Exempt from filing fee 1 DOUGLAS J. EVERTZ, SBN 123066 Government Code § 6103 MURPHY & EVERTZ LLP 2 650 Town Center Drive, Suite 550 Costa Mesa, California 92626 Telephone: (714) 277-1700 3 Fax: (714) 277-1777 4 Attorneys for Defendants 5 City of Lancaster and Rosamond Community Services District 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 10 11 ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER LASC Case No. BC 325201 **CASES** 12 Judicial Council Coordination Included Actions: Proceeding No. 4408 13 Los Angeles County Waterworks District **CLASS ACTION** No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. 14 Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara Case No. 1-05-CV 049053 15 Los Angeles, Case No. BC325201; Assigned to The Honorable Jack Komar 16 Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co. **NOTICE OF LODGING JUNE 16, 2011** 17 Superior Court of California, County of Kern, REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF Case No. S-1500-CV-254-348 PROCEEDINGS RE PRELIMINARY 18 APPROVAL OF WOOD CLASS Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of **SETTLEMENT** 19 Lancaster, Diamond Farming Co. v. City of Lancaster, Diamond Farming Co. v. Palmdale DATE: October 25, 2013 Water Dist., Superior Court of California 20 TIME: 9:00 a.m. County of Riverside, consolidated actions; Case DEPT: 11 - San Jose 21 Nos. RIC 353 840, RIC 344 436, RIC 344 668. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 {00049748.1}

NOTICE OF LODGING

1	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that City of Lancaster and Rosamond Community Services District	
2	hereby lodge with the Court the June 16, 2011 Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings ("Transcript") in	
3	connection with the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Partial Wood Class Settlement to be held on	
4	October 25, 2013 in the above-captioned action. A true and correct copy of the Transcript is attached	
5	hereto as Exhibit "A."	
6		
7	DATED: October 22, 2013 MURPHY & EVERTZ LLP	
8	David Nout	
9	By: Attorney for City of Languages and	
10	Douglas J. Evertz, Attorney for City of Lancaster and Rosamond Community Services District	
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NOTICE OF LODGING

{00049748.1 }

## **EXHIBIT "A"**

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES	
3	DEPARTMENT NO. 4 HON. JACK KOMAR, JUDGE	
4	COORDINATION PROCEEDING )	
5	SPECIAL TITLE (RULE 1550B) )  JUDICIAL COUNCIL	
6	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES) COORDINATION	
7	PALMDALE WATER DISTRICT AND ) SANTA CLARA CASE NO.	
8	QUARTZ HILL WATER DISTRICT, ) 1-05-CV-049053	
9	CROSS-COMPLAINANTS, )	
10	vs. )	
11	LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS, ) DISTRICT NO. 40, ET AL, )	
12	) CROSS-DEFENDANTS. )	
13	)	
14		
15	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS	
16	THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2011	
17		
18	APPEARANCES:	
19	(SEE APPEARANCE PAGES)	
20		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27	GINGER WELKER, CSR #5585	
28	OFFICIAL REPORTER	

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14		BY: MARLENE L. ALLEN
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CASE NUMBER: 1 JCCP 4408 2 CASE NAME: ANTELOPE VALLEY 3 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2011 DEPARTMENT NO. 2D HON. ELIA WEINBACH 4 5 REPORTER GINGER WELKER, CSR #5585 6 TIME: 8:38 A.M. 7 APPEARANCES: (SEE TITLE PAGE) 8 9 THE COURT: WE HAVE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO ARE ON 10 COURT CALL. HAVE THEY BEEN IDENTIFIED? 11 THE CLERK: YES, THEY HAVE, YOUR HONOR. THE COURT: IF ANYBODY ON COURT CALL WISHES TO 12 13 ARGUE, COMMENT, OR ADDRESS THE COURT, MAKE SURE YOU 14 STATE YOUR NAME EACH TIME YOU SPEAK SO THAT THE REPORTER 15 AND I WILL KNOW WHO YOU ARE. WE HAVE SEVERAL ACTIONS AND MATTERS TO TAKE 16 17 CARE OF THIS MORNING. THE PRIMARY ONE IS THE MOTION FOR 18 PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE WOOD'S CLASS SETTLEMENT 19 PROPOSED. AND THE COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THAT 20 APPLICATION AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF PARTIES WHO HAVE 21 FILED WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THAT. 22 I WILL TELL YOU I HAVE SOME CONCERNS. AND I THINK WE NEED TO ADDRESS THOSE HERE THIS MORNING. 23 BEFORE I DO THAT, IS THERE SOMETHING AS MOVING PARTY, 24 25 MR. MCLACHLAN, THAT YOU WANT TO STATE? 26 MR. MCLACHLAN: NO. I THINK MAYBE THE TIME IS 27 BEST SPENT ADDRESSING WHATEVER CONCERNS THE COURT IS 28 ALLUDING TO.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE FIRST CONCERN I HAVE RELATES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE CLASS MEMBERS AND THE DEFINITION THAT THE ALLOCATION FOR EACH MEMBER WILL BE AS TO PER HOUSEHOLD RATHER THAN TO THE CLASS MEMBERS AS THEY WERE DEFINED IN THE ORDER ESTABLISHING THE CLASS.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE IS POTENTIAL HERE
FOR SOME CONTRADICTIONS IN TERMS. FOR EXAMPLE, A
HOUSEHOLD MAY OWN SEPARATE PARCELS. EACH PARCEL OF
WHICH WOULD HAVE OVERLYING RIGHTS. THAT IS MY FIRST
CONCERN BECAUSE IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE DEFINITION
OF THE CLASS.

AND AS I UNDERSTAND IT -- AND WE WILL TALK

ABOUT THIS IN A FEW MOMENTS -- PART OF THE REASON FOR

THAT IS TO ESTABLISH DOMESTIC USE. AND THAT IS ALSO NOT

PART OF THE CLASS DESCRIPTION. AND IT IS NOT A

LIMITATION OF THE CLASS DESCRIPTION. SO IT IS A

NARROWER DESCRIPTION, IT SEEMS TO ME, THAN THE CLASS

DESCRIPTION.

AND I GUESS WHAT I CAN DO IS JUST GO THROUGH
THESE AND TELL YOU WHAT MY CONCERNS ARE, AND WE CAN
START ADDRESSING THEM SERIATIM.

ON PAGE 11 OF THE AGREEMENT STARTING AT LINE FOUR, "THE SETTLING PARTIES AGREE THAT THE WOOD CLASS MEMBERS MAY EACH PUMP UP TO 3 ACRE-FEET PER HOUSEHOLD FOR REASONABLE AND BENEFICIAL USE ON THEIR OVERLYING LAND," ET CETERA, ET CETERA. AND THAT IF THE COURT DOES NOT APPROVE THIS PROVISION, THIS AGREEMENT IS VOID.

THE PROBLEM THAT I HAVE WITH THAT IS NOT

THAT THE PARTIES WHO ARE SETTLING THE CASE CANNOT AGREE

AMONG THEMSELVES. THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT WHAT YOU ARE

DOING IS ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH, AS I READ THIS

AGREEMENT, THE 3 ACRE-FEET PER YEAR ALLOCATION AS A -
AS A STANDARD THAT IS GOING TO BIND ALL THE NONSETTLING

PARTIES. AND I DON'T THINK YOU CAN DO THAT.

YOU HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE FACT THAT AS TO OTHER PARTIES THE COURT HAS TO MAKE FINDINGS BASED UPON EVIDENCE. I CAN'T DO THAT BASED UPON AN AGREEMENT OF SOME OF THE PARTIES, BUT NOT ALL OF THE PARTIES.

AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THE CONCERN THAT YOU
HAVE IS THAT YOU CAN'T SETTLE THIS CASE WITHOUT THAT
KIND OF A FINDING BINDING EVERYBODY, BUT I CAN'T MAKE
THAT KIND OF A FINDING WITHOUT EVIDENCE AND AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PARTIES TO DISPUTE IT. IT MAY WELL
BE REASONABLE, BUT I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING THAT AT THIS
POINT.

