cases have a common question of law or fact, complete consolidation is appropriate here.

2. Consolidation is warranted because the cases involve a common question of law and fact.

A judge may consolidate actions when they involve a common question of law or fact. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1048(a) (2009). "Common questions" between cases are areas of "overlap"; identical or similar parties and/or claims. *Medlock v. Taco Bell Corp.*, 2009 WL 1444343, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2009). Pursuant to § 1048, "[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1048(a).

Here, it has already been determined that the cases involve common questions of law and fact because the cases have been coordinated. *See* Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 404. Moreover, one of the factors considered prior to coordination is if common questions of law or fact are predominating or significant to the litigation. *Id.* at § 404.1.

The predominating common question in this case is the determination of rights to groundwater in the Antelope Valley groundwater basin. All the parties share this commonality including the dormant landowners, the small and large pumpers, the municipal water providers, the purveyors, and the federal government. The Willis class of non-pumping landowners, for example, recognize that the Antelope Valley groundwater adjudication "has been combined with other cases to determine all the groundwater rights in the Basin." (Willis) Notice of Class Action, at 1 (attached as Exh. A to Plaintiff Willis' Order Modifying Class Definition and Allowing Parties to Opt in the Plaintiff Class, filed May 22, 2008); see also Second Order Modifying Definition of Plaintiff [Willis] Class, dated September 2, 2008, at 2 ("The claims asserted on behalf of the Class raise common issues of fact and law, which predominate over any individual issues.") Moreover, this class was certified "in light of the need to obtain a comprehensive allocation of water rights that is binding on all landowners within the Basin." Order Certifying Plaintiff Class, dated September 9, 2007, at 2, ¶ 7.

Similarly, the Wood class of small pumpers claims that "[t]here are common question [sic] of law and fact as to all members of the Class, which predominate over any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class. Specifically, the Class members are united in establishing (1) their priority to the use of the Basin's groundwater given their capacity as overlying landowners" First Amended Class Action Complaint (Wood Class), dated June 20, 2008, pp. 7-8, ¶ 21. Because the coordinated cases involve the common question of rights to groundwater these cases are appropriate for complete consolidation.

3. Consolidation for all purposes is proper.

Section 1048 of the California Code has been interpreted by courts to permit complete consolidation, or consolidation of particular issues for trial only. *See Sanchez v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County*, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1391, 1396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). Both complete consolidation and consolidation for trial require a common question of law or fact. *Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd.*, 22 Cal. 4th 1127, 1148 n.12 (Cal. 2000). In a complete consolidation, however, "the pleadings are regarded as merged, one set of findings is made, and one judgment is rendered." Judge Robert I. Weil & Judge Ira A. Brown, Jr., Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro. Before Trial § 12:341.1 (The Rutter Group 2007); *see also Sanchez*, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 1396. Otherwise stated, complete consolidation is proper when "the causes of action might have been united." *Smith v. Smith*, 80 Cal. 323, 324 (Cal. 1889). In these coordinated cases, all the causes, including determination of safe yield, overdraft, prescription, rights priority, reserved rights, and a physical solution unite to produce a determination of the parties' relative rights to groundwater. Therefore, complete consolidation is proper.

4. The cases have already been transferred.

In their Consolidation Motion, the Public Water Suppliers request that, "to the extent not already transferred, the Court is authorized to order whatever transfers are deemed necessary to allow complete consolidation." PWS Consolidation Mtn. at 9. In this case, however, the Judicial Council has already effected a transfer of the coordinated

actions by assigning the actions to Judge Komar and the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. *See* Exhibit 2 attached to PWS Consolidation Mtn. Accordingly, no further transfer of the respective cases is necessary prior to consolidation.

The California Rules define "transfer" as the "means to remove a coordinated action or severable claim in [an] action from the court in which it is pending to any other court under rule 3.543, without removing the action or claim from the coordination proceeding." Cal. Civ. Code § 3.501 (19) (2009). Here, the Judicial Council's August 31, 2005 order effected a transfer by assigning Judge Komar as the coordination trial judge, and vested him with the authority to "hear and determine the coordinated actions listed below, at the site or sites that he finds appropriate." PWS Consolidation Mtn. at Exh. 2. The Judicial Council continues that, pursuant to the coordination, "the coordination trial judge may exercise all the powers over each coordinated action of a judge of the court in which that action is pending." *Id.* Because the cases have already been effectively transferred to Judge Komar, it is within his powers to consolidate without further action by way of a transfer. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1048(a) (2009).\(^1\)

5. Conclusion.

A complete consolidation is necessary in order to achieve a comprehensive adjudication and comport with the requirements set forth in the McCarran Amendment. Because the predominating common question in this case is the determination of water rights within the groundwater basin, complete consolidation is warranted.

A coordination judge is vested with "whatever great breadth of discretion that may be necessary and appropriate to ease the transition through the judicial system and the logjam of cases which gives rise to coordination." *Ableson v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.*, 28 Cal. App. 4th 776, 786 (Cal Ct. App. 1994)(quoting *McGhan Medical Corp. v. Superior Court*, 11 Cal. App. 4th 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); *see also Fellner v. Steinbaum*, 132 Cal. App. 2d 509, 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (concluding that the consolidation of two cases for trial was "committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge"). Therefore, the United States agrees with the Public Water Suppliers that the Court has authority to transfer cases to the extent transfer has not already occurred, but believes this action is unnecessary in the instant case.

1 Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of August, 2009. 2 3 JOHN C. CRUDEN Acting Assistant Attorney General 4 Environment and Natural Resources Division 5 R. LEE LEININGER 6 JAMES J. DUBOIS United States Department of Justice 7 Environment and Natural Resources Division Natural Resources Section 8 1961 Stout Street, Suite 800 Denver, Colorado 80294 9 lee.leininger@usdoj.gov james.dubois@usdoj.gov 10 Phone: 303/844-1364 Fax: 303/844-1350 11 12 MARK S. BARRON United States Department of Justice Environment and Natural Resources Division 13 Natural Resources Section Post Office Box 663, Ben Franklin Station 14 Washington, DC 20044-0663 carol.draper@usdoj.gov 15 mark.barron@usdoj.gov Phone: 202/305-0490 Fax: 202/305-0506 16 Attorneys for the United States 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Linda Shumard, declare:

I am a resident of the State of Colorado and over the age of 18 years, and not a party to the within action. My business address is U.S. Department of Justice, Environmental and Natural Resources Section, 1961 Stout Street, 8th Floor, Denver, Colorado 80294.

On August 3, 2009, I caused the foregoing documents described as; FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO MOTION TO TRANSFER AND CONSOLIDATE, to be served on the parties via the following service:

X	BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE AS FOLLOWS by posting the documents(s) listed above to the Santa Clara website in regard to the Antelope Valley Groundwater matter.
	BY MAIL AS FOLLOWS (to parties so indicated on attached service list): By placing true copies thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as indicated on the attached service list.
	BY OVERNIGHT COURIER: I caused the above-referenced document(s) be delivered to FEDERAL EXPRESS for delivery to the above address(es).
	Executed on August 3, 2009, at Denver, Colorado.

/s/ Linda Shumard
Linda Shumard
Legal Support Assistant

1	
1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
3	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JACK KOMAR, JUDGE
4	DEPARTMENT 19
5	000
6	COORDINATION PROCEEDING SPECIAL TITLE (RULE 1550(B)
7	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER)
8	CASES) JUDICIAL COUNCIL OCCUPATION PROCEEDING
9	INCLUDED ACTIONS: Output Out
10	LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS) CASE NO.1-05-CV-049053 DISTRICT NO. 40 V.
11	DISTRICT NO. 40 V. DIAMOND FARMING CO.) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA)
12	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CASE) NO. BC 325 201
13	LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS)
14	DISTRICT NO. 40 v.) DIAMOND FARMING CO.)
15	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,) COUNTY OF KERN,)
16	CASE NO. S-1500-CV-254-348)
17	WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC., V.) CITY OF LANCASTER)
18	DIAMOND FARMING CO. V. CITY) OF LANCASTER)
19	DIAMOND FARMING CO. V.) PALMDALE WATER DISTRICT)
20	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,) COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE,)
21	CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS,) CASE NOS. RIC 353 840,)
22	RIC 344 436, RIC 344-668
23	WILLIS v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY) WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40)
24	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,)
25	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,) CASE NO. BC 364 553)
26	WOOD v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY) WATER WORKS DISTRICT NO. 40)
27	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,) COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
28	CASE NO. BC 391869
	<u></u>

1	000	
2		
3	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS OCTOBER 13TH, 2009	
4	OCTOBER 131F	1, 2009
5		
6	APPEARANCES:	
7	FOR THE CITY OF PALMDALE:	JAMES MARKMAN ATTORNEY AT LAW
8 9	FOR DIAMOND FARMING, ET AL:	BOB JOYCE ATTORNEY AT LAW
10	FOR U.S. BORAX:	WILLIAM SLOAN ATTORNEY AT LAW
11 12	FOR ANTELOPE VALLEY UNITED GROUP:	MICHAEL DAVIS ATTORNEY AT LAW
13	FOR BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES:	RICHARD ZIMMER ATTORNEY AT LAW
14 15	FOR ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER AGREEMENT ASSOCIATION:	MICHAEL FIFE ATTORNEY AT LAW
16 17	FOR RICHARD WOOD:	MICHAEL MCLACHLAN ATTORNEY AT LAW
18	FOR REBECCA WILLIS:	RALPH KALFAYAN ATTORNEY AT LAW
19 20	FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40:	JEFFREY DUNN ATTORNEY AT LAW
21	FOR AGWA:	BRADLEY J. HERREMA ATTORNEY AT LAW
23	FOR NORTHROP GRUMMAN, ET AL.: (VIA COURT CALL)	TAMMY L. JONES ATTORNEY AT LAW
2425	FOR COPA DE ORA LAND CO.:	STEPHEN M. SIPTROTH ATTORNEY AT LAW
26 27	FOR ANTELOPE VALLEY JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT: (VIA COURT CALL)	ANNA MILLER ATTORNEY AT LAW
28	FOR CAMERON PROPERTIES: (VIA COURT CALL)	CLIFF MELNICK ATTORNEY AT LAW

