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12	Special Title (Rule 1550(b))	Proceeding No. 4408		
13	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER	LASC Case No.: BC 325201		
14 15	CASES	Santa Clara Court Case No. 1-05-CV-049053 Assigned to the Hon. Jack Komar, Judge of the Santa Clara Superior Court		
16		ANTELOPE VALLEY		
17		WATERMASTER'S OPPOSITION TO PHELAN PIÑON HILLS COMMUNITY		
		SERVICES DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF RE		
18 19	AND ALL RELATED ACTIONS	WATERMASTER RESOLUTION NO. R- 19-27 AND NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT		
		OF REPLACEMENT WATER ASSESSMENTS FOR 2016, 2017 AND		
20		2018; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF		
21 22		MATTHEW KNUDSON AND PATRICIA ROSE; EXHIBITS 1-15		
23		[Declarations of Matthew Knudson and		
23		Patricia Rose filed concurrently herewith]		
25		Date: November 7, 2019 Time: 9:00 a.m.		
26		Dept: Courtcall		
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SANTA BARBARA, CA

RICE, POSTEL & PARMA LLP

The Antelope Valley Watermaster ("Watermaster") opposes Phelan Piñon Hills Community Services District's ("Phelan") Motion for Declaratory Relief Re Watermaster Resolution No. R-19-27 and Notice of Assessment of Replacement Water Assessments for 2016, 2017 and 2018 (the "Motion") as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

The Watermaster is charged with administering the December 23, 2015 Judgment and Physical Solution in the above-captioned action (the "Judgment"). The Watermaster's duties under the Judgment include, among other responsibilities, the levying and collection of Replacement Water Assessments ("RWA(s)"). In the Motion, Phelan seeks to invalidate the Watermaster invoice charging Phelan a total of \$1,191,063.34 in RWAs for 2016, 2017, and 2018. Phelan argues that the RWA rates in the invoice are unsupported by substantial evidence, that the Watermaster cannot levy and collect RWAs without first adopting rules and regulations applicable thereto, and that the invoice is invalid because the dates on the invoice pre-date the Watermaster's adoption of the relevant RWA rates. Phelan also insists that the Watermaster cannot collect RWAs for 2016 or 2017 while Phelan's appeal of this Court's April 26, 2018 Order (the "2018 Order," a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "15") is pending.

The Watermaster has worked cooperatively with the Antelope Valley State Water Contractors Association ("AVSWCA") and its constituent members (Antelope Valley - East Kern Water Agency ("AVEK"), Littlerock Creek Irrigation District ("LCID"), and Palmdale Water District ("PWD")) to establish the applicable RWA rates using the evidence and analysis set forth in the Financial Analysis Study for Replacement Water Assessment Final Report dated March 6, 2019 (the "Raftelis Report," a true and correct copy of which is attached to the Declaration of Matthew Knudson as Exhibit "8"). As discussed in this opposition, the Raftelis Report provides more than substantial evidence to support the Watermaster-approved RWA rates. Phelan's arguments to the contrary are rooted in Phelan's fundamental misunderstanding of the terms of the Judgment and of the analysis found in the Raftelis Report.

All capitalized terms included in this Opposition not otherwise defined herein shall have the same meaning as set forth in the Judgment.

Furthermore, nothing in the Judgment preconditions the levy and collection of RWAs upon Watermaster adoption of rules and regulations therefor. Whether or not the Watermaster has formally adopted any such rules and regulations has no bearing on the enforceability of the RWAs or the invoice. Likewise, the "irregularities" in the invoice sent to Phelan relate only to inconsistencies in non-substantive dates. These inconsistencies are the result of ministerial error, and do not impact the enforceability of the RWAs or the invoice.

Finally, the 2018 Order is not a money judgment, and contrary to Phelan's arguments, enforcement of the 2016 and 2017 RWAs is <u>not</u> tantamount to requiring Phelan to post a bond pending the outcome of its appeal. Rather, Phelan's ongoing failure to pay past-due RWAs is in violation of the <u>prohibitory</u> injunction against export of Groundwater from the Basin. The prohibitory injunction does not apply to Phelan "so long as" it pays RWAs, and it is not stayed pending appeal.

For these reasons Phelan's Motion must be denied in its entirety.

II. <u>STATEMENT OF FACTS</u>

A. Phelan's RWA Obligations

The Watermaster is charged with levying and collecting RWAs for the purpose of paying all costs related to Replacement Water. (Judgment ¶¶ 3.5.41, 9.2.) "To the extent that Production by a Producer exceeds such Producer's right to Produce a portion of the Total Safe Yield as provided in this Judgment, the Producer will pay a [RWA] to the Watermaster and the Watermaster will provide Replacement Water to replace such excess production according to the methods set forth in this Judgment." (*Id.* ¶ 7.3.) "The amount of the [RWA] shall be the amount of such excess Production multiplied by the cost to the Watermaster of Replacement Water, including any Watermaster spreading costs." (*Id.* ¶ 9.2.) The RWA rate is expressed in dollars per acre-foot, and is multiplied by the Replacement Obligation (in acre-feet) to determine a Party's total RWA.

The Judgment makes clear that the Watermaster has the authority to levy and collect RWAs from Phelan. As set forth in the 2018 Order, Phelan has no Production Right or Imported Water Return Flow Rights, and its only right to use Groundwater in the Basin is set forth in

Paragraph 6.4.1.2 of the Judgment. (Exh. 15 at 3:15-16 ("Phelan has neither appropriative nor prescriptive rights to pump or produce ground water in the adjudication area.").) Therefore any Groundwater use by Phelan is "in excess of the sum of [Phelan's] Production Right and Imported Water Return Flow," and Phelan must pay RWA on all Groundwater it pumps from the Basin. (Id. at 5:21-22 (Phelan "has no right to produce water from the aquifer without paying for replacement water.").) The Watermaster is therefore explicitly authorized and required to impose RWAs on Phelan for all Groundwater it uses. (Id. at 6:1-3 (Phelan "must... pay for all water pumped out of the adjudication area so that the water taken can be replaced by imported water.").)