LET ME JUST GO THROUGH HERE: YOU ARE
ATTEMPTING TO BIND A WATER MASTER AND A WATER MASTER
DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF ALLOCATION OF WATER RIGHTS
AND PREVENTING THE COURT AND THE WATER MASTER FROM DOING
ANYTHING OTHER THAN WHAT YOU HAVE AGREED AMONG
YOURSELVES.

WELL, AS TO YOURSELVES, THAT IS FINE. AND

IF YOU WANT TO AGREE THAT THE WATER PRODUCERS, PURVEYORS

HERE, WILL NOT TAKE A POSITION THAT YOU ARE NOT ENTITLED

TO A 3 ACRE-FEET PER YEAR, THAT IS FINE. THEY CAN DO

THAT, BUT YOU CAN'T BIND THE OTHER PARTIES. THE ALLOCATION CANNOT BIND NONSETTLING PARTIES.

MR. MCLACHLIN: YOUR HONOR, THAT LAST COMMENT. IS
THAT DIRECTED TO A PARTICULAR PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT?

THE COURT: YES, IT IS -- IT IS ACTUALLY DIRECTED TO WHERE I JUST POINTED TO.

MR. MCLACHLIN: PAGE 11?

THE COURT: YEAH, PAGE 11, STARTING AT LINE 4; BUT IT THREADS ITS WAY THROUGH THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT SO THAT THE COURT BINDS ITSELF DEPENDING UPON YOUR AGREEMENT AND NOT WHAT THE EVIDENCE MIGHT ESTABLISH UPON FURTHER PRESENTATION OR DETERMINATION BY THE WATER MASTER.

I THINK WHAT YOU ARE ATTEMPTING TO

ACCOMPLISH CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY AGREEMENT, BUT I DON'T

THINK YOU CAN DO IT IN THIS FASHION WHERE YOU ARE

BINDING OTHER PARTIES.

STARTING ON LINE 16 ON THAT SAME PAGE, "IF
THE WATER MASTER'S ASSESSMENT DETERMINES THAT
COLLECTIVELY THAT THE WOOD CLASS IS USING LESS THAN AN
AVERAGE OF 3 ACRE-FEET PER YEAR, THEN ANY UNUSED PORTION
IN ANY GIVEN YEAR WILL BE REALLOCATED FOR USE BY OTHER
OVERLYING OWNERS AS PART OF THEIR RIGHT TO USE THEIR
CORRELATIVE SHARES OF THE BASE OF THE 85 PERCENT OF THE
BASIN'S FEDERALLY ADJUSTED RATE OF SAFE YIELD; HOWEVER,
SUCH REALLOCATION SHALL IN NO WAY DIMINISH ANY CLASS
MEMBERS FOR -- FOR A REASONABLE AND BENEFICIAL USE."

WELL, YOU ARE BINDING THE COURT WITHOUT
HAVING PRESENTED ANY EVIDENCE OF THE PROPRIETY OF THAT

DETERMINATION.

THE -- LINE 26, "THE WOOD CLASS MEMBERS

PUMPING IN EXCESS OF 3 ACRE-FEET PER YEAR SHALL NOT BE

SINGLED OUT BY THE WATER MASTER FOR REDUCTION OF PUMPING

OR ASSESSMENT." WHAT YOU ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO IS

ESTABLISH AN EXEMPTION THAT PREVENTS THE WATER MASTER

FROM MAKING A DETERMINATION AS TO THE APPROPRIATE

ALLOCATION OF WATER TO THE CLASS MEMBERS.

AND YOU CAN, I BELIEVE, ENTER INTO AN

AGREEMENT THAT THE WATER PURVEYORS WILL NOT CONTEST

THAT, BUT YOU CAN'T BIND NONSETTLING PARTIES TO THAT

KIND OF A DETERMINATION.

YET YOU ARE DOING THE SAME THING ON PAGE 12, STARTING AT LINE 6. YOU ARE TAKING AWAY FROM THE COURT THE ABILITY AND THE WATER MASTER THE ABILITY TO MAKE DETERMINATIONS BASED UPON FACTS. AND, AGAIN, AS BETWEEN YOU AND THE WATER PURVEYORS IF THEY WISH TO AGREE NOT TO CONTEST YOUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO THAT, THEY CERTAINLY MAY DO THAT.

AND TO THE EXTENT THAT ALL THE OTHER PARTIES
IN THIS LAWSUIT WERE TO ENTER INTO THAT AGREEMENT AS
WELL, THAT WOULD BE FINE. BUT THAT IS NOT WHAT WE ARE
DEALING WITH HERE. WE ARE DEALING WITH SOME OF THE
PARTIES, AND YOU CANNOT BIND NONSETTLING PARTIES.

AGAIN, ON LINE 23 THROUGH 27, YOU ARE MAKING FINDINGS FOR THE COURT THAT BINDS THIRD PARTIES. AND YOU CAN'T DO THAT TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO DOMESTIC USE WITHOUT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT AND AN OPPORTUNITY

FOR NONSETTLING PARTIES TO CONTEST IT.

MR. MCLACHLIN: YOUR HONOR, AT SOME POINT HERE, I
REALLY WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A COMMENT TO SOME OF THIS
STUFF, PARTICULARLY THIS NOTION OF PRESENTATION OF
EVIDENCE. BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO BE A -- RUNNING THROUGH A
NUMBER OF THE COURT'S OBSERVATIONS ON THESE PAGES 11 AND
12.

THE COURT: WOULDN'T YOU LIKE TO HEAR THE REST OF MY COMMENTS?

MR. MCLACHLIN: YES, YOUR HONOR, I WOULD. I WILL HOLD MY THOUGHTS. CONTINUE.

THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE NOT HAPPY, BUT I
THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE A FULL HEARING ON
THESE ISSUES. YOU'RE ON PAGE 14, PARAGRAPH 2, STARTING
AT LINE 4, "THE SETTLING PARTIES AGREE THAT THE PRIMARY
MEANS FOR ENFORCING THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT AND
MONITORING THE GROUNDWATER USE WILL NOT INCLUDE METERING
OF WELLS."

AND, AGAIN, YOU'RE ELIMINATING THE COURT'S DISCRETION WITH REGARD TO THIS ENTIRE BASIN. IT MAY WELL BE -- AND I DON'T KNOW IF THIS IS THE CASE -- THAT METERING WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

AS TO THIS AGREEMENT IF THE PURVEYORS WANT
TO AGREE WITH YOU THAT THEY WILL NOT ASSERT A RIGHT TO
HAVE METERING, THEY CAN CERTAINLY DO THAT, BUT THEY
CAN'T BIND NONSETTLING PARTIES. THE SAME IS TRUE WITH
THE PROVISIONS REGARDING THE REPLACEMENT WATER.

I GUESS THAT I CAN SIMPLIFY MY CONCERNS BY

TELLING YOU THAT TOO MANY OF THE PROVISIONS IN HERE DO
ATTEMPT TO BIND THIRD PARTIES, TIE THE COURT'S HANDS
WITH REGARD TO DECISIONS THAT IT WILL MAKE BASED UPON
THE EVIDENCE, AND I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU ADDRESS THOSE
ISSUES.

MR. MCLACHLIN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. I THINK
THAT THE FIRST COMMENT I'LL START WITH WAS THE COURT'S
COMMENT RELATIVE TO -- LET ME TAKE A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE.
LET'S SAY THE 3 ACRE-FOOT CONCEPT AND THE LACK OF
EVIDENCE, THE AGREEMENT IS -- WAS STRUCTURED IN THAT
FASHION BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S PRIOR RULINGS
REFLECTINGLY TIEING THE CLASS COUNSEL'S HANDS IN TERMS
OF THE COURT APPOINTED EXPERT. OVER A YEAR AND A HALF
AGO, THE COURT APPOINTED A COURT APPOINTED EXPERT THAT
WAS TASKED WITH THIS VARIOUS ISSUE.

AND -- BUT WE HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED FROM

USING THAT EXPERT TO ACTUALLY DO THE WORK TO ASSESS THE

CLASS'S WATER USE. AND UNDER APPLICABLE LAW -- BEFORE I

AGREED -- THIS IS GOING BACK A LITTLE BIT IN TIME, BUT I

THINK THERE NEEDS TO BE A LITTLE BIT OF AN UNDERSTANDING

OF WHAT IS GOING ON HERE.

BEFORE -- WHEN I WAS INITIALLY APPROACHED TO TAKE THIS CASE, I REFUSED FOR A LOT OF DIFFERENT REASONS. WHEN I DECIDED TO RECONSIDER IT, YOUR HONOR WILL REMEMBER IN MAY OF 2008 THERE WAS A HEARING. I SENT YOU A LETTER AND LAID OUT THE CONCERNS REGARDING THE EXPERT FOR THE CLASS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW IN CALIFORNIA THAT, UNFORTUNATELY, HAS A HOLE IN IT.

IT DOESN'T ALLOW -- EVEN IF I WANTED TO

ADVANCE THOSE COSTS, IT DOESN'T ALLOW THOSE TO BE

RECOVERED. WOOD'S CLASS COUNSEL IS IN A VERY DIFFICULT

SITUATION.

THE AGREEMENT IS STRUCTURED TO DEAL WITH

THAT IN TERMS OF WE STAY IT -- IT IS NOT A 3 ACRE-FOOT.

IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT ANY PARTICULAR CLASS MEMBER -
LET'S JUST TAKE MR. WOOD WHO HAPPENS TO BE IN THE

COURTROOM FOR AN EXAMPLE.

HE IS NOT GETTING A GUARANTEED 3 ACRE-FEET.

WHAT HE IS GETTING IS THE RIGHT TO PUMP FOR A REASONABLE

BENEFICIAL -- BENEFICIAL USES FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES

ON HIS LAND, AND THE OTHER 3800 PEOPLE WOULD BE

EFFECTIVELY IN THE STATE BOAT. YOU CANNOT OBVIOUSLY

TREAT CLASS MEMBERS DIFFERENTLY.

AND THOSE WHO WOULD PUMP, LET'S SAY, MORE
THAN 10 ACRE-FEET AND HAVE SOME LIGHT AGRICULTURAL, THEY
COULD, OF COURSE, OPT-OUT AND HAVE THEIR OWN
REPRESENTATION AND PROVE UP THEIR SELF-HELP. AND THE
COURT COULD SAY, WELL, YOU KNOW, YOU GET X ACRE-FEET OF
WATER OR YOU DON'T AT SOME FUTURE POINT IN TIME.

THERE IS NO WAY FOR CLASS COUNSEL TO DEAL WITH THOSE VARIATIONS. WE DO KNOW -- I KNOW OF NONE OF THESE PROPERTIES OTHER THAN ONE, A CAMP, A CHILDREN'S CAMP, THAT DOESN'T HAVE A RESIDENTIAL USE.

THAT IS THE ONLY REASONABLE WAY TO STRUCTURE
THIS. THE AGREEMENT ALLOWS THE WATER MASTER, ASSUMING
ONE COMES AROUND SOME DAY, TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE

CLASSES' WATER USE ON A WHOLE AND SET THAT. THIS IS EFFECTIVELY THE SURROGATE FOR THE COURT APPOINTED EXPERT.

AND THE WATER MASTER CAN MAKE THAT

ASSESSMENT AND SAY, LOOK, THE CLASS IS ONLY COLLECTIVELY

USING ABOUT 6,000 ACRE-FEET. SO WE ARE GOING TO TAKE

THAT ACCESS AND PUT IT BACK IN THE OVERLYING POOL, AND

IT CAN BE ALLOCATED IN WHATEVER MANNER THE COURT

DETERMINES IN THE FUTURE.

BUT I DISAGREE WITH THE NOTION THAT THERE IS -- SOME OF THE COMMENTS ARE THAT THE -- THAT THE AGREEMENT IS TRYING TO BIND THIRD PARTIES. IN SOME OF THOSE, I WOULD AGREE WITH. BUT THE COURT HAS THE POWER ULTIMATELY TO DECIDE ALL OF THESE ISSUES. AND RELATIVE TO THE CLASS, THESE DECISIONS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE AT SOME POINT IN TIME, AND THERE ARE -- I SEE NOTHING IN HERE THAT -- OTHER THAN THE NOTION THAT THE CLASS IS USING IT FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES THAT SETS EVERYTHING IN STONE AND TIES THE COURT'S HANDS IN THE FUTURE.

THE COURT: WELL, WHAT ABOUT THE LANGUAGE THAT
ALLOCATES THE COST -- THAT LIMITS, I SHOULD SAY, THE
EXEMPTION THE COURT CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT? THE THREE
ACRE-FEET PER YEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, AS A STANDARD AND
THAT -- BUT IT IS NOT EVEN SO MUCH THAT AS IT IS THAT IT
BINDS A WHOLE LOT OF OTHER PARTIES HERE WHO HAVE -- WHO
ARE NOT PART OF THIS AGREEMENT.

MR. MCLACHLIN: THE COURT CLEARLY, I THINK, COULD DO THAT BECAUSE THE LAW SAYS IN CALIFORNIA THAT DOMESTIC

USE -- WELL, LET ME STRIKE THAT.

THE AGREEMENT REFERS TO DOMESTIC USE FOR REASONABLE BENEFICIAL PURPOSES ON THESE PARCELS. SO TO THE EXTENT, LET'S SAY, THAT MR. WOOD OR SOME OTHER CLASS MEMBER DECIDES TO -- OR IS ACTUALLY USING WATER THAT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THOSE STANDARDS, CLEARLY THE COURT, AND IF IT DELEGATES ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO A WATER MASTER, WOULD HAVE THE ABILITY TO CURTAIL THAT PERSON'S WATER USE AND, THEORETICALLY, DOWN TO ZERO ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.

REMEMBER, WE ARE DEALING WITH 3800 PARCELS
HERE. THERE IS NO WAY IN A CLASS CONTEXT TO DO THAT.

IT CAN'T BE DONE. IT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. BECAUSE
IF THAT IS THE -- IF THAT IS WHAT WE ARE REALLY DRIVING
AT, THEN THE CLASS VEHICLE IS THE WRONG VEHICLE TO BE
USING. ALL THESE PEOPLE SHOULD HAVE BEEN INDIVIDUALLY
NAMED AND SERVED AND MADE TO COME IN AS I THINK
BOLTHOUSE MAY HAVE STATED IN THEIR PAPERS AND PROVE UP
THEIR INDIVIDUAL WATER RIGHT.

OKAY. THAT IS WHY MR. GARNER'S DECLARATION
DELINEATES THE HISTORY AND THE USAGE OF THE DE MINIMUS
EXEMPTION. BECAUSE IF WE USE THINGS LIKE -- IF WE
HAVE -- LET'S SAY WE SPEND \$1,500 PER PARCEL TO PUT
METERS ON ALL THESE PARCELS AND THEN WE HAVE TO SPEND,
WHAT, THREE OR 400 OR \$500,000 A YEAR AT LEAST TO HAVE A
COUPLE OF PEOPLE GO READ THOSE MEETINGS.

WE START ADDING UP ALL THE COSTS OF THIS AND WE LOOK AT THE OPTIONS, OF COURSE, OF AERIAL ENFORCEMENT

WHICH IS -- A LOT OF THE WORK HAS BEEN DONE IN THIS

CASE, THE DATABASE ALREADY EXISTS. AND WE LOOK AT THE

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS, I REALLY THINK -- AND I BELIEVE

MR. DUNN AND THE OTHER WATER SUPPLIER COUNSEL ALL AGREE

THAT IF PENNY WISE AND POUND FOOLISH WE END UP SPENDING

A SMALL FORTUNE TO MONITOR WHAT IS A VERY SMALL AMOUNT

OF WATER --

THE COURT: MR. MCLACHLAN, I DON'T DISAGREE WITH
YOU. I DON'T DISAGREE AT ALL WITH THAT CONCLUSION. THE
PROBLEM IS HOW DO WE GET TO THERE. AND WE CAN'T GET TO
THERE IN A LITIGATION AND IN AN ADJUDICATION THAT
ENCOMPASSES ALL OF THE WATER USERS WITHIN THE VALLEY, BY
AGREEMENT OF SOME OF THEM. THAT IS THE PROBLEM THAT I'M
HAVING.

