SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE

DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, WILLIAM BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

RIC-344436

CITY OF LANCASTER, ANTELOPE VALLEY WATER DISTRICT, PALMDALE WATER DISTRICT, PALM RANCH IRRIGATION DISTRICT, QUARTZ HILL WATER DISTRICT, ROSAMOND COMMUNITY SERVICE DISTRICT, MOJAVE PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT, LITTLE) ROCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT, LOS ANGELES) COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICTS, et al.,

Defendants.)

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL PROCEEDINGS Had before the Honorable Gary B. Tranbarger, Judge of the Superior Court, Department 7, on November 12, 2004.

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff/

Diamond Farming:

LeBEAU & THELEN

By: Bob H. Joyce 5001 East Commercenter Drive, Suite 300

Bakersfield, CA 93389-2092

For Plaintiff/

Bolthouse:

CLIFFORD & BROWN BY: Richard Zimmer

1430 Truxtun Avenue, Suite 900

Bakersfield, CA 93301

For Defendant/ Antelope Valley: CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE COMPANY

CORPORATE COUNSEL BY: John S. Tootle

2632 West 237th Street, Suite 100

Torrance, CA 90505-5272

For Defendants/ Palmdale W. D., Quartz Hill W. D.: LAGERLOF, SENECAL, BRADLEY, GOSNEY

& KRUSE

BY: Thomas S. Bunn III

301 North Lake Avenue, 10th Floor

Pasadena, CA 91101-4108

ORIGINAL

EXHIBIT " EXHIBIT 2

APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

For Defendants/ LA Waterworks Districts 37 and 40: OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES BY: Frederick W. Pfaeffle 500 West Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012

Also:

BEST, BEST & KRIEGER BY: Jeffrey V. Dunn 5 Park Plaza, Suite 1440 Irvine, CA 92614

Also:

BEST, BEST & KRIEGER BY: Eric L. Garner 3750 University Avenue Riverside, CA 92501

For Defendant/ City of Lancaster: STRADLING YOCCA CARLSON & RAUTH
BY: Jeffrey Robbins
660 Newport Center Drive, Suite 1600
Newport Beach, CA 92660

For Other farming interests:

HATCH AND PARENT BY: Michael T. Fife 21 E. Carrillo Street Santa Barbara, CA 93102

For City of Palmdale:

RICHARDS, WATSON & GERSHON BY: James L. Markman Number One Civic Center Circle Brea, CA

Reported by:

Sharon A. Jones, C. S. R. 3022 4100 Main Street, Room 110 Riverside, CA 92501

RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 2004

GARY B. TRANBARGER, JUDGE

DEPARTMENT 7

THE COURT: Diamond Farming versus City f Lancaster.

Let's see if we can avoid everyone making an appearance. We

got --

MR. JOYCE: Good morning, your Honor. Bob Joyce appearing on behalf of Diamond Farming.

MR. ZIMMER: Good morning, your Honor. Richard Zimmer on behalf of Bolthouse Farms.

THE COURT: Who wants to speak for the district?

MR. DUNN: Good morning, your Honor. Jeffrey Dunn on behalf of defendants, L. A. County Water Works District 37 and Rosamond Community Services District.

MR. GARNER: Good morning, your Honor. Your Honor, Eric Garner also on behalf of Los Angeles County Waterworks Districts number 37 and 40 and Rosamond Community Services District.

MR. PFAEFFLE: Good morning, your Honor. Fred Pfaeffle, Senior Deputy County Counsel for L. A. County Waterworks District 40 and 37.

MR. TOOTLE: Good morning, your Honor. John Tootle on behalf of Antelope Valley Water Company.

MR. BUNN: Good morning, your Honor. Tom Bunn on behalf of Palmdale and Quartz Hill Water District.

MR. MARKMAN: Good morning, your Honor. James Markman, not yet a party, representing the City of Palmdale and interested-hope-to-be-party in this matter.

MR. ROBBINS: Good morning, your Honor. Jeff Robbins for City of Lancaster.

MR. FIFE: Good morning, your Honor. Michael Fife for the other so-called farming interests that are referenced in the papers.