Although Phelan is subject to the injunction against transportation of Basin Groundwater for use outside the Basin (Judgment ¶ 6.4.), the injunction does not apply to Phelan so long as its total Groundwater usage does not exceed 1,200 acre-feet per year, and so long as Phelan "pays [RWA] pursuant to Paragraph 9.2, together with any other costs deemed necessary to protect Production Rights decreed herein, on all water Produced and exported in this manner." (*Id.* ¶ 6.4.1.2.) Therefore Phelan is automatically subject to the injunction against transportation of Groundwater for use outside the Basin unless Phelan pays RWAs for all Groundwater it uses.

B. The 2018 Order

On January 24, 2018, the Watermaster adopted Resolution No. R-18-04, instructing staff to impose RWAs for Groundwater pumped by Phelan in 2016 and 2017. (Knudson Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. 1 & 2.) Thereafter, Phelan filed a motion seeking a declaration that it is entitled to the benefits of Paragraph 8.3 of the Judgment, and therefore is not required to pay RWAs during the Rampdown Period (*i.e.*, for 2016 and 2017). The Watermaster and the Public Water Suppliers filed opposition, and the Court denied Phelan's motion on April 26, 2018. In its 2018 Order, the Court found that Phelan has neither appropriative nor prescriptive rights to Produce Groundwater in the Basin, and therefore has no Production Right. Because Phelan's only right to Groundwater in the Basin is set forth in Paragraph 6.4.1.2, which requires Phelan to pay for all Groundwater it uses, the Court concluded that Phelan has no Rampdown rights under Paragraph 8.3, and therefore must pay RWA during the Rampdown Period. On May 17, 2018, Phelan filed an appeal of the 2018 Order, which appeal is still pending.

C. Watermaster Adoption Of RWA Rates

At its February 28, 2018 meeting, the Watermaster Board considered and approved Resolution No. R-18-08, setting the 2018 RWA rate for Parties within the AVEK service area. It was noted at the meeting that the established RWA rate would apply only within the AVEK service area, and that the 2018 RWA rate for Parties within the PWD and LCID service areas would be established at a later date. (Knudson Decl. ¶ 5, Exh 3 & 4.)

At its July 19, 2018 meeting, the AVSWCA Board of Commissioners considered approval of a professional services agreement with Raftelis Financial Consultants, Inc. ("Raftelis") for the purpose of eventually generating the Raftelis Report. (Knudson Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. 5.) The Raftelis professional services agreement was approved by the AVSWCA Board and executed by the parties effective August 1, 2018. (Knudson Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. 6.) Thereafter, AVSWCA constituent member staff met with Raftelis to review the scope of work and provide documentation and information necessary for preparation of the Raftelis Report. (Knudson Decl. ¶ 8.)

On March 14, 2019, the AVSWCA Board of Commissioners reviewed and considered a draft of the Raftelis Report, and determined that the draft should be presented to the governing bodies of each of the AVSWCA constituent members for review and approval. (Knudson Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. 7.) Thereafter, the governing bodies of each of the AVSWCA constituent members reviewed and approved the draft Raftelis Report, which was finalized effective March 6, 2019. (Knudson Decl. ¶ 10, Exh. 8.)

At its April 24, 2019 meeting, the Watermaster Board considered and adopted Resolutions Nos. R-19-10 and R-19-11, setting the 2018 RWA rate for Parties within the PWD and LCID service areas, and the 2019 RWA rate for Parties within and outside the AVSWCA boundaries. A copy of the Raftelis Report was attached to the Watermaster staff report for Resolutions Nos. R-19-10 and R-19-11. (Knudson Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. 9 & 10.)

At its August 28, 2019 meeting, the Watermaster Board considered and adopted Resolution No. R-19-27, setting the 2016 and 2017 RWA rate for Parties within and outside the AVSWCA boundaries, and the 2018 RWA rate for Parties outside the AVSWCA boundaries. The Watermaster staff report for Resolution No. R-19-27 referred to the Raftelis Report as the basis

D. The Invoicing

for the RWA rate structure. (Knudson Decl. ¶ 12, Exh 11 & 12.)

Beginning on or about July 10, 2019, Watermaster staff began drafting invoices for

collecting 2016, 2017, and/or 2018 RWAs. Template invoices were prepared with blanks in the

columns for yearly total acre-feet, RWA rate, and RWA amount, as well as the total amount due.

These template invoices were dated July 15, 2019, with a due date of August 14, 2019, and saved

in the Watermaster files for later completion after Watermaster Board approval of the applicable

expeditiously finalized upon Watermaster Board approval of the applicable RWAs. (Rose Decl. ¶

On or about September 3, 2019, after Watermaster Board approval of the RWAs

applicable to Phelan, Watermaster staff entered the yearly total acre-feet, applicable RWA rate,

and final RWA amount, as well as the total amount due, into the template invoice for Phelan.

Watermaster staff then mailed the final invoice to Phelan on September 5, 2019, but without

updating the invoicing date of July 15, 2019 or the due date of August 14, 2019. (Rose Decl. ¶ 4,

point out that the invoice erroneously stated Phelan's total acre-feet for 2018 as 385.18, when

Phelan's Groundwater usage in 2018 was actually 176.83 acre-feet. On or about September 26,

15, 2019 invoicing date or the August 14, 2019 due date. (Rose Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. 14.) The

2019, Watermaster staff updated and re-sent the invoice to Phelan, again failing to update the July

Watermaster received no further correspondence from Phelan regarding the RWA invoice until

On or about September 13, 2019, a Phelan representative contacted the Watermaster to

RWAs. Watermaster staff began drafting these invoices in July 2019 in anticipation of a staff

member's planned leave in August, and in order to ensure invoices could be efficiently and

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Exh. 13.)

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III. <u>ARGUMENT</u>

the filing of this Motion. (Rose Decl. ¶ 6.)

