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11 ZAMRZLA AND JEANETTE ZAMRZLA

12 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
13 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

14 Coordinated Proceeding,  
15 Special Title (Rule 1550(b))

16 ANTELOPE VALLEY  
17 GROUNDWATER CASES.

Judicial Council Coordination  
Proceeding No.: 4408

LASC Case No. BC325201

Santa Clara Sup. Court Case No.: 1-05-CV-049053  
Assigned to Hon. Jack Komar, Judge of the Santa  
Clara County Superior Court

**REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF JOHNNY  
AND PAMELLA ZAMRZLA’S MOTION TO  
SET ASIDE OR MODIFY JUDGMENT [IN  
RESPONSE TO WATERMASTER  
OPPOSITION]**

**Date: December 13, 2022**  
**Time: 9:00 a.m.**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1  
2 The Watermaster’s opposition paints an incredulous picture of the Zamrzlas. If the  
3 Watermaster is to be believed, the Zamrzlas knew of the Antelope Valley Ground Water litigation  
4 being a basin-wide adjudication, knew the litigation could severely curtail or eliminate their water  
5 rights that had been part of their lives for decades, and willfully ignored that substantial threat to  
6 their water rights for years that not only contributed to their enjoyment of their property but  
7 certainly added value to their property. The Watermasters’ story simply does not add up, nor is it  
8 supported by the evidence. Why would the Zamrzlas, who are long-time, upstanding residents in  
9 the Antelope Valley and business owners, “stick[] their heads in the sand” as the Watermaster  
10 claims they did? It is logically inconsistent that the Zamrzlas would knowingly engage in a  
11 dangerous and irrational game of chance by ignoring the litigation for years and only now attempt  
12 to protect their water rights. The Watermaster would likely respond that the Zamrzlas hoped to  
13 escape the adjudication and if caught then to concoct a story for judicial relief. The Watermaster  
14 has created a caricature – a distorted image to fit the means most convenient to the Watermaster  
15 and other parties, the “status quo.”

16 As established by the evidence provided in the support of their motion, Johnny and Pamella  
17 Zamrzla never received notice of the litigation. As owners of more than 100 acres, they should  
18 have been personally served as directed by the court, but no attempt was made to personally serve  
19 them. The Watermaster alleges the Zamrzlas were served a Small Pumper Class notice by mail but  
20 fails to provide any proof of service. While the Zamrzlas were aware of water litigation generally,  
21 they were unaware the litigation affected them personally. As Johnny Zamrzla noted in his  
22 deposition, he “thought it was the big guys.” (Supp. COE Exh. 20.)

23 The Zamrzlas seek only the opportunity afforded other parties to this litigation: to establish  
24 their proper class under the 2015 Judgment and Physical Solution and establish reasonable water  
25 production rights thereunder. Had they been served with notice of the litigation they could have,  
26 and would have as they testified, litigated those rights previously, but were denied that opportunity.  
27 The Court is empowered to provide that opportunity and the Zamrzlas humbly request it do so as  
28 this Court sitting in law and equity respectfully should do.

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## II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

**A. The Watermaster Misrepresents the History of the Zamrzlas' Involvement in this Litigation and Has Engaged in Bad Faith Delays and Harassment in its Refusal to Withdraw the Erroneous Invoice.**

The Watermaster claims the Zamrzlas had two prior opportunities to object to their status as small pumpers, and thus should be precluded from doing so now. However, the Watermaster's contentions are not based in fact.

First, the Watermaster makes the circular argument that the Zamrzlas cannot object to the Judgment because the deadline to do so has passed. However, as the Zamrzlas have proven, they never received notice of the litigation and were unaware it affected their water rights until 2018. Without notice, how could the Zamrzlas have timely objected? The Watermaster, in making this claim, *presumes* notice, despite the issue before the Court concerning proper notice and the related evidence establishing a lack of notice.

Second, since the Zamrzlas first received a letter from the Watermaster on July 16, 2018, a letter dated by the Watermaster as June 9, 2018, the Zamrzlas have actively attempted to address the issue of their water rights. That first letter from the Watermaster notified the Zamrzlas of the Adjudication and informed them that "...the Judgment provides a process for non-parties to intervene in the Judgment to become a party" and "intervening...has a number of potential advantages". The Zamrzlas retained counsel, Mr. Brumfield, who requested on July 24, 2018, that the Watermaster stipulate to the Zamrzlas being permitted to intervene in the litigation. No response was received. Mr. Brumfield followed up again on August 6, 2018, again no response was given to the request.

