reasonable and does not constitute waste of groundwater and/or available imported water under Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution.

- 52. Diamond and Crystal desire a declaration of their rights with respect to the constitutionality and application or nonapplication of Article X, Section 2 to Phelan's actions and asks the court to make a declaration of such rights, duties, and responsibilities, and to make a declaration as to the validity and constitutionality of the Article X, Section 2. Such a declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that Diamond and Crystal's property rights may be protected and to ensure that Phelan may proceed under the law and cause no further damage to Diamond and Crystal or property overlying the water supply. There are no administrative remedies available to Diamond and Crystal.
- 53. A timely declaration by this court is urgent for the following reasons: by way of this action, Phelan is seeking to have the court ratify their method and choice of water usage and declare that they have the right to continue to extract groundwater from the Valley in excess of the safe yield and to continue to cause damage to the Valley itself as well as to the land overlying the water supply, absent a timely declaration by this court, an injustice will result from the improper validation of Phelan's water usage should this constitutional provision be found to apply to Phelan.
- 54. Diamond and Crystal and numerous other private parties will suffer irreparable and lasting injury unless declaratory relief is granted.

## Seventh Cause of Action

- 55. Cross-Complainants refer to and incorporate, as though fully set forth herein, paragraphs 1 through 54, inclusive, of this Cross-Complaint.
  - 56. Phelan filed a Cross-Complaint in this matter seeking to implement policy objectives.
- 57. In order to implement these policy objectives, Phelan has brought a cause of action against all owners of property overlying the Antelope Valley seeking the imposition of a "physical solution" that would manage the groundwater supply by augmenting the water supply, manage the pumping and storage of water and impose monetary assessments on water extraction from the supply.

- 58. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Diamond and Crystal and Phelan concerning their respective rights and duties in that Diamond and Crystal contend that it is a violation of the Constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers for this Court to implement Phelan's objectives as they are by nature legislative actions, subject to the provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act (hereinafter "CEQA"; Public Resources Code sections 21000-21177.) That the requirements of CEQA are both procedural (requiring notice, disclosure and a review process) and substantive (by requiring public agencies to take affirmative measures to avoid environmental harm and to also protect the citizens and landowners of the State of California.)
- 59. Phelan contends that they may use the judicial system to circumvent CEQA and impose by judicial fiat what should be a legislative policy. In doing so, they seek to avoid providing the public with the required disclosures and evaluations, and thereby deny Diamond and Crystal and the public their procedural and substantive protections required by CEQA.
- 60. Diamond and Crystal desire a judicial determination of Phelan's rights and duties, and a declaration as to the application of Public Resources Code sections 21000-21177 to any proposed water management plan sought to be implemented by judicial decree by Phelan. That the legislative protections afforded to the public under CEQA cannot be ignored or subverted by resorting to the court to implement Phelan's plan, and that such a request of this Court induces a violation of the doctrine of the separation of powers.
- 61. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the circumstances in order that Diamond and Crystal may ascertain their rights and duties relating to production of water from the Antelope Valley.

# **Eighth Cause of Action**

- 62. Cross-Complainants refer to and incorporate, as though fully set forth herein, paragraphs 1 through 61, inclusive, of this Cross-Complaint.
  - 63. Phelan filed a Cross-Complaint in this matter seeking to implement policy objectives.
- 64. In order to implement these policy objectives, Phelan has brought a cause of action against all owners of property overlying the Antelope Valley seeking the imposition of a "physical

solution" that would manage the groundwater supply by augmenting the water supply, manage the pumping and storage of water and impose monetary assessments on water extraction from the supply.