1	FOR MIKE FLOYD: (VIA COURT CALL)	MIKE FLOOD ATTORNEY AT LAW
2	FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY: (VIA COURT CALL)	MAY M. GANTVOORT ATTORNEY AT LAW
4	(VIA COURT CALL)	
5	FOR UNITED STATES: (VIA COURT CALL)	ATTORNEY AT LAW
6	FOR VAN DAM & ANTELOPE VALLEY:	SCOTT K. KUNEY ATTORNEY AT LAW
7	(VIA COURT CALL)	AIIONNEI AI DAW
8	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER:	ALICIA PLANCARTE CSR# 12161
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

OCTOBER 13TH, 2009 SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 1 2 PROCEEDINGS 3 4 THE COURT: We have a sign in-list. Let's 5 find out by calling roll who on the Court Call list is 6 7 present. As your name is called answer present or here. 8 9 THE CLERK: Tammy Jones. 10 MS. JONES: Present. 11 THE CLERK: Michael Crow, Michael Crow. 12 Steven Siptroth. 13 MR. SIPTROTH: Present. THE CLERK: Mr. Herrema is here. 14 15 John Tootle, John Tootle. Bradley Weeks. Christopher Sanders. Ana Miller. 16 17 MS. MILLER: Present. Edward Renwick, Edward Renwick. 18 THE CLERK: 19 John Ukkestad, Robert Kuhs, Keith Lemieux. Malissa 20 McKeith. Cliff Melnick. MR. MELNICK: Present. 21 22 THE CLERK: Mike Flood. 23 MR. FLOOD: Present. 24 THE CLERK: Richard Wood, Susan Trager, Amy 25 Gantvoort. 26 MS. GANTVOORT: Present. 27 THE CLERK: R. Lee Leininger. 28 MR. LEININGER: Present.

THE CLERK: Scott Kuney. 1 2 MR. KUNEY: Present. Is there anybody on the 3 THE COURT: telephone whose name has not been called? All right. 4 5 Well, we've got principally a motion here in connection to the previous motion to transfer and 6 7 consolidate. Who is going to speak to that opposition? 8 9 MR. MARKMAN: James Markman for the City of 10 Palmdale for the moving party. Who is going to speak on the 11 THE COURT: 12 opposition? 13 MR. JOYCE: Bob Joyce --14 THE COURT: I'm asking you to step forward 15 to counsel table, identify yourself at that time. 16 try and stay where you are so that the court reporter 17 can follow. 18 MR. JOYCE: Bob Joyce on behalf of Diamond 19 Farming, Crystal Organic Enterprises Inc. and Office 20 Land Company. 21 William Sloan on behalf of U.S. MR. SLOAN: 22 Borax. 23 Michael Davis on behalf of MR. DAVIS: 24 Antelope Valley United Mutual Group, Service Rock 25 Product Corporation Enterprises Inc. and Sheet Creek 26 Water Company. Richard Zimmer on behalf of 27 MR. ZIMMER: 28 Bolthouse Properties and Bolthouse Farms.

MR. FIFE: Michael Fife on behalf of Antelope Valley Groundwater Agreement Association.

MR. MCLACHLAN: Michael McLachlan on behalf of the small pumper class.

MR. KALFAYAN: Ralph Kalfayan on behalf of the Willis class.

MR. DUNN: Jeffrey Dunn on behalf of Rosenbaum Community Services District and Los Angeles County Waterworks District Number 40.

THE COURT: Moving party first.

MR. MARKMAN: Well, your Honor, this has been briefed back and forth about six times. I think when I sum this up as a bit of a surprise on my part that any party presently in this proceeding that's seen all these papers will so oppose having one trial and having one judgment that manages the water rights of the resources of this basin.

The only reason we are even having these discussions is because we needed MacKaren (phonetic) Act jurisdiction so two classes were created at the Court's suggestions, plaintiffs classes. And in those pleadings filed by those plaintiffs class attorneys who are here they actually prayed for declaratory relief and a declaration of all the water rights that are present in the basin, including theirs, comparing theirs to everybody else. Even though there were only certain defendants named they ask for that kind of broad relief and management of the basin. So it's more

interesting to me what nobody has disagreed with.

Number one, common issues of law and fact are pervasive in this case, there's not much difference between these and the Indian Wells or redevelopment plants as far as we can see, or any other case, that is the, that is the benchmark for consolidation. That's the substantive criteria.

Secondly, we have procedural issues, any of which I'd discuss in detail, if the Court sees fit, but basically service of process, a method of serving process on everybody, suggesting somehow that didn't occur when we obviously served this motion in accordance with the way you present motions in this proceeding pursuant to the Court's coordination powers, and we did so.

Furthermore, everyone argues that obviously received notice. I don't know whose right they are asserting that may not have received notice, but nobody's even been drenched up to come and make that claim even after this state, after two or three continuances. This just seems to be simple to me than it has been made out to be by some of these arguments.

The one argument, for example, that you can't consolidate cases that have been coordinated because by definition they are complex based on a Court Rule that only applies to noncomplex cases doesn't make sense to me. It seems to me that there's been a lot of hurdles put in front of getting to a process that

everybody must agree with. One trial, not multiple trials, one disposition of all the substantive issues in this case that applies to everybody at one time resulting in one judgment where everybody's rights, whether they're intersaying against everybody else or only against some select parties, are all there in one document so that the Court and the parties subject to it can see that it's administered properly. So I don't want to go over the details of all these arguments.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, did you want to add anything?

MR. DUNN: Yes, your Honor.

When we went back and looked at the Court record to see if in fact a consolidation order had been put in place the one thing that we came to understand or realize is we did have that, we went back over through this extensive record is that if there has not been an order put in place, the proceedings, all proceedings today have been conducted as if such an order had been in place. All of the hearings have involved both the classes and involved issues involving the United States and MacKaren. There's been no division by pleading or by party, instead what has happened is as I look to my right and I see this distinguished group of counsel, all of them have voluntarily weighed in on issues involving both classes that grade in on issues involving service.

The record will also reflect that on the

matters involving the two class action complaints that
the various landowner parties were active in this case
that participated in those discovery proceedings
including the meet and confer letters, and without, you
know, taking much more of the Court's time here, it
simply comes down to this. If there has not yet been
an order consolidating these cases for all purposes
we've had that certainly as a de facto consolidation,
and the reason it's been done that way is it has to be
done that way in a case like this to have the
multiplicity of proceedings as Mr. McLachlan and
Mr. Markman described would create such an undue burden
and, and the impracticality upon the Court, I really
can't see that.

So I'll close though with the comment that I think there has been a consolidation for all purposes today by conduct of the parties, and to the extent that there's any remaining concern that somehow consolidation, you know, either expands the scope of the pleadings and makes people adverse or not adverse, it does no such thing. It simply allows for the judicial use, excuse me, the efficient use of judicial resources both the courts and the parties and so we can continue to move this case towards a resolution. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right. Your position?

MR. JOYCE: Your Honor, I'll make just an

initial observation.

1.5

THE COURT: I just ask that you really don't repeat what's in your papers because your papers have been very clear as to the position of the case.

MR. JOYCE: I understand that, your Honor, and Bob Joyce on behalf of Diamond Farms.

COURT CALL: Who's my driver?

THE CLERK: Excuse me, you're coming through the court.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Joyce.

MR. JOYCE: Yes, your Honor. Bob Joyce on behalf of Diamond Farming, Crystal Organic Enterprises and Office Land Company.

My observation is, your Honor, that rules of civil procedure, court rules, those are designed and intended to aid both parties and the court is administering our system to ultimately achieve a sound and a just conclusion. Common vote is between civil litigants an incorrect observation made by opposing counsel is that the affect of this court order would not do any of the things that we point out in our opposition that it would have a tendency to do, one of which is obviously it turns the situation where I am neither a defendant in an action involving, in that brought by the United States against my client, nor have I sued the United States, suddenly I will be put into a situation where I'm adverse to the interest of the United States. Same situation now pertains to the

classes in a sense that I have not sued any member of 1 2 the class nor the class representative, neither have 3 they sued myself. Most significantly, your Honor, this 4 motion to consolidate is merely the flip side of the 5 same coin of the motion to dismiss for failure to join 6 indispensable parties. For the Court to deny that 7 motion the Court --8 THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, 9 Mr. Joyce, what do you make of California Rule of Court 10 2.541(b)(1)? The Court would have to assist 11 MR. JOYCE: 12 I'm not -- I don't know off the top of my head --That provides that the 13 THE COURT: 14 coordination judge has the power to transfer cases from 15 one court to another within the discretion of the Court 16 for good cause. 17 And your Honor, I think there's MR. JOYCE: a distinction between transferring and consolidation. 18 THE COURT: Well, isn't that a first step? 19 20 Assuming the Court --MR. JOYCE: 21 THE COURT: Lays a foundation for consolidation under 1048 of the Code of Civil 22 23 Procedure. 24 The practical outcome is that MR. JOYCE: 25 assuming that you're transferring, and I'm not aware of 26 any case that's not presently pending by virtue of the 27 coordination order before this Court in any event.