THE COURT: You represent all of them?

MR. FIFE: Two to 355. Currently we represent a group of several of the largest of them. And if the motion is granted today or if the county does file the second adjudication, we would expect to represent most, if not all of them.

THE COURT: All right. Let's start with threshold question. No one needs my permission to file a new and separate action asking for a basin adjudication, do they?

MR. DUNN: May I be heard on that, your Honor?

THE COURT: Since you're the one who thinks you might be filing it, yeah.

MR. DUNN: Jeffrey Dunn on behalf of the moving party.

The issue arises whether there has to be a cross-complaint filed in this action. In other words, is the cross-complaint compulsory or is it permissive? And depending upon whether it's permissive or compulsory, that would impact the ability of any of these defendants to file a separate action for adjudication.

If it is a compulsory cross-complaint in this action, there could be an argument in a separate action or actions that those actions are improper or otherwise should not be brought, but instead should have been brought as a compulsory cross-complaint in this action.

THE COURT: Aren't there a number of parties who are not parties in this action that had the ability to seek a basin-wide adjudication?

MR. DUNN: No question that that is true. However, as to the parties who are defendants in this action, and specifically my client, the waterworks district, it is a party, it is a defendant, and it is faced with the issue of filing a compulsory cross-complaint in this action. So we are not in a position to ignore the compulsory cross-complaint rule. And that's why the motion is brought.

THE COURT: Would I be safe to assume that the only persons that can make such a complaint against you if you were to file a separate action would be the two plaintiffs in this case?

MR. DUNN: Hard to say, your Honor. It is possible that parties -- excuse me -- entities that are not parties to this case, but would be parties in a separate action or separate actions, could still make the claim that the basin adjudication claim, at least as it relates to these two plaintiffs, should have been raised in this action today.

THE COURT: As it relates to these two plaintiffs?
MR. DUNN: Correct.

THE COURT: These two plaintiffs interested in raising such a procedural objection to a separately filed basin adjudication claim?

MR. JOYCE: Well, your Honor, I -- I don't necessarily want to prejudge or speculate as to what my legal position would or would not be until I was confronted with that event.

I will advise the Court that I think, as we clearly point out in our opposition papers, that first and foremost any claims that are now desired to be advanced as agains the quote-unquote Roe cross-defendants, are not compulsory by clear definition or

permissive at best.

As against any defendant as against any other defendant, those would be likewise permissive at best.

If and to the extent any claims could be characterized as, quote-unquote, and I use that word advisedly, as compulsory, it would be any -- it would have to be claims as between the party and plaintiff and the defendant. And I think we made it fairly clear in our opposition that in the characterization of this action as it properly is as a straightforward quiet title action that the cross-complaint is really an unnecessary procedural vehicle inasmuch as all issues of contest as to the adversity of title are raised by virtue of answer and the affirmative defenses pled therein.

So I don't think it's a compulsory cross-complaint at all. I think that's a bit of a red herring. I would advise the Court that I find it a bit interesting that in the motion in the first instance, they were relying upon subsection (c) of 426.50.

This concept of compulsory cross-complaint is something that they allude to, but don't even affirmatively acertain to be the case in the reply memorandum. I don't know if it was — if they were holding it in abeyance or if this was just a new thought that came to mind, but in any event this motion as originally brought and brought pursuant to 426.50 subparagraph (c) therein, that is the basis for the motion. And under that the only standard to be applied is the interest of justice standard. And we've addressed that in our opposition.

THE COURT: Let's assume for the moment that somebody files a lawsuit somewhere seeking a basin-wide adjudication. Do

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plaintiffs in this case think there is something -- some ruling that I will end up making in this case that will have any continued viability once a ruling is made in that case?

MR. JOYCE: Your Honor, any rulings made in this case on the issue of title as between my client and these defendants will be determinative of those issues.

As to the two pieces of property that my client owns that are -- and have before the court in Kern County and Los Angeles County and as to the claims raised defensively of claims of prescription and the like, that once those have been litigated in this case as between that particular piece of property and the named defendants, they're done.