- 65. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Diamond and Crystal and Phelan concerning their respective rights and duties in that Diamond and Crystal contend that it is a violation of the Constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers for this Court to implement Phelan's policy objectives as they are by nature legislative and executive actions that are within the power of Phelan to enact by following the statutory requirements set forth in Water Code sections 10700-10795.20. These sections of the Water Code provide the procedural method by which Phelan must implement a ground water management plan and also ensures constitutionally required process through the required public hearings, notice, and publication of the proposed management plan, and the opportunity for public discourse, input and objection.
- 66. Phelan contends that it may use the judicial system to impose by judicial fiat what would otherwise be done through legislative action. In doing so, it seeks to avoid providing the public with the required notice, hearing and disclosures and deny them their procedural and substantive protections provided by the Constitution and the Water Code sections 10700-10795.20..
- 67. Diamond and Crystal desire a judicial determination of Phelan's rights and duties, and a declaration as to the application and propriety of Water Code sections 10700-10795.20 to the proposed water management project sought to be implemented by Phelan. That the legislative protections afforded to the public under the Water Code may not be ignored or subverted by the filing of a legal action by a public agency, and that such action requests this court to violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
- 68. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the circumstances in order that Diamond and Crystal may ascertain their rights and duties relating to their continued production of water from the Antelope Valley.

#### Ninth Cause of Action

69. Cross-Complainants refer to and incorporate, as though fully set forth herein, paragraphs 1 through 68, inclusive, of this Cross-Complaint.

70. Diamond and Crystal are the owners of land overlying the Antelope Valley. Phelan is a user of water pumped from the Antelope Valley which underlies Diamond and Crystal's land.

- 71. Initially, Phelan legally used and maintained water wells that extracted water from the Antelope Valley for public distribution. Over time the increased urbanization and Phelan's continued and increasing extractions exceeded their legal boundaries, such that the water extracted from the supply has exceeded the ability to naturally recharge the water supply. Phelan has claimed to have knowledge that this continuous and increasing use caused a progressive and chronic decline in long term water supply and the available natural supply is being and has been chronically depleted. Based on the present trends, demand will continue to exceed supply which will cause damage to private rights and ownership of real property.
- 72. The aforementioned extractions of groundwater from the supply constitute a continuing progressive nuisance within the meaning of Section 3479 of the Civil Code, in that Phelan has created a condition in the future supply that is injurious to Diamond and Crystal's right, in the future, to freely use and exercise its overlying property rights to extract groundwater from the common supply in the customary manner. Phelan is attempting, through the efforts of their pumping groundwater and this present legal action, to take, and or alter, Diamond and Crystal's overlying property rights to use and access the Antelope Valley supply.
- 73. This nuisance affects, at the same time, a substantial number of persons in that, Phelan claims that the continued pumping in excess of the supply's safe yield is, and will, eventually cause a chronic decline in water levels and the available natural supply will be chronically depleted, that, based on the present trends, demand will continue to exceed supply which will continue to cause a reduction in the long term supply. Additionally, the continued pumping by Phelan under these conditions will result in the unlawful obstruction of the overlying landowner's rights to use the water supply in the customary manner.
- 74. Phelan has threatened to and will, unless restrained by this court, continue to pump groundwater in increasing amounts, and each and every act has been, and will be, without the consent, against the will, and in violation of the rights of Diamond and Crystal.

- 75. As a proximate result of the nuisance created by Phelan, Diamond and Crystal have been, and will be, damaged in a sum to be proven at trial.
- 76. Unless Phelan is restrained from increasing their pumping from the supply by order of this court, it will be necessary for Cross-Complainant to commence many successive actions against Phelan to secure a project by project injunction and/or compensation for the continuing and repeated damages sustained, thus requiring a multiplicity of suits.
- 77. Should Phelan continue to increase their pumping without replenishing the Valley's water supply, Diamond and Crystal will suffer irreparable injury in that the usefulness and economic value of Diamond and Crystal's overlying property right will be substantially diminished and Diamond and Crystal will be deprived of the comfortable, reasonable and beneficial use and enjoyment of its property.
- 78. In maintaining this nuisance, Phelan is, and has been, acting with full knowledge of the consequences and damage being caused to Diamond and Crystal, and their conduct is willful, oppressive, malicious and designed to interfere with and take Diamond and Crystal's right to freely access the water supply in its customary manner. Accordingly, Phelan has intentionally dirtied hands and no right to involve equity in these actions.