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A. The RWA Rates are Supported By Substantial Evidence

Although judicial review of a Watermaster decision is de novo (Judgment ¶ 20.3.4),

Phelan suggests that the "substantial evidence" test is the applicable standard of review for

determining the enforceability of the 2016, 2017, and 2018 RWAs. When weighing the evidence 1 in the record in order to determine whether a decision is supported by substantial evidence, the 2 Court must indulge all presumptions, and resolve all conflicts, in favor of the agency's decision. 3 (Telish v. State Pers. Bd. (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 1479, 1487.) "In determining whether 4 substantial evidence supports a finding, the court may not reconsider or reevaluate the evidence 5 presented to the administrative agency." (Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Cty. of San Bernardino (2010) 185 Cal. App. 4th 866, 881 (internal quotes omitted).) Regardless of the standard of 7 review, the evidence in the record—the Raftelis Report—clearly supports the Watermaster's 8 decision to adopt the 2016, 2017, and 2018 RWAs for Parties outside the AVSWCA boundaries. Phelan's argument that there is no substantial evidence to support the RWAs relies entirely on an 10 incorrect interpretation of the Judgment and the analysis found in the Raftelis Report. 11 While the Watermaster is responsible under the Judgment to accomplish recharge of 12 Replacement Water, it does not have contracts for Imported Water supplies, and it does not have 13 facilities for recharge of Imported Water. Therefore the Watermaster must work with entities that 14 have contracts for Imported Water and/or recharge facilities—i.e., AVSWCA's constituent 15 members, each of whom has a contract with the California Department of Water Resources 16 ("DWR") for entitlement to and delivery of Imported Water from the State Water Project 17 ("SWP"). (Judgment ¶ 9.2 (all RWAs "collected by the Watermaster shall be used to acquire 18 Imported Water from AVEK, [LCID], [PWD], or other entities.").)² 19 20 21

AVSWCA contracted the Raftelis Report in recognition of the fact that SWP water is a critical source of Replacement Water, and that AVSWCA costs of acquiring and recharging Replacement Water would be an important factor in determining RWAs. The AVSWCA also recognized that the Watermaster will need to acquire and recharge Replacement Water for Parties outside the ACSWCA service area, which is not covered by the AVSWCA constituent members'

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Carry Over or Stored Water, or Production Rights or Imported Water Return Flow rights.

² Note that Parties have options other than payment of RWAs to address their Replacement Obligation. The RWAs based on the Raftelis Report reflect the amount required by the State Water Contractors to obtain and recharge imported water to meet Replacement Water Obligations, without any "markup" or "profit" for the Watermaster. Parties are free to address their Replacement Obligations in other ways if they choose, including purchases from willing sellers of

existing rates. (Knudson Decl. ¶ 12, Exh. 12.) Therefore the Raftelis Report was prepared in order "to conduct financial analyses necessary to develop the proposed [RWAs] for [Parties outside the AVSWCA boundaries] related to AVSWCA's groundwater recharge activities." (Knudson Decl. Exh. 8 (Raftelis Report p. 1).) The Raftelis Report details the analysis performed to generate the RWA rates, including appendices with DWR data for each AVSWCA constituent member, and provides results and recommendations based on the data analysis.

AVSWCA's constituent members collect revenues for both: (1) variable costs recovered through charges for water deliveries on a cost per acre-foot basis; and (2) fixed costs that are independent of the amount of SWP water delivered to specific users that are recovered through property taxes on lands within the AVSWCA boundaries. The Raftelis Report identifies the total costs of SWP water, and expresses it as a cost per acre-foot. Parties within the AVSWCA boundaries already contribute to payment of SWP fixed costs through property taxes, so that RWA rates for those Parties can be determined simply as the existing variable charges for the amount of water actually delivered. (Knudson Decl. Exh. 8 (Raftelis Report p. 2).)

The RWA rate for Parties <u>outside</u> of the AVSWCA boundaries, however, includes an additional fixed cost component to make the RWA rate equitable to the rates for Parties within the AVSWCA boundaries (who already pay a portion of the cost of Imported Water through property taxes). (Knudson Decl. Exh. 8 (Raftelis Report p. 1) ("[I]t is reasonable and equitable for the [Parties outside the AVSWCA boundaries] to pay a [RWA] based in part on the investments of the [AVSWCA constituent] members.").) The methodology used to determine the fixed cost component for Parties outside of the AVSWCA boundaries is outlined in step 1 of the Raftelis Report as follows:

- 1(a): The total present value of SWP fixed costs through year 2017 for each of the AVSWCA's constituent members were estimated based on information contained in their water supply contracts with DWR, using an average cost escalation factor of 3.9% per year.
- 1(b): The total present value is divided by the total SWP deliveries in acre-feet through year 2017.

This methodology evaluates the fixed cost amounts paid by those Parties within the AVSWCA boundaries through property taxes, and estimates an equivalent cost per acre-foot to be collected

from Parties that incur Replacement Obligations based on Production outside of the AVSWCA boundaries. (Knudson Decl. Exh. 8 (Raftelis Report p. 2).)

Phelan argues "there is no substantial evidence establishing that the RWA rates in fact represent all [costs incurred by the Watermaster related to Replacement Water]." (Motion at 12:10-11.) However the Raftelis Report provides information on the appropriate purchase price for Imported Water for those outside of the AVSWCA boundaries, and adjusts the variable cost "to account for 10% water loss due to leakage" that could apply to the recharge process. (Knudson Decl. Exh. 8 (Raftelis Report p. 2).) Phelan does not explain what costs are alleged to be missing from the Raftelis Report, and later, without any supporting evidence, argues that the RWAs may need to be lower. (Motion at 13:1-5.) These conclusory allegations do not demonstrate a lack of substantial evidence supporting the Watermaster-approved RWAs.

Phelan further asserts that there is "no substantial evidence explaining why some Parties receive significantly lower rates than those demanded of Phelan." (Motion at 12:11-12.) This ignores the stated purpose of the Raftelis Report: to "develop the proposed [RWAs] for" Parties outside the AVSWCA boundaries, in order to reflect that those Parties need to pay their fair share of the fixed costs associated with SWP water. (Knudson Decl. Exh. 8 (Raftelis Report p. 1).)

Phelan also asserts there is no substantial evidence to support the finding that the RWA rate for Parties outside of the AVSWCA boundaries are based on the actual cost of Replacement Water. To the contrary, the Raftelis Report explains that analysis of the appropriate RWA rate for Parties outside of the AVSWCA boundaries must reflect an equitable share of the fixed costs for SWP water because those Parties do not pay for fixed costs through property taxes. (Knudson Decl. Exh. 8 (Raftelis Report p. 2, steps 1(a) and 1(b)).) The RWA rate identified in the Raftelis Report therefore accurately reflects the cost of Imported Water to the AVSWCA.

