I. INTRODUCTION

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Antelope Valley Groundwater Agreement Association ("AGWA") submits this Reply to Quartz Hill Water District's Opposition to Motion for Protective Order, filed September 28, 2012 ("Opposition"). The Opposition fails to respond to AGWA's points about the current lack of an order setting the next phase of trial and the scope of such trial, if indeed a subsequent phase of trial is to occur. Instead, the Opposition improperly raises claims based on alleged periods of prescription that are not currently before the Court. In fact, the Opposition's premature statements on prescription perfectly illustrate AGWA's point: that forcing AGWA to produce detailed records of groundwater levels and pumping ahead of the defined limits of any alleged prescriptive period is unduly burdensome and prejudicial at this time, where AGWA cannot even determine what periods of pumping may be relevant to the next phase of trial.

AGWA's efforts are focused on the settlement process under the guidance of Justice Robie. This is where all of the parties' efforts should be focused. This is why at the July 9, 2012 hearing, the Court specifically directed Quartz Hill not to reinitiate its discovery efforts prior to the conclusion of that process (see July 9, 2012 Reporter's Transcript page 71). The Court should not allow Quartz Hill to ignore the Court's prior direction and derail the settlement process. The Court's broad discretion to control the course of discovery is sufficient to support the motion for a protective order.

II. **ARGUMENT**

The Issues Raised by the Opposition Regarding Prescription Demonstrate the Α. **Necessity for a Protective Order**

The Opposition's attempts to paint AGWA as trying to "suppress evidence" are meritless and fail to respond to AGWA's main justification for a protective order; mainly, that ahead of the Court setting the scope of the next phase of trial, a request of all information related to groundwater use for every landowner parcel within AGWA since the 1950s is overly broad.

Certainly at some point the Court must receive evidence regarding the properties currently owned by the parties in this case and the amount of groundwater currently used on those properties. The Opposition acknowledges that these issues "...will likely be addressed in the next

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

trial phase of the case, and future phases as well." (Opposition, at 4:23-25.) But the Opposition fails to recognize that the Court has not set a subsequent phase of trial or entered any order defining the scope of the next phase of trial.

Indeed, illustrative of AGWA's point, the Opposition cites case law related to prescriptive claims and then baldly states, "Prescription started to run in 1945, when the overdraft started." (Opposition, at 6:8.) Prescriptive issues are not presently before the Court and were not determined in the Phase III trial. The Opposition acts as if trial has already been set. (E.g., Opposition, at 7:21-23 ("Providing evidence which relates to an intended affirmative defense four months prior to trial is not unreasonable or burdensome.") Divining AGWA's "intended" defenses and assuming a trial date further underline the premature nature of Quartz Hill Water District's requests, and is counter-productive to serious settlement discussions.

Indeed, AGWA has recommended that the next phase of trial be a technical determination regarding return flows, which is the primary issue that is making settlement discussions protracted and difficult. If the Court accepts AGWA's recommendation, then all of Quartz Hill's discovery will be irrelevant.

If and when the Court defines the scope of the next phase of trial and relevant prescriptive periods, AGWA will respond and produce its members' pumping information for the relevant periods. Ahead of that time, AGWA objects to an overly broad request for the entire universe of all AGWA members' pumping. Without a protective order, AGWA members will be forced to provide extensive information that may not even be relevant to the next phase of trial, at great expense to AGWA members and counsel.

В. AGWA Would be Overly Burdened by Responding to the Propounded Discovery

The Opposition mischaracterizes its requests for production as simple requests to "identify the real property owned, how much groundwater is used on that property, and documents that support that use...." (Opposition, at 7:7-9.) The Opposition presents the argument that it would not be burdensome for AGWA to produce all crop records, water well levels, groundwater pumping records, meter records, parcel documentation, and other records for the approximately

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

136 individual landowners comprising AGWA would be burdensome. (Opposition, at 6:24-25, 7:7-13.) The Opposition at the same time glibly suggests that AGWA has no pumping records (Opposition, at 8:11-23)—a completely baseless statement.

The Court's Broad Discretion to Control the Course of Discovery is Sufficient C. to Support the Motion

This Court has the broad power and responsibility to determine what discovery measures and procedures are appropriate in varying circumstances. (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal. App.4th 424, 431; see also Govt. Code, § 68607 (judge's responsibility to manage litigation); Code Civ. Proc., § 128(a)(5) (judge's power to control conduct of judicial proceeding in furtherance of justice).) This Court also has broad discretion to control the course of discovery and to decide the issues raised in the course of discovery. (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 378 ("Undoubtedly the discovery statutes vest a wide discretion in the trial court in granting or denying discovery"); see also Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 175 (discussing trial court's wide discretion to decide discovery issues).)

The discovery statutes themselves "recognize[] the court's inherent power to balance the benefits and burdens of proposed discovery." (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (1998) § 8.74.) Thus, when faced with a motion for a protective order, this Court is empowered to consider all relevant issues before granting that motion, including the unique burden imposed on AGWA due to its multiple members.

III. **CONCLUSION**

Based on the arguments herein and AGWA's Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the Declaration of Michael T. Fife submitted in support of AGWA's Motion for Protective Order, AGWA has demonstrated good cause that answering Quartz Hill Water District's overly broad fishing expedition ahead of an order setting trial is untimely and prejudicial. In this case, a protective order will prevent Quartz Hill Water District from overburdening the landowners in this case such as AGWA to provide reams of historical information that may not even be relevant to the next phase of trial, if indeed there is a next phase of trial.

1		
2	Dated: October 5, 2012	BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP
3		By: Thelise of
4		By: MICHAEL T. FIFE
5		BRADLEY J. HERREMA ATTORNEYS FOR AGWA
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		