THE COURT:

Well, there's a difference

28

though between a coordination order and transfer pursuant to the coordination order in terms of them affixing the venue of that case. Each one of these cases that were filed in separate counties, remain cases within those counties even though they are being adjudicated pursuant to the coordination order. Let's see if I can jump ahead a little bit and move this along.

It seems to me that there are substantial issues in this case that every pleading, every pleading without exception implicates. And that is the declaratory relief as to the status of the rights to use the groundwater within the basin.

The Court has previously found that there's a single aquifer. That seems to me, given the nature of water law in California, groundwater law, to put every party who is here, whichever court they may have started in, with correlative rights that are essentially making them a necessary party to any ultimate judgment in this case. In other words, the Court cannot adjudicate the rights of a party in one part of the aquifer to -- without considering the rights of the parties in another part of the aquifer because those rights are correlative and they are subject to the consequences of one part as to the other.

So it seems to me that perhaps not all of the causes of action related to the right to use the

water, some of them are damage actions, some of them relate to settlement, some of them relate to inverse condemnation and the like, but the central core of every cause of action of every pleading, of every complaint really relates to the right to use water and those rights are correlative and they implicate every other party in this proceeding, and that's why we have attempted, and the Court has encouraged the parties to join together to deal with these issues. The issues that have arisen, whether they are the class action issues or the other issues, all fall within the same basic core principal. Now I understand your consternation and the concern of everybody in terms of the causes of action that really are not part of the question concerning declaratory relief and the request that the Court find there's a physical solution.

All of the parties here have participated in the issues that have been adjudicated thus far with regard to the nature and jurisdiction of the Court, the nature of the aquifer, whether it's a single aquifer or not, and now we are moving into another issue that still relates directly to the question of water rights and whether or not the basin is in a condition of overdraft, the safe field is and the like. And while I understand the technical objections which you've raised and frankly I don't think are valid --

And I intend -- I'm intending at this point to overrule your objections and to do two things. One,

order a transfer of these proceedings from Riverside and Kern County to Los Angeles County, and then take up the issue of how we consolidate the various causes of action, so that we don't do an injustice to anybody in terms of affecting whatever rights they may have to some of the causes of action, yet bringing together in a single proceeding the cause of action for declaratory relief, which seems to me to be the principal one that we have to deal with here first in determining whether or not we can have a sufficient adjudication of everybody's rights, and also to comply with the Maclaren Act.

And so that's where I'm headed and if you want to address those issues I'd be happy to hear whatever other argument you might have.

MR. JOYCE: Well, your Honor, actually before the Court expressed its views I was headed to some extent in the very same direction, but what I really wanted the Court to both appreciate and fully understand, and that was why I prefaced my comment as I did, and that is as things currently stand there are pending motions before the Court to allocate expert witnesses' fees, costs from Mr. MacLachlan's class. There's prospectively from what I've been hearing settlements, there may be applications for attorney's fees. Under the current posture of the case I have no exposure to any of those.

The effect of the order of consolidation

that the Court is heading towards is essentially to certify a cross-defendant class, i.e. presumably under the purveyors' first amended cross-complaint, thus then in subjecting myself and Mr. MacLachlan's people under the same litigation under the same complaint, the same with Mr. Kalfayan. Suddenly I'm now a party to the same action, consequently theoretically exposed. That is a significant shift in the posture of the case from my vantage point, that is the reason I have resisted consolidation primarily because — and that's the reason why I proposed a single judgment, because as it currently stands the pleadings will not permit the outcome that I can see coming.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Well, the Court does have THE COURT: discretion to deal with the question of allocation of fees and costs and obviously the role various parties play in litigation and the extent of their causes of action, the defenses will have some significant bearing I understand that there's been a tentative settlement reached between the classes in the water I have not seen that. I don't know what purveyors. I don't know what the agreement is. So the terms are. it's really premature for me to, as the Court to run conclusions, inferences at all about that, but I would not do anything with regard to consolidation that would impact negatively the settlement that these parties have entered into. I want to see what it is. want to see what the agreement is and what the impact

of the consolidation might have on that.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The United States has responded to the objection filed under this class, and at this point I can't really decide that issue 'cause I don't know what the settlement is, but it seems to me that a settlement that puts that settlement into a single judgment ultimately carries out the purpose of the Maclaren Act, is not contrary to it and ultimately benefits all the parties to this adjudication, whatever the ultimate determination might be as to the status of the aquifer and the rights of the parties to that water. So it's a little bit premature. And I think that the form of the order of consolidation is something we are going to have to work on. I don't think that we are in a position at all to be able to actually formulate that order, but I do think that the Court can make it a generalized order at this point that the parties engage in a meet and confer to prepare a consolidation order because I am ordering a transfer of these actions to Los Angeles County.

MR. JOYCE: Your Honor, I just reiterate that any order that would create a circumstance where I am now a party to the same action as the classes raises the very concern I have because the Court has articulated the Court has discretion. Currently the Court does not have discretion. I am not a party, therefore I'm not exposed. Once the Court has the discretion, in my mind, I'm significantly exposed.

THE COURT: Well, you may be, but the ultimate effect to that is I don't know at this point.

1.5

MR. JOYCE: And I can't gamble on that, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Dunn?

MR. DUNN: Your Honor, I'd like to make an observation relative to the small pumper class. Some of these I believe Mr. Kalfayan agrees with, but I won't necessarily speak for him.

My concern is that -- well, let's start from the foundation, which is do we have an existing precedent for what we are trying to do here? No.

If there was a case out there in which class action was consolidated into another civil litigation I was not able to find it. There is one in Southern District of New York that looks like it possibly might have been going that way, but there's not really. I couldn't find any published authority on it.

My concern is that in order to -- we are now in the process of trying to document the settlements that were reached with Justice Robie, and then we'll take some time more with the various public bodies that have to approve these things and so forth before it reaches your desk.

It is ultimately that settlement in either of the class cases needs to result in final judgment for the class. I think we can put the classes to bed once and for all and not jeopardize the MacKaren

jurisdiction without having to consolidate. And I think that we may end up blowing the classes up if we consolidate them into this litigation because there's a dearth of applicable law, it's hard to really say, we are in effect charting new grounds here.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

So in that sense it makes me want to be more conservative and my suggestion to the Court is that we let the settlements come to the Court in their current case, their current case number, and have those reviewed by the Court and then at some later date if for some reason they don't work or there's a problem with them and the classes are still around then you can consolidate into a larger proceeding. We can always do But I think -- I don't want to -- I can't, I'm not at liberty to disclose specific terms of the settlement, but I think it's a possibility that the classes can be put to bed and all issues resolve between the class members and the public water suppliers, and allow the rest of the litigation to proceed and still have jurisdiction over the United States because the claims of the class would have been, have been resolved. And so there is no need for another judgment down the road.

THE COURT: The difficulty as I see it, you know, the difficulty for me to really express an understanding 'cause I don't know what your settlement is, but each member of that class has a reciprocal right to water that relates to every other pumper or

overlying owner in the valley. So that I really don't understand the surrender to a separate judgment on behalf of the classes and ensure that there would be no further litigation between the members of the class and any of the other overlying landowners.

And you may settle out the purveyors, the water suppliers, but you don't settle out the other overlying landowners, I think. But it's premature for me to draw any conclusion at all about that. But I think that ultimately what is necessary in this case, whatever the ultimate facts might be that you find that there be a judgment that affects every party to the litigation, a single judgment. How we go about achieving that without consolidation seems to me to be a puzzle that I don't fully understand and -- but at this point I think that it's in everybody's best interest that there be a single judgment.

Now Mr. Joyce's concern about having to pay somebody else's fees, I understand that because at this point in time he has no obligation whatsoever to class members to compensate for Court ordered expert fees.

And I would say this --

MR. DUNN: I think he was referring to attorney's fees. Were you not?

MR. JOYCE: I was referring to the attorney's fees, but also fees respective to application fees at a later date.

THE COURT: That may be. But the only order

that I made at this point that would impact whatsoever is the order of authorizing the appointment of an expert to assist the Court, not to assist the parties, and that's what that ruling was. And I know that you disagree with the implications of that, but that's the order that I made.

2.6

In terms of attorney's fees, because you're not a direct -- it seems to me there's not a direct relationship between Mr. Joyce's complaint and the complaint that has been filed by the class. I fail to see how at this point there could be attorney's fees involving of any resolution there as to Mr. Joyce's clients. And to the extent that the Court orders consolidation, the Court does have the power and the discretion, it seems to me, to ensure that parties are not affected adversely by areas that they are not interested.

MR. DUNN: There's a practical concern which I've discussed with some of the public water suppliers, but I think before we go on record on this issue is that if, you know, it's hard to say exactly how the cards play out, but there's a theoretical possibility that if the book is not closed on the class members' rights vis-a-vis, the settlement. In other words, if they still can get their turn the class members' rights are affected by the third or fourth phases of the trial or whatever even comes beyond that.

Class counsel is obligated legally and

ethically to stay in the case and continue protecting those rights, whatever they may be left over for any number of years, and that's a prospect that I know the public water suppliers do not like because the legal bills are mounting, they are getting rather high.

I want everybody to be on record that if we don't find a way to, to -- there is a way to do it. I think -- I can't, you know, divulge the terms of the settlement because of the confidentiality stipulation. Once that's papered we can do that. But I think that should be explored first. It sounds like your Honor is going to do a two phase deal where we transfer and we talk about consolidation.

