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8	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA	
9	COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA	
10	* * COORDINATION PROCEEDING	* *
11	SPECIAL TITLE (Rule 1550(b))	) Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No.   4408
	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER	
12	CASES	) CASE NO. 1-05-CV-049053
13	INCLUDED ACTIONS:	) ) BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLC'S
14	LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40 v.	) AND WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.'S ) REPLY TO PUBLIC WATER
15	DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No.	) SUPPLIERS' RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS RE SCALMANINI
16	BC325201	TESTIMONY
17	LOS ANGELES COUNTY	) Phase 3 Trial Date:
18	WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40 v. DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, et al.,	) January 4, 2011 )
19	Kern County Superior Court Case No. S-1500-CV-254348	
20	DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, and	)
21	W.M. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC., v. CITY OF LANCASTER, et al.,	)
22	Riverside Superior Court Case No. RIC 344436 [c/w case no. RIC ]	
23	344668 and 353840   ROSAMOND COMMUNITY SERVICES	
24	DISTRICT,	
25	CROSS-COMPLAINANT,	
26	Bolthouse Properties, LLC and Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. (hereinafter "Bolthouse"),	
27	respond to Public Water Suppliers' Response to Objection Re Scalmanini Testimony in the	
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	BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLC'S AND WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.'S REPLY TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS' RESPONSE	

order of the arguments raised by the Public Water Suppliers and specifically without waiving objections previously made at trial of this matter and in the deposition of Mr. Scalmanini.

### A. MR. SCALMANINI'S EXPERT DESIGNATION DID NOT DISCLOSE HIM TO TESTIFY REGARDING EXTENSOMETER DATA

Mr. Scalmanini's expert designation was premised upon the opinions contained in the "expert witness report" attached hereto as Exhibit "1" to the expert witness designation. (Public Water Suppliers' Expert Designation For Phase III Trial And Expert Declaration, page 3 line 10 and Exhibit 1) The Summary Expert Report was attached to the expert designation as Exhibit 1. The landowners were justified in relying upon the representation as to the scope of Appropriator expert testimony, including that of Mr. Scalmanini, as set forth in the Summary Expert Report attached as Exhibit 1, in order to decide whether to designate any supplemental experts and as to the opinions Mr. Scalmanini would be called to give at the time of trial. The Summary Expert Report clearly provides as follows:

"Post-1992 subsidence data for the Antelope Valley is lacking. The water derived from compaction from 1993 to 2005 was estimated based upon the annual subsidence rate in 1992. Estimates of the water derived from compaction from 2006 through 2009 were not made due to lack of publicly available data. The following steps were executed to calculate the value of subsidence (i.e., water derived from the compaction of aquitards):

The volume of water derived from compaction between 1951 and 2005 is approximately 400,000 acre-feet. Figure E2-17 shows the cumulative volume of water derived from subsidence and clearly shows that the majority of the subsidence occurred between 1957 and 1981." (Summary Expert Report, Appendix E, Page 11, Section 2.6.3.)

Late in the afternoon on the last day of Appropriator expert witness depositions, on the last day of Mr. Scalmanini's deposition, only three weeks before trial and following completion of cross examination by the landowner attorneys, Appropriator attorneys began questioning Mr. Scalmanini regarding new data and a new opinion not contained in the Summary Expert Report. The new data was the extensometer data from one remote location in the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin. The Summary Expert Report indicated that this data did not exist. Based upon this new data, Mr. Scalmanini opined that subsidence was continuing.

The Appropriators properly point out that unfair surprise or prejudice will limit an expert's ability to testify beyond written reports. (See discussion of *Easterby v. Clark* (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 772, 775 on page 6, lines 4-6 of their Response.) The opinions expressed by Mr. Scalmanini at trial should be limited to the opinions and data contained in the Summary Expert Report. Allowing Mr. Scalmanini to testify to new opinions and data at trial is prejudicial to the landowners since they did not designate supplemental experts on the issue of the extensometer data or opinions related thereto, which were not identified as expert opinions which would be provided at trial by Appropriator experts.

