1 BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP **EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES** ERIC L. GARNER, Bar No. 130665 UNDER GOVERNMENT CODE 2 JEFFREY V. DUNN, Bar No. 131926 **SECTION 6103** STEFANIE D. HEDLUND, Bar No. 239787 3 5 PARK PLAZA, SUITE 1500 IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 92614 4 TELEPHONE: (949) 263-2600 TELECOPIER: (949) 260-0972 5 Attorneys for Cross-Complainants ROSAMOND COMMUNITY SERVICES DISTRICT and LOS ANGELES COUNTY 6 WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40 7 OFFICE OF COUNTY COUNSEL 8 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES RAYMOND G. FORTNER, JR., Bar No. 42230 9 COUNTY COUNSEL MICHAEL L. MOORE, Bar No. 175599 10 SENIOR DEPUTY COUNTY COUNSEL **500 WEST TEMPLE STREET** 11 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012 TELEPHONE: (213) 974-8407 12 TELECOPIER: (213) 687-7337 Attorneys for Cross-Complainant LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40 13 14 [See Next Page For Additional Counsel] SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 15 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 16 17 **ANTELOPE VALLEY** Judicial Council Coordination No. 4408 18 **GROUNDWATER CASES** CLASS ACTION 19 **Included Actions:** 20 Los Angeles County Waterworks District Santa Clara Case No. 1-05-CV-049053 No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co., Superior Assigned to The Honorable Jack Komar Court of California, County of Los 21 Angeles, Case No. BC 325201; **PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS'** 22 Los Angeles County Waterworks District OPPOSITION TO SHEEP CREEK WATER No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co., Superior **COMPANY'S MOTION TO BE** 23 Court of California, County of Kern, Case **EXCLUDED FROM THE ANTELOPE** No. S-1500-CV-254-348; VALLEY GROUNDWATER 24 ADJUDICATION, OR, IN THE Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of ALTERNATIVE, FOR RECOGNITION OF 25 Lancaster, Diamond Farming Co. v. City of ITS PRIOR RIGHTS TO THE WATERS Lancaster, Diamond Farming Co. v. OF SHEEP CREEK 26 Palmdale Water Dist., Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, Case Nos. 27 RIC 353 840, RIC 344 436, RIC 344 668 28

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 22, 2008, the Public Water Suppliers filed a procedural opposition to the motion, which argued that the motion was in essence a motion for summary judgment. Sheep Creek, however, did not comply with the procedural requirements for a summary judgment motion. The Public Water Suppliers reiterate that opposition, and in addition submit the following opposition on the merits.

Sheep Creek Water Company owns a well site ("Sheep Creek well") adjacent to the Los Angeles – San Bernardino County line, within Los Angeles County and within the Area of Adjudication. Sheep Creek wants to be excluded from the adjudication, however, because Sheep Creek claims its well is in a separate groundwater basin. Alternatively, it seeks recognition of prior groundwater rights to water produced from its well, which it asserts is water from Sheep Creek. Neither position has merit.

Sheep Creek's well is within the Adjudication Area and not within a separate basin. The 1931 judgment - to which Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 ("District") and the many other parties to these consolidated proceedings were not parties – is not *res judicata* or collateral estoppel as to the claims and issues by the parties in these coordinated proceedings. Sheep Creek cannot meet the elements of *res judicata* because the 1931 action and the present coordinated proceedings do not have identical parties, claims and issues. Moreover, public policy would prevent the application of *res judicata* as explained herein, and this Court should deny the Motion.

II. SHEEP CREEK'S WELL IS NOT IN A SEPARATE GROUNDWATER BASIN

A. Sheep Creek's Well Is Within The Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin, As Mapped By The Department Of Water Resources In Bulletin 118.