Phelan characterizes the objective of the Raftelis Report as both: (1) "to justify recovery of costs incurred by the AVSWCA rather than the Watermaster," (Motion at 12:21-22); and (2) "to generate a revenue stream for the AVSWCA rather than recover the Watermaster's costs." (Motion at 13:5-6.) While it is true that the suggested RWA rates in the Raftelis Report are based on providing sufficient revenues for AVSWCA to deliver and recharge Imported Water as

required for Replacement Water by the Watermaster, it is misleading for Phelan to imply that the RWA rate in the Raftelis Report does not reflect costs that the Watermaster would incur for Replacement Water. Rather than relying on Phelan's disingenuous characterization of what the objective or purpose of the Raftelis Report "appears to be," the Court should instead look at the plain language of the Raftelis Report's stated objectives:

- "The primary objective of the study was to perform a financial analysis of the imported water costs associated with AVSWCA's groundwater basin recharge, and to develop [RWA] fees to be assessed to property owners or agencies outside of AVSWCA's service area." (Knudson Decl. Exh. 8 (Raftelis Report transmittal letter dated March 6, 2019).)
- "The primary objective of the Study was to conduct financial analysis necessary to develop the proposed [RWA] for Outside Users related to AVSWCA's groundwater recharge activities." (Knudson Decl. Exh. 8 (Raftelis Report p. 1).)

The evidence in the Raftelis Report therefore supports the RWA rates through an objective, factdriven analysis of the actual costs of acquiring and recharging Replacement Water which comports with the needs and responsibilities of the Watermaster under the Judgment.

Phelan also expresses confusion about the escalation of past financial values to 2018 dollars, noting the use of "an average cost escalation factor of 3.9 percent which is purported [to be] equal to the average annual increase in the Consumer Price Index between 1962 and 2017," but that the Raftelis Report did not disclose "which Consumer Price Index was used for this calculation." (Motion at 12:24-28). In its April 23, 2019 and August 26, 2019 comment letters to the Watermaster Engineer, Phelan indicated that it "attempted to replicate the process by which the capital costs were inflated to 2017 or 2018 dollars and have been unable to confirm the accuracy of the calculation." (Motion, Exh. 9 & 12.) Phelan provides no documentation in its comment letters or the Motion indicating how it attempted to replicate the average CPI escalation rate. However, a simple internet search of CPI data reveals the average annual CPI from 1962 (30.2) to 2017 (245.12) is computed to equal 3.88%, which if rounded to the nearest tenth equals 3.9%. Sudhir Pardiwala, the author of the Raftelis Report, confirmed that Raftelis used the data from the CPI-All Urban Consumers (Current Series) for Los Angeles to make this calculation. It

https://cpiinflationcalculator.com/

is unclear whether Phelan is concerned about this minimal rounding or some other calculation, but Phelan's concerns clearly have no bearing on whether the RWA calculations are supported by substantial evidence.

Phelan states that the Raftelis Report "centers around recovery of various costs, including but not limited to, capital costs inflated to current values, incurred by the members of the State Water Project, since the inception of the State Water Project," and that "[t]he original cost of construction of the State Water Project in 1962 has been inflated from its original dollar amounts to supposedly 2018 values . . ." (Motion at 12:22-26.) This description roughly correlates to step 1(a) in the Raftelis Report for the computation of the present value of SWP fixed costs of AVSWCA constituent members through 2017, although the Raftelis Report estimates the "present value of fixed costs through 2017," which is different from "the original cost of construction of the State Water Project in 1962." (Knudson Decl. Exh. 8 (Raftelis Report p. 2).) For some reason Phelan ignores step 1(b) of the Raftelis Report computation, in which the total present value is divided by the total SWP deliveries to generate a fixed cost per acre-foot. (*Ibid.*) Phelan's failure to consider the additional step in 1(b) to compute a SWP fixed cost per acre-foot indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of the methodology in the Raftelis Report. Nothing in Phelan's description suggests a lack of substantial evidence supporting the RWA rates.

Phelan further implies that the Raftelis Report should consider whether historical costs have already been recouped from other sources "such that the RWA rates should be lower, or perhaps should not include a component for these capital costs at all." (Motion at 13:1-5.)

Whether historical costs have been recovered (and the sources of such recovery) is irrelevant to setting RWA rates that will apply to Replacement Obligations incurred in the <u>future</u>. RWAs are intended to pay for future purchases of Imported Water and are not related to recouping past costs. Furthermore, fixed costs will continue to be a component of the cost of purchase of Imported Water, and therefore must continue to be included in the RWA rate calculation. Finally, fixed costs should be equitably shared by those inside <u>and</u> outside of the AVSWCA boundaries. Phelan's concerns are therefore unrelated to evaluating whether the RWA rate is supported by substantial evidence.

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⁴ The Watermaster could only buy Replacement Water before it receives RWAs if it borrows money under Judgment Paragraph 18.4.7, which is limited to "an amount not to exceed the annual amount of assessment."

Phelan also argues that the RWA rate must be based on costs already incurred by the Watermaster, implying that estimation of the RWA rate before costs are actually incurred does not provide substantial evidence therefor. For example, Phelan argues that the Raftelis Report fails to examine whether or how the costs presented relate to costs incurred by the Watermaster in providing Replacement Water, and "[t]here is no evidence presented that the Watermaster has in fact purchase[d] any Replacement Water, what costs it incurred to do so, and what spreading costs the Watermaster has incurred." (Motion at 13:7-10, (emphasis added).) However the Judgment clearly contemplates collection of RWAs prior to the purchase and recharge of the Replacement Water. 4 Replacement Water is defined as "Water purchased by the Watermaster or otherwise provided to satisfy a Replacement Obligation" (Judgment ¶ 3.5.40), which makes clear the water purchase precedes the satisfaction of the Replacement Obligation by using Replacement Water to recharge the Basin. The Judgment also includes provisions to address a situation where, due to cost increases, the RWAs may be "insufficient to purchase all Imported Water for which the Assessments were made," demonstrating that RWAs are collected before the purchase of Replacement Water. (Id. ¶ 9.2.)