In response to the Watermasters' request for information regarding how much both sets of Zamrzlas planned to pump in the future, Mr. Brumfield provided the requested information. Only after discussions regarding water production amounts and the intervention process had begun, did the Watermaster then claim the Zamrzlas were Small Pumper Class members. That was, in fact, the first knowledge the Zamrzlas had of the existence of a Small Pumper Class. On November 21, 2018, the Watermaster sent two compliance letters to Johnny Zamrzla. On January 22, 2019, the Watermaster invoiced the Zamrzlas for the year 2018 in the amount of \$273,165. This invoice was

1 based on an error wherein the Watermaster believed the *estimate* of 650 acre-feet of future water  
2 production was the actual produced amount for 2018. Mr. Brumfield clarified to the Watermaster  
3 that the actual 2018 production amount was estimated to be less than 50 acre-feet for each of the  
4 Zamrzla parties. On March 18, 2019, the Zamrzlas produced documents demonstrating the actual  
5 combined 2018 production amount totaled 93.75 acre-feet.

6       Thereafter counsel for the Zamrzlas engaged in negotiations with the Watermaster in an  
7 attempt to resolve the discrepancies concerning the 2018 production amount and settle the issue.  
8 The Watermaster refused to withdraw the \$273,165 invoice, despite it being clearly erroneous. On  
9 May 16, 2019, Mr. Brumfield emailed the Watermaster to request corrected and separate invoicing  
10 for each Zamrzla party, explaining that the 2018 invoice was inaccurate as to the Zamrzlas’  
11 production and requested that the Watermaster board review and correct the invoice. On June 26,  
12 2019, the Watermaster sent a “Final Notice” letter to Johnny Zamrzla. The Watermaster finally  
13 responded to Mr. Brumfield’s May 16, 2019 email more than three months after it was sent, on  
14 August 20, 2019, claiming various data and aerial photography shows the Zamrzlas pumped more  
15 than they claimed.

16       On September 5, 2019, eight months after generating the inaccurate invoice the  
17 Watermaster produced a memorandum from their water engineer which attempted to validate the  
18 Watermaster’s inaccurate invoice and claimed the Zamrzlas produced 570 acre-feet in 2018. As a  
19 result of this erroneous report by the Watermaster’s engineer, the Zamrzlas hired expert Dr. Jan  
20 Hendrickx. On October 22 and 25, 2019 Dr. Hendrickx inspected the fields referenced by the  
21 Watermaster’s engineer, and Dr. Hendrickx later issued his report persuasively refuting the  
22 Watermaster report, pointing out errors and mistaken assumptions made by the Watermaster, whose  
23 engineer had never inspected the property prior to generating their flawed memorandum.<sup>1</sup> On April  
24 12, 2021, the Watermaster sent Mr. Brumfield a draft settlement agreement, however, Mr.  
25 Brumfield noted that the agreement improperly put Johnny and Pamella Zamrzla together with  
26 Johnny Lee and Jeanette Zamrzla as if they were one party.

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>1</sup> See Declaration of Dr. Jan Hendrickx, in Support of Zamrzlas’ Opposition to Watermaster’s Motion, Docket No. 12129.

1           On October 28, 2021, the Watermaster moved for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive  
2 relief against the Zamrzlas. Interestingly, this motion is the first time the Watermaster  
3 acknowledges its error, now claiming the Zamrzlas owe only \$28,755 based on their own reported  
4 2018 pumping. Notwithstanding this admission of error, the invoice for \$273,165 remains publicly  
5 posted to the Watermaster’s website, despite numerous requests that it be withdrawn.

6           The Court is aware of the timeline from there. The Zamrzlas opposed the Watermaster’s  
7 motion. The Watermaster filed a reply brief. Four hearings were held as to the Watermaster’s  
8 claims against the Zamrzlas: December 10, 2021, January 25, 2022, February 18, 2022, and March  
9 4, 2022. At the December 10, 2021 hearing the Court suggested the Zamrzlas attempt to meet and  
10 confer with the Watermaster to reach an agreement regarding their water entitlement. (Supp. COE,  
11 Exh. 18.) The Zamrzlas welcomed that opportunity and the Watermaster quickly agreed and  
12 represented to the Court that it would meet and confer with the Zamrzlas to reach an agreement.  
13 The Zamrzlas continued meet and confer attempts, to no avail as the Watermaster later claimed it  
14 had no authority to reach an agreement. At the hearing on March 4, 2022, the Court ordered the  
15 Zamrzlas file an affirmative motion to address their status vis-à-vis the Judgment – i.e., whether  
16 they are bound by the Judgment and properly members of the Small Pumpers Class.

17           This timeline is critical in understanding the Watermaster’s bad faith argument that the  
18 Zamrzlas delayed in bringing this motion. On the contrary, upon receipt of the first letter from the  
19 Watermaster in 2018, the Zamrzlas promptly retained counsel and engaged in discussions with the  
20 Watermaster in an attempt to resolve their status with respect to the Judgment and any alleged over-  
21 pumping. The Zamrzlas cooperated with the Watermaster, providing requested information, and  
22 attempted to negotiate a reasonable settlement. The Watermaster, however, spent years asserting  
23 the Zamrzlas pumped such a large amount of water in 2018 that they owed in excess of a quarter  
24 million dollars in assessments. The Watermaster has since admitted its error, and in its Reply brief  
25 on December 2, 2021, the Watermaster admitted the original invoice of \$273,165 was “moot” and  
26 “entirely irrelevant” but to this day refuses to withdraw the invoice. (See Watermaster’s Reply  
27 Brief, COE Exh. 26.) Any delay in seeking affirmative relief from the Court regarding their status  
28 as to the Judgment was caused by the Watermaster’s bad faith in settlement negotiations and

1 obstinance in maintaining a frivolous water assessment invoice.

2 Thus, it is the Watermaster’s own actions that have resulted in this ongoing litigation,  
3 costing both the Zamrzlas and the Watermaster ongoing legal fees. The Zamrzlas actively sought  
4 to reach a stipulated agreement with the Watermaster, but the Watermaster refused to negotiate in  
5 good faith, instead choosing to carry-on an aggressive and costly legal battle. Moreover, it is  
6 unclear why the Watermaster is actively litigating against the Zamrzlas at all. Any replacement  
7 water assessments owed will inherently derive from whatever the Court (or a settlement)  
8 determined to be the Zamrzlas’ water production rights under the judgment. Per the Judgment and  
9 Physical Solution, section 18.2: “The Watermaster shall carry out its duties, powers, and  
10 responsibilities in an impartial manner without favor or prejudice to any Subarea, Producer, Party,  
11 or Purpose of Use.” (COE, Ex. 7, Docket No. 11020.) The Watermaster’s defined duties to perform  
12 its role in an impartial and unbiased manner certainly do not require that the Watermaster oppose a  
13 motion that humbly asks the Court to correct an error that occurred fifteen years ago; in fact, the  
14 opposite is true.

15 **B. The Factual and Legal Issues Raised by the Zamrzlas are Distinguishable from**  
16 **those Raised by Long Valley Road, L.P.**

17 The doctrine of res judicata rests on the ground that a party who has litigated a matter or  
18 had an opportunity to do so should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and  
19 vexation of his or her opponent. Public policy and the interests of litigants alike require that there  
20 be an end to litigation. (*Busick v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 967, 972;  
21 *Rubenstein v. Rubenstein* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1144 [whether applied as total bar to further  
22 litigation or as collateral estoppel, doctrine rests on sound policy of limiting litigation by preventing  
23 party that had one fair adversary hearing on issue from drawing it into controversy again and  
24 subjecting other party to further expense in its reexamination].

25 The rule of res judicata is to prevent vexatious litigation and to require the parties to rest on  
26 one decision in their controversy; res judicata bars not only the reopening of the original  
27 controversy, but also subsequent litigation of all issues that were or could have been raised in the  
28 original suit. (*McFadden v. Los Angeles County Treasurer & Tax Collector* (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th

1 1072, 1079; *Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Court* (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 813, 821.)

2 Issue preclusion precludes relitigation of an issue previously adjudicated when the  
3 following requirements are satisfied:

- 4 • The issue sought to be precluded must be identical to that decided in a prior proceeding;
- 5 • The issue must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding;
- 6 • The issue must have been necessarily decided in the prior proceeding;
- 7 • The decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits; and
- 8 • The party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must be the same as or in privity with  
9 the party to the prior proceeding.

10 (*Hernandez v. City of Pomona* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501; *Lucido v. Superior Court* (1990) 51  
11 Cal.3d 335, 341; *Shuler v. City of Los Angeles* (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 793, 798.) Further, when the  
12 issue is a question of law rather than one of fact, **the prior determination is not conclusive either**  
13 **if injustice would result** or if the public interest requires that relitigation not be foreclosed. (*City*  
14 *of Sacramento v. State of California* (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 51, 64 [emphasis added].)