Sheep Creek incorrectly asserts that its well is located not in the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin, but in the adjacent El Mirage Basin, which it further asserts is "hydrogeologically separate and distinct" from the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin. (Motion at p. 10.) The property on which Sheep Creek's well is located overlies the Antelope Valley

Groundwater Basin, as mapped by the California Department of Water Resources in its Bulletin 118. (Scalmanini Declaration, ¶ 4-¶ 6 and Exhibit 2.) This Court used the Bulletin 118 basin boundary as the principal basis for the boundary of the Area of Adjudication. (See Order After Hearing on Jurisdictional Boundaries (November 3, 2006); Scalmanini Declaration, ¶ 7.) One local exception in the area of the Sheep Creek property was the truncation of the Area of Adjudication at the county line, because the county line had previously been established as the westernmost boundary of the Mojave River Area adjudication. (*Id.*)

Sheep Creek appears to ask this Court to change the Adjudication Area boundary and use a more restrictive delineation of the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin, as depicted by prior researchers. During the Phase 1 trial, Mr. Scalmanini referred to some of those delineations in his own testimony. This Court, however, has already determined that it will use the Bulletin 118 boundaries, and Sheep Creek gives no reason to change this conclusion.

Additionally, Sheep Creek's assertion that its property is in the El Mirage Basin is also incorrect. No mapping of the El Mirage Basin has ever extended west of the Los Angeles County – San Bernardino County line. (Scalmanini Declaration, ¶ 19.)

B. In Any Case, The El Mirage Basin Is Not Hydrogeologically Separate And Distinct From The Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin.

Irrespective of which basin boundaries are used, the boundary between the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin and the El Mirage Basin does not present any barrier to groundwater flow. The boundaries of the El Mirage Basin are described in Bulletin 118 as "alluvial drainage divides extending from the San Gabriel Mountains." (Sheep Creek's Exhibit E; Scalmanini Declaration, ¶ 9.) Surface drainage divides do not constitute subsurface hydrogeologic features that would impede groundwater flow. Therefore, groundwater is free to move across the boundary in response to prevailing hydraulic gradients. (*Id.*)

Sheep Creek's claim is similar to those claims addressed by the Court in the Phase 2 trial. Just as the Court determined that the areas claimed by Tejon Ranch, Crystal Organic Farms, and Anaverde were not in separate groundwater basins, so should it determine that the Sheep Creek well is not in a separate groundwater basin.

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C. Sheep Creek's Claims That Pumping From Its Well Would Not Impact The Groundwater Supply In The Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin Are Not Supported.

Sheep Creek relies on the declaration of Dr. Ram Arora to support its claim that pumping from its well would not impact the groundwater supply in the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin. Dr. Arora calculates a "radius of influence" for Sheep Creek's well, and concludes that this radius of influence does not extend into the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin or to any nearby wells. There are several flaws in this analysis, which are discussed in detail in the Scalmanini Declaration at paragraphs 13 through 22. In summary, first, as discussed above, the well and its radius of influence are not located in the El Mirage Basin. Second, the distance between the Sheep Creek property and the Carlson-Phillips basin boundary line is not material to a determination of whether the Sheep Creek well is in the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin, as mapped by the Department of Water Resources. Third, Dr. Arora uses an antiquated method to determine a fixed radius of influence. This method fails to recognize that the actual radius of influence will be a function of aquifer parameters and time, and will expand as time goes on. Fourth, and most importantly, Dr. Arora focuses on direct pumping impacts that derive from the hydraulics of flow around a well, and ignores basin impacts that derive from the extraction of water from an aquifer and the subsequent recharge to the aquifer to replace the pumped water. The conclusion that there are no nearby wells to be affected by Sheep Creek's pumping does not mean that Sheep Creek's groundwater pumping will have no effect on the groundwater supply to the basin.

D. Delivery Of Water From Sheep Creek's Well To Its Service Area In San Bernardino County Will Result In A Depletion Of Water In The Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin.

Sheep Creek proposes to export water from its well in Los Angeles County to serve its customers in San Bernardino County. In contrast to its well, which is in the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin, its service area is in the El Mirage and Upper Mojave River Valley Groundwater Basins. (Sheep Creek Exhibit A; Scalmanini Declaration, ¶ 3.) Although these basins are hydrologically connected with the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin, there is no

prevailing groundwater flow westerly toward Los Angeles County. (*Id.* ¶ 10 and Exhibit 3.)