For these reasons, the data, analysis, and recommendations in the Raftelis Report clearly provide more than substantial evidence to support the Watermaster-approved 2016, 2017, and 2018 RWAs for Parties outside the AVSWCA boundaries, as set forth in Resolution No. R-19-27. Phelan's arguments to the contrary are inapposite, and demonstrate Phelan's lack of understanding of the terms of the Judgment and of the analysis in the Raftelis Report.

B. Rules And Regulations Are Not Required To Impose And Collect RWAs

Phelan argues that because the Watermaster has not adopted rules and regulations for levying and collecting RWAs, "the invoice must be invalidated, and the Watermaster must be directed to adopt the necessary rules and regulations, procedures and schedules, before re-issuing the invoice." (Motion at 13:21-24). To the contrary, all assessments "shall be levied and collected

in accordance with the <u>procedures and schedules</u> determined by the Watermaster." (Judgment ¶ 18.4.12 (emphasis added).) Phelan incorrectly conflates the term "procedures and schedules" with the term "rules and regulations." Nothing in Paragraph 18.4.12 or anywhere else in the Judgment indicates that Watermaster adoption of "rules and regulations," a clearly defined term, is a prerequisite to the levying and collection of RWAs.

The Judgment consistently identifies all instances in which rules and regulations must be adopted prior to the Watermaster taking specific actions. (*See Id.* ¶¶ 9.2 (allocation of Imported Water), 16.1 (when Transfers are permitted), 18.1.4 (AVEK performance of Watermaster staff and administrative functions), 18.4.12 (definition of delinquent assessment), 18.5.5 (installation of water meters), 18.5.12 (Production reports), 18.5.14 (Storage Agreements), and 18.5.17 (Annual Report public hearing).) Such rules and regulations must be prepared by the Watermaster and proposed to the Court for adoption after a public hearing with 30 days' advance notice. (*Id.* ¶ 18.4.2.)

The levy and collection of assessments, on the other hand, must be done in accordance with "procedures and schedules <u>determined by the Watermaster</u>." (*Id.* ¶ 18.4.12.) The term "procedures and schedules" is not used anywhere else in the Judgment, and clearly is not analogous to "rules and regulations." This is supported by the fact that the Watermaster may unilaterally "determine" such procedures and schedules, as opposed to rules and regulations which must be "adopted" and approved by the Court after public comment.

Watermaster Resolution No. R-19-20, attached as Exhibit 10 to the Motion, does not support Phelan's position. This resolution adopts a memorandum from the Watermaster General Counsel recommending methods for collecting delinquent assessments, and directs that the memorandum be incorporated into the Watermaster's final set of rules and regulations which will eventually be presented to the Court for approval. Nothing in the Judgment requires that RWA levy and collection procedures be incorporated into rules and regulations prior to implementation. Furthermore, while Resolution No. R-19-20 mentions rules and regulations, it is itself not involved in the adoption of rules and regulations, and therefore is not governed by Section 18.4.2 and its hearing requirement and time frames.

Even assuming that the plain language of the Judgment could be construed to require the Watermaster to adopt rules and regulations prior to collecting and levying RWAs, any such requirement would constitute a mere formality, and Phelan's argument elevates form over substance. The Watermaster is clearly authorized to levy and collect RWAs, and in fact is obligated to do so in order to timely purchase Replacement Water and protect the health of the Basin. A Court declaration that the Watermaster's hands are tied in enforcement of a key component of the Judgment until finalizing unnecessary rules and regulations would improperly delay a critical step in ensuring Replacement Obligations are timely satisfied.

C. The Invoicing Irregularities Do Not Render The Invoice Invalid

Phelan argues that the erroneous invoicing date and due date on the invoice require invalidation of the invoice and the RWAs reflected therein. (Motion at 14:14-15.) Phelan goes so far as to suggest that these ministerial dating errors demonstrate that "the RWA rates were actually adopted in secret." (Motion at 14:4-5.)

Watermaster's final approval of the applicable RWA rates and in anticipation of a staff member's planned leave in August 2019. As a result of the shifting of Watermaster staff member responsibilities, the July invoicing date and August due date were erroneously carried over onto the final invoices once the applicable RWAs were entered into the template invoices. This is not supportive of Phelan's conspiracy theory, nor does it indicate that the Watermaster must adopt rules and regulations prior to collecting RWAs. Rather these dating inconsistencies were harmless ministerial errors which had no prejudicial effect on Phelan.

Furthermore, the RWA rates were adopted at a properly noticed public hearing after receiving public comment from Phelan. (Motion at Exh. 12 (Phelan's August 26, 2019 comment letter).) This was in no way a "secret" process.

While the Motion highlights that the number of acre-feet and assessment amount for 2018 were "the only changes made" to the invoice, this was the only item that Phelan brought to the Watermaster's attention and requested to be updated. (Motion, Bartz Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) If Phelan was unclear about the due date for the purposes of the 10% late fee referenced in the invoice, it could

have contacted the Watermaster directly to request clarification. A motion for declaratory relief was hardly necessary to rectify this harmless ministerial error.

D. The 2016 And 2017 RWAs Are Enforceable Pending The Outcome Of Phelan's Appeal Of The 2018 Order

Phelan acknowledges that "the April 2018 Order that is the subject of a pending appeal by Phelan was not a money judgment." (Motion at 11:25-26 (emphasis added).) Nevertheless, Phelan goes on to argue that as a government agency it cannot be required to post a bond or make a deposit to avoid enforcement of a money judgment pending appeal (Motion at 11:14-24), which is clearly an argument specific to judgments for money.

Phelan's position appears to be premised on the idea that the 2018 Order "paved the way for the Watermaster's issuance of the invoice," and therefore that the invoice "is, in effect, seeking to enforce the April 2018 Order, or seeking a bond or deposit." (Motion at 11:26, 12:1-2.) Phelan fails to recognize that its obligation to pay RWA is elective and arises only if Phelan wishes to avoid the prohibitory injunction against exporting Groundwater from the Basin. (Judgment § 6.4.1.2). The Judgment does not permit Phelan to invoke the exception to the prohibitory injunction without paying RWAs. Having elected to pump Groundwater from the Basin, Phelan is responsible for the RWAs imposed by the Watermaster. This is not analogous to Phelan being required to post a bond pending the outcome of the appeal of a money judgment. Phelan's payment of the RWA reflects a condition under the Judgment that Phelan accepted when it chose to pump Groundwater for export from the Basin post-Judgment.