SEE, I DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH YOU AND
THE WATER PURVEYORS AGREEING THAT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO
CONTEST UP TO 3 ACRE-FEET PER YEAR THAT EACH ONE OF THE
MEMBERS OF THIS CLASS HAVE THE RIGHT TO PUMP. OKAY?

AND IT MAY WELL BE THAT WHEN ALL IS SAID AND DONE IF THAT IS THE AGREEMENT AND THE COURT THEN IS IN THE POSITION OF CREATING A PHYSICAL SOLUTION -- AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT FORM IS GOING TO BE -- THAT THAT ENCOMPASSES YOUR AGREEMENT AND EVERYBODY ELSE IS GOING TO BE BOUND BY THAT. BUT YOU CAN'T DO THAT AT THIS POINT. THAT IS THE PROBLEM.

AND WHAT YOU HAVE DONE IS, YOU HAVE ALSO PUT IN LIMITATIONS ON THE COURT'S ABILITY TO CREATE A PHYSICAL SOLUTION HERE. I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THAT

PHYSICAL SOLUTION IS GOING TO BE. I DOUBT SERIOUSLY AT THIS POINT THAT ANYBODY DOES.

WE DON'T EVEN HAVE THE STATEMENT OF DECISION
YET. I HAVE GIVEN A TENTATIVE DECISION. I HAVE A
PROPOSAL FROM THE PURVEYORS AS TO WHAT THAT STATEMENT OF
DECISION SHOULD BE. AND IT MOSTLY FOLLOWS THE TENTATIVE
DECISION THAT I RENDERED WITH A COUPLE OF EXCEPTIONS.

I HAVE ESSENTIALLY INTERROGATORIES FROM SOME OF THE PARTIES ASKING THE COURT TO MAKE DETAILED RESPONSES AS PART OF THE STATEMENT OF DECISION. WE WILL TALK ABOUT THAT ANOTHER TIME. BUT AT THIS POINT, WHAT YOUR AGREEMENT DOES IS IT TIES THE COURT'S HANDS, AND IT CREATES A PROCESS THAT BINDS OTHER PARTIES WHO ARE NOT PARTIES TO THE SETTLEMENT PLAN. AND I JUST DON'T THINK I CAN DO THAT.

I DO THINK THAT THE NUB OF YOUR SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS SOMETHING THAT IF MODIFIED CAN BE APPROVED; BUT AT THIS POINT, I CAN'T APPROVE THE AGREEMENT AS IT STANDS FOR THE REASONS THAT I HAVE INDICATED.

AND IF YOU READ THROUGH THE AGREEMENT, I
THINK THAT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND WHY I CAN'T DO THAT. I
HAVEN'T HEARD FROM MR. DUNN.

MR. DUNN: WELL, I HAVE BEEN LISTENING TO THE COURT'S COMMENTS, AND IT SEEMS TO ME GIVEN WHAT THE COURT HAS INDICATED, AND I HAVE LISTENED TO COUNSEL'S COMMENTS AS WELL, I -- WHAT I WOULD SUGGEST IS THAT WE BE ALLOWED TO AFTER THIS HEARING, YOU KNOW, GO BACK AND SEE WHAT WE CAN DO TO -- I'M LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT

1 WORD -- TO REVIEW, REVISE, EDIT, WHATEVER, THE AGREEMENT 2 TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE COURT'S CONCERNS. 3 THE COURT: WELL, I DO THINK THAT IT IS A WORKABLE 4 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SETTLING PARTIES, AND IT MAY WELL 5 BE IF IT IS A REASONABLE AGREEMENT THAT OTHER PARTIES 6 ARE GOING TO BUY INTO IT AND BE BOUND. BUT I CAN'T MAKE 7 THEM DO THAT. YOU HAVE TO MAKE THEM DO THAT. 8 AND WHAT I -- I'M -- YOU KNOW, I HATE TO DO 9 THIS TO YOU, MR. MCLACHLIN, BECAUSE I KNOW HOW HARD YOU 10 HAVE WORKED ON THIS CASE, AND I KNOW HOW SINCERELY YOU 11 HAVE ATTEMPTED TO REPRESENT YOUR CLIENTS EFFECTIVELY, 12 AND I THINK YOU HAVE DONE A GOOD JOB. 13 THE PROBLEM IS THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE ABILITY FOR THE COURT TO APPROVE 14 15 IT AT THIS POINT. SO I'M SORRY. I TRULY AM SORRY THAT 16 I COULDN'T APPROVE IT. 17 NOW, THERE ARE A COUPLE OF OTHER THINGS. I HAVEN'T HEARD FROM ANYBODY ON THE TELEPHONE. DOES 18 19 ANYONE WISH TO MAKE ANY COMMENTS OR ARGUMENT? ARE YOU 20 STILL ON THE LINE? 21 22 (SEVERAL ATTORNEYS RESPOND, "YES, YOUR HONOR.") 23 24 THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. 25 MR. SLOAN: YOUR HONOR, THIS IS WILLIAM SLOAN FOR 26 U.S. BORAX. 27 THE COURT: YES.

MR. SLOAN: I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE AN OPPORTUNITY --

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IT IS SO RARE THAT WE'RE ALL SPEAKING TOGETHER. I WOULD JUST ENCOURAGE IN THAT REWRITE EFFORT THAT THE PARTIES THAT NEED TO BE A PART OF SOME OF THESE ISSUES BE ENGAGED IN THE DISCUSSION.

THE COURT: YES. MR. MCLACHLAN?

MR. MCLACHLAN: YES, I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THAT.

THE PROBLEM WITH THE CLASS COMPLAINT IS THAT IT -- IT

HAS FOUR CORNERS, AND IT HAS SOME CAUSES OF ACTION THAT

ARE FAIRLY CLEARLY DEFINED. AND THERE HAS BEEN

SIGNIFICANT EFFORTS TO STUFF A LOT OF THINGS INTO THAT

COMPLAINT TALKING LOOSELY IN LOOSE TERMS THAT JUST

SIMPLY ARE NOT THERE.

IT HAS SOME DISCREET CAUSES OF ACTION AND SOME DISCREET PARTIES. THE -- THERE ARE NO CLAIMS BETWEEN THE CLASS MEMBERS AND ANYBODY ELSE OTHER THAN THE WATER SUPPLIERS. IN FACT, NO ONE IN THIS PROCEEDING IS SUING MR. WOOD OR ANY OF THE CLASS MEMBERS. THERE ARE NO CLAIMS AGAINST THEM.

THE ONLY CLAIMS THE CLASS MEMBERS HAVE ARE AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS AGAINST THOSE 12 WATER SUPPLIERS. SO THE LANDOWNERS ARE NOT PARTY TO THE WOOD ACTION. THEY SIMPLY ARE NOT. I UNDERSTAND BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOURCE WE ARE DEALING WITH BEING COMMON IN NATURE THAT THERE IS SOME TIE IN WITH THE LANDOWNERS.

THE NOTION THAT SOMEHOW THEY ARE A PARTY TO THE WOOD CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT IS JUST WRONG, AND I THINK WE NEED TO DRAW A LINE THERE.

THE COURT: WELL, THAT WAY WELL BE; BUT IF YOU

1 HAVE CONCURRENCE WITH THESE PARTIES IN THIS CONSOLIDATED 2 COORDINATED ACTION, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT YOU COULD HAVE 3 AN EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT THAT WILL PERMIT IT TO BE 4 APPROVED BY THE COURT. 5 MR. MCLACHLIN: WE DID. IT WAS CALLED "THE 6 ACCORD." AND ALL THE PROVISIONS IN MY AGREEMENT ARE 7 CONTAINED IN THAT. I SPENT I DON'T KNOW HOW MANY HUNDREDS OF HOUR ENGINEERING THAT. AND IF YOU WILL NOTE 8 THAT ALL THOSE OBJECTIONS WERE BEHIND THAT "ACCORD." 9 10 THE COURT: IN THE EVENT THAT YOU WISH TO CONTINUE 11 THAT DISCUSSION, IT SEEMS TO ME, IT WOULD BE A REASONABLE THING TO DO. MR. SLOAN INDICATES HE WOULD 12 13 LIKE TO PARTICIPATE. I THINK -- THAT IS THE INFERENCE 14 THAT I GOT. 15 WAS THAT RIGHT, MR. SLOAN? 16 MR. SLOAN: YES, YOUR HONOR. THANK YOU. 17 MR. ZIMMER: YOUR HONOR? 18 THE COURT: YES, MR. ZIMMER. 19 MR. ZIMMER: THIS IS MR. ZIMMER FROM BOLTHOUSE. I 20 HATE TO INTERRUPT YOU, BUT I REALIZE THERE IS AN 21 OPPORTUNITY. 22 THE COURT: GO AHEAD. 23 MR. ZIMMER: I WOULD JUST LIKE TO RESPOND TO 24 MR. MCLACHLAN'S COMMENTS, AND JUST AS A MATTER OF 25 SIMPLICITY GO BACK TO THE PLEADINGS. THIS CASE ORIGINALLY STARTED OUT AS WHAT THEY CALL A TITLE ACTION 26 IN RIVERSIDE INVOLVING DIAMOND AND BOLTHOUSE AND THE 27 28 PURVEYORS.

AND IT WAS THE PURVEYOR CROSS-COMPLAINTS IN KERN COUNTY AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY THAT EXPANDED THE ACTION TO WHAT ONE WOULD MIGHT LOOSELY CALL A BASIN-WIDE ADJUDICATION REQUESTING -- LA REQUESTING A DETERMINATION OF ALL RIGHTS OF ALL PARTIES IN THIS BASIN.

SO I UNDERSTAND THAT THE -- MR. MCLACHLAN'S COMPLAINT ONLY DEALS WITH THE ISSUE OF PRESCRIPTION REALLY. IT CAUSES ME TO WONDER WHY IF HE IS ONLY TRYING TO SETTLE PRESCRIPTION THEY HAVE ALL THESE OTHER RIGHTS THAT ARE BEING DISCUSSED IN THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

AND THE ONLY REASON I CAN COME UP WITH IS THAT LA COUNTY IS TRYING TO CREATE THOSE RIGHTS IN THAT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. BECAUSE, OTHERWISE, THEY ARE GOING TO HAVE THESE PARTIES IN THE CASE TO LITIGATE ALL OF THOSE ISSUES.

HOW (UNINTELLIGIBLE TELEPHONIC TRANSMISSION)
FOR EVERY OTHER CASE ON THIS ISSUE DEAL WITH THE
CORRELATIVE RIGHT AND SHARED EQUALLY BY ALL PARTIES.
AND I AGREE WITH THE COURT'S OBSERVATIONS THAT YOU CAN'T
BIND A NONSETTLING PARTIES TO THIS NUMBER. BUT I HAVE
TO WONDER WHY THEY ARE TRYING TO CREATE A QUANTIFIED
RIGHT OF THE ILLUSION OF A QUANTIFIED RIGHT IN THE CLASS
MEMBERS WHEN THAT RIGHT DOESN'T EXIST EITHER UNDER THE
LAW OR WITHOUT PROOF OR SOME KIND OF ADJUDICATION.

SO THEY CAN'T -- THEY CAN'T CREATE THIS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. SO IT'S LIKE I HAVE TO WONDER WHY
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS SO COMPLICATED WHEN THE
CLASS COULD CLEARLY SETTLE BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT

THEY COULD GET AN ASSERTION FROM -- OR A -- A

DOCUMENTATION FROM LA COUNTY AND PRESCRIPTION RIGHTS

AGAINST THEM.

I AGREE WITH THE COURT THAT IF THEY CAN

AGREE -- LA COUNTY CAN AGREE THAT WE WILL NOT CONTEST UP

TO 3 ACRE-FEET THAT YOU MIGHT CLAIM, BUT IT DOESN'T

CHANGE THE FACT THAT SOMEWHERE AROUND THE LINE THERE

STILL HAS TO BE PROOF OF THAT. AND IF LA COUNTY HAS

THAT -- THIS CLAIM THAT ALL THESE RIGHTS NEED TO BE

ADJUDICATED, I STILL DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW WE GET AROUND

THE NECESSARY PARTIES' ISSUES.

LA COUNTY NEEDS TO HAVE THOSE PEOPLE IN

FRONT OF THE COURT TO LITIGATE THE CORRELATIVE RIGHT AND

TO LITIGATE ANY PRESCRIPTIVE CLAIMS THAT THEY HAVE

EITHER -- I'M NOT SURE THEY CAN LITIGATE THE

PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT AGAINST THE BASIN AS A WHOLE WITHOUT

HAVING THESE PEOPLE HERE OR -- IF -- IF THEY MAKE THE

SAME CLAIM AS THEY DID IN SANTA MARIA THAT TURNS INTO A

QUANTIFIED RIGHT, THEN -- THEN WOULD ALL THE CLASS

MEMBERS SHOW UP HAVE LOST THAT RIGHT? IS THE

CORRELATIVE RIGHT DETERMINED WITHOUT THOSE PEOPLE

PRESENT?

I JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW THIS -- HOW THIS
ALL WORKS OUT IN THE END. BUT I DON'T DISAGREE THAT
THEY CAN'T SETTLE THEIR CLAIMS, AND I AGREE WITH
MR. MCLACHLIN THAT THEIR CLAIM WAS VERY NARROW
INITIALLY. AND WHAT IS COMPLICATING THIS SETTLEMENT IS
THE -- I THINK IS LA COUNTY TRYING TO CREATE RIGHTS IN

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THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WHETHER WE ARE TALKING ABOUT
 1
 2
     THE RIGHT TO ACRE-FEET OR WHETHER WE'RE TALKING ABOUT
 3
     DOMESTIC PRIORITY WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN LITIGATED WHICH
     WASN'T LITIGATED IN SANTA MARIA OR ANYWHERE ELSE THAT I
 4
 5
     CAN SEE ON A -- ON A -- AS AN OVERLYING OWNER AND IN A
 6
     LITIGATION SUCH AS THIS.
 7
                 SO I -- I -- IT JUST SEEMS TO ME THAT IT
 8
    CREATES MORE PROBLEMS THAN WE NEED AT THIS POINT IF THEY
 9
    ARE GOING TO SETTLE SO -- ON THE PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT
10
    CLAIMS.
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          THE COURT: WELL, I DON'T THINK WE NEED TO HAVE
    THAT DISCUSSION HERE THIS MORNING. BUT I THINK THAT
12
    MAYBE IF THE PARTIES WERE TO SIT DOWN AND TALK ABOUT A
13
14
    FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING AND GETTING CONCURRENCE WITH AN
15
    AGREEMENT, YOU MIGHT WELL NEED TO WORK SOMETHING OUT.
16
    AND I KNOW THAT JUSTICE ROBBIE HAS MADE HIMSELF
17
    AVAILABLE. I DON'T KNOW IF ANYTHING IS SCHEDULED WITH
18
    HIM?
19
         MR. DUNN: YES. IT IS NEXT WEEK.
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          THE COURT: WHEN ARE YOU GOING TO SEE HIM,
21
    MR. DUNN?
22
          MR. DUNN: WE ARE BACK ON THE --
23
          MR. ZIMMER: THEY ARE TRYING TO SET THAT UP FOR
    THE END OF THE MONTH AND (UNINTELLIGIBLE TELEPHONIC
24
25
    TRANSMISSION).
26
          MR. WELLEN: IT'S THE LAST WEEK IN JUNE AND THEN
27
    THE LAST WEEK IN JULY, YOUR HONOR.
28
          THE COURT: SO DO YOU HAVE A FIRM DATE, LAST WEEK
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IN JUNE?

MR. DUNN: WE DO.

MR. WELLEN: YES.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I AM GOING TO LET JUSTICE ROBBIE KNOW WHAT THE STATUS OF THE CASE IS FROM THIS STANDPOINT. BUT I WOULD CERTAINLY HOPE THAT -- WE ARE AT A POINT IN THIS CASE NOW, IT SEEMS TO ME -- WE HAVE HEARD A LOT OF EVIDENCE. THE COURT IS NOT MAKING ANY KIND OF DETERMINATION CONCERNING PRESCRIPTION.

10 PRESCRIPTION IS AN EXTRAORDINARY COMPLEX ISSUE AS IT IS
11 ARTICULATED IN AND ALLEGED IN THIS CASE.

YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF PRESCRIPTION THAT WOULD NEED TO BE ESTABLISHED IN ORDER TO CREATE THAT SORT OF A RIGHT.

THERE ARE MIXED STATUS OF THE VARIOUS

PUMPERS HERE. EVEN THE PURVEYORS SOME OF THEM ARE

OVERLYING OWNERS AND SOME ARE NOT AND SOME ARE IN THE

CATEGORY OF APPROPRIATORS.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF THE PARTIES WOULD FORGET ABOUT -- LET ME REPHRASE THAT. IF THE PARTIES WOULD FOCUS ON HOW TO PROVIDE FOR EVERYBODY'S RIGHTS WITHIN THIS VALLEY INSTEAD OF ATTEMPTING TO BE OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT HOW YOU GET TO THE ALLOCATION OF THOSE RIGHTS THAT THIS CASE COULD AND SHOULD SETTLE.

AND I MEAN TO HANG A HAT ON PRESCRIPTION OR

ADVERSE POSSESSION -- AND I'M NOT FORECLOSING THAT, AND

I'M NOT GIVING YOU ANY OPINIONS ABOUT HOW THAT IS

ULTIMATELY GOING TO COME OUT, BUT I THINK SOMETIMES WE

MISS THE FOREST FOR THE TREES OR WE MISS THE TREES FOR 1 2 THE FOREST. AND I'M NOT SURE WHICH ONE OF THOSE WOULD 3 APPLY. 4 BUT I WOULD CERTAINLY ENCOURAGE GIVEN WHAT 5 WE KNOW ABOUT THE BASIN AT THIS POINT THAT THE PARTIES 6 REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS IN GOOD FAITH TO TRY AND MAKE 7 THIS SETTLEMENT FOR THE CLASS WORK AS WELL AS THE OTHER ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED WITH REGARD TO THE 8 9 OTHER PARTIES IN THIS LAWSUIT. 10 I DON'T KNOW IF THAT MAKES ANY SENSE TO YOU. BUT THAT IS WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO SEE HAPPEN HERE. 11 12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (UNINTELLIGIBLE ELECTRONIC 13 TRANSMISSION). 14 THE REPORTER: YOUR HONOR, I COULDN'T HEAR THE 15 SPEAKER? 16 THE COURT: KEITH LEMIEUX. 17 THE REPORTER: OKAY. I COULDN'T HEAR THE COMMENT, 18 YOUR HONOR. 19 THE COURT: WELL, ALL RIGHT. YOU HAVE AN 20 OPPORTUNITY IF YOU WISH TO ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE THOSE 21 OBJECTS. 22 THE REPORTER: I'M SO SORRY, YOUR HONOR, BUT I COULDN'T HEAR WHAT HE SAID. I DIDN'T HEAR WHAT MR. 23 24 LEMIEUX SAID. 25 THE COURT: HE SAID HE AGREES. 26 THE REPORTER: OH, OKAY. 27 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 28 MR. MCLACHLAN: YOUR HONOR?

THE COURT: YES, MR. MCLACHLAN.

MR. MCLACHLAN: I APOLOGIZE. I HAVE ONE MORE
QUICK QUESTION AS I'M SITTING HERE THINKING THROUGH
VARIOUS OPTIONS -- AND GRANTED I NEED A LITTLE MORE TIME
TO THINK THINGS OVER AND DISCUSS IT OVER WITH MY
CO-COUNSEL AND WATER SUPPLIER COUNSEL.

AT THE END OF THE PHASE III TRIAL, I RAISED WHAT HAS BEEN THE SORT OF ONGOING PROBLEM WITH MY CLASS SINCE THE BEGINNING, THE ISSUE OF BEING ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY REPRESENT THE CLASS AND ESTABLISH ANY SORT OF PROOF THAT WAS NEEDED IN THE FUTURE PHASES VIS-A-VIS THIS COURT APPOINTED EXPERT.

AND WE HAD THOUGHT ABOUT REFILING THAT

MOTION AGAIN; AND I RAISED WITH YOUR HONOR, IF YOU

RECALL, ON THAT LAST DAY AFTER THE CLOSING ARGUMENTS

THESE ISSUES NOT WANTING TO FILE AN UNNECESSARY MOTION

AGAIN. BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW -- IT IS PROBABLY FOUR OR

FIVE TIMES WE FILED THESE VARIOUS MOTIONS FOR THE EXPERT

IN AND -- BUT I AM GETTING THE FEELING FROM THE COURT'S

COMMENTS THAT IF CLASS COUNSEL FEELS LIKE THEY CAN STILL

STAY IN THIS LITIGATION -- AND I'M NOT SO SURE THAT'S

THE CASE.

BUT IF THAT IS POSSIBLE, WE MAY HAVE TO

REVIEW THAT MOTION, AND THE COURT -- I'M NOT ASKING FOR

AN ADVISORY OPINION IN ADVANCE, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT

MAYBE THAT MOTION HAS GOT TO BE REFILED AGAIN, AND THIS

EXPERT HAS TO START DOING SOMETHING IN TERMS OF

ASSESSING THE CLASS'S WATER USE.

THE COURT: WELL, YOU KNOW, I CAN'T -- I CAN'T

TELL YOU WHAT YOU SHOULD DO. I CAN TELL YOU THAT I

THINK THAT YOU SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSIONS TO

SEE IF THERE CAN BE A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT OF THIS CASE.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT -- THE CASE IS REALLY ON THE VERGE OF A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT, AND I THINK THAT -- IN PARTICULAR AS I LISTEN TO AND READ THE OBJECTIONS THAT WERE MADE BY THE NONSETTLING PARTIES TO THE LANGUAGE IN THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, I REALLY THINK THAT IF YOU ALL WORK AT IT YOU CAN ACCOMPLISH THAT SETTLEMENT AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF YOUR CLIENTS IN THAT CLASS.

MR. MCLACHLIN: THE QUESTION I WAS DRIVING AT IS,
I THINK THAT DECISION DEPENDS UPON WHAT IS TO COME IN
TERMS OF THE NEXT PHASE, AND I WAS WONDERING ABOUT WHEN
WE ARE GOING TO MAKE A DECISION AS TO WHAT THE NEXT
PHASE IS GOING TO BE AND WHEN THAT IS GOING TO OCCUR.

WILL THAT OCCUR AT SOME POINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, A DECISION?

THE COURT: WE HAVE A HEARING SCHEDULED FOR THE 15TH OF JULY AT 9 O'CLOCK. AND THAT IS A CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE. THAT IS WHAT IT WAS SCHEDULED FOR. I'M GOING TO EXPAND THAT TO PERMIT ARGUMENTS ON THE PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECISION THAT WAS PROPOUNDED IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S REQUEST, AND WE WILL CONSIDER AS WELL AS THE -- ANY OBJECTIONS THAT ARE MADE TO THAT STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS FOR THEM ON THE 15TH.

AND SO WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO IS JUST ESSENTIALLY BE ABLE TO SET ASIDE THAT ENTIRE DAY AND --

IF NEED BE FOR THOSE HEARINGS.

NOW IN THE MEANTIME, THERE IS GOING TO BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PARTIES TO WORK FURTHER ON A GLOBAL RESOLUTION OF THIS CASE, AND I AM HOPEFUL THAT THAT WILL BEAR FRUIT. BUT I'M ALWAYS HOPEFUL.

I'LL DO A MINUTE ORDER SO THAT EVERYBODY UNDERSTANDS WHAT THE HEARING WILL BE ON THE 15TH.

THERE WERE A COUPLE OTHER THINGS THAT WERE POSTED.

MR. DUNN, YOUR OFFICE POSTED A PROPOSED ORDER REGARDING PARTIES' REQUEST TO REJOIN THE WILLIS AND WOOD'S CLASS. I PRESUME THAT WAS A REQUEST MADE TO YOU BECAUSE I -- THERE WAS NO APPLICATION POSTED. IT WAS JUST A REQUEST FOR THE ORDER.

