1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Michael D. McLachlan (State Bar No. 181 LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL D. Mc 44 Hermosa Avenue Hermosa Beach, California 90254 Telephone: (310) 954-8270 Facsimile: (310) 954-8271 mike@mclachlan-law.com Daniel M. O'Leary (State Bar No. 175128) LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL M. O'LEA 2300 Westwood Boulevard, Suite 105 Los Angeles, California 90064 Telephone: (310) 481-2020 Facsimile: (310) 481-0049 dan@danolearylaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff Richard Wood and	LAĆHLAN, APC		
11				
12				
	SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
13	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES			
14				
15 16	Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b)) ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES	Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 (Honorable Jack Komar) Lead Case No. BC 325201		
17	RICHARD A. WOOD, an individual, on	Case No.: BC 391869		
18	behalf of himself and all others similarly			
19	situated,	NOTICE OF MOTION AND SUPPLEMETNAL MOTION FOR		
20	Plaintiff,	AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS		
21	v.	[filed concurrently with		
22	LOS ANGELES COUNTY	[filed concurrently with Declarations of Michael D.		
23	WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40; et	McLachlan, Daniel M. O'Leary]		
24 25	al. Defendants.	Location: Room 222 Stanley Mosk Courthouse Los Angeles, California Date: July 20, 2016 Time: 10:00 a.m.		
26				
27				

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Plaintiff Richard Wood ("Plaintiff") requests approval of a supplemental award of attorneys' fees for the period of January 27, 2016 through the date of hearing on this Motion as against the eight Non-Settling Defendants: California Water Service Company, Desert Lake Community Services District, Littlerock Creek Irrigation District, Los Angeles Waterworks District No. 40 ("District 40"), North Edwards Water District, Palm Ranch Irrigation District, Quartz Hill Water District , and the City of Palmdale (collectively, the "Settling Defendants").¹

By its Order of April 25, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiffs earlier motion for fees and costs, with the issue of costs pending further hearing at the same time as this supplemental fee motion. Much of the evidence submitted in support of that earlier fee motion is relevant to this one. Given the voluminous nature of that material as well as the record in this case as well, Plaintiff will not re-attach those earlier declarations, and will not re-argue legal issues resolved by the Court's April 25, 2016 Order, e.g. issues bearing on entitlement to attorneys' fees, prevailing party status and the like. Plaintiff rely upon and incorporate reference the earlier Declarations and documentary evidence, and in particular the evidence related to billing rates, including the following declarations: Michael D. McLachlan (served January 1, 2014, January 27, 2016 [D.E. 11144], March 11, 2016 [D.E. 11279], March 25, 2016 [D.E. 11355]); Daniel M. O'Leary (January 27, 2016 [D.E. 11145] and March 29, 2016 [D.E. 11364]); the Declaration of Richard

²⁶ Lai

¹ In 2013, the Class settled with the following Defendants: City of Lancaster, Palmdale Water District, Phelan Piñon Hills Community Services District, and Rosamond Community Services District. Pursuant to the 2015 Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, which has been approved by the Court under the master judgment, these Settling Defendants are not subject to this fee motion. Per the terms of the 2015 Settlement, the City of Palmdale is not subject to attorneys' fees or costs because it dropped its prescription claims in 2008.

1 2

M. Pearl (January 27, 2016 [D.E. 11146]; and the Declaration of David B. Zlotnick (same [D.E. 11148]).

Class counsel now seeks approval of an award of attorney's fees with a lodestar totaling \$204,485.75, as well as additional costs of \$1,838.37.

II. RELEVANT FACTS

A. Attorneys' Fees and Costs Incurred.

From January 27, 2016 to date, Michael McLachlan has incurred 207.8 hours of attorney time and 34.9 paralegal hours. (McLachlan Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. 2.) Mr. O'Leary has worked at additional 45.3 hours. (O'Leary Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) We also retained attorney Richard M. Pearl to assist with certain aspects of the initial fee motion, and he worked 9.15 hours at a total cost of \$7,091.25. (McLachlan Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. 3.) Class Counsel reasonably anticipate that they will spend another 15 hours opposing the motion to tax costs, preparing reply papers on this motion, and attending the hearing. Those future hours have been split this evenly in the table below.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests approval of a total of 269.7 hours of attorney time, including the time incurred by Mr. Pearl (whose experience and qualifications are summarized in his January 27, 2016 declaration [Dkt. No.], and 34.9 hours of paralegal time. The fee request is summarized as follows:

	TOTAL	HOURLY	
TIMEKEEPER	HOURS	RATE	TOTAL
Michael D. McLachlan	207.8	\$720	\$155,016
Daniel M. O'Leary	52.8	\$720	\$38,016
Richard M. Pearl	9.15	\$775	\$7,091.25
Paralegals	34.9	\$125	\$4,362.5
TOTAL			\$204,485.75

Plaintiff also seeks award of additional costs of \$1,838.37. (McLachlan Decl., \P 11, Ex. 4; O'Leary Decl., \P 4.)