THE COURT: I'm going to order that there be a meet and confer in terms of that and recognizing concerns of the issues that various parties might have, but it does seem to me that there's no question the Court has the authority to order a transfer. If anybody disagrees with that I'd be happy to hear their arguments concerning that. And then we'll deal with the form of -- some form of consolidation which I think has to happen in order to result in a single judgment.

And of course, I would invite the parties to propose settlements, to talk to each other about potential for unifications that have been. There are future claims made by other overlying landowners to the extent that Mr. McLachlan was talking about having future liabilities which he has to protect against. It

seems there are a variety of ways of dealing with that.

That gets to settlement discussions, and that I don't

want to engage in that discussion here.

Mr. Zimmer, you have something?

MR. ZIMMER: Just for clarification, your

Honor.

My understanding what the Court is saying is Mr. Joyce's client and my client for that matter or any of the other defendants do not have exposure to attorneys' fees or expert fees from the classes because the matter has not yet been consolidated?

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. ZIMMER: I agree with that. I disagree with Mr. Dunn's comments about a de facto consolidation.

But what I'm curious about is -- is the Court's intention to stay with this case after whatever happens today?

THE COURT: Yes. You're asking about whether or not the Court can take an assignment to continue hearing this case. I have communicated with the assignment's office and the chief justice as indicated. He's doesn't mind me staying on the case and I'll agree to do that. I would not want to abandon this case for, pardon the expression, midstream.

MR. ZIMMER: My concern is this, we started out with a quiet title action down in Riverside and that action still exists as to Mr. Joyce's client and

my client. The only reason that these classes ever became an issue was because of the actions that were filed by Los Angeles County and Kern County and L.A. County, filing a comprehensive adjudication and asking for declaratory relief of all the rights of all the parties in the case. My client Bolthouse never asked for that. Mr. Joyce's client never asked for that. We simply asked --

THE COURT: You are a defendant in those cases?

MR. ZIMMER: We are a defendant in those cases.

So what happened after that was the county was unable or did not want to have to serve all the people that they should serve to properly bring the action for declaratory relief of all rights in that water basin. So the first discussion came up about having a class. Now in my view there's absolutely no question that this should be a defendant class. If there had been a defendant class in this matter we wouldn't be having the issues that we have now because there would be a defendant class with an action brought against them by Los Angeles County as it should because those landowners are indispensable parties.

Now we are in a situation where we have plaintiff classes in an attempt to settle their action as plaintiffs, which does absolutely nothing to resolve the problem that L.A. County has to have all landowners

in there as defendants to resolve the claims that they have pleaded.

And we are, we are really ending up with a procedural nightmare. I'm sure the Court didn't contemplate that at the outset. We are ending up with a procedural nightmare here that I'm not sure we are able to fix. And I don't want to come back eight years from now again. We were in Riverside for five years. We have now been here for five years. And I don't want to come back again and have to retry this case because it benefits the purveyors. It spends everybody else into the ground. We've been spending money, spending money, and spending money.

And we are simply back in a situation where they can't get their reliefs they claim and where there's no conformance with the MacKaren Act, that's a significant problem. I understand, and it's my understanding that the Court today is intending to consolidate this or not consolidate it.

Is that correct?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ZIMMER: I think that's all the comments I have and the rest is in the papers.

THE COURT: What do you see is the difference between a plaintiffs class and a defendants class vis-a-vis the water purveyors? The classes have sued for declaratory relief among other things of the water providers, and it seems to me that that creates

the same issue that you would have if they were being sued as a defendant class.

MR. ZIMMER: Well, I think the answer to that is obvious, the classes don't feel that way. You've heard both Mr. McLachlan and Mr. Kalfayan came into this court on numerous occasions saying, we have limited action. We are only seeking a determination of our -- there's no proscriptive rights against us. I asked Mr. Dunn at the last hearing, is L.A. County still making the same claims against the classes that they're going to determine the classes' rights as correlative rights holders? He said, yes, we are still making that claim.

The classes still think they are getting out by simply dealing with proscriptive rights. The difference is huge. The differences between solely being plaintiffs and the difference between being defendants to a declaratory relief action is seeking to declare their overlying rights. That's a huge difference in my mind.

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that the issue is ultimately going to be assuming that the aquifer is an overdraft, assuming so then it's going to be a question of a physical solution, and that physical solution is going to impact the class as well as every other party in this action. And it seems to me that's the ultimate objective, to get everybody's correlative rights at issue and resolved. And I don't understand,

of course, I don't know what the settlement is, but I don't understand that anything I've heard from the purveyors or anybody else is looking to a different result than that. I mean, if the basin is in overdraft there's a serious issue that has been presented to the Court for resolution.

MR. ZIMMER: I agree that in the end if there is a physical solution you may end up at the same point, but from a pleading standpoint, from a burden of proof standpoint there are huge issues that relate to the burden of proof, who is bringing the action under case law, who is required to prove what, and that's the critical issue.

Now if, if the Court consolidates you're still going to have to have determinations of pleadings who is suing who for what. But my view is it shouldn't be consolidated. The county should name defendants, they should serve those defendants and they should proceed on their claims. Procedurally that — to me that's the right way to do it. We are not in that context. I understand what the Court is saying about a physical solution. I just disagree that procedurally it's the correct way to do it.

THE COURT: You know, creating a defendant class is a very difficult problem, unless somebody steps forward and volunteers to, to represent that class, an individual, and then obtaining counsel and that's why I ultimately suggested that we go to a

plaintiffs class. I think that so far it is achieving the result. There's no argument, a lot of discussion, a lot of angst among a lot of people based on uncertainties. We are moving along.

1.5

We, I think finally have jurisdiction over all of the component parts of the valley that need to be within the Court's jurisdiction. And now we are trying to work through the adjudication process to get a fair just resolve and determine what the facts are.

And I frankly, I think that we are charting into some new ground here. I think Mr. McLachlan is correct, there's not a lot of case law dealing with this type of situation. But there needs to be, and maybe that's what this case is going to be all about, I don't know.

But in any event, there are other people who want to argue.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, Mike Davis.

I'm not going to reiterate everything that's in the pleadings, but I would respectfully disagree with Mr. Dunn, this case has not, to this point been tried as if it was consolidated. If it were we would have all been able to participate in these discussions with Justice Robie, we were not. We were excluded. We have no clue what's happened there. And quite honestly when discovery was submitted by Mr. Kalfayan and others, we refused to respond because we were not parties to their case, and they have not objected to

that because in fact they recognize that we are not parties to their case.

7.

I would simply like to make it clear from my perspective we have never acted as if this was a de facto consolidated action and the implication that it is I think is significant.

with you, that there's been no consolidation. But there has been a joinder with regard to the adjudication of the common issues that we've dealt with at this point. Every party has participated or had an opportunity to participate fully in the adjudication of the jurisdictional bounds, the single aquifer and other issues that have come up incident to those.

If you want to call that a de facto consolidation fine, it's certainly not a technical or a correct use of the phrase of art. I agree with you, but that's where we are headed. And I want to make sure that everybody has an opportunity to be heard with regard to these issues.

And Mr. Davis, with regard to the settlement conference that was discussed between the purveyors and the two classes, I don't think that's inconsistent with anything that has happened here. I think that's perfectly appropriate.

The parties sometimes will sit down with a third party, not all parties to the action are involved in that discussion, to try to settle some aspect of the

case or their portions of the case, that happens very I can't think of a large case that I've ever handled where it hasn't happened. And I think it's a very important thing to do. That has nothing to do with the question of the ultimate adjudication of rights here. Not every lawyer, not every party has a right to join in discussions that several of the parties may be having with a third party mediator, and Justice Robie was a third party volunteer mediator. appreciated that very much. He's a very knowledgeable I just might add that to the extent that this case moves on in the manner which it is, he may well be available to assist us in resolving other aspects of this case and he certainly was very gracious in participating -- the parties who did participate. That has nothing to do with really the progress of the litigation or any other aspect.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1.5

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, my point simply was that it is not, as Mr. Joyce was indicating, it was not a significant issue if we are not parties to those actions and their isolated actions, even though they've been coordinated and their common issues have been tried, not all of the issues in our opinion in those two class cases are issues that are common to the rest of the case that we are in.

THE COURT: Well, there's no question about that.

MR. DAVIS: And so there's a reason that it

was not a big issue, but as Mr. Joyce indicated to us it would be a huge issue upon the consolidation, which I anticipate the Court is going to order today without putting specificity as to how that's implemented. I understand the Court is saying I'm going to order transfer. I'm going to order consolidation. I simply am not going to put the details on how that's going to happen.

THE COURT: I can't at this point because there are a multitude of causes of action some of which really belong together and some of which do not, but the declaratory relief actions and the quiet title is really a form of that, it's an effaceable action, anyway seems to me is essentially the same side of the coin or different side of the same coin.

In any event, anybody else want to say anything?

MR. KALFAYAN: Yes, your Honor.

If I had concern initially that complete consolidation might somehow conflict with the settlement that we have with the public water suppliers in the U.S., however, earlier today I met with counsel, and I believe we have worked that out so that, so that that issue will no longer be there. So we just need to put the settlement agreement together and put a motion for you to approve that settlement.

THE COURT: Yeah. And I cannot and will not make a final order of consolidation until I've heard

that motion to approve the settlement.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

MR. DUNN: Your Honor, this is just a little bit off topic, but it does -- all the things we are doing here do bear upon the settlement agreement and the terms that we are putting in there.