15 Here, the Watermaster asks this Court to deny the Zamrzlas’ motions based on the  
16 contention that the issues were already decided when the Court ruled on Long Valley Road, L.P.’s  
17 (LVRP) Motion for Leave to Intervene. Although the Watermaster fails to cite any relevant case  
18 law or other legal authorities for this proposition, it is clear the Watermaster is attempting to apply  
19 the principles of res judicata. The attempt fails.

20 The issues raised by the Zamrzlas are not identical to the issues raised by LVRP. Whereas  
21 LVRP filed a motion to intervene in the Judgment, the Zamrzlas seek to vacate or amend the  
22 judgment. Like the Zamrzlas, LVRP contended it was not properly classified as a Small Pumper,  
23 but unlike the Zamrzlas, LVRP did not contend it was never served with notice of the litigation.  
24 Indeed, LVRP admitted “it may have been served with related notices of Small Pumper Class  
25 certification and settlement....” (Watermaster’s Exh. 6, Docket No. 11811.) Finally, the Zamrzlas  
26 are not LVRP. They are separate parties, and the Zamrzlas have not had a prior opportunity to  
27 litigate their claims, and thus res judicata does not apply here. Indeed, even if there was a plausible  
28 rationale for res judicata – which there is not – the Zamrzlas would be entitled to avoid any

1 preclusive effect on the basis that injustice would result if res judicata were applied.

2 **C. The Watermaster Fails to Establish the Existence of Notice.**

3 As discussed in the Zamrzlas’ moving papers, the key issue in this case is the lack of notice  
4 of the underlying litigation. As established, the Zamrzlas never received notice, and thus cannot  
5 be bound by the Judgment. Nothing in the Watermaster’s opposition changes that reality.

6 Notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested  
7 parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”  
8 (*Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.* (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314.) Water rights are subject  
9 to due process. Once rights to use water are acquired, they become vested property rights. As such,  
10 they cannot be infringed by others or taken by governmental action without due process and just  
11 compensation. (*United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd.* (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 82, 101.)  
12 Due process principles require reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard before governmental  
13 deprivation of a significant property interest. (*Horn v. Cty. of Ventura*, (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612.)

14 It is well settled that “the judgment in a class action binds only those class members who  
15 had been notified of the action and who, being so notified, had made no request for exclusion.”  
16 (*Steen v. Fremont Cemetery Corp.* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227.) The notice requirement is  
17 not only important and essential to the correct determination of the main issue it is, above all,  
18 jurisdictional. (*Id.*, at p. 1227-1228.)

19 As discussed in great detail in the Zamrzlas’ moving papers, they never received notice of  
20 the underlying litigation. Indeed, the Watermaster, in contravention to the orders of this Court,  
21 now claims personal service was not required on the Zamrzlas, despite their owning more than 100  
22 acres of land. The Watermaster fails to provide any proof of service to establish the Zamrzlas were  
23 served by mail. No party, including the Watermaster, has provided any invoice, receipt, certified  
24 mailing, proof of mailing, or other documentation of any kind establishing a mail notice was in fact  
25 ever sent to the Zamrzlas.

26 Conversely, the Zamrzlas have declared, under penalty of perjury, in both their declarations  
27 and depositions, that they never received the mail notice. Despite being subjected to hours of  
28 deposition interrogation on the topic, they have never wavered. Indeed, the sequence of events



1 since 2018, outlined above, further belies the Watermaster’s contention that the Zamrzlas had actual  
2 notice of the underlying litigation and its threat to their water rights. Since the first letter from the  
3 Watermaster in 2018, the Zamrzlas have actively attempted to litigate and resolve the issue of their  
4 water rights under the 2015 Judgment. It strains credulity to conclude the Zamrzlas would have  
5 knowingly refused to do anything to protect their rights prior to 2015 had they been served with  
6 notice of the litigation.