MR. DUNN: YES, I APOLOGIZE, YOUR HONOR. THAT CAME FROM MY OFFICE THROUGH MISS HEDLUND, AND I DON'T HAVE A COPY OF THAT WITH ME HERE TODAY.

THE COURT: WELL, I HAVE A COPY OF THE PROPOSED ORDER.

MR. DUNN: YES.

THE COURT: IT SETS OUT A NUMBER OF PARTIES --

MR. DUNN: YEAH, I --

THE COURT: IF YOU WANT TO JOIN UP.

MR. DUNN: I'M SORRY. I MAY HAVE TO DEFER TO

MR. MCLACHLAN ON THIS. MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT IN THE

PROCESS OF EVALUATING WHO THE CURRENT ROSTER OF CLASS

MEMBERS -- FROM TIME TO TIME WE MAKE THESE APPLICATIONS

TO THE COURT TO BRING IT UP TO -- TO BRING IT

1 UP-TO-DATE, AND THAT WAS THE GENESIS FOR THIS PARTICULAR 2 REQUEST. IF IT NEEDS MORE PAPERWORK, I CAN TRACK THAT. 3 THE COURT: I WAS JUST NOT CLEAR AS TO HOW THIS CAME ABOUT. 4 5 MR. DUNN: AND CANDIDLY WITH THE COURT, I'M 6 PERSONALLY NOT EXACTLY CLEAR MYSELF SO OTHER THAN 7 WHAT --8 MS. HEDLUND: YOUR HONOR, THIS IS MISS HEDLUND. 9 MAYBE I COULD SHED SOME LIGHT ON THE SUBJECT. 10 THE COURT: GO AHEAD. 11 MS. HEDLUND: THESE PEOPLE WERE INDIVIDUALS WHO 12 HAVE BEEN DEFAULTED. WE HAD PUT IN THE REQUEST TO TAKE THEIR DEFAULT. THEY CONTACTED OUR OFFICE AND ASKED TO 13 14 REJOIN THE CLASS, OR THEY CONTACTED MISS WALKER AND 15 ASKED FOR INFORMATION TO REJOIN THE CLASS. 16 I SPOKE WITH MISS WALKER, AND SHE SUGGESTED 17 THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE THIS WOULD BE TO DO AN ORDER TO 18 THE COURT, A PROPOSED ORDER, AND HAVE YOU SIGN IT TO 19 REALLOW THESE INDIVIDUALS BACK INTO THE CLASS. 20 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. BASED ON THAT 21 REPRESENTATION, I WILL APPROVE THE REQUEST TO INCLUDE 22 THESE MEMBERS. THERE IS EXHIBIT A AND EXHIBIT B. 23 EXHIBIT A IS PARTIES WHO WISH TO REJOIN THE WILLIS 24 CLASS, AND EXHIBIT B IS THE WOOD'S CLASS. 25 MR. MCLACHLIN: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD ADD ONE NOTE. 26 I DON'T KNOW IF OF IMPORTANCE; BUT AS I TOLD

MISS HEDLUND AFTER I READ THAT ORDER, MR. PIKE WHO IS

LISTED ON EXHIBIT B WAS NEVER ON THE CLASS LIST AND

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1 NEVER RECEIVED NOTICE. 2 AND SO I -- CLASS COUNSEL DOES NOT HAVE ANY 3 INFORMATION OF HIS ADDRESS, HIS TELEPHONE NUMBER, A PARCEL NUMBER, OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT. SO, 4 5 THEORETICALLY, IF THERE WERE TO BE A SETTLEMENT IN THE 6 FUTURE, THERE WOULD BE NO WAY TO NOTICE HIM. 7 REALLY THINK WHAT THE COURT SHOULD DO IS ORDER THAT AT LEAST HE FILL OUT THE OPT-BACK-IN FORM WHICH REQUESTS 8 9 ALL THAT INFORMATION. 10 THE COURT: I THINK THAT IS APPROPRIATE. 11 MR. MCLACHLIN: SO I'M NOT SO SURE I WOULD INCLUDE 12 HIM ON THAT LIST. 13 THE COURT: INCLUDE HIM ON THE LIST BUT PROVIDE 14 THE INFORMATION. MISS HEDLUND, YOU WILL COMMUNICATE 15 THAT TO MR. PIKE, PLEASE. 16 MS. HEDLUND: YES, YOUR HONOR. 17 THE COURT: THANK YOU. AND HE WAS SERVED AS 1745. MR. MCLACHLIN: YEAH, I DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO 18 19 WITH THAT, BUT HE WAS NEVER ON THE LIST OF CLASS 2.0 NUMBERS. 21 THE COURT: YEAH. 22 MR. MCLACHLIN: PRESUMABLY HE WAS MISSED. 23 THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. SO THAT IS -- THAT 24 IS SO ORDERED. AND THERE WAS ANOTHER -- ROSAMOND LAND 25 TRUST REQUEST TO FILE AN ANSWER. 26 MISS HEDLUND, I PRESUME THAT ARE YOU THE 27 PERSON THAT SHOULD ADDRESS THAT? 28 MS. HEDLUND: YES, YOUR HONOR.

1 THE COURT: TELL ME ABOUT IT. 2 MS. HEDLUND: AGAIN, ANOTHER DEFAULT, AND THEY 3 ARE -- CONTACTED OUR OFFICE AND REQUESTED TO FILE AN 4 ANSWER. AND WE SAID WE WOULD FILE THE PROPOSED ORDER 5 SINCE WE WERE FILING THE PROPOSED ORDER FOR THE PEOPLE 6 WHO WANTED TO OPT BACK INTO THE WOOD AND WILLIS CLASSES. 7 THE COURT: ARE THERE OTHER LAWYERS REPRESENTING 8 THAT TRUST? 9 MS. HEDLUND: I BELIEVE SO, YOUR HONOR, BUT I 10 DON'T HAVE THE INFORMATION IN FRONT OF ME TO CONFIRM. 11 THE COURT: WELL, WAS THERE A DEFAULT NOTICED AS 12 TO THAT, AS TO THE TRUST? 13 MS. HEDLUND: YES, THERE WAS A DEFAULT NOTICE. THE COURT: SO YOU ARE GOING TO, WHAT, SET ASIDE, 14 15 WITHDRAW THAT REOUEST? 16 MS. HEDLUND: AGAIN, YOUR HONOR, I HAVE BEEN 17 WORKING WITH THE CLERK IN LA BECAUSE THEY HAVE TO FILE ALL OF THE PAPERWORK AND HANDLE THE DEFAULT. AND MISS 18 WALKER -- AND SO WE FILED A REQUEST FOR THE DEFAULT. 19 20 AND SEVERAL OF THE PEOPLE OBVIOUSLY FROM WHAT YOU HAVE 21 SEEN HAVE WANTED TO OPT BACK INTO THE CLASS. 22 SO WE ARE GOING TO REFILE THE NOTICE OF 23 DEFAULT REMOVING THOSE INDIVIDUALS. 24 THE COURT: NO. I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT THEM. I'M 25 TALKING ABOUT THE TRUST. THE ROSAMOND LAND TRUST WHICH 26 APPARENTLY WAS SERVED AS A ROW 548 BY THE

CROSS-COMPLAINANT; I GUESS DISTRICT 40 AND OTHERS.

MS. HEDLUND: RIGHT. THE DEFAULT HASN'T YET BEEN

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1 ENTERED, SO WE WERE JUST GOING TO AMEND THE DEFAULT TO 2 REMOVE THEM. WE CAN --3 THE COURT: I --4 MS. HEDLUND: -- CAN'T REALLY SATISFY THE DEFAULT 5 BECAUSE THE LA COURT HASN'T DONE ANYTHING WITH 6 PROCESSING THE DEFAULTS AT THIS POINT IN TIME. THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO YOU WANT THEM TO BE 7 ABLE TO FILE AN ANSWER? 8 9 MS. HEDLUND: YES, PLEASE. 10 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO ORDERED. AND I SIGNED YOUR ORDER. 11 12 ALL RIGHT. I THINK THAT IS ALL THAT I SEE 13 BEFORE ME. 14 DOES ANYBODY HAVE ANYTHING ELSE? 15 MR. DUNN: I DO, YOUR HONOR. ON THAT HEARING THAT IS SCHEDULED ON THE 15TH AND JUST SPEAKING FOR MYSELF AT 16 17 THIS POINT, IS THERE ANY POSSIBLE WAY OF MOVING TO AN 18 EARLIER DATE? OR CHANGING THAT DATE SOMEWHAT? 19 THE COURT: WHAT IS THE MOTIVATION FOR THAT 20 EARLIER DATE? 21 MR. DUNN: YEAH, THIS DID NOT GET ON MY CALENDAR AS IT SHOULD HAVE. I JUST NOTICED, AND I HAVE GOT A 22 23 TRIP PLANNED. 24 MR. WEEKS: YOUR HONOR, THIS IS BRAD WEEKS ON 25 COURT PHONE. THIS WAS ALSO NOT ON MY CALENDAR. I CAN'T FIND IT. AND I WOULD ALSO REQUEST A DIFFERENT DATE. 26 27 THE COURT: THAT -- BECAUSE THAT WAS AN ORDER THAT 28 I MADE --

1 MR. DUNN: YES, IT WAS. 2 THE COURT: -- AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. 3 MR. DUNN: YES, IT WAS. 4 THE COURT: SO THE LAWYERS WHO WERE PRESENT OR 5 SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENT WERE AWARE OF IT, AND I'M SURE 6 THAT IT IS IN THE MINUTES. SO WHAT DATE ARE YOU LOOKING 7 AT, MR. DUNN? 8 MR. DUNN: I COULD DO IT ANY DAY EARLIER. I COULD 9 DO IT THE MONDAY, TUESDAY, OR WEDNESDAY OF THAT WEEK. 10 THAT'S THE 11TH, 12TH, OR 13TH OR ANY DAY IN THE 11 PREVIOUSLY WEEK. 12 THE COURT: OKAY. I'M GOING TO HAVE STEP DOWN AND 13 GET MY CALENDAR. SO DON'T GO AWAY. I'LL RETURN. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE IN THE PROCEEDINGS) 16 17 THE COURT: I CAN DO IT JULY 11TH. THAT IS A 18 MONDAY. THAT IS NOT THE BEST DAY OF THE WEEK FOR ME TO 19 DO IT FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, BUT I CAN. 20 MR. MCLACHLIN: YOUR HONOR, WHAT TIME WAS -- WILL THIS HEARING BE STARTING? 21 22 THE COURT: WELL, ON A MONDAY, I WOULD ORDINARILY START IT AT 9:00 UNLESS THERE IS SOME REASON NOT TO. 23 24 MR. MCLACHLIN: I DON'T KNOW ABOUT ANYBODY ELSE, 25 BUT I HAVE A HEARING ALREADY SET IN ANOTHER COURT, ACTUALLY IN ANOTHER COUNTY, THAT MORNING. BUT, YOU 26 27 KNOW, IF IT IS POSSIBLE, I WOULD REQUEST THAT THE 28 HEARING START A LITTLE LATER.

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                 AND IF I'M THE ONLY ONE AND CLASS COUNSEL
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     ISN'T REALLY NECESSARY -- I MEAN, IT SEEMS LIKE WE KIND
 3
    OF ARE -- BUT IF WE ARE NOT, THEN I LEAVE IT TO THE
    COURT TO SET THAT UP. I THINK MR. O'LEARY IS ON
 4
 5
    VACATION THAT WEEK BUT ...
 6
          THE COURT: WELL, I CAN SET IT -- I CAN SET IT FOR
 7
    11:00. WOULD THAT ACCOMMODATE YOU?
 8
          MR. MCLACHLIN: YEAH, I THINK SO. THE HEARING,
 9
    UNFORTUNATELY, IS IN RIVERSIDE, BUT YOU KNOW IT COULD BE
10
    A LITTLE BIT EARLIER.
11
          THE COURT: OKAY. LET'S DO IT AT 11:00. AND AT
12
    11:00, WE WILL START OUT WITH THE HEARING ON THE
13
    STATEMENT OF DECISION, AND THE OBJECTIONS THERETO. AND
14
    THEN WE WILL DO A CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND MAYBE
15
    EVEN ON THE RECORD SETTLEMENT DISCUSSION.
16
          MR. JOYCE: YOUR HONOR?
17
          THE COURT: YES.
18
         MR. JOYCE: THIS MR. JOYCE FOR DIAMOND FARMING, ET
19
    AL.
20
          THE COURT: YES, MR. JOYCE.
21
          MR. JOYCE: COULD THE COURT INCLUDE THE CHANGE OF
22
    DATE IN ITS MINUTE ORDER FOR THIS HEARING TO FACILITATE
23
    CALENDAR?
24
          THE COURT: I WILL.
25
          MR. JOYCE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
26
          THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYBODY ELSE HAVE ANYTHING
27
    ELSE?
28
          MR. DUNN: NO.
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THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WITH THAT IN MIND THEN,
  1
  2
     HAVE A GOOD WEEK.
 3
           MR. DUNN: AND YOU, TOO, YOUR HONOR.
  4
         (SEVERAL COUNSEL ON COURT CALL SAY "THANK YOU.")
 5
 6
 7
           THE COURT: THANK YOU.
 8
           MR. DUNN: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
 9
10
              (THE PROCEEDINGS WERE THEN CONCLUDED.)
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1	SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
2	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES		
3	DEPARTMENT NO. 316 HON. JACK KOMAR,		
4 5	COORDINATION PROCEEDING ) SPECIAL TITLE (RULE 1550B) )		
6	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES) COORDINATION		
7	DALMDALE WATER DISTRICT AND CANTA GLARA GARANGE		
8	PALMDALE WATER DISTRICT AND ) SANTA CLARA CASE NO. QUARTZ HILL WATER DISTRICT, ) 1-05-CV-049053		
9	CROSS-COMPLAINANTS,		
10	vs.		
11	LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS, ) DISTRICT NO. 40, ET AL, )		
12	CROSS-DEFENDANTS. )		
13	)		
14			
15	STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ) SS.		
16	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )		
17			
18	I, GINGER WELKER, OFFICIAL REPORTER OF THE		
19	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FOR THE		
20	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE		
21	TRANSCRIPT DATED JUNE 16, 2011 COMPRISES A FULL, TRUE,		
22	AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS HELD IN THE		
23	ABOVE ENTITLED CAUSE.		
24	DATED THIS 5TH DAY OF JULY, 2011.		
25			
26			
27			
28	OFFICIAL REPORTER, CSR #5585		

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PROOF OF SERVICE 1 ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES 2 Judicial Council Coordination, Proceeding No. 4408 3 Santa Clara Case No. 1-05-CV 049053 Assigned to the Honorable Jack Komar 4 Los Angeles County Superior Court, Central, Dept. 1 5 I am a resident of the State of California, over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. My business address is 650 Town Center 6 Drive, Suite 550, Costa Mesa, California 92626. 7 On October 22, 2013, I served the within document(s): 8 NOTICE OF LODGING JUNE 16, 2011 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 9 RE PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF WOOD CLASS SETTLEMENT by posting the document(s) listed above to the website http://www.scefiling.org, a 10 X dedicated link to the Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases; Santa Clara Case 11 No. 1-05-CV 049053, Assigned to the Honorable Jack Komar, said document(s) is electronically served/distributed therewith. 12 By transmitting via e-mail the document(s) listed above to the e-mail address(es) and/or 13 fax number(s) set forth below on this date. 14 by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed Overnite Express envelope/package for 15 overnight delivery at Costa Mesa, California addressed as set forth below. 16 by causing personal delivery by Nationwide Legal of the document(s) listed above, to the 17 person(s) at the address(es) set forth below. 18 I am readily familiar with Murphy & Evertz, LLP's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service 19 on the same day that the correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage 20 fully prepaid. 21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is 22 true and correct. Executed on October <u>///</u>, 2013, at Costa Mesa, California. 23 24 25 26 27 28 (00049748.1)

PROOF OF SERVICE