Down in Los Angeles, certainly I don't know how the practice is going up here, but in some cases in situations where parties are trying to move things along we have done the preliminary approval process by way of stipulation and order as opposed to scheduling a hearing out 60 days. It's, actually I've done some research for some of my colleagues in Central Civil West it's been done a number of times this year, and I was thinking about trying to do that in this case. don't know if your Honor has had any experience with that, but if your Honor has some objection to that then the public water suppliers, at least in my class and I believe Mr. Kalfayan's class, is considering doing that once we get things approved. And the concern there is that if, possibly that the settlement process of the few classes could hold -- continue to hold up the phase three trial date.

And as a way to move to the -- 'cause the thing that really matters is the fairness hearing, a day where everybody gets to voice their objections.

And if we set that trial date at some point for let's say the springtime Mr. Kalfayan and I are obligated to -- with our firms to go to, you know, I don't know

50 days of expert deposition and go through all the litigation, and do all the stuff that's going to happen because the classes' rights have not been laid to rest.

So I wanted to raise the question if your Honor had a strong objection to the -- at least the theoretical possibility of doing the preliminary approval by way of stipulation and order, then we can do it the old fashioned way and set a hearing date.

THE COURT: Well, I would want the request for preliminary approval, whether it will be by stipulation or otherwise, to be set for a hearing so that I can review it and determine whether or not it should be preliminary approval granted, that means that at least 20 days notice to do that. And I would urge you to do that. I don't want to have it just an in-chambers conference.

MR. DUNN: Well, your Honor, the hearing is down in Los Angeles at the end of the month?

THE COURT: I think for the most part that's what we would do. It is a Los Angeles case. We are going to continue to use the electronic website for filing orders made previously in Santa Clara County for the most part in Los Angeles filing under those circumstances.

MR. DUNN: Well -- does your Honor have a plan as far as a designated date in which things can be noticed? I assume you are probably going to be doing some mediation or arbitration or something.

THE COURT: I'll be doing private work.

MR. DUNN: Just as a practical matter when we want to set things, I understand Rowena said that we will probably still be going through her. And I'm curious if your Honor has in your head set particular days of the week or how that would work for noticing things.

THE COURT: Actually I have not. I think that we tentatively set a hearing for November the 30th --

MR. DUNN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- on a couple of these matters including the settlement approval I presume. That's a Monday. I don't have a preference as to any particular days. I think my schedule can be rather flexible until it becomes inflexible. I don't know when that's going to happen. You know, I would just ask you to call Mrs. Walker and schedule whatever you want to schedule. She'll be in touch with me and confirm it.

MR. KALFAYAN: Your Honor, I was told that we'll need a week to complete the draft of the settlement agreement. And the public supplier is going to need about 45 days.

THE COURT: How many?

MR. KALFAYAN: 45 days.

MR. BUNN: For governing board approval.

MR. KALFAYAN: For governing board approval and then we can set it for a hearing 20 days after

1 that. 2 THE COURT: Will not be ready -- you will not be ready on November 30th. 3 I don't see that possible. MR. BUNN: 4 Not with 20 days notice. I think 5 MR. DUNN: realistically, so we are probably looking at the first 6 week of January or something or the last week of 7 8 December. 9 MR. SLOAN: Your Honor, William Sloan on behalf of U.S. Borax. Would it be possible if we could 10 11 perhaps recess for five minutes just to discuss some 12 logistics and then reconvene? 13 THE COURT: Sure. 14 MR. SLOAN: Thank you. 15 THE COURT: In terms of a date for a hearing on that motion I would like a firm date and schedule 16 And I would like to avoid repetitive trips to Los 17 Angeles as much as we can and to the extent that we 18 have to, but if we can set it for let's say the first 19 week in January, like January the 7th or 8th and do the 20 21 other motions at that time. 22 MR. JOYCE: Your Honor, can we hold that 23 date open. THE COURT: Yes. I just want you to be 24

MR. JOYCE: Ten if we could, your Honor.

(Whereupon, a break was taken.)

25

26

five minute recess.

thinking about that date. Okay. Let's take a maybe

THE COURT: Do you have anything to report to the Court?

MR. ZIMMER: Thank you for the chance to talk among ourselves. Obviously there's several different motions here on calendar here today.

I want to make it clear that it's our understanding that the Court is granting the motion to consolidate and that the Court is intending to seek further details. We just want to make sure that's decided one way or the other before we get into these other motions.

THE COURT: Let me clarify where we are.

I am granting the motion to the extent that I'm ordering transfer of the Kern, Riverside County cases to the County of Los Angeles. I am indicating and intend to consolidate. I want to schedule a hearing on the form of that order for a date that coincides with the request for preliminary approval of the class settlements in the Willis cases. And ordering that the parties meet and confer concerning the form of the order of consolidation so that we ensure that only the causes of action that should be consolidated are consolidated. Some of the causes of action one party may not have an interest in with regard to the other causes of action. So I'm thinking, for example, in terms of inverse condemnation, damages caused by settlement, and the like.

MR. ZIMMER: I guess our question is, the

motion was a motion to consolidate there was no motion 1 2 to transfer. 3 THE COURT: I am doing that out of my own 4 motion. 5 MR. MARKMAN: That's not true, your Honor. Since I drafted that it was a motion to transfer to the 6 7 extent a transfer hasn't already occurred and to consolidate. 8 9 So the question is, is the MR. ZIMMER: Court granting the motion to consolidate at this point? 10 THE COURT: As I have expressed it, 11 Mr. Zimmer? 12 13 MR. ZIMMER: The Court said it's granting a 14 motion to transfer, is the Court granting a motion to 15 consolidate? It is my intent to sign an order 16 THE COURT: 17 to consolidate once the transfer has been completed and after counsel have had an opportunity to meet and 18 confer concerning the form of the order. 19 20 MR. ZIMMER: Is the Court intending to hear 21 the other motions that are currently scheduled today? 22 As I understand it the motion to THE COURT: allocate costs was continued to November the 30th. 23 24 That will be continued again to the date of the approval of the -- maybe in fairness here to -- 'cause 25 26 I don't know what's transpired with the appointment of that expert at this point. The motion to dismiss the 27

first amended cross-complaint which was filed on

28

January 10th, I don't think I've seen any recent papers 1 The motion by Lancaster is concerning that request. 2 stay the case for six months, continue the trial 3 setting conference. We can take that up today if we 4 want to do that. The motion by Bolthouse to amend the 5 exhibits to its amended cross-complaint --6 I put that off until the next MR. ZIMMER: 7 8 hearing. Well, that's my point, I haven't THE COURT: 9 seen anything on that lately. 10 We can't make any decision 11 MR. ZIMMER: until we find out what's happening with consolidation. 12 The further motion to disqualify THE COURT: 13 the Blue (phonetic) Firm was reset to November the 14 30th, that will again be reset to a date that coincides 15 with the motion to approve, the next hearing date. 16 think those are the only motions that were referred to 17 for today's hearing. 18

There was a request by the Willis class to dismiss the Mohave Employment Utility District from the second class action complaint on grounds that they don't occupy any land or pump water within the Antelope Valley. If there's no objection I'll grant that.

MR. KALFAYAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anybody have any idea that there's anything else pending?

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

MR. ZIMMER: So was the Court still intending to take up anything today other than what

| we've done so far?

THE COURT: We do have a case management conference scheduled as we always do. I'd be happy to take that and anything else that's appropriately before the Court.

MR. ZIMMER: Can we have another five minutes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Can you just step to the back of the courtroom and see if you've got something else to talk about.

(Whereupon, a break was taken.)

MR. ZIMMER: Thank you for the Court's indulgence on that. I think we have nothing else further to discuss, but we would request that nothing further happen on the case substantively or in terms of case management conference until there's a ruling on the motion to consolidate.

THE COURT: You mean in the form of an order?

MR. ZIMMER: I would say on the motion.

Unless the Court is saying that the motion is granted today to consolidate, then my understanding is the Court is going to look at what's going to be submitted later and determine whether the Court is going to grant it. If the Court is granting it today then we need to know that.

THE COURT: Well, I think that the Court is granting it today, but the exact form of that order and

what exactly is going to be consolidated is not clear to me at this point. I want counsel to meet and confer concerning that and provide the Court with some proposals for how that consolidation should work. This is as you know a very complicated complex case with a series of pleadings that are somewhat disparate, but which as I've indicated, have an accord that is common to all of them. And I want to make sure that the form of the order is appropriate to achieve the objectives of litigation. And I can't do that without some proposals.

So I think you understand what I think the issues are with regard to that, we've had enough of a discussion about that, make sure that what we do is fair to all parties and that no party is prejudiced as a result of what it is that we are attempting to accomplish, which I think is to provide a benefit to all the parties to the adjudication of the valley water.

MR. MARKMAN: Your Honor, we have a few requests when you went through your list of motions pending. We would ask that you grant -- deny the motion to dismiss the cross-complaint filed by Public Water Suppliers and also deny the motion for a stay.

