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	JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT		

#### SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

#### COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

COUNTY

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COORDINATION PROCEEDING

ANGELES

ANGELES

WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40 v.

DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, et al.,

WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40 v. DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, et al.,

Kern County Superior Court Case No. S-

W.M. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC., v.

Case No. RIC 344436 [c/w case no. RIC

CITY OF LANCASTER, et al., Riverside Superior Court

SPECIAL TITLE (Rule 1550(b))

**INCLUDED ACTIONS:** 

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CASES

LOS

LOS

BC325201

1500-CV-254348

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TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

The following parties, BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLC and WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC., by and through their attorneys of record, Clifford & Brown, by Richard G. Zimmer; DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY and CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS, LLC, by and through their attorneys of record, LeBeau Thelen, LLP, by Bob Joyce; ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER AGREEMENT ASSOCIATION ("AGWA"), by and through its

JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT

\* \* \* ) Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. ) 4408 ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER ) CASE NO. 1-05-CV-409053 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. ) CONFERENCE STATEMENT **DATE: JANUARY 15, 2010** TIME: 9:00 a.m. DEPT: 1 DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, and )

attorneys of record, Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber & Schreck, LLP, by Michael Fife; SERVICE ROCK PRODUCTS CORPORATION, SHEEP CREEK WATER COMPANY, INC. and A.V. UNITED MUTUAL GROUP, by and through their attorneys of record, Gresham Savage Nolan & Tilden, APC, by Michael Duane Davis (hereinafter collectively referred to as "These Responding Parties") file this Case Management Conference Statement.

## **STATUS OF CONSOLIDATION**

These responding parties contends that in order to properly align the parties in these coordinated proceedings, all properties in the Antelope Valley must be joined *in rem* and the current and future owners of all such properties must be named in order for there to be a complete adjudication of the water rights appurtenant to such properties. These responding parties contend that given the scope and nature of the allegations in the Cross-Complaints filed by Los Angeles County, all such parties need to be named as cross-defendants to said action. The plaintiff classes need to be named as defendant classes and certified accordingly.

These responding parties disagree with the Court's previously expressed position that complete jurisdiction can be achieved by an alignment of the coordinated proceedings and the parties to each, under a "consolidation order" in which the classes would be permitted to solely remain as plaintiff classes, and only the declaratory relief causes of action would be "coordinated," finding such a potential procedural alignment both infeasible and unworkable. The pleadings must clearly set forth each and every cause of action that is being asserted by each party as against each other party. Such clarification is necessary to give such parties proper due process notice of the allegations against them in order for them to properly defend such allegations and to properly frame cross-complaint causes of action, if necessary. Additionally, such clarification is necessary in order for the parties to propound appropriate discovery to assess the factual basis for each of the pleaded causes of action, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of each such allegation, to meaningfully participate in settlement discussions and if necessary, to litigate the issues properly raised in the pleadings by and against them at trial.

action does not provide due process notice necessary to evaluate claims, conduct discovery, engage in settlement discussions and litigate the case. Further, allowing such generally pled causes of action, would allow the parties to change or reframe the legal and factual claims being made by and against them during the course of trial. And, permitting generally pled declaratory relief causes of action would deprive the parties of due process and fail to achieve the legislative intent of notice pleadings, to give every party proper notice of the causes of action and allegations being made in order to properly represent the interests of their respective clients.

Allowing the case to proceed with very generally pled declaratory relief causes of

# BOLTHOUSE MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT AND CROSS-COMPLAINT (By Bolthouse)

It is unclear how and to what extent the coordinated proceedings will be aligned in the final consolidation order. Additionally, it appears this Court intends to allow the coordinated proceedings, even if ultimately coordinated to some degree, to proceed on an *in personam* rather than *in rem* basis. Until such time as the final consolidation order has been issued and the issues regarding *in rem* versus *in personam* jurisdiction and indispensable parties have been clarified, Bolthouse is not in a position to determine what properties may need to be added to and/or deleted from its previously filed pleadings. Bolthouse requests that its motion to amend the pleadings be continued for hearing following resolution of these procedural issues.

# ADDITIONAL CASE MANAGEMENT ISSUES

# Joinder of Indispensable Parties.

The Cross-Complaint filed by Los Angeles County in Kern County and Los Angeles County has clearly become the primary pleading in these coordinated proceedings from which the other pleadings derive. The Los Angeles County Cross-Complaint, as pled, requests a comprehensive, total basin wide adjudication of the water rights of all holders of such rights in the Antelope Valley. However, from a procedural standpoint, as noted above, the coordinated proceedings are pled on an *in personam* rather than an *in rem* basis; giving the Court incomplete jurisdiction over all necessary and proper parties.