The testimony regarding the extensometer data also should be excluded on the grounds of *Evidence Code* Section 352 since the probative value of this testimony is clearly far outweighed by the prejudicial affect of allowing introduction of this data and testimony. The data from one remote location in the basin shows only what was occurring at that particular location without significant evidentiary value in terms of what was occurring in the basin at large. Allowing expert opinions based upon this new data at the eleventh hour before trial, after all experts including those of the Landowner Parties, had been deposed, was very prejudicial. Any potential relevance this data and opinion is outweighed by the prejudicial affect on the landowners because of the surprise and inability to properly and fully address this information.

Additionally, simply because an expert includes a reference in his or her bibliography, does not make the contents of those bibliographic references admissible. Likewise, simply including a reference in a bibliography does not mean that an expert, simply because of referring to the reference in the bibliography, is permitted to testify to additional opinions not designated as opinions he or she would give at trial.

## B. EVIDENCE OF RECYCLED WATER SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.

The critical course of events to be considered on this issue are as follows:

"1. Purveyor Expert Peter Leffler, conducted the expert analysis of recycled water and the amount thereof on behalf of the Appropriators.

- 2. Both Los Angeles County Sanitation and Los Angeles County Waterworks objected to deposition of Mr. Leffler related in any way to recycled water, and demanded that his deposition testimony be limited to the narrow issue of fractured bedrock as indicated in his expert witness designation.
- 3. E-mails clarified that Mr. Leffer would be allowed to testify only regarding fractured bedrock but not as to recycled water.
- 4. At the deposition of Mr. Leffler, representations were made by Appropriator attorneys, that the deposition of Mr. Leffler would be limited to fractured bedrock and that there would be no opinions given regarding recycled water or the amounts thereof.
- 5. The Landowner attorneys accepted this representation and deposed Mr. Leffler only regarding fractured bedrock and not on the issue of recycled water or the amount thereof.

As this Court is aware, the right to recycled water must be proved. Likewise the amount of return flow must be proved. For example, in the Santa Maria case over which this Court presided, the same attorneys involved in this case, offered purported proof of the amount of return flows claimed and the scientific and expert basis supporting the claim for recycled water and the amounts thereof. This type of proof was not introduced in this case.

The Appropriators assert that Mr. Scalmanini may testify to recycled water expert opinions. This is not only inaccurate, but would be patently unfair. First, Mr. Scalmanini did not do the expert recycled water analysis. This analysis was done by Mr. Leffler. Accordingly, Mr. Scalmanini has no expert basis to give testimony regarding recycled water, the right to this water, or the amount thereof. Further, the express representation of agreement by the Appropriator attorneys that they would not be giving recycled water expert opinions, certainly entitled the Landowner attorneys to rely on this representation.

The argument that Mr. Scalmanini should nevertheless be able to testify to Mr. Leffler's expert opinions regarding recycled water, and the amount thereof, improperly allows one expert to simply repeat the expert opinions of another expert and amounts to nothing more than a deceptive attempt by the Appropriators to prevent the Landowners from deposing the expert who did the recycled water expert analysis. It would be improper for the Court to allow this to

occur. The documents setting forth the objections by Los Angeles County and Los Angeles County Sanitation along with the e-mails and agreement at deposition accordingly, already were marked as an exhibit with the Court.

# C. THE COURT DID NOT PROHIBIT MR. SCALMANINI FROM TAKING INTO ACCOUNT INDIVIDUAL PUMPING AS A BASIS FOR HIS OPINION OF OVERDRAFT AND SAFE YIELD. HOWEVER, THE COURT DID ADVISE COUNSEL PRE-TRIAL THAT INDIVIDUAL PUMPING WOULD NOT BE INTRODUCED AS EVIDENCE OF WHAT PUMPING ACTUALLY WAS.

Mr. Scalmanini certainly can testify about the pumping data that he evaluated and relied upon to form his opinions of sustainable yield and overdraft. However, that does not make the data he relied upon admissible as evidence of what actual pumping was collectively, or individually. The data itself is hearsay and inadmissible. *Continental Airlines v McDonnel Douglas* (1989) 216 Cal. App. 3d 388, 414-415.

## D. <u>AN EXPERT MAY RELY ON HEARSAY AS A BASIS FOR AN EXPERT'S OPINION. HOWEVER, THE HEARSAY ITSELF IS NOT ADMISSIBLE.</u>

To the extent that hearsay is of the "type that may reasonably be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates...", an expert may rely upon such hearsay as a basis for an expert opinion. *Id.* at p. 414. However, the hearsay data itself is not admissible. As the Court in *Continental* explained:

"While an expert may state on direct examination the matters on which he relied in forming his opinion, he may not testify as to the details of such mattes if they are otherwise inadmissible. [Citations.] The rule rests on the rationale that while an expert may give reasons on direct examination for his opinions, including the matters he considered in forming them, he may not under the guise of reasons bring before the jury incompetent hearsay evidence.