MR. SLOAN: Your Honor, before you even act on that several of the parties have prepared a 170.6 challenge. We believe that upon consolidation that gives us the right to exercise the 170.6. I'd like

```
permission to provide it at this time to the clerk.
1
                              You certainly may file that.
                  THE COURT:
2
                  MR. SLOAN: I also have additional copies
3
4
     here for everybody.
                                Your Honor, we haven't seen
                  MR. KALFAYAN:
5
     that. Can I get a copy.
6
                  THE COURT: Would you like to set that for a
7
8
     hearing?
                              We don't believe it requires a
                  MR. SLOAN:
9
10
     hearing.
                              It's going to have a hearing.
                  THE COURT:
11
                              If your Honor would like to set
12
                  MR. SLOAN:
     a date.
13
                              When would you like to have a
                  THE COURT:
14
15
     hearing?
                                  Your Honor, this is Mr.
                  MR. LEININGER:
16
                  We couldn't hear Mr. Sloan's comments on
17
      Leininger.
18
      the motion.
                              I indicated that several of the
19
                  MR. SLOAN:
      parties are filing a 170.6.
20
                  MR. LEININGER: I'm still having
21
      difficulty --
22
                  MR. SLOAN:
                              Several of the parties are
23
      filing a 170.6 preemptory challenge to disqualify the
24
      judge. It's our understanding upon consolidation the
25
      parties are afforded a renewed right to exercise that
26
      challenge. And I believe we are now going to set a
27
      hearing for that.
28
```

THE COURT: All right. When would you like 1 to have a hearing? We can do that do that up here. 2 Would you like to do that within ten days? 3 MR. BUNN: If we can have that on a Monday 4 or Tuesday. I'm currently in trial on Wednesdays, 5 Thursdays or Fridays. 6 So your Honor knows, I'm not 7 MR. SLOAN: 8 available Monday or Tuesday of next week. I'm sorry. Preferably a Tuesday 9 MR. BUNN: if that would please the Court. 10 How about October 27th? 11 THE COURT: MR. SLOAN: Is that two weeks from today? 12 MR. BUNN: Yes, your Honor, that's fine. 13 Would that be at nine or ten? MR. MARKMAN: 14 THE COURT: Let's make it at nine o'clock. 15 MR. EVERTS: Your Honor, we can appear by 16 17 court call. 18 THE COURT: Now I do want some briefing by anybody who is opposed to the motion. And I'd like an 19 opposition filed by the 20th. Next Tuesday seven days. 20 Defense 2: Yes, your Honor. 21 MR. THE COURT: And response no later than --22 let's make the opposition the 19th and have the 23 response no later than the 22nd. I should say the 24 25 reply. Okay. Your Honor, we are hearing that MR. FIFE: 26 Several of us catch a flight out of Burbank 27 up here. that gets here just after nine. Can we set it for 28

1 ten o'clock. 2 THE COURT: I really don't think I can do that under the circumstances. The nine o'clock has to 3 be it so if you are a few minutes late I'll understand. 4 Your Honor, I've conferred 5 MR. KALFAYAN: with the Public Water Suppliers. Should we reserve 6 January 7th or 8 for the motion? 7 THE COURT: I think that's a smart thing to 8 9 do. January 8th. 10 MR. KALFAYAN: THE COURT: Well, that's a Friday that 11 sounds about right. January the 8th reserve it. 12 13 MR. KALFAYAN: Yes, your Honor. 14 MR. EVERTZ: Doug Evertz for the City of Lancaster with the Court's permission we agree to have 15 our motion stayed and continued to that particular date 16 17 too. 18 THE COURT: Okay. MR. EVERTZ: If you want argument I'd be 19 20 happy to do that. All right. All pending motions THE COURT: 21 with exception to the hearing on the 170.6 will be 22 23 reset to January 8th. 24 Okay. Thank you very much. 25 (Whereupon, the proceedings concluded.) 26 27 28

1	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
2	COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA)
3	
4	
5	I, Alicia Plancarte, Certified Shorthand
6	Reporter, do hereby certify:
7	That I am the reporter, duly appointed and
8	sworn, who reported the above and foregoing proceedings
9	at the time and place therein stated.
10	That I reported the said proceedings; and
11	that the foregoing pages are a full, true, complete and
12	correct transcript of my shorthand notes taken at said
13	time and place to the best of my ability.
14	
15	I further certify that I have complied with
16	CCP 237 (A) (2) in that all personal juror identifying
17	information has been redacted, if applicable.
18	
19	DATED: This day of, 2009
20	
21	
22	,
23	
24	ALICIA PLANCARTE
25	CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER NO. 12161
26	
27	
28	

Exhibit 11

1	EDGAR B. WASHBURN (BAR NO. 34038) WILLIAM M. SLOAN (BAR NO. 203583)	
2	MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 425 Market Street	
3	San Francisco, California 94105-2482	
4	Telephone: 415.268.7000 Facsimile: 415.268.7522	
5	Email: wsloan@mofo.com	
6	Attorneys for U.S. BORAX INC.	
7	RICHARD G. ZIMMER (BAR NO. 107263) T. MARK SMITH (BAR NO. 162370)	
8	CLIFFORD & BROWN	
9	1430 Truxtun Avenue, Suite 900 Bakersfield, California 93301-5230	
10	Telephone: 661.322.6023 Facsimile: 661.322.3508	
11	Email: rzimmer@clifford-brownlaw.com	,
12	Attorneys for BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLC and WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.	
13	(List of Counsel Continues on Next Page)	
ایر	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STA	THE OF CALIFORNITA
14	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STA	IE OF CALIFORNIA
15	COUNTY OF LOS AT	
15	COUNTY OF LOS AT	NGELES Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 Assigned to
15 16	COUNTY OF LOS AN Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b)) ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES	NGELES Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408
15 16 17	COUNTY OF LOS AND Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b)) ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES Included Actions:	NGELES Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 Assigned to The Honorable Jack Komar
15 16 17 18	COUNTY OF LOS AND Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b)) ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES Included Actions: Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co.	Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 Assigned to The Honorable Jack Komar PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO ASSIGNED
15 16 17 18 19	COUNTY OF LOS AND Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b)) ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES Included Actions: Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v.	Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 Assigned to The Honorable Jack Komar PEREMPTORY
15 16 17 18 19 20	COUNTY OF LOS AND Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b)) ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES Included Actions: Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 325 201 Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v.	Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 Assigned to The Honorable Jack Komar PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO ASSIGNED
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COUNTY OF LOS AND Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b)) ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES Included Actions: Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 325 201	Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 Assigned to The Honorable Jack Komar PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO ASSIGNED
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COUNTY OF LOS AND Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b)) ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES Included Actions: Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 325 201 Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. Superior Court of California, County of Kern, Case No. S-1500-CV-254-348 Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of Lancaster	Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 Assigned to The Honorable Jack Komar PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO ASSIGNED
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	County Of Los And Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b)) ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES Included Actions: Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 325 201 Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. Superior Court of California, County of Kern, Case No. S-1500-CV-254-348 Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of Lancaster Diamond Farming Co. v. City of Lancaster Diamond Farming Co. v. Palmdale Water Dist.	Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 Assigned to The Honorable Jack Komar PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO ASSIGNED
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Country of Los And Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b)) ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES Included Actions: Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 325 201 Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. Superior Court of California, County of Kern, Case No. S-1500-CV-254-348 Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of Lancaster Diamond Farming Co. v. City of Lancaster	Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 Assigned to The Honorable Jack Komar PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO ASSIGNED

28

1	List of Counsel (Continued):
2	BOB H. JOYCE (BAR NO. 84607) ANDREW SHEFFIELD (BAR NO. 220735)
3	KEVIN E. THELEN (BAR NO. 252665) LAW OFFICES OF LEBEAU THELEN, LLP
4	5001 East Commercenter Drive, Suite 300 Post Office Box 12092
5	Bakersfield, California 93389-2092 Telephone: 661.325.8962
6	Facsimile: 661.325.1127 Email: bjoyce@lebeauthelen.com
7	
8	Attorneys for DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, a California corporation, CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS, a limited liability company, GRIMMWAY
9	Enterprises, Inc., and LAPIS LAND COMPANY, LLC.
10	
11	MICHAEL D. DAVIS (BAR NO. 93678) GRESHAM SAVAGE NOLAN & TILDEN, APC
12	3750 University Avenue, Suite 250 Riverside, CA 92501-3335
13	Telephone: 951.684.2171 Facsimile: 951.684.2150
14	Email: Michael.Davis@GreshamSavage.com
15	Attorneys for SERVICE ROCK PRODUCTS CORPORATION, as successor-in-interest to Owl
16	Properties, Inc., SHEEP CREEK WATER COMPANY, INC., and A.V. UNITED MUTUAL
17	GROUP
18	MICHAEL T. FIFE (BAR NO. 203025)
19	BRADLEY J. HERRÈMA (BAR NO. 228976) BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP
20	21 East Carrillo Street Santa Barbara, California 93101
21	Telephone: 805.963.7000 Facsimile: 805.965.4333
22	Email: mfife@bhfs.com
23	Attorneys for the ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER AGREEMENT ASSOCIATION
24	("AGWA")
25	
26	
27	
28	

We, the undersigned counsel, declare as follows:

thereto.

1. We are all attorneys duly licensed to practice law in the courts of the State of California. We submit this declaration as Cross-Defendants' Peremptory Challenge to the Honorable Jack Komar. We have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and we make this declaration based upon personal knowledge, and, if called as a witness, could and would competently testify

- 2. On October 13, 2009, despite significant opposition from numerous parties, including our clients, Judge Komar granted the Public Water Suppliers' Motion to Transfer and Consolidate for All Purposes each of the actions pending as part of Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding 4408 (also known as the Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases). This consolidation, among other things, has the effect of unwillingly making our clients parties to two class actions involving separate causes of action in which they have not been named.
- 3. The law provides that upon consolidation, the opportunity to exercise a peremptory challenge under California Civil Procedure Code section 170.6 is available.

A party's acquiescence of a judge to hear one action does not impair his or her right to exercise a challenge to prevent that judge from hearing another matter, even if that matter raises issues closely related to those in the first action. [Citations.] 'Assigning the same judge to hear a series of complex actions, such as these where there exists subject matter overlap, may promote judicial efficiency. However, judicial efficiency is not to be fostered at the expense of a litigant's rights under section 170.6 to peremptorily challenge a judge.'