## **Tenth Cause of Action**

- 79. Cross-Complainants refer to and incorporate, as though fully set forth herein, paragraphs 1 through 78, inclusive, of this Cross-Complaint.
- 80. This cause of action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover damages against Phelan for violation of Diamond and Crystal's right under the 5th and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution through Phelan's taking of Diamond and Crystal's private property for public use without paying just compensation and depriving Diamond and Crystal of both substantive or procedural due process of law.
- 81. Phelan, at all times mentioned in this cross-complaint, was a governmental entity organized and operating in San Bernardino County and in the State of California, and is organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, with the capacity to sue and be sued.

82. Phelan, at all times mentioned in this cross-complaint, was acting under color of state law.

- 83. At an as yet unidentified historical point in time, Phelan began pumping water from the Antelope Valley as a permissive appropriator. Over the course of time, it is believed and therefore alleged, that the aggregate amount of water being extracted from the Valley began to exceed the safe yield resulting in a condition called "overdraft." Diamond and Crystal are informed and believe and based thereon allege, that Phelan had knowledge of the "overdraft" condition and nonetheless continued pumping and increased their pumping with the specific intent to impair and take all superior overlying property rights to extract groundwater, including that of Diamond and Crystal. Phelan continued to pump and increased its pumping of groundwater believing that given the intervention of the committed public use, that no injunction would issue to restrain and/or compel Phelan to reduce its dependence upon groundwater. Phelan contends that despite its status as a governmental entity, it can nonetheless take private property for a public use under a theory of prescription and without compensation. Phelan claims that presumed or constructive knowledge of the overdraft condition alone was sufficient to commence the running of the statutory prescriptive period. Phelan did not undertake any affirmative action reasonably calculated and intended to provide notice and inform any affected landowner, including Diamond and Crystal, of its adverse and hostile claim. Phelan contends that it has taken the private property rights of Diamond and Crystal and others, and have committed them to a public use, without following the Constitutional constraints imposed by Article 1, Section 19, of the California Constitution, and the eminent domain law, Code of Civil Procedure Section 1230.010 et seq., and specifically, the substantive and procedural protections contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure Section 1245.230. The acts of Phelan were done under the color of state law with the intent of depriving Diamond and Crystal of their property rights without substantive and procedural due process of law and to avoid payment of compensation to Diamond and Crystal for the property rights taken, all in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.
- 84. Diamond and Crystal are informed and believe and thereon allege that it was subjected to a violation of its right to due process of law prior to the taking of its property and its right to receive

27

25

just compensation when its property was taken for the public benefit. This violation was a direct result of the knowing customs, practices, and policies of Phelan to continue to pump in excess of the supply, to suppress the assertion of their adverse and hostile claim, and the resulting ever increasing intervening public use and dependance, without acceding to Constitutional limits.

- 85. The customs, practices, and policies of Phelan to prescript or adversely possess the property rights of property owners and/or to establish a nonenjoinable intervening use amounted to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons, such as Diamond and Crystal, who stand to lose their rights to extract water from the Antelope Valley for use on their property through the actions of Phelan.
- 86. As a direct and proximate result of the acts of Phelan, Diamond and Crystal have suffered injury, loss, and damage, including a cloud upon their title to their real property, a reduction in value, and the loss of its right in the future to extract and use groundwater from the Valley.

#### First Cause of Action

WHEREFORE, cross-complainants pray for a declaratory judgment as follows:

- 1. That the court declare the respective rights, duties, and responsibilities of Phelan and Diamond and Crystal under the statute in question and that by its declaration and judgment the court declare that the statute applies to Phelan in this matter, and that the statutes is constitutional and valid;
- 2. That Phelan and all others acting in or on its behalf, be enjoined from taking property or the rights attendant thereto in any manner not expressly set forth and authorized in the provisions of Water Code section 55370;
  - 3. For costs of suit herein incurred; and
  - 4. For such other and further relief as the court deems proper.