"In other words, as relevant here, while an expert may rely on inadmissible hearsay in forming his or her opinion (see *People v. Coleman, supra*) and may state on direct examination the matters on which he or she relied, the expert may not testify as to the details of those matters if they are otherwise inadmissible."

(emphasis added)

28. The distinction asserted by the Appropriators that inadmissible hearsay is only admissible when the case is tried to a jury, is simply without merit. Inadmissible hearsay is inadmissible whether or not a jury is present. A limiting instruction simply assures that when a jury hears a statement which would otherwise be hearsay, that the jury is instructed that such hearsay is not being admitted for the truth of the matter asserted therein. Clearly a limiting instruction is not necessary for the Court. However, the hearsay is still inadmissible.

In a court trial such as this, the problem with admitting hearsay, is most likely to occur on appeal. Unless the record is extremely clear regarding what evidence is being admitted for the truth of the matter and what evidence is not, confusion can result. The Court has, I believe, indicated that all of the data and reports relied upon by Mr. Scalmanini, are in fact hearsay, and only admitted as the basis for his expert opinion, and not for the truth of the matter asserted therein. Another way to handle the same circumstances is to simply identify all documents offered as the basis for the expert witnesses' opinion and to have them simply identified, not admitted as evidence. Nevertheless, assuming the record is clear, which hopefully it is, that none of the data, documents or other information relied upon by the experts is admitted for the truth of the matter, but solely as a basis for the expert's opinion, perhaps this is enough.

## E. <u>EVIDENCE CODE, SECTION 356 DOES NOT PERMIT USE OF EXPERT OPNION REPORTS, SUCH AS USGS REPORTS.</u>

Evidence Code, Section 356 does allow introduction of other parts of a writing when that writing is "given in evidence" in order to make the part of the writing admitted into evidence understood. However, this section does not provide for admission of inadmissible hearsay, nor does it allow for admission into evidence of expert reports simply when an expert is questioned about a report upon which the expert relied, since the expert report and the part of the report which relates to impeachment, are not admissible and are only offered for impeachment.

As discussed before the Court, Mr. Scalmanini, for example, offered one graph from a report showing extensometer data. He was effectively impeached by the fact that he had not read the rest of the report, as a basis for showing that he may have improperly relied upon the

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report without reading the whole thing. He admitted during cross-examination that he was not aware of, or did not recall, the language cited to him from the report and admitted during redirect that he had not read other portions of the reports.

The cross-examination does not make the hearsay, which Mr. Scalmanini could either not recall or did not read, admissible. It simply impeaches his reliance on the underlying data showing that he did not fully read and/or remember the report. This type if impeachment does not provide a basis for the Appropriators to enlarge the scope of direct examination. Likewise this impeachment does not provide a basis for the Appropriators to simply read lengthy sections of any of these reports into the record as evidence or otherwise, since Mr. Scalmanini admitted he either did not read or did not remember any other portions of the report.

Additionally, the Appropriators intentionally ran out the clock of available time so that the Landowner Parties would have no time to effectively cross-examine Mr. Scalmanini regarding the new sections from USGS or other reports. This action prevented crossexamination and severely prejudice the Landowner Parties by denying them the ability to crossexamine Mr. Scalmanini on these new sections and by preventing them from offering further sections as necessary. Impeachment was proper to show that Mr. Scalmanini either did not read or could not remember the reports upon which he relied. This impeachment does not provide the basis to enlarge the scope of direct exam, or to allow improper hearsay, which the expert did not even read or remember, to be read into the record.

The Appropriator reliance on Evidence Code Section 1280 is misplaced and inappropriate. Contrary to the assertion of the Purveyors, Evidence Code Section 1280 does not make USGS and other governmental expert reports admissible as an official records exception to the hearsay rule. Evidence Code Section 1280 provides as follows:

> "Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered in any civil or criminal proceeding to prove the act, condition. or event if all of the following applies:

> The writing was made by and within the scope of duty of à public employee.