Phelan's obligation to comply with the injunction against pumping Groundwater for export unless Phelan pays RWAs is not stayed by its appeal of the 2018 Order. While proceedings on a mandatory injunction are automatically stayed by perfecting an appeal from the injunction, a "prohibitory injunction is self-executing" and therefore is not automatically stayed by appeal.

(Sun-Maid Raisin Growers of Cal. v. Paul (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 368, 374; Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Davis (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 827, 835.) To ascertain whether an injunction is mandatory or prohibitory, courts look not to the designation or form of the language in the judgment or order imposing the injunction, but instead look to the terms and effect of the injunction. (People v.

1	Mobile Magic Sales, Inc. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 1, 13; United Railroads of San Francisco v.		
2	Superior Court (1916) 172 Cal. 80, 84.) Mandatory relief will "compel the performance of a		
3	substantive act or a change in the relative positions of the parties," whereas prohibitive relief		
4	"seeks to restrain a party from a course of conduct or to halt a particular condition." (Mobile		
5	Magic Sales, 96 Cal.App.3d at 13.) "The character of prohibitory injunctive relief, is not		
6	changed to mandatory in nature merely because it incidentally requires performance of an		
7	affirmative act." (Ibid., citing United Railroads, 172 Cal. 80, 88-89.) If an injunction commands		
8	an affirmative action in order to prevent a party from engaging in a prohibited act, it is still		
9	prohibitive in character and properly issued to halt a continuing violation. (<i>Ibid.</i>)		
10	Here, the injunction prohibiting exports of Groundwater except as provided in the		
11	Judgment is prohibitory in character as it halts continuing appropriation of Groundwater in the		
12	overdrafted Basin. If Phelan wishes to continue pumping and exporting Groundwater, it must		
13	render the injunction inapplicable to its exports by invoking the exception to the injunction, which		
14	includes payment of RWAs. The injunction therefore is not stayed pending appeal, and Phelan is		
15	obligated to pay RWAs for 2016, 2017 and 2018 forthwith.		
16	IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>		
17	For the foregoing reasons, the Watermaster respectfully requests that Phelan's Motion be		
18	denied in its entirety.		
19	Respectfully submitted,		
20	Dated: October 25, 2019 PRICE, POSTEL & PARMA LLP		
21	. 0		
22	Ву:		
23	CRAIG A. PARTON CAMERON GOODMAN		
24	Attorneys for		
25	Antelope Valley Watermaster		
26			
27			
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[Exempt From Filing Fee Government Code § 6103]

Ì		Government Code § 6103]	
1 2 3 4 5 6	ALESHIRE & WYNDER, LLP JUNE S. AILIN, State Bar No. 109498 jailin@awattorneys.com NICOLAS D. PAPAJOHN, State Bar No. 30536 npapajohn@awattorneys.com 18881 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 1700 Irvine, California 92612 Telephone: (949) 223.1170 Facsimile: (949) 223.1180 Attorneys for Defendant and Cross-Complainant Phelan Piñon Hills Community Services District		
8			
9	SUPERIOR COURT OF TH	E STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
10			
11	-		
12	Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b))	Case No. Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408	
13	ANTELOPE VALLEY	9	
14	GROUNDWATER CASES	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER AFTER HEARINGS ON APRIL 18, 2018	
- 15	Included Actions:	112.1141.00 01.112.112.20, 2010	
16 17	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co., et al. Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case	[Motion by PPHCSD Requesting Declaratory Relief Regarding Watermaster's Resolution R-18-04, Finding PPHCSD is Obligated to Pay Replacement	
18	No. BC 325 201	Water Assessment Notwithstanding First Sentence of Judgment Section 8.3]	
19	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v.		
20	Diamond Farming Co., et al. Kern County Superior Court, Case No.	Assigned for All Purposes to:	
21	S-1500-CV-254-348	Hon. Jack Komar	
22 23	Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of Lancaster		
23	Diamond Farming Co. v. City of Lancaster Diamond Farming Co. v. Palmdale Water		
25	Dist. Riverside County Superior Court,		
26	Consolidated Action, Case Nos. RIC 353 840, RIC 344 436, RIC 344 668		
27	AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS		
20			

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER AFTER HEARINGS ON APRIL 18, 2018

01133.0012/476394.1

EXHIBIT 15

Case No. JCCP 4408.

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 18, 2018, an Order was entered in the above entitled Court. A true and correct copy of the Court's Order is attached hereto.

DATED: May 25, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

ALESHIRE & WYNDER, LLP JUNE S. AILIN

By:

NES. AILIN

Attorneys for Defendant and Cross-Complainant Phelan Piñon Hills Community Services District

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Case No.

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER AFTER HEARINGS ON APRIL 18, 2018

Issued April 27, 2018 Envelope: 1460121 2 3 4 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 7 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 8 9 ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER Judicial Council Coordination CASES Proceeding No. 4408 10 Included Consolidated Actions: 11 Lead Case No. BC 325 201 12 Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. 13 ORDER AFTER HEARINGS ON Superior Court of California **APRIL 18, 2018** County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 325 201 14 Motion by PPHCSD Requesting 15 Declaratory Relief Regarding Watermaster's Resolution R-18-04, Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. 16 Finding PPHCSD's is Obligated to Pay Replacement Water Assessment Superior Court of California, County of Kern, Case No. S-1500-CV-254-348 17 Notwithstanding First Sentence of Judgment Section 8.3. 18 Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of Lancaster Diamond Farming Co. v. City of Lancaster 19 Honorable Jack Komar, Ret. Judge: Diamond Farming Co. v. Palmdale Water Dist. Superior Court of California, County of 20 Riverside, consolidated actions, Case Nos. 21 RIC 353 840, RIC 344 436, RIC 344 668 22 Rebecca Lee Willis v. Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 23 Superior Court of California, County of Los 24 Angeles, Case No. BC 364 553 25 Richard A. Wood v. Los Angeles County 26 Waterworks District No. 40 Superior Court of California, County of Los 27 Angeles, Case No. BC 391 869 28 Antelope Valley Groundwater Litigation (Consolidated Cases) (JCCP 4408) Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Lead Case No. BC 325 201 Order After Hearings on April 18, 2018

The above-entitled matters came on regularly for hearing on April 18, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Room 222, the Honorable Jack Komar (Ret.) presiding. The appearances are as stated in the record. The Court, having read and considered the supporting and opposing papers, and having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefore, makes the following order:

The subject of this coordinated matter is an adjudication of conflicting claims for water in a drought impacted, severely overdrawn aquifer in the Antelope Valley. The adjudication as a coordinated case commenced in 2005 and was completed by entry of judgment in December 2015.