Nissan Motor Corp. v. Super Ct., 6 Cal. App. 4th 150, 155 (1992).

A party to any of the consolidated cases may disqualify the assigned judge by a timely challenge under CCP section 170.6, even where that party previously acquiesced to the judge in one of the consolidated cases., i.e., consolidation with another case may create a second chance for a section 170.6 challenge.

Weil & Brown, Section 12:369, Civil Procedure Before Trial (2009) (citing Nissan Motor Corp.).

4. The Honorable Jack Komar is prejudiced against the Cross-Defendants, or the interests of the Cross-Defendants, in this newly consolidated action so that we believe the Cross-Defendants cannot have a fair or impartial trial or hearing before him.

1	We declare under penalty of perjury	under the laws of the State of California that the
2	foregoing is true and correct.	
3	Executed this 12th day of October at	EDGAR B. WASHBURN
.4	San Francisco, California.	WILLIAM M. SLOAN MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
5		
6		By: Walliam M. Sloan
7		Attorneys for U.S. BORAX, INC.
8	Executed this 12th day of October at	RICHARD G. ZIMMER (BAR NO. 107263)
9	Bakersfield, California.	T. MARK SMITH (BAR NO. 162370) CLIFFORD & BROWN
10		
11		By: Richard G. Zimmer
12		Attorneys for BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLC and WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.
13	t .	LLC and WIVI. BOLTHOUSE PARIVIS, INC.
14	Executed this 12th day of October at Bakersfield, California.	BOB H. JOYCE (BAR NO. 84607) ANDREW SHEFFIELD (BAR NO. 220735)
15	,	KEVIN E. THELEN (BAR NO. 252665) LAW OFFICES OF LEBEAU THELEN, LLP
16		
17		By: Bob H. Joyce
18		Attorneys for DIAMOND FARMING
19		COMPANY, a California corporation, CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS, a limited
20		liability company, GRIMMWAY Enterprises, Inc., and LAPIS LAND COMPANY, LLC.
21	Executed this 12th day of October at	MICHAEL D. DAVIS (BAR NO. 93678)
22	Riverside, California.	GRESIIAM SAVAGE NOLAN & TILDEN, APC
23		By:
24		Michael D. Davis
25		Attorneys for SERVICE ROCK PRODUCTS CORPORATION, as successor-in-interest to
26		Owl Properties, Inc., SHEEP CREEK WATER COMPANY, INC., and A.V. UNITED
27		MUTUAL GROUP
28		
1		2

- 1		
1	We declare under penalty of perjur	y under the laws of the State of California that the
2	foregoing is true and correct.	
3	Executed this 12th day of October at	EDGAR B. WASHBURN
4	San Francisco, California.	WILLIAM M. SLOAN MORRISON & FOERSTER llp
5		
6		By: William M. Sloan
7		Attorneys for U.S. BORAX, INC.
8	Executed this 12th day of October at Bakersfield, California.	RICHARD G. ZIMMER (BAR NO. 107263) T. MARK SMITH (BAR NO. 162370) CLIFFORD & BROWN
10		Quel A Comment
11		By: All G. Zimmer
12		Attorneys for BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLC and WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.
13		
14	Executed this 12th day of October at Bakersfield, California.	BOB H. JOYCE (BAR NO. 84607) ANDREW SHEFFIELD (BAR NO. 220735)
15		KEVIN E. THELEN (BAR NO. 252665) LAW OFFICES OF LEBEAU THELEN, LLP
16		n.
17		By: Bob H. Joyce
18		Attorneys for DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, a California corporation,
19		CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS, a limited liability company, GRIMMWAY Enterprises,
20		Inc., and LAPIS LAND COMPANY, LLC.
21	Executed this 12th day of October at	MICHAEL D. DAVIS (BAR NO. 93678)
22	Riverside, California.	GRESHAM SAVAGE NOLAN & TILDEN, APC
23		By:
24		Michael D. Davis Attorneys for SERVICE ROCK PRODUCTS
25		CORPORATION, as successor-in-interest to Owl Properties, Inc., SHEEP CREEK WATER COMPANY, INC., and A.V. UNITED
26		COMPANY, INC., and A.V. UNITED MUTUAL GROUP
27		
28		2

1	We declare under penalty of perju	ry under the laws of the State of California that the	
2	foregoing is true and correct.		
3 4	Executed this 12th day of October at San Francisco, California.	EDGAR B. WASHBURN WILLIAM M. SLOAN MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP	
5			
6		By: William M. Sloan	
7		Attorneys for U.S. BORAX, INC.	
8	Executed this 12th day of October at Bakersfield, California.	RICHARD G. ZIMMER (BAR NO. 107263) T. MARK SMITH (BAR NO. 162370) CLIFFORD & BROWN	
0			
1		By: Richard G. Zimmer	
2		Attorneys for BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES,	
3		LLC and WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.	
4	Executed this 12th day of October at Bakersfield, California.	BOB H. JOYCE (BAR NO. 84607) ANDREW SHEFFIELD (BAR NO. 220735)	
5		KEVIN E. THELEN (BAR NO. 252665) LAW OFFICES OF LEBEAU THELEN, LLP	
6		Ву:	
' 8		Bob H. Joyce Attorneys for DIAMOND FARMING	
9		COMPANY, a California corporation, CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS, a limited	
0		liability company, GRIMMWAY Enterprises, Inc., and LAPIS LAND COMPANY, LLC.	
1	Executed this 12th day of October at	MICHAEL D. DAVIS (BAR NO. 93678)	
2	Riverside, California.	GRESHAM SAVAGE NOLAN & TILDEN, APC	
3		Ву:	
4		Michael D. Davis Attorneys for SERVICE ROCK PRODUCTS	
5 6		CORPORATION, as successor-in-interest to Owl Properties, Inc., SHEEP CREEK WATER COMPANY, INC., and A.V. UNITED	
7		MUTUAL GROUP	
8		2	
		2 Y Challenge to Assigned Judge	
I	SF-2750341		

1	We declare under penalty of perjury	under the laws of the State of California that the
2	foregoing is true and correct.	•
3 4	Executed this 12th day of October at San Francisco, California.	EDGAR B. WASHBURN WILLIAM M. SLOAN MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
5		
6		By: William M. Sloan
7		Attorneys for U.S. BORAX, INC.
8	Executed this 12th day of October at Bakersfield, California.	RICHARD G. ZIMMER (BAR NO. 107263) T. MARK SMITH (BAR NO. 162370) CLIFFORD & BROWN
10		
11		By: Richard G. Zimmer
12		Attorneys for BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLC and WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.
13		
14 15	Executed this 12th day of October at Bakersfield, California.	BOB H. JOYCE (BAR NO. 84607) ANDREW SHEFFIELD (BAR NO. 220735) KEVIN E. THELEN (BAR NO. 252665) LAW OFFICES OF LEBEAU THELEN, LLP
16		
17		By: Bob H. Joyce
18		Attorneys for DIAMOND FARMING
19		COMPANY, a California corporation, CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS, a limited liability company, GRIMMWAY Enterprises,
20		Inc., and LAPIS LAND COMPANY, LLC.
21	Executed this 12th day of October at	MICHAEL D. DAVIS (BAR NO. 93678)
22	Riverside, California.	GRESHAM SAVAGE NOLAN & TILDEN, APC
23	·	By: Menalland
24	-	Michael D. Davis
25		Attorneys for SERVICE ROCK PRODUCTS CORPORATION, as successor-in-interest to Owl Properties, Inc., SHEEP CREEK WATER
26		COMPANY, INC., and A.V. UNITED MUTUAL GROUP
27		1410 1 0110 0100 01
28		2

1 2	Executed this 12th day of October at Santa Barbara, California.	MICH BRAI BRO	HAEL T. FIFE (BAR NO. 203025) DLEY J. HERREMA (BAR NO. 228976) WNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP
3			The list
4		Ву: _	
5		_	Michael T. Fife
6			Attorneys for the ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER AGREEMENT
7			ASSOCIATION ("AGWA")
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
28	,		
40			

PROOF OF SERVICE

I declare that I am employed with the law firm of Morrison & Foerster LLP, whose address is 425 Market Street, San Francisco, California 94105-2482. I am not a party to the within cause, and I am over the age of eighteen years.

I further declare that on October 13, 2009, I served a copy of the attached PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO ASSIGNED JUDGE (c.c.p. § 170.6) by electronically posting a true copy thereof to Santa Clara County Superior Court's electronic filing website for complex civil litigation cases (Judge Jack Komar, Dept. 17C — http://www.scefiling.org) with respect to Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 (Antelope Valley Groundwater matter).

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this document was executed at San Francisco, California, on October 13, 2009.

Catherine L. Berté (typed)

Catherine & Berke

Exhibit 12

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b))

ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES

Included Actions:

Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 325 201

Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. Superior Court of California, County of Kern, Case No. S-1500-CV-254-348

Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of Lancaster Diamond Farming Co. v. City of Lancaster Diamond Farming Co. v. Palmdale Water Dist. Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, consolidated actions, Case Nos. RIC 353 840, RIC 344 436, RIC 344 668

Willis v. Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 364 553

Wood v. Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 391869 Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408

For Court's Use Only: Santa Clara County Case No. 1-05-CV-049053 (for E-Posting/E-Service Purposes Only)

Date/Time: Tuesday, October 13, 2009 (10:00 a.m.)

Location: Santa Clara County Superior Court 191 N. 1st Street, Department 17C

San Jose, CA 95113

Present: Hon. Jack Komar, Judge R. Gutierrez, Clerk

Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases (JCCP 4408) Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. BC 325 201 Tuesday, October 13, 2009 (10:00 am) / Hon. Jack Komar

MINUTE ORDER RE:

(1) MOTION BY THE PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS TO TRANSFER AND TO CONSOLIDATE CASES FOR ALL PURPOSES ALL MATTERS PRESENTLY PENDING UNDER JUDICIAL COUNCIL PROCEEDING NO. 4408 FROM THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, LOS ANGELES COUNTY AND KERN COUNTY, SPECIALLY ASSIGNED TO THE HONORABLE JACK KOMAR (ATTY WHITNEY G. MCDONALD)

OPERATIVE COMPLAINTS:

Case Name	Filed in (County)	Case Number
Wm. Bolthouse Farms v. City of Lancaster	Riverside	RIC 353840
Diamond Farming Co. v. City of Lancaster	Riverside	RIC 344436
Diamond Farming Co. v. Palmdale Water District	Riverside	RIC 344668
Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co.	Kern	S-1500-CV 254-348
Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co.	Los Angeles	BC 325 201
Willis v. Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40	Los Angeles	BC 364 553
Wood v. Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40	Los Angeles	BC 391 869

Motion was previously heard on August 17, 2009 and continued for further hearing on October 13, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. in Department 17, Santa Clara County.

Meet and confer letter is to be posted by August 25, 2008.

Supplemental materials to the motion are to be filed by September 8, 2009.

Supplemental oppositions are to be filed by September 18, 2009.

Responses to oppositions are to be filed by September 23, 2009.

The Motion was heard and GRANTED. Counsel are ordered to meet and confer regarding the form of the Order to Consolidate.

(2) CONTINUED HEARING ON MOTION BY PLAINTIFF RICHARD WOOD FOR ORDER ALLOCATING COSTS OF COURT-APPOINTED EXPERT WITNESS (ATTY MICHAEL MCLACHLAN)

This matter was previously set on August 17, 2009 and September 14, 2009. **Update:** On October 1, 2009, the Court continued this matter to November 30, 2009, at the moving party's request.

Matter was continued for further hearing on January 8, 2010 in Los Angeles.

(3A) CONTINUED HEARING ON THE MOTION BY DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS THE PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS' FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT FILED ON JANUARY 10, 2007; and (3B) JOINDER BY CROSS-DEFENDANT ANTELOPE VALLEY JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT (ATTY WILLIAM M. SLOAN)

This is a continued hearing from August 17, 2009.

Matter was heard and continued for further hearing on January 8, 2010 in Los Angeles.

(4) MOTION BY CITY OF LANCASTER, ET AL. TO STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR SIX MONTHS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, CONTINUE TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE (ATTY DOUGLAS J. EVERTZ)

This is a continued hearing from August 17, 2009.

Matter was heard and continued for further hearing on January 8, 2010 in Los Angeles.

(5) CONTINUED HEARING ON REQUEST BY BOLTHOUSE TO AMEND THE EXHIBITS TO ITS AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT (ATTY RICH ZIMMER)

This is a continued hearing from August 17, 2009.

At the hearing on June 19, 2009, the Court set forth a briefing schedule for the above motion. On August 17, 2009 the Court noted that formal moving papers have not yet been filed.

Matter was heard and continued for further hearing on January 8, 2010 in Los Angeles.

(6) CONTINUED HEARING ON THE MOTION BY PLAINTIFF WOOD FOR AN ORDER DISQUALIFYING THE LAW FIRM OF LEMIEUX & O'NEIL (ATTY MICHAL MCLACHLAN)

This matter was previously heard on July 24, 2009 and taken under submission by the Court until August 17, 2009 to allow opposing party to file documents under seal as per the Court's comments on the record. The matter was taken up on the Court's calendar on August 17, 2009 and continued for further hearing on October 13, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. in Department 17, Santa Clara County. **Update:** On October 1, 2009, the Court continued this matter to November 30, 2009, at the moving party's request.

Matter was continued for further hearing on January 8, 2010 in Los Angeles.

(7) TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE/FURTHER CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

This is a continued hearing from August 17, 2009.

At the hearing held on July 24, 2009, the Court referred counsel to Justice Robie, through his secretary, Linda Moore, at 916-651-7254, for interested parties to participate in a settlement conference with Justice Robie.

The Request by the Willis Class to Dismiss Without Prejudice the Mojave Public Utility District from the Second Amended Class Action Complaint, received on September 29, 2009, was heard and GRANTED.

A hearing on the Motion by U.S. Borax Inc., Bolthouse Properties, LLC and Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. for a Peremptory Challenge (C.C.P. §170.6) was set for hearing on October 27, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. in San Jose. Oppositions to the Motion are due on October 19, 2009; replies are due on October 22, 2009.

PARTIES/ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: SEE COURTCALL ROLL CALL LIST ATTACHED

City of Lancaster	Douglas Evertz
County of Los Angeles	Jeffrey Dunn
Waterworks District #40	
Richard Wood	Michael McLachlan
Quartil Water District	Bradley Weeks
City of Palmdale	James L. Markman
Antelope Valley United Water	Michael D. Davis
Group	
U.S. Borax	William Sloan
Antelope Valley Groundwater	Michael Fife
Agreement Association	
Los Angeles Waterworks 40	Michael Moore
Rebecca Willis	Ralph Kalfayan
Palmdale Water District	Thomas Bunn
Antelope Valley Kern Water	William J. Brunick
Agency	
Diamond Farming, et al	Bob Joyce
Bolthouse Farms	Richard Zimmer

. CourtCall ®Appearance Calendar

October 2009

13 Tuesday

17C Judge Jack Komar

Santa Clara County Superior Court

ime Case Information	Attorney Inf	ormation
Case #: 105CV049053 Case Name: Antelope Valley Groundwater Litigation (JCCP 4408) Proceeding Type:	Firm: Phone: Contact: For	Alston & Bird, LLP- Los Angeles (213) 576-1000 Tammy L. Jones Defendant(s), Northrop Grumman, Enxco Development, Palmdale Hills Property
Motion	Firm: Phone: Contact: For	Attorney General's Office (916) 327-7875 Michael L. Crow Defendant(s), State of California
•	Firm: Phone: Contact: For	Bartkiewicz Kronick & Shanahan (916) 446-4254 Stephen M. Siptroth Cross-Defendant(s), Copa De Oro Land Company
	Firm: Phone: Contact: For	Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck 805-963-7000 Bradley J. Herrema Defendant(s), Antelope Valley Groundwater Agreement Association (Agwa)
·	Firm: Phone: Contact: For	California Water Service Company 310-257-1433 John S. Tootle Defendant(s), Antelope Valley
	Firm: Phone: Contact: For	Charlton Weeks LLP 661-265-0969 Bradley T. Weeks Interested Party, Quartz Hill Water District
	Firm: Phone: Contact: For	Ellison Schneider & Harris LLP 916-447-2166 Christopher M. Sanders Defendant(s), Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts
	Firm: Phone: Contact: For	Fagen Friedman Fulfrost LLP (323) 330-6300 Anna Miller Cross-Defendant(s), Antelope Valley Jcint Union High School District.

1st Revision 10/12/2009 05:32 PM

· CourtCall ®Appearance Calendar

October 2009

13 Tuesday

17C Judge Jack Komar Santa Clara County Superior Court

10:00 AM	Dial: (866) 708-0801	
Time Case Information		Attorney Information
		Firm: Hanna & Morton LLP
		Phone: 213-430-2505 ext. 516
		Contact: Edward S. Ranwick
		For Cross-Defendant(s), Wagas Land
		Company, LLC.
	,	Firm: John Ukkestad - Client
		Phone: (661) 272-0015
		Contact: John URRestad
		For Client, John Ukkestad
,		Firm: Kuhs & Parker
		Phone: (661) 322-4004
		Contact: Robert G. Kuns
		For Defendant(s), Tejon Ranch Corporation
		Firm: Lemieux & O'Neill
		Phone: 805-495-4770
		Contact: Keith W. Lemieux, Jr.
		For Defendant(s), Little Rock Creeks et al
		Firm: Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith
		Phone: 213-580-3902
		Contact: Matissa McKeith
		For Cross-Complainant(s), Anaverde, LLC
		Firm: Meserve, Mumper & Hughes, LLP
		Phone: 213-620-0300 /
		Contact: Cliff Melnick
		For Defendant(s), Cameron Properties
		Firm: Mike Floyd - Client -
		Phone: (661) 943-3201
		Contact: Mike Flood
		For Client, Mike Floyd
		Firm: Richard A. Wood - Client
		Phone: 661-946-1161
		Contact: Richard A. Wood
		For Client, Richard Wood
		Firm: SmithTrager LLP
		Phone: (949) 752-8971
		Contact: Susan M. Trager
		For Cross-Defendant(s), Phelan Pinion Hills
		Community

1st Revision 10/12/2009 05:32 PM

. CourtCall ®Appearance Calendar

October 2009

1st Revision 10/12/2009 05:32 PM

: :

13 Tuesday,

17C Judge Jack Komar Santa Clara County Superior Court

10:00 AM Dial: (866) 708-0801

Time	Case Information	Attorney Information
		Firm: Southern California Edison Company Phone: 626-302-3712 Contact: Amy M. Gantvoort For Representing, Southern California Edison Company
		Firm: U.S. Department of Justice Phone: 303-844-1364 Contact: R. Lee Leininger For Defendant(s), United States
		Firm: Young Wooldridge LLP Phone: 661-327-9661 ext. 16/1 Contact: Scott K. Kuney For Defendant(s), Van Dam & Antelope Valley