Thus, the water produced from the Sheep Creek well would be exported from the jurisdictional portion of the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin to the Sheep Creek service area in San Bernardino County, with no return flows from that service area to the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin. The planned groundwater pumping would be a net extraction or loss of part of the groundwater yield of the Antelope Valley Area of Adjudication. (*Id.*)

It may be that certain limited exports from the basin will be permitted as part of an overall physical solution. Sheep Creek's equity arguments may come into play at that time. But it is premature to make that determination now because this Court has yet to determine the safe yield of the basin. If the Court determines that the yield of the basin is insufficient to support in-basin uses, then exporting water from the basin would exacerbate that shortage.

III. THE 1931 JUDGMENT HAS NO PRECLUSIVE EFFECT IN THESE COORDINATED PROCEEDINGS

Sheep Creek is incorrect to argue that the 1931 judgment has preclusive effect under the doctrines of *res judicata* and collateral estoppel, thereby barring the District's claims in these coordinated proceedings.

Res judicata describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits, and "prevents the relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them." (Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 675, 683 [quoting Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896].) "A prior judgment is not res judicata on a subsequent action unless three elements are met: (1) the issues decided in the prior adjudication are identical with those presented in the later action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior action; and (3) the party against whom the plea is raised was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication." (Id. at p. 685-86 [quoting Citizens for Open Access etc. Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Assn. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1065].) Even if these requirements are met, "res judicata will not be applied if injustice would

result or if the public interest requires that relitigation not be foreclosed. (Ibid [emphasis added].)

Collateral estoppel "precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings." (Mycogen, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 896 [quoting Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341].) A prior decision precludes relitigation of an issue under the doctrine of collateral estoppel only if the party asserting the doctrine meets its burden to establish five elements: (1) the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation, must have been decided in a former proceeding; (2) that issue must have been actually litigated; (3) that issue must have been necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the former proceeding must have been final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. (Johnson v. Glaxosmithkline, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1507-08 [quoting Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341].) Even if these requirements are met, the court still analyzes the public policies underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel before concluding that it applies. (Id. at p. 1509.) Collateral estoppel will not apply if injustice would result or the public interest requires that relitigation not be foreclosed. (Rodgers v. Sargent Controls (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 82, 90 [quoting Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 902].)

Sheep Creek has not met its burden to establish that the claims decided and issues actually and necessarily litigated in the 1931action were not identical to the claims the District asserts in this action. Even if Sheep Creek could satisfy all the elements of res judicata, the public interest disfavors applying either doctrine in these coordinated groundwater adjudication proceedings.

A. The Claims And Issues Decided In The 1931 Action Are Not Identical To Those In This Case.

Sheep Creek argues the 1931 judgment resolved identical claims and issues that the District raises in these proceedings, but it mischaracterizes those claims and issues, and distorts the primary right underlying them. Sheep Creek appears to contend that the primary right vindicated in the 1931 action is Sheep Creek's right to a certain amount of groundwater from the Adjudication Area, and that right was determined in the 1931 judgment. Sheep Creek further

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contends that the Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40's actions seek to determine rights to Sheep Creek water. The supposed "identity" between these claims and issues is that both actions seek to determine the rights to Sheep Creek surface water. (Sheep Creek Motion, p. 12.) This, Sheep Creek says, shows that both the present groundwater adjudication proceedings and the 1931 judgment over rights to surface stream water are identical issues. Sheep Creek is not correct.

Unless the issue or cause of action in the actions is identical, the first judgment does not stand as a bar to the second suit. (Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass'n (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1067.) California's res judicata doctrine is based on the "primary right theory." (Mycogen, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 904.) It provides that a "cause of action" is comprised of a "primary right" of the plaintiff, a corresponding "primary duty" of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant to breach that duty. (Id. [quoting Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681-82].)

The violation of a single primary right gives rise only to one cause of action. (*Ibid.*) The primary right is the plaintiff's right to be free from the <u>particular injury</u> suffered, as distinguished from the various available theories of recovery or remedies sought. (*Ibid.*) The court compares both actions, looking at the rights which are sought to be vindicated and the harm for which redress is claimed. (*Citizens for Open Access, supra*, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067.)

Sheep Creek's 1931 action did not resolve the same primary right that is at issue in these proceedings. The purpose of the 1931 action was to resolve a dispute between a few parties over surface water rights permitted by the State of California. Surface water is regulated by the State of California and is defined in Water Code section 1200. Surface water does not include percolating groundwater, the subject of this litigation, and thus the primary right is not the same.

In the present litigation, many landowners, the United States, and governmental entities are involved in a comprehensive adjudication of groundwater rights within the Adjudication Area. The primary right at issue in these coordinated proceedings involves all parties' claims to groundwater within the Adjudication Area. Stated simply, the Public Water Suppliers claims for a comprehensive determination of rights and a physical solution to the Adjudication Area's

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groundwater overdraft conditions were not and could not have been decided by the 1931 judgment.

Finally, the groundwater extracted from Sheep Creek's well is not derived from Sheep Creek. (Sheep Creek Exhibit A; Scalmanini Declaration, ¶¶ 9 - 16.) Thus, there cannot be issue an identity of issues in these coordinated proceedings and the 1931 judgment.

B. Public Policy Militates Against Applying *Res Judicata* Or Collateral Estoppel

Even if the threshold requirements for res judicata or collateral estoppel are met, neither of these doctrines will be applied "if injustice would result or if the public interest requires that relitigation not be foreclosed." (Citizens for Open Access, supra, 60 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1065 [quoting Consumers Lobby, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 902; Rodgers, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 90 [quoting Consumers Lobby, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 902].) Applying those doctrines here would work an obvious injustice on all the parties, given that, due to the overdraft conditions within the Adjudication Area since the 1931 judgment. To bind the District and all other parties to these proceedings, based on the outcome of a 1931 judgment involving only a few parties, which itself was a stipulated or agreed upon judgment, would deprive all parties of their opportunity to fully present their case and would result in an injustice upon all parties. The District, together with other parties, has a right to seek a physical solution to groundwater overdraft conditions which pose serious risks to the public benefit and welfare within the Adjudication Area. To allow Sheep Creek to export water outside the Adjudication Area, with no return flows to the Adjudication Area, and without a court determination involving all parties who have an interest in the groundwater yield of the Adjudication Area, would result in an injustice and would be against the public interest. (E.g., In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System (1979) 25 Cal.3d 339, 347 [judgment upon a water rights dispute between a few parties is disfavored and can be nullified by a comprehensive adjudication of all parties' rights].) // //

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IV. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth herein, Sheep Creek Water Company does not establish that it takes water from a separate basin; public policy prevents the application of *res judicata* or collateral estoppel, and the Court should deny the motion.

Dated: May 16, 2009

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PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Kerry V. Keefe, declare:

I am a resident of the State of California and over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action; my business address is Best & Krieger LLP, 5 Park Plaza, Suite 1500, Irvine, California 92614. On May 15, 2009, I served the within document(s):

LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40'S OPPOSITION TO SHEEP CREEK WATER COMPANY'S MOTION TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER ADJUDICATION, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR RECOGNITION OF ITS PRIOR RIGHTS TO THE WATERS OF SHEEP CREEK

×	by posting the document(s) listed above to the Santa Clara County Superior Court website in regard to the Antelope Valley Groundwater matter.
	by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Irvine, California addressed as set forth below.
	by causing personal delivery by ASAP Corporate Services of the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.
	by personally delivering the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.
	I caused such envelope to be delivered via overnight delivery addressed as indicated on the attached service list. Such envelope was deposited for delivery by Federal Express following the firm's ordinary business practices.
Service on the	I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing ce for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal at same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. It on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

Executed on May 15, 2009, at Irvine, California.

Kerry V Keefe

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