## Second Cause of Action

WHEREFORE, cross-complainants pray for a declaratory judgment as follows:

1. That the court declare the respective rights, duties, and responsibilities of Phelan under Article 1 Section 19 of the California Constitution and that by its declaration and judgment the court declare that Article 1 Section 19 applies to Phelan in this matter, and that just compensation is a prerequisite to any taking by each of these governmental entities;

- 2. That Phelan and all others acting in or on their behalf, be enjoined from taking property or the rights attendant thereto in any manner not expressly set forth and authorized in the provisions of Article 1 Section 19 of the California Constitution;
  - 3. For costs of suit herein incurred; and
  - 4. For such other and further relief as the court deems proper.

#### Third Cause of Action

WHEREFORE, cross-complainants pray for a declaratory judgment as follows:

- 1. That the court declare the respective rights, duties, and responsibilities of Phelan under Article 1 Section 19 of the California Constitution and that by its declaration and judgment the court declare that Article 1 Section 19 applies to Phelan in this matter, and that Section 19 prohibits a governmental entity from taking private property for a public use without compensation under the doctrines of prescription or adverse possession;
- 2. That Phelan and all others acting in or on their behalf, be enjoined from taking property or the rights attendant thereto in any manner not expressly set forth and authorized in the provisions of Article 1 Section 19 of the California Constitution;
  - 3. For costs of suit herein incurred; and
  - 4. For such other and further relief as the court deems proper.

## Fourth Cause of Action

WHEREFORE, cross-complainants pray for a declaratory judgment as follows:

- 1. That the court declare the respective rights, duties, and responsibilities of Phelan under Article 1 Section 7 of the California Constitution and that by its declaration and judgment the court declare that Article 1 Section 7 applies to the municipal Phelan in this matter, and that Section 7 prohibits a governmental entity from taking private property for a public use without providing due process of law to the individual whose property is being taken;
- 2. That the municipal Phelan and all others acting in or on their behalf, be enjoined from taking property or the rights attendant thereto in any manner not expressly set forth and authorized in the provisions of Article 1 Section 7 of the California Constitution;

3	Fifth Cause of Action				
4	WHEREFOR	RE, cross-complainants pray judgment as follows:			
5	1.	For a declaration that Diamond and Crystal's continued pumping has interrupted any			
6	period of adv	verse pumping by the municipal Phelan negating any claim of prescription and thereby			
7	preserving Diamond and Crystal's overlying priority right to pump water from the Antelope Valley;				
8	2.	For costs of suit herein incurred; and			
9	3.	For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.			
10		Sixth Cause of Action			
11	WHEREFORE, cross-complainants pray for a declaratory judgment as follows:				
12	1.	That the court declare the respective rights, duties, and responsibilities of Phelan and			
13	Diamond and	Crystal under the statute in question and that by its declaration and judgment the cour			
14	declare that the Article X, Section 2 applies and that Phelan's continued dependence on, and increased				
15	use of, groundwater in excess of the safe yield is unreasonable and constitutes waste;				
16	2.	That Phelan and all others acting in or on their behalf, be enjoined from engaging in the			
17	continued unreasonable and wasteful use of the groundwater in violation of the provisions of Article X				
18	Section 2 of the California Constitution;				
19	3.	For costs of suit herein incurred; and			
20	4.	For such other and further relief as the court deems proper.			
21		Seventh Cause of Action			
22	WHEREFOR	E, cross-complainants pray judgment as follows:			
23	1.	For a declaration that the doctrine of separation of powers prohibits this court from			
24	imposing the objectives of Phelan upon the groundwater supply; that the implementation of Phelan'				
25	objectives requires compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (Public Resources Code				
26	sections 21000-21177 to provide the required procedural and substantive protections to the citizens o				
27	the State of California.				
28		20			
	CROSS-COMPLAINT OF DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY AND CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS, LLC FOR EQUITABLE AND MONETARY RELIEF AGAINST CROSS-COMPLAINANT PHELAN PIÑON HILLS COMMUNITY SERVICES DISTRICT				

1

2

3.