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These responding parties continue to assert that the coordinated proceedings should be pleaded and tried as an *in rem* action. Unless the matter is litigated as an *in rem* action, including the filing of *lis pendens* notice, many properties that should be subject to the Court's jurisdiction will be accidentally omitted. The result will be that many parcels, the owners thereof and/or the subsequent owners thereof, will never receive notice (i.e., due process) of the litigation and be afforded the opportunity to protect themselves and their properties from the potential effects of the coordinated proceedings on the water rights appurtenant to their parcels. The result will be a legal quagmire of parcels not bound by the adjudication, parcel owners claiming that their parcels are not bound, irreparable due process problems and the real potential that the coordinated proceedings need to be re-litigated in their entirety.

These responding parties request that the pleadings in the coordinated proceedings be re-pled or amended such that these coordinated proceedings must be tried as *in rem* actions and that all procedural requirements relating to *in rem* actions be properly met.

#### Service of Process.

The true status of Service of Process is unknown, probably to everyone. Some parties have been served with the original Cross-Complaint. Other parties have been given notice of the Plaintiff and/or Defendant Class Actions. Some parties have opted into one of the classes, and some parties opted out. Even the definitions of the classes have been subject to considerable question and have changed over time. Because the pleadings are not yet finalized, it does not appear that the Court has any way to track the names of all parties and whether they have properly filed responsive pleadings. Likewise, it does not appear that Los Angeles County has any accurate records concerning all parties, whether they have been served or not, or what they were served with. Once the coordinated proceedings have been consolidated and the pleadings finalized, there must be some reliable written record of all parties to each of the remaining action(s), confirmation of service on all parties to each of the action(s), and confirmation of the filing of responsive pleadings by all parties in each of the actions followed by the defaults of all parties who fail to file responsive pleadings.

#### The Class Actions.

The Class Action process has suffered from the same procedural and pleading issues as the rest of the coordinated proceedings. Although these responding parties are not entirely certain on the issue, they recall that a defendant class was previously certified by this Court; but, because no counsel was willing to undertake representation of the parties of that defendant class, this Court then certified a plaintiff's class of non-pumpers and a plaintiff's class of small pumpers. These responding parties believe the defendant's class was never decertified. Though possibly less than fully documented in the transcripts of the numerous hearings on these issues, the definitions of the various classes have changed over time; and even presently, there is less than unanimity amongst the various parties over the specific definitions of each of the classes.

Finally, as discussed in more detail above, these responding parties continue to contend that the dormant class and the small pumpers' class must be named as defendants to the Los Angeles County Cross-Complaint. Otherwise, the causes of action alleged and claims made in the Los Angeles County Cross-Complaint cannot be adjudicated, lacking indispensable parties, and must be dismissed.

#### Discovery.

The court and the parties seem to have ignored many of the rules of *Civil Procedure* regarding pleadings, discovery and process. As mentioned above, no one appears able to specifically name all of the plaintiffs, all of the defendants, all of the cross-complainants and all of the cross-defendants in each of the various coordinated proceedings, due in no small part to the ambiguities of and confusion caused by the pleadings. The current plan appears to be for the parties to agree on some type of "consolidation order" which, in theory, would somehow address these issues. However, it is highly unlikely if not certain that the parties will ever mutually understand such an order even if they are able to agree upon one. The rules of pleading were legislatively designed to confer due process and avoid confusion of the nature being experienced in these coordinated proceedings, by requiring that a complaint set forth all allegations by one party against another, afford the opportunity for a cross-complaint, and

accommodate a party's right to legally challenge the sufficiency of each alleged cause of action. Until the allegations are known, understood and legally challenged, a party cannot properly engage in discovery in a cost effective and legally appropriate manner. Accordingly, discovery in the coordinated proceedings has stalled, pending clarification of the classes, pleadings, causes of action and claims of the various parties in each of the coordinated proceedings.

## Trial.

Because the rules of *Civil Procedure* have not been followed by the parties and the court, two phases of trial have already occurred, notwithstanding that many of the present and potentially future parties had not yet been named and served, or appeared. Notwithstanding the frequent suggestions that personal jurisdiction over all potentially affected parties was not necessary because these two phases of trial have been procedural only, serious questions remain over whether subsequently appearing parties will be able to claim they were deprived of due process of law and at a later time, such as on appeal, which could invalidate or nullify the entire process. In truth, any unnamed party, could claim that, had they been afforded due process, they would have been able to present evidence that would have brought about a totally different resulted in one or more of these two already tried phases of trial.

Also because the rules of *Civil Procedure* have not been followed by the parties and the court, it is not clear what causes of action and claims are being asserted by each party as against each other party; making it extremely difficult if not impossible to determine exactly what issues will be or are being tried in any particular phase of trial. It has been suggested that the next phase of trial will deal with issues of safe yield and overdraft; though the context in which those issues will be tried remains unclear. However, without knowing the specific allegations being made by each party as against each other party, the significance of these issues remains very unclear.