The court adjudicated the respective water rights of the residents, property owners, municipalities, public service districts, industries, farmers, and public and private water producers, and approved and adopted a remedy (physical solution) to relieve the continuing shortage of water within the basin.

A Judgment was signed by the court on December 23, 2015, based upon the court's findings of fact and a stipulation among most but not all of the parties to the litigation. As an integral part of the judgment, the court adopted a physical solution which most of the parties stipulated to or supported and which the court independently adopted, thereby making it binding on all the parties to the adjudication.

The judgment and physical solution established which parties have water rights in the adjudication area, quantifying such rights where possible, and established a process to eliminate the overdraft by which all parties having a right to pump water from the aquifer (water producers) are required to reduce their pumping from the native yield over a period of time and to pay a replacement water assessment for any water pumped which exceeds their annual and ultimately their permanent entitlement.

The judgment provides for a seven year period commencing in 2016 within which to bring the aquifer into balance so that annual water production does not exceed the native safe

yield of the aquifer. With a gradual reduction of pumping by all water producers, by the end of the rampdown period, the total amount of pumping is expected to not exceed the annual recharge, and to bring the aquifer into balance. The physical solution and Judgment established the creation of a Watermaster to manage the physical solution.

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The motion by Defendant/Cross Complainant Phelan Pinon Hills Community Services District (hereinafter Phelan) seeks a declaration that it is entitled to the benefit of Paragraph 8.3 of the physical solution (all references to paragraphs are to the numbered paragraphs in the physical solution) which provides that "during the first two years of the Rampdown Period, no producer will be subject to a replacement water assessment. The motion is opposed by the Watermaster and the Public Water Producers.

Phelan occupies a unique position as a party to this litigation. Phelan is a public entity, a community service district, and is charged with, among other things, a duty to provide water to its customers. It owns a single well in the Antelope Valley Adjudication area from which it obtains some of the water used to service its customers. None of its customers reside in the subject adjudication area. As is explained below, Phelan has neither appropriative nor prescriptive rights to pump or produce ground water in the adjudication area.

Notwithstanding that it has no correlative water right, in view of the public good and the public interest, the court deemed it equitable to permit Phelan the right to continue to pump water and export it for use of its customers with quantity limits so long as it paid for the water based upon its replacement cost and so long it was not causing damage to the aquifer. The amount of water that Phelan can pump is capped at 1200 acre feet per year based on its historical usage. See Paragraph 6.4.1.2. The essence of Phelan's theory is that because it pumps water from the aquifer it is a producer, and that Paragraph 8.3 is unqualified in its description of "producer." The Watermaster and the public water producers have opposed Phelan's interpretation of the Paragraph 8.3.

While Phelan points to the express language of Paragraph 8.3, as the beginning and end of the inquiry, it is necessary to look at the entirety of Paragraph 8 and all of its subparts (as well as the entirety of the physical solution, including the entire rampdown process) to

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evaluate Phelan's position. While the first sentence in Paragraph 8.3 does specifically eliminate the replacement water assessment during the first two years of the rampdown period, and in a vacuum might appear to support Phelan's argument, the second sentence makes clear to whom the relief applies: "During years three through seven of the rampdown period, the amount that each party may produce from the native safe yield will be progressively reduced as necessary, in equal annual increments, from its Pre-rampdown production to its Production right. . . any amount produced over the required production shall be subject to the replacement water assessment." See Paragraph 9.2.

Parties with a prescriptive or other appropriative or "legacy" right¹ to produce water from the native yield are described in Paragraph 5.1 et sq., and includes the small pumper class, overlying producers, non-overlying producers (public water suppliers with prescriptive rights) as well as the federal and state government entities. While Paragraph 3.5.30 defines a producer as a party who produces groundwater, "produce" is defined as pumping that is for reasonable and beneficial uses. Paragraph 3.5.29.

The issue requires interpretation of the judgment and the court approved physical solution. All parties contend that the stipulation and judgment is clear on its face although they arrive at different conclusions. No party has offered parol or extrinsic evidence to interpret the stipulation or the judgment. However, in ascertaining the intent of the judgment and the language used in its interpretation, it is necessary to consider the court's statements of decisions, the evidence upon which the court based the approval of the physical solution, and the entirety of the physical solution and the judgment.

The physical solution "requires quantifying the Producers' rights within the basin which will reasonably allocate the Native Safe Yield..." Paragraph 7. Phelan was found to not have any correlative or other rights to native yield. It acquired no prescriptive right, made no reasonable and beneficial use of any water on property from which it pumped water within the adjudication area, and exported all water pumped from its single well out of the

Parties who protected their correlative rights by pumping water in the face of prescriptive claims.
 Phelan produced no evidence to support a prescriptive right and voluntarily dismissed a claim for prescription.

 adjudication area for use of its customers in the Mojave Adjudication Area. See Partial Statement of Decision of February 3, 2015. The aquifer was, and has long been, in severe overdraft at the time that Phelan first commenced pumping from its well in 2005 in the adjudication area r and it could not establish an appropriative right. There was no surplus of ground water. Phelan's only right to pump is under the provisions of Paragraph 6.4.1.2. See also Paragraph 3(f) of the Judgment itself.

As a party not having a right to a correlative share of the water in the aquifer, Phelan also has no obligations or other burdens or role in the rampdown process or the rampdown period. Consequently, because Phelan has no rampdown obligations, the provisions relieving a producer of the obligation to pay a water replacement assessment for pumping over its reduced pumping rights has no relevance or impact on Phelan. Only parties subject to the rampdown are required to reduce the amount of water pumped over the rampdown period at their own cost and to pay a replacement water assessment only if they pump more than their reduced right.