4.

For costs of suit herein incurred; and

For such other and further relief as the court deems proper.

- 1	1						
1	2.	For costs of suit herein incurred; and					
2	3.	For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.					
3	Eighth Cause of Action						
4	WHEREFORE, cross-complainants pray judgment as follows:						
5	1.	For a declaration that the doctrine of separation of powers prohibits this court from					
6	imposing the objectives of Phelan upon the groundwater supply; that the implementation of Phelan's						
7	objectives requires Phelan to act pursuant to the requirements of Water Code section 10700-10795.20;						
8	2.	For costs of suit herein incurred; and					
9	3.	For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.					
10		Ninth Cause of Action					
11	WHEREFOR	E, cross-complainants pray judgment against Phelan as follows:					
12	1.	For a physical solution enjoining Phelan from increasing their extractions from the					
13	Antelope Valley and ordering Phelan to collectively abate the nuisance by purchasing, from time to time,						
14	all available imported water, and to bank and to replenish the groundwater supply and replace, in the						
15	aggregate, the extractions made by Phelan in excess of the safe yield;						
16	2.	For general damages according to proof;					
17	3.	For punitive damages;					
18	4.	For costs of suit herein incurred; and					
19	5.	For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.					
20		Tenth Cause of Action					
21	WHEREFORE, Diamond and Crystal pray judgment against Phelan as follows:						
22	1.	For compensatory damages, in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial;					
23	2.	For reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;					
24	///						
25	///						
26	///						
27	///						
28		21					

1	3.	. For costs	of suit incurred in t	his acti	on; and
2	4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.				
3	Dated: A	April 16, 2009		LeBE	AU•THELEN, LLP
4					
5				By:	On the
6					BOB H. JOYCE, Attorneys for DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, a California corporation, and CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS.
7					a limited liability company
8					
9					
10					
11					
12					
13					
14					
15					
16					
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					
26					
27					
28	CROSS	-COMPLAINT O	F DIAMOND FARMIN	IG COM	PANY AND CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS, LLC FOR

COMMUNITY SERVICES DISTRICT

## PROOF OF SERVICE

1								
2	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES JUDICIAL COUNCIL PROCEEDING NO. 4408 CASE NO.: 1-05-CV-049053							
3								
4	I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; I am over the ag							
5	of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is: 5001 E. Commercente							
6	Drive, Suite 300, Bakersfield, California 93309. On April 16, 2009, I served the within CROSS							
7	COMPLAINT OF DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY AND CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS							
8	LLC FOR EQUITABLE AND MONETARY RELIEF AGAINST CROSS-COMPLAINANT							
9	PHELAN PIÑON HILLS COMMUNITY SERVICES DISTRICT							
10	■ (BY POSTING) I am "readily familiar" with the Court's Clarification Order.							
11	Electronic service and electronic posting completed through www.scefiling.org; All papers filed							
12	in Los Angeles County Superior Court and copy sent to trial judge and Chair of Judicial Council.							
13	Los Angeles County Superior Court Chair, Judicial Council of California 111 North Hill Street Administrative Office of the Courts							
14	Los Angeles, CA 90012 Attn: Appellate & Trial Court Judicial Services Attn: <b>Department 1</b> (Civil Case Coordinator)							
15	(213) 893-1014 Carlotta Tillman 455 Golden Gate Avenue							
16	San Francisco, CA 94102-3688 Fax (415) 865-4315							
17								
18	(BY MAIL) I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S.							
19	Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Bakersfield, California, in the ordinary course of business.							
20								
21	(STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of							
22	California that the above is true and correct, and that the foregoing was executed on April 16, 2009, in Bakersfield, California.							
23	DONNA M. LUIS							
24	DONIVA W. LOIS							
25								
26	19							
27								
28								