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- (b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event.
- (c) The sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness."

(emphasis added)

USGS, or any other governmental reports containing expert opinion are not an "act, condition, or event" as contemplated by Evidence Code, Section 1280. What is contemplated by Section 1280 is the recordation of an "act, condition, or event", which recordation is made "at or near the time of the act, condition, or event." Further, "the sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness." Section 1280 is directed to ministerial acts by public employees within the scope of their duty as a public employee made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event. It has nothing to do with expert opinions by government or any other experts and is simply allowed as an exception to the hearsay rule, without cross-examination of the party recording the act condition or event, because of the general trustworthiness of an existence of an act condition or event recorded as a business record. Allowing introduction of expert opinion under the guise of an act, condition, or event, would totally deprive parties of the ability to cross-examine the expert regarding the basis of the opinion, its applicability to a particular fact situation and the evidentiary weight to be given to the opinion, in the particular case in question. Accordingly, Section 1280 does not make these reports admissible.

#### F. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Testimony and evidence regarding extensometer data should be excluded since this information and testimony was not timely presented nor timely disclosed. This late disclosure resulted in unfair surprise and prejudice to the landowners. In addition, this evidence should be excluded since any marginal relevance of data from this one remote site in the basin is clearly outweighed by the prejudicial affect on the landowners of being unable to properly and fully address the new data and opinions.

The only expert who analyzed and provided an expert opinion on recycled water, was expert Peter Leffler. LA County Waterworks and LA County Sanitation objected to Mr.

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Leffler's deposition on the issue of recycled water and indicated that his testimony would be limited to the narrow scope of his expert designation limited to the issue of fractured bedrock. They confirmed their objection in e-mails and confirmed at the beginning of Mr. Leffler's deposition that they would not use his recycled water expert opinion. Mr. Scalmanini did not conduct any expert analysis of recycled water or the amount thereof. Allowing Mr. Scalmanini to testify regarding Mr. Leffler's expert opinion would improperly allow Mr. Scalmanini to testify to the expert opinion of another expert. Further, allowing Mr. Scalmanini to testify to Mr. Leffler's expert opinion would improperly subvert the agreement by the Purveyors that this expert opinion regarding recycled water would not be used.

The record should be made clear, that any evidence of pumping, in general, or specifically, was offered and/or admitted solely for the purpose of showing the basis for an expert opinion and not for the truth of the matter asserted therein. The record should likewise be clear that any other data or information relied upon by any expert, identified or admitted, was identified and/or admitted solely for the purpose of showing the basis for the opinion of said expert, and not for the truth of the matter asserted therein.

Evidence Code Section 356 does not allow the introduction of inadmissible hearsay to rebut impeachment of a witness' memory and/or whether a witness fully read a particular report. Finally, Evidence Code, Section 1280 does not make admissible USGS or other government expert reports.

DATED: March 11, 2011

Respectfully submitted.

CLIFFORD & BROWN

By:

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T. MARK SMITH, ESO.

Attorneys for

BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLQ and

WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.

#### 1 PROOF OF SERVICE (C.C.P. §1013a, 2015.5) Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases 2 Judicial Counsel Coordination Proceeding No. 4408 Santa Clara County Superior Court Case No. 1-05-CV-049053 3 I am employed in the County of Kern, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a 4 party to the within action; my business address is 1430 Truxtun Avenue, Bakersfield, CA 93301. 5 On March 11, 2011, I served the foregoing document(s) entitled: 6 BOLTHOUSE PROPERTIES, LLC'S AND WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.'S REPLY TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS' RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS RE SCALMANINI 7 **TESTIMONY** 8 by placing the true copies thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes 9 addressed as stated on the attached mailing list. 10 by placing \_ the original, \_ a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed enveloped addressed as follows: 11 12 SUPERIOR **COURT E-FILING COMPLEX CLARA** $\mathbf{X}_{-}$ SANTA $\mathbf{BY}$ LITIGATION PURSUANT TO CLARIFICATION ORDER DATED OCTOBER 13 27, 2005. 14 Executed on March 11, 2011, at Bakersfield, California. 15 (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California $\mathbf{X}$ 16 that the above is true and correct. 17 I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the Bar of (Federal) this Court at whose direction the service was made. 18 19 20 2455-2 21 22 2.3 24 25 26