The Replacement Water Assessment as specified in Paragraph 9.2 is designed to ensure that as the various producers water rights are reduced, water used above the reduced right will result in an assessment to permit the Watermaster to replace that excess water with imported water. Phelan has no water rights, is not obligated to engage in pumping reduction, and is permitted to produce and pay for up to 1200-acre feet a year. The rampdown provisions do not apply to Phelan which has no right to produce water from the aquifer without paying for replacement water. It also has no rampdown obligations. If it uses water, it must pay for it.

Phelan is neither a stipulating nor a supporting party to the judgment. Paragraph 5.1.10 specifically provides that non-stipulating parties are subject to the judgment's terms but if such party has any water rights as determined by the court, it is subject to reduction in production to implement the physical solution, and the requirement to pay assessments, but shall not be entitled to benefits provided by the stipulation. Here, the court found that Phelan was an

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appropriator without any water rights, but accorded it a right to pump but that it must, in effect, pay for all water pumped out of the adjudication area so that the water taken can be replaced by imported water. Phelan's water pumping right is not based on a correlative right to water in the aquifer.

Paragraph 6.4.1.2 in effect permits Phelan to pay for water to replace all water it pumps out of the adjudication area so long as it nets out the water pumped by water to be replaced. But that does not make Phelan a water producer of right from the native safe yield. The specific language of 6.4.2.1 permits Phelan to pump "up to 1200 acre feet a year" so long as it causes no material Injury to the native safe yield and so long as it pays a water replacement assessment so that the water it removes can be returned by purchased water acquired by the Watermaster. Because Phelan has no right to pump water from the native yield without paying for the same, it is not a water producer as defined in Paragraphs 5.1 et seq.

The parties seeking approval of the proposed physical solution and judgment offered evidence to justify and support the proposal. The physical solution was dependent on that evidence. The rights granted to Phelan were only to be a purchaser of water so that its use could not impact the status of the aquifer. No expert opinion quantified Phelan's water use as either a plus or a minus- it was intended to have no net impact. If, as it requests, it is not required to pay for water pumped during 2016 and 1017, its pumping would contribute to the overdraft by pumping water to which it has no right.

The expert opinions were based on the provisions of the stipulation and court's various trial phase statements of decision, subject to the specifics in the proposed judgment and the stipulation. The testimony provided justification for the efficacy of the physical solution, showing how the rampdown process would be able to bring the basin into balance within 7 years. The entirety of the statements of decision and the findings of the court upon which the experts opinions were based included findings that Phelan had no water rights (and because all water pumped by it would be replaced by water purchased by water replacement assessments, Phelan's water use was not subject to the rampdown provisions). Phelan received no burdens

(other than the water assessment) and would receive no benefits from the stipulation since it 2 had no reduction obligations and was neither a stipulating nor a supporting party to the 3 physical solution or the judgment. **CONCLUSION** The court concludes that Phelan is not entitled to the provisions of Paragraph 8.3. The specification that "during the first two years of the Rampdown Period no producer shall be 6 subject to a Replacement Water Assessment . . ." (emphasis added) is not unqualified. It limits 7 the definition of "producers" to parties having a right to pump from the native yield but who 8 also have a duty to reduce pumping. 10 SO ORDERED. Dated: April 26, 2018 12 How. Jack Komar (Ret.) Judge of the Superior Court 13 14 15 16 17 18 22 25 26 28

Antelope Valley Groundwater Littgation (Consolidated Cases) (JCCP 4408) Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Lead Case No. BC 325 201

Order After Hearings on April 18, 2018

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Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408
 PROOF OF SERVICE
 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I, Judy C. Carter,

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 2361 Rosecrans Ave., Suite 475, El Segundo, CA 90245.

On May 25, 2018, I served the within document(s) described as NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER AFTER HEARINGS ON APRIL 18, 2018 on the interested parties in this action as follows:

BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: By posting the document(s) listed above to the Antelope Valley WaterMaster website in regard to Antelope Valley Groundwater matter with e-service to all parties listed on the websites Service List. Electronic service and electronic posting completed through www.avwatermaster.org via Glotrans.

BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed said document(s) in an envelope or package provided by the overnight service carrier and addressed to Craig Andrews Parton listed below. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight service carrier or delivered such document(s) to a courier or driver authorized by the overnight service carrier to receive documents.

Craig Andrews Parton Price Postel & Parma 200 E. Carrillo St., Suite 400 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 Tel: (805) 962-0011 (805) 965-3978 Attorney for Watermaster Board for the Antelope Valley Groundwater Adjudication

VIA OVERNIGHT MAIL

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on May 25, 2018, at El Segundo, California.



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Case No.

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER AFTER HEARINGS ON APRIL 18, 2018

1	PROOF OF SERVICE	
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA	
3	I am employed in the County of Santa Barbara, State of California. I am over the age	of
4	eighteen (18) and not a party to the within action. My business address is 200 East Carrillo St Fourth Floor, Santa Barbara, California 93101.	reet,
5	On October 25, 2019, I served the foregoing document described as ANTELOPE VALLEY WATERMASTER'S OPPOSITION TO PHELAN PIÑON HILLS	
6	COMMUNITY SERVICES DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF R WATERMASTER RESOLUTION NO. R-19-27 AND NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT OF	Æ
7	REPLACEMENT WATER ASSESSMENTS FOR 2016, 2017 AND 2018; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF MATTH	EW
8	KNUDSON AND PATRICIA ROSE; EXHIBITS 1-15 on all interested parties in this actio the original and/or true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes, addressed as follows:	n by
9		
10 11	BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: I posted the document(s) listed above to the Santa Clara County Superior Court Website @ www.scefiling.org and Glotrans website in the action of the Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases.	е
12	action of the Anterope variety Groundwater Cases.	
13	(STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the	nat
14	the foregoing is true and correct.	iai
15	(FEDERAL) I hereby certify that I am employed in the office of a member of the Bar this Court at whose direction the service was made.	of
16		
17	Executed on October 25, 2019, at Santa Barbara, California.	
18	Sam CM	
19	Signature Elizabeth Wright	
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