Additionally, these responding parties have contended and continue to contend, that proper pleading requires specifically identified causes of action which are being tried by a specific party as against other parties. The idea that declaratory relief somehow encompasses

any and all claims is insufficient both procedurally and as a practical matter, because it wholly fails to place parties on notice of what is being litigated. Simply trying issues is neither sufficient nor legally proper. Issues are non-dispositive. Which party bears the burden of proof is unclear and the legal and/or factual significance of the issues is unclear. Furthermore, the parties are left to guess about the significance of these issues, compelled to spend exorbitant amounts of money on discovery without knowing the significance of the issues, and challenged to address legal rulings regarding these issues with unknown and potentially devastating consequences.

Finally, neither the definition nor the scope of the issues that the court has suggested will likely be tried, is clear. The terms "safe yield" and "overdraft" do not have clear, consistent meaning. These terms are often used in different ways by hydrologists to define hydrogeologic conditions for different purposes. There are no consistent meanings for these terms throughout the water law cases in California. Discovery propounded upon the purveyor parties has been responded to with objections and refusals to define these terms. The Court has not provided any legal mechanism to define these terms. Even the experts used by the various parties in these coordinated proceedings do not agree on the meaning of the terms. If the court intends to require the parties to try "safe yield" and "overdraft" in the next phase, those terms have to be given clear, relevant and hydrologically meaningful definitions that are legally consistent with authoritative California case law.

These terms need to be defined in order to properly conduct discovery and engage in litigation wherein rulings will be made by the Court regarding hydrogeologic conditions and conclusions made using these terms. Likewise, the scope of litigation regarding these terms needs to be determined. For example, assuming the terms are defined, is a factual determination to be made by the Court in the next phase regarding "safe yield" and/or "overdraft" currently, as of the date of the filing of the Complaint by Los Angeles County, as of the date of the filing of the Complaint by Bolthouse and Diamond Farming circa 2001 or as to some prior date or dates over the past one hundred (100) years. This determination must be clearly made, in order for the parties to conduct discovery, prepare for trial and conduct trial.

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Finally, such terms must be in the context of the causes of action, in order for them to be properly tried. These issues need to be resolved, along with the procedural issues discussed above, before another trial date can be set.

## Demand for Jury Trial.

The Court previously ruled and acknowledged that all parties may demand a jury trial as to all matters as to which jury trial is authorized. Issues related to "safe yield" and "overdraft" depending on how they are defined, and depending upon the scope and burden of proof at a trial, may very well be necessary elements of a claim of prescription. Prescription is a central claim by the purveyors against the landowners. The landowners, including Bolthouse, have continued to demand a jury trial as to the claim of prescription. Bolthouse continues to demand jury trial on any claim of prescription, including all required factual findings and elements of proof thereof. Bolthouse demands jury trial on the issues of "safe yield" and "overdraft" since they have not been properly defined and the meaning and legal impact thereof cannot be determined.

#### **CONCLUSION**

Bolthouse Properties, LLC and Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. request that rules of Civil *Procedure*, including pleading and practice be followed, that the pleadings be clarified and that proper notice and service of process occur. Thereafter, appearances of all parties need to be made and/or defaults taken. There must be a window of time for proper legal challenge to the sufficiency of the various pleadings. Thereafter, all parties must be afforded the opportunity to engage in meaningful discovery and to prepare for the next phase of trial. The next phase of trial must be well defined including the matters which will be tried, the legal causes of action asserted, and, if the Court is to rule on issues dependent on definitions, those definitions have to

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3	DATED: January 8, 2010	Respectfully submitted.	
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JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT

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DATED: January 8, 2010 Respectfully submitted, GRESHAM SAVAGE NOLAN & TIDEN, APC By: MICHAEL DUANE DAVIS, ESQ. Attorneys for SERVICE ROCK PRODUCTS CORPORATION, SHEEP CREEK WATER COMPANY, and A.V. UNITED MUTUAL **GROUP** 

1	<b>PROOF OF SERVICE (C.C.P. §1013a, 2015.5)</b>		
2	Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases  Judicial Counsel Coordination Proceeding No. 4408		
3	Santa Clara County Superior Court Case No. 1-05-CV-049053		
4	I am employed in the County of Kern, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a		
5	party to the within action; my business address is 1430 Truxtun Avenue, Bakersfield, CA 93301.		
6	On January 8, 2010, I served the foregoing document(s) entitled:		
7	JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT		
8	by placing the true copies thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as stated on the attached mailing list.		
9	by placing _ the original, _ a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed enveloped addressed as follows:		
11	X BY SANTA CLARA SUPERIOR COURT E-FILING IN COMPLEX		
12	LITIGATION PURSUANT TO CLARIFICATION ORDER DATED OCTOBER		
13	<b>27, 2005.</b>		
14	Executed on January 8, 2010, at Bakersfield, California.		
15	X (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.		
16 17	(Federal) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the Bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made.		
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