Now, what if any impact that has elsewhere or in other cases, I don't know. Frankly, from my client's perspective I want them done, resolved, adjudicated and over. I want the judgment, good or bad, so I know what I'm going to do in the future and that's the end of it.

THE COURT: Let's assume you get a judgment in this case.

MR. JOYCE: If I have a judgment -- .

THE COURT: I assume any judgment that's going to be of value to you is, go ahead and pump X number of gallons.

MR. JOYCE: That in essence would be correct. And that's going to be res judicata --

THE COURT: Well, hang on.

MR. JOYCE: -- from once it's entered thereafter.

THE COURT: It's going to be res judicata?

MR. JOYCE: As between my client and the specifically identified participating defendants in this action it will be

over.

THE COURT: But how many gallons you really get to pump will be determined by the basin-wide adjudication, won't it?

MR. ZIMMER: Your Honor, if I could just speak to this briefly, just answer the Court's question? Number one, I do not think that what we do in our action will stop the County if they so desire, or any other party in the Antelope Valley, from filing a basin-wide adjudication.

Number two, what we do in our action will have binding effects on the parties to the action. We are simply farmers who have been farming on this ground.

THE COURT: Counsel, you're not answering my question.

Yes, you'll have some binding collateral estoppel/res judicata

effect on the parties to this case. But is that going to at all

affect how many gallons you actually get to pump out as

determined by basin-wide adjudication?

MR. ZIMMER: No. I would say no. We filed this action precisely to cut off prescriptive claims.

THE COURT: Counsel, if it doesn't really effect how many gallons you get to pump out, it's somewhat of a Pyrrhic victory, isn't it, assuming you get a victory?

MR. ZIMMER: If there's no prescriptive claims. The prescriptive claims could affect the number of gallons because the argument could be they have diminished our right to pump by whatever numbers of gallons they are claiming prescriptively. So it could effect it in that way. That judgment of the Court, that declaration of the Court would be binding as between these parties clearly in a subsequent basin-wide adjudication.

MR. JOYCE: Your Honor, if I could take it one step --

THE COURT: Let me phrase it one more time. Let's try it this way: A judgment that affects two farms in two water districts only --

MR. JOYCE: Actually, your Honor, there's seven parties that have --

THE COURT: All right. Seven parties.

MR. JOYCE: Okay.

THE COURT: A judgment affecting seven parties, what effect, if any, is that going to have on a basin-wide adjudication lawsuit with 300 parties?

MR. JOYCE: Very simple, your Honor. The parties that we have named as party defendants that are presently before the Court are the primary, if not the only, appropriator pumpers within the area that we're concerned with.

The claims that are in issue are primarily this: Do we have and have we preserved our common law rights as an overlying landowner with the -- with the attendant priority that attaches to that status? In other words, do we have first rights against the available supply as against these party defendants?

If we prevail upon that theory and we get a judgment quieting our title and confirming our priority, then in any subsequent adjudication, whether it be amongst some parties or everybody else, at least as between my client and our properties and these defendants we now have a confirmed priority.

If in the course of a subsequent adjudication a court were to say there was an inadequate supply to service all the needs of both the appropriators and overlying landowners, then

in — in that subsequent action any adjustments that need to be made in relation as it would pertain to the relationship between the pumping of the parties, the adjustments would have to be made in recognition of my now confirmed priority; which means, in essence, there's going to have to be cutbacks. The appropriators would have to cut back first before I could be compelled to cut back. That's in essence the impact of what happens if I secure a judgment in this action quieting my title, confirming my

Once established, then on a going forward basis anything else that happens would have to give due recognition to my status and my priority. It's inconsistent with the Mojave-Barstow decision where the court said and recognized that if, in fact, there's an absence of showing prescription, the overlyer retains his priority. And that even in the context of physical solution in an adjudication setting, then the Court cannot impose upon the priority right holder any inordinate expense, any inordinate costs, or any inordinate inconvenience in the exercise of priority right.

So the key focus in this litigation is to establish that priority or to find that it doesn't exist, one or the other.

THE COURT: All right. Anyone disagree with that?

MR. DUNN: Yes.

THE COURT: What practical or legal effect do you think judgment in this case will have on the hypothetical separate basin adjudication lