1	EDGAR B. WASHBURN (BAR NO. 34038) WILLIAM M. SLOAN (BAR NO. 203583)		
2	MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 425 Market Street		
3	San Francisco, California 94105-2482		
4	Telephone: 415.268.7000 Facsimile: 415.268.7522		
	Email: wsloan@mofo.com		
5	Attorneys for U.S. BORAX INC.		
6	RICHARD G. ZIMMER (BAR NO. 107263)		
7	T. MARK SMITH (BAR NO. 162370) CLIFFORD & BROWN		
8	1430 Truxtun Avenue, Suite 900 Bakersfield, California 93301-5230		
9	Telephone: 661.322.6023		
10	Facsimile: 661.322.3508 Email: rzimmer@clifford-brownlaw.com		
11	Attorneys for BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLC and WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.		
12	,		
13	(List of Counsel Continues on Next Page)		
14	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
15	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES		
16	Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b))	Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408	
17	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES	Santa Clara Case No. 1-05-CV-	
18	Included Actions:	049053	
19	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v.	Assigned to	
20	Diamond Farming Co. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles,	The Honorable Jack Komar	
21	Case No. BC 325 201	REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT	
22	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co.	OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PUBLIC	
23	Superior Court of California, County of Kern, Case No. S-1500-CV-254-348	WATER SUPPLIERS' CROSS-COMPLAINT	
24			
25	Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of Lancaster Diamond Farming Co. v. City of Lancaster	Date: June 19, 2009 Time: 2:00 p.m.	
26	Diamond Farming Co. v. Palmdale Water Dist. Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, Comp. No. 2012, 252, 240, PIC 244, 426, PIC 244, 669	Dept: 17C	
27	Case Nos. RIC 353 840, RIC 344 436, RIC 344 668 (Consolidated Actions)		
28			

1	List of Counsel (Continued):
2	BOB H. JOYCE (BAR NO. 84607) ANDREW SHEFFIELD (BAR NO. 220735)
3	KEVIN E. THELEN (BAR NO. 252665) LAW OFFICES OF LEBEAU THELEN, LLP
4	5001 East Commercenter Drive, Suite 300 Post Office Box 12092
5	Bakersfield, California 93389-2092 Telephone: 661.325.8962
6	Facsimile: 661.325.1127 Email: bjoyce@lebeauthelen.com
7	
8	Attorneys for DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, a California corporation, CRYSTAL ORGANIC EARMS, a limited liability company, CRIMMWAY
9	FARMS, a limited liability company, GRIMMWAY Enterprises, Inc., and LAPIS LAND COMPANY,
10	LLC.
11	ROBERT M. DOUGHERTY (BAR NO. 41317) JESSE T. MORRISON (BAR NO. 247185) COVINGTON & CROWE, LLP
12	1131 West Sixth Street, Suite 300
13	Ontario, California 91762 Telephone: 909.983.9393 Foosimila: 000.301.6763
14	Facsimile: 909.391.6762 Email: jmorrison@covcrowe.com
15	Attorneys for A.V. UNITED MUTUAL GROUP
16	MICHAEL T. FIFE (BAR NO. 203025) BRADLEY J. HERREMA (BAR NO. 228976)
17	BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP 21 East Carrillo Street
18	Santa Barbara, California 93101 Telephone: 805.963.7000
19	Facsimile: 805.965.4333 Email: mfife@bhfs.com
20	
21	Attorneys for the ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER AGREEMENT ASSOCIATION
22	("AGWA")
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The moving Cross-Defendants¹ submit this reply to the opposition filed by the Public Water Suppliers² and the partial joinder and partial opposition filed by Plaintiff Richard Wood to the Motion to Dismiss the Public Water Suppliers' Cross-Complaint ("Motion to Dismiss") for failure to join indispensable parties. As the opening brief established, this Court should dismiss the Public Water Suppliers' Cross-Complaint in its entirety. Alternatively, the Court should order the Public Water Suppliers to name and serve the Wood and Willis classes as cross-defendants to their lawsuit, as the Public Water Suppliers have now indicated a willingness to so do. The moving Cross-Defendants are prepared to accept this alternative of naming and serving the classes in the Public Water Suppliers' lawsuit for purposes of resolving this motion.

I. INTRODUCTION

The comprehensive adjudication commenced by the Public Water Suppliers has resulted in thousands of landowners in the Antelope Valley being sued as cross-defendants. From the absentee small parcel owner who may have unwittingly inherited this lawsuit, to the family farmer that has brought up generations in the valley, to one of the nation's strategic air force bases, to a historic resource company that has employed local citizens for more than a century, the reach of the Public Water Suppliers' lawsuit has been all-encompassing. In recognition that these parties were all necessary—indeed, indispensable—to the comprehensive adjudication of groundwater rights that the Public Water Suppliers are seeking, the litigation proceeded with all of them named and served as cross-defendants specifically in the Public Water Suppliers' action.

Relevant here, the Public Water Suppliers' First Amended Cross-Complaint ("Cross Complaint") specifically states that "[t]his cross-complaint seeks a judicial determination of rights to all water within the adjudication area of the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin." (First-Amended

¹ A complete list of the cross-defendants submitting this reply is contained on page three of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

² The Public Water Suppliers include the California Water Service Company, City of Lancaster, City of Palmdale, Littlerock Creek Irrigation District, Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40, Palmdale Water District, Rosamond Community Services District, Palm Ranch Irrigation District, and Quartz Hill Water District.

Cross-Complaint of Public Water Suppliers for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Adjudication of Water Rights ("Cross-Complaint") at ¶ 1 (emphasis added).) Moreover, the Cross-Complaint expressly states that "[t]his is an action to *comprehensively adjudicate the rights of all claimants* to the use of a source of water located entirely within California, i.e., the Basin, and for the ongoing administration of such claimants' rights." (*Id.* at ¶ 15 (emphasis added).) The Cross-Complaint also expressly names as Roe defendants:

[O]wners, lessees or other persons or entities holding or claiming to hold ownership or possessory interests in real property within the boundaries of the Basin; extract water from the Basin, claim some right, title or interest to water located within the Basin; or that they have or assert claims adverse to the Public Water Suppliers rights and claims.

(*Id.* at ¶12.) Despite this express language, the Public Water Suppliers and Richard Wood maintain that the Wood and Willis classes, which consist of adverse landowners claiming rights to groundwater within the Basin, are not indispensable parties to the Public Water Suppliers' lawsuit. This position is untenable.

At the heart of the opposition is the argument that the Wood and Willis classes are not indispensable parties to the Public Water Suppliers' lawsuit because the separate class actions have, by coincidence or luck, been filed and now "coordinated" under California Civil Procedure Code section 404, and that this coordination is sufficient to comprehensively adjudicate the rights of all water rights holders within the Basin. As demonstrated below, however, the fact that actions are coordinated does not alleviate the requirement set forth in California Civil Procedure Code section 389 that all indispensable parties to a lawsuit must be joined.

II. COORDINATION IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE § 389

The fact that the Wood and Willis class actions have been coordinated with the Public Water Suppliers' lawsuit as complex coordinated actions collectively referred to as the Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases has not been lost on the Cross-Defendants. (*See* Motion to Dismiss at 6:20-7:6.) However, because the coordination of these actions has not resulted in the joinder of indispensable parties to the Public Water Suppliers' comprehensive adjudication, it does not serve as a replacement for the dictates of California Civil Procedure Code section 389.

Indeed, both the Court and class counsel for the Willis class have recognized that any member of the plaintiff classes who chooses to opt out must be *named and served as a cross-defendant to the Public Water Suppliers' lawsuit*. Specifically, class counsel for the Willis class stated his understanding with respect to the Willis class as follows:

The Court certified a class. The notice went out to the class. Now, we have a list of members in the Willis class. There are individuals that have opted out of the Willis class. They are no longer in the Willis class. . . . I don't believe the Court has jurisdiction over them until someone serves them. So I think they have to be served with process.

(Excerpt from April 24th Hearing Transcript at 64:14-22 [attached as Ex. A to the Declaration of William Sloan ISO Defs.' Reply Brief].) And this Court appropriately stated, in rejecting the Public Water Suppliers' argument that there was still jurisdiction over class members who had opted out:

To the extent that [opt out class members] do not return the notice and acknowledge the service, then I think we have to serve them personally, unfortunately, in order for the Court to have jurisdiction over them. If they have opted out of the class, they are no longer class members. The Court does not have jurisdiction over them. All we sent them was a notice of the class.

(*Id.* at 65:14-21.) These conclusions accurately reflect that all members of the Wood and Willis classes, as well as any other landowners with overlying water rights in the Basin, must be joined as indispensable parties to the Public Water Suppliers' "comprehensive adjudication." If members of the Wood and Willis classes who choose to opt out must be named and served as cross-defendants to the Public Water Suppliers' comprehensive adjudication, it logically follows that the classes themselves are also indispensable parties and must be named and served as cross-defendants to the Public Water Suppliers' lawsuit.

The law also does not support somehow using coordination as a surrogate for meeting the indispensable parties requirement. Under California law, the provisions of the California Civil Procedure Code generally applicable to civil actions remain controlling on any question not expressly covered by the coordination statute (California Civil Procedure Code section 404 et seq.), or the applicable California Rules of Court. *See* Cal. Rule of Court 3.504(a). Neither section 404 of the California Civil Procedure Code nor any rule contained in the Rules of Court pertaining to coordinated actions addresses compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Therefore, despite the

broad discretion given to judges presiding over coordinated actions, California Civil Procedure Code section 389 still applies in analyzing whether the Wood and Willis classes constitute necessary and indispensable parties to the Public Water Suppliers' lawsuit.³

Further demonstrating the insufficiency of coordination to facilitate a general adjudication of all of the water rights within the Basin, if either of the Wood or Willis classes should dismiss their class actions with Court approval under California Civil Procedure Code section 581(k), jurisdiction over the dismissed class members is lost, thus violating the McCarran Amendment's comprehensiveness requirement and rendering all of this Court's efforts to completely adjudicate all of the groundwater rights within the Basin a nullity. *See, e.g., Harris v. Billings*, 16 Cal. App. 4th 1396, 1405 (1993) (holding that upon voluntary dismissal, the court is immediately deprived of its personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the dismissed parties). This potential result further demonstrates the inadequacy of relying solely on coordination.

The Public Water Suppliers argue in the alternative that the Court may order complete consolidation of all actions included in these coordinated proceedings under California Civil Procedure Code section 1048(a) if it finds that coordination is insufficient to constitute a "general adjudication" of all of the groundwater rights in the Basin. (Public Water Suppliers' MPA in Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss ("Opp.") at 7:6-9:2.) The law on coordination and consolidation is less than a model of clarity. Nonetheless, as the Matthew Bender treatise cautions, actions pending in different counties are not eligible for consolidation. Matthew Bender Practice Guide, Pretrial Civil Procedure, 32.08[1]. Here, several of the actions, including the class actions, were commenced in different counties. The treatise also suggests that consolidation is not available for complex actions, such as this case. *Id.* Concerns such as this further militate towards simply naming and serving the classes as cross-defendants under California Civil Procedure Code § 389(a). That the Public Water Suppliers

³ Contrary to the suggestion made by Plaintiff Wood's Partial Opposition to [the] Motion to Dismiss, Rule of Court 3.504(b) is inapplicable here because there is no conflict between Code of Civil Procedure section 389 and the Rules of Court pertaining to coordinated actions. *See*, *e.g.*, *Paterno v. Super. Ct. of Yuba County*, 123 Cal. App. 4th 548, 554-55 (2004) (holding that the rules specifically applicable to coordinated actions will only prevail over the general rules of civil procedure where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two).

have stated their willingness to name and serve the classes helpfully avoids any of these concerns regarding the availability and adequacy of coordination or consolidation.

III. AT THE LEAST, THE WOOD AND WILLIS CLASSES SHOULD BE NAMED AS CROSS-DEFENDANTS TO THE PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS' LAWSUIT.

The Public Water Suppliers' other arguments are also briefly addressed: First, the argument that the Court has the power to issue judgments in all of the coordinated actions, and therefore, a "general adjudication" will result fails to appreciate the fact that any judgment entered prior to another judgment will necessarily impact the rights of those parties to the later judgment. A patchwork adjudication comprised of several lawsuits is not the same as one general adjudication with all necessary parties. For example, if a judgment were entered with respect to the rights of the named overlying landowner cross-defendants prior to the entry of judgment in the Small Pumper class action, the rights of the members of the Small Pumper Class would necessarily be affected, and could be diminished. Certainly, such a judgment would "as a practical matter impair or impede" the class members' ability to protect their interests. *See* Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 389(a)(2)(i).

Second, the argument that the rights of the Wood and Willis classes are adequately protected by their own lawsuits similarly fails to recognize the very nature of a comprehensive groundwater adjudication – i.e., the fact that they are represented in their own lawsuits does not take away the fact that their rights will be impacted if a judgment is reached regarding the rights of other water rights holders before their rights are determined. Therefore, the assertion that "the collection of judgments that will be issued in these coordinated cases will resolve the rights of the *Wood* and *Willis* Classes, and all other parties in the same manner as if the Public Water Suppliers had sued them directly" is incorrect. (*See* Opp. at 6:5-7.)

Finally, while the moving Cross-Defendants have no doubt that this Court will judiciously manage these cases to assure fairness to all parties, there remains also the risk that a court of appeal will not view separate but coordinated cases as affording parties to one case the ability to protect their respective interests when they are impacted by another case.

The Public Water Suppliers' opposition also asserts that the numerous problems identified with the Wood class are "curable and do not affect the ability to name either of the classes as

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defendants." Opp. at 9:25-10:3. Cross-Defendants do not agree that the problems with the class are necessarily curable, and specifically reserve the right to seek further relief on issues regarding the classes, but for purposes of this motion would accept the naming and service of both classes as crossdefendants to the Public Water Suppliers' lawsuit.

IV. **CONCLUSION**

From the outset of this litigation, the Public Water Suppliers contemplated that their Cross-Complaint must include members of the Wood and Willis classes as cross-defendants. (See Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 12, 15.) Indeed, the Cross-Complaint specifically names as Roe defendants all "persons or entities holding or claiming to hold ownership or possessory interests in real property within the boundaries of the Basin." (*Id.* at ¶ 12.) All members of both the Wood and Willis classes clearly fall under this definition. Further, the Public Water Suppliers earlier in these proceedings specifically requested that a defendant class be certified.

All parties, including the Public Water Suppliers, agree that all overlying landowners within the Basin are necessary parties to adjudicating the groundwater rights of the Antelope Valley. As set forth above, coordination and consolidation are insufficient to protect the rights of all of the parties to this comprehensive adjudication. Therefore, both the Wood and Willis classes must be named as cross-defendants by the Public Water Suppliers.

The moving Cross-Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss the action, as it is still anticipated that the unresolved class issues will prove incurable. For purposes of resolving this motion, however, Cross-Defendants accept the Public Water Suppliers' alternative suggestion and request the Court order the Public Water Suppliers to properly name and serve the classes as crossdefendants in the Public Water Suppliers' lawsuit.

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1	D . 1 1 12 2000	EDCAR R. WACHRIDIA
1	Dated: June 12, 2009	EDGAR B. WASHBURN WILLIAM M. SLOAN
2		MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
3		By: /s/ William M. Sloan
4		William M. Sloan Attorneys for U.S. BORAX, INC.
5		Auomeys for U.S. DORAA, INC.
6		RICHARD G. ZIMMER (BAR NO. 107263) T. MARK SMITH (BAR NO. 162370)
7		CLIFFORD & BROWN
8		By: /s/ Richard G. Zimmer
9		Richard G. Zimmer
10		Attorneys for BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLC and WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.
11		BOB H. JOYCE (BAR NO. 84607)
12		ANDREW SHEFFIELD (BAR NO. 220735) KEVIN E. THELEN (BAR NO. 252665)
13		LAW OFFICES OF LEBEAU THELEN, LLP
14		By: /s/ Bob H. Joyce Bob H. Joyce
15		Attorneys for DIAMOND FARMING
16		COMPANY, a California corporation, CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS, a limited
17		liability company, GRIMMWAY Enterprises, Inc., and LAPIS LAND COMPANY, LLC.
18		ROBERT M. DOUGHERTY (BAR NO. 41317)
19		JESSE T. MORRISON (BAR NO. 247185) COVINGTON & CROWE, LLP
20		COVINGTON & CROWE, EEF
21		By: /s/ Jesse T. Morrison Jesse T. Morrison
22		Attorneys for A.V. UNITED MUTUAL
23		GROUP
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
20		9

MICHAEL T. FIFE (BAR NO. 203025) BRADLEY J. HERREMA (BAR NO. 228976) BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP By: /s/ Michael T. Fife Michael T. Fife Attorneys for the ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER AGREEMENT ASSOCIATION ("AGWA")

PROOF OF SERVICE

I declare that I am employed with the law firm of Morrison & Foerster LLP, whose address is 425 Market Street, San Francisco, California 94105-2482. I am not a party to the within cause, and I am over the age of eighteen years.

I further declare that on June 12, 2009, I served a copy of the attached REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS' CROSS-COMPLAINT by electronically posting a true copy thereof to Santa Clara County Superior Court's electronic filing website for complex civil litigation cases (Judge Jack Komar, Dept. 17C—http://www.scefiling.org) with respect to Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 (Antelope Valley Groundwater matter).

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this document was executed at San Francisco, California, on June 12, 2009.

Catherine L. Berté (typed)

Catherine V. Better