7 Further, the Watermaster’s opposition (Pg. 8:11-15) incredibly claims that the historical  
8 amount of water pumped by the Zamrzlas is irrelevant, that the Class definition of a Small Pumper  
9 Member is irrelevant, and finally, that the Court’s directive to personally serve the Zamrzlas as  
10 owners of 100 acres of land, is irrelevant. (Pg. 9:22-28.) Rather, the Watermaster claims, the only  
11 relevant inquiry is whether the Zamrzlas were properly served notice that they were in the Small  
12 Pumper Class. It is telling that the Watermaster seeks to avoid any discussion of the Zamrzlas’  
13 historical water usage, or land ownership. Only by ignoring such facts can the Watermaster reach  
14 its desired result. Upon a fair consideration of the Zamrzlas’ situation, relief in equity is clearly  
15 appropriate, as discussed below.

16 **D. The Court Has the Inherent Power in Equity to Modify or Set Aside the**  
17 **Judgment.**

18 The Watermaster attempts to couch the Zamrzlas’ motion as a collateral attack, thus barring  
19 extrinsic evidence. However, the Zamrzlas were simply unable to attack the judgment at a prior  
20 time, given the lack of notice, and the history of this matter since the Watermasters’ letter in 2018.  
21 Indeed, extrinsic evidence is permitted in an attack on a judgment based in equity:

22 An equitable attack on a judgment or order, whether by motion in the same action or by a  
23 separate action in equity, is a direct attack on the judgment or order. (*Bennett v. Hibernia Bank*  
24 (1956) 47 Cal.2d 540, 558; *Olivera v. Grace* (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 575.) Extrinsic evidence is  
25 admissible on a direct attack in equity to set aside a judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud or  
26 mistake. (*Bae v. T.D. Service Co.* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89, 98; *Sousa v. Freitas* (1970) 10  
27 Cal.App.3d 660, 667; *Munoz v. Lopez* (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 178, 183–184.) A mistaken belief  
28 of one party preventing proper notice of the action has been held to be a mistake warranting

1 equitable relief. (*Aldabe v. Aldabe* (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 453, 475.)

2 Here, the Zamrzlas were prevented from engaging in the underlying litigation because, in  
3 the most charitable interpretation, the parties to the underlying litigation mistakenly failed to serve  
4 the Zamrzlas. (In the less charitable version of events, the parties to the underlying litigation  
5 negligently failed to properly serve the Zamrzlas.) In either case, the Zamrzlas were not served,  
6 and were thus denied their due process when their water rights were taken from them without their  
7 knowledge or opportunity for an adversarial hearing. This is precisely the kind of circumstance  
8 warranting relief from the judgment in equity.

9 **E. Granting the Zamrzlas Relief Will Not “Set a Dangerous Precedent.”**

10 Instead of focusing on the facts and the law relevant to the issues at hand, the Watermaster  
11 instead attempts to deploy a scare tactic to influence the Court that granting the relief requested  
12 would cause chaos by undermining the judgment issued by this Court. The Watermaster’s  
13 imagined doomsday scenario is not grounded in reality, nor is it legally justified.

14 At no point have the Zamrzlas requested they be permitted to “produce groundwater with  
15 impunity.” They merely seek to establish their proper classification and rights under the Judgment,  
16 an opportunity afforded to every other party to the litigation. Granting this relief would have no  
17 precedential effect on any other parties/non-parties. The present situation is unique to the Zamrzlas  
18 based on the specific facts and circumstances applicable to them.

19 Even if the decision did set some precedent for other parties, consideration of such  
20 precedent is not a proper basis for denying the motions. Certainly, the Watermaster provides no  
21 authority for such a contention.

22 **F. The Watermaster’s Request for Relief is not Ripe.**

23 Pursuant to the stipulation between the Zamrzlas, the settling parties, and the Watermaster,  
24 the hearing of this motion was to address *only* the issues raised by this motion. Other issues were  
25 explicitly reserved for future hearings. (See Supp. COE Exh. 21, Docket No.12322; and Supp.  
26 COE Exh. 22, Docket No.12372.) The rationale for this agreement was to focus the parties’ efforts,  
27 and limit expenditure of both the parties and the Court’s resources, as the Court’s decision regarding  
28 the Zamrzlas’ motions inherently impacts their status vis-à-vis the judgment, their proper

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classification under the judgment, if any, and their water production rights. Those issues then must be determined to adequately assess the merits of the Watermaster’s motion. Accordingly, the Watermaster’s motion is not ripe for decision, and should not be decided at this time.

**III. CONCLUSION**

The Zamrzlas humbly request the Court vacate or amend the Judgment *as to them only* and give them the opportunity to fairly litigate their water rights in an adversarial hearing.

Dated: October 26, 2022

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\_\_\_\_\_  
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