III. ARGUMENT

As noted above, the Court has already ruled that Plaintiff is a prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorneys' fees. The Court is also familiar with the lodestar methodology, which was briefed in the earlier fee motion, so Plaintiff will not address that again here, other than to note that the lodestar standard is the applicable to this motion as well. Consequently, Plaintiff will restrict the argument here to the law related to the time at issue in this Motion.

A. An Award of Fees And Costs Is Appropriate.

It is well established that a prevailing party is entitled to attorneys' fees for time spent litigating the fee claim. (*Serrano v. Unruh (Serrano IV)* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621.) As a matter of policy, the court held that to deny fees for fee-related services would permit the fee to "vary with the nature of the opposition." (*Id.* at 638.) The court stated that a defendant "cannot litigate [a fee motion] tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response." (*Ibid.*; *see also Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 581 (expressly reaffirming the rule of *Serrano IV*); *Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122 (same); *612 South LLC v. Laconic United Partnership* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1284 (court must consider fees incurred after fee motion filed).) "Absent unusual circumstances, [a plaintiff is] entitled to recover compensation for all the hour its attorneys spent prosecuting the attorney fees motion." (*Hogar Dulce Hogar v. Community Dev. Comm'n* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1371.)

Here, the opposition briefs totaled nearly 45 pages, and were accompanied by many substantive declarations. Given that, and the eight years of time at issue, the 30-page reply brief and additional fee-related work is entirely

SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

3

4 5

6

7 8

9

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17 18

19

20

21

22

23

24 25

26

27

appropriate and should be compensated in full. Similarly, work not expressly related to the fee motion is all necessary are reasonable the ongoing representation of the Class, and should be compensated in full.

В. The Court Should Apply Current Market Rates.

It is well established the Courts must use market rates in the lodestar analysis. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094.) To determine reasonable market value, courts must determine whether the requested rates are "within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work." (Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. V. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.)²

The hourly rate of \$720 an hour is below what could be requested in the current market rates, but is entirely reasonable in light of current rates being charged and awarded.³ (Pearl Decl. ¶¶ 10-15; McLachlan Decl. (June 27, 2016), ¶¶ 14-20; McLachlan Decl. (January 27, 2016) ¶ 42.)

The Pearl Declaration and Exhibits contain a substantial amount of evidence regarding market rates. (at ¶¶ 10-14.) Indeed, \$720 per hour is a lower rate than those of many firms in Los Angeles. (Pearl Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. C.) The 2013 fees survey for Ty Metrix/Legal Analytics found that third quartile partner rates in 2012 were \$812 per hour – nearly one hundred dollars higher. (Pearl Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. D.) Average partner rates for big firms in 2013 were \$880 per hour. (Id., Ex. E.) Additional materials on market rates are included in the McLachlan Declaration (June 27, 2016), at paragraphs 14 to 19 and Exhibits 5 through 11.

² Historic rates can only be used if there is an enhancement to the lodestar, i.e. fee awards must be based on current rates and should compensate for the delay in payment. (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 583; *Perdue v. Kenny A.* (2010) 559 U.S. 542, 555.)

³ Over a year ago, Mr. McLachlan was approved by the Central District of California at a rate of \$690 in a class context. (McLachlan Decl. (January 27, 2016), ¶ 42.) The rate of \$720 per hour is an upward adjustment of just over 4% over that Court-approved rate of \$690 per hour.

C. The Recent Litigation Costs Should Also Be Awarded.

Class counsel has incurred new and additional litigation costs totaling \$1,838.37. (McLachlan Decl., \P 11, Ex. 4; O'Leary Decl., \P 4.) All of these costs are standard items incurred and charged in litigation, and the Court should award them under Section 1033.5.

D. Allocation of Fees and Costs Among the Defendants.

As noted in the reply to the Motion for Clarification of the initial attorney fee order [D.E., the Stipulation for Entry of Judgment establishes that pure several liability is not appropriate here. Plaintiff should not bear the burden if one of the defendants fails to pay the fee award. There is no entitlement to apportionment of a fee award under Section 1021.5. (*Friends of the Trails v. Blasius* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 810, 837-838.)

Treating the *Code of Civil Procedure* section 1021.5 obligation of more than one opposing parties as joint is consistent with the purposes of that statute. If the obligation is apportioned in the sense that it is not joint the successful party faces greater difficulty in collection of the judgment for attorney's fees and some of the attorney's fees will not be recoverable if any opposing party is insolvent.

(Id. at 838.)

For these reasons, the Court should make the award joint, not several.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Richard Wood requests that the Court approve the supplemental award of attorneys' fees in the amount of \$204,485.75, as well as additional costs of \$1,838.37.

1	DATED: June 27, 2016	LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL D. McLACHLAN LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL M. O'LEARY
2		LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL W. O LEAKT
3		By:
4		By: MICHAEL D. MCLACHLAN Attemptive for Plaintiff and the Class
5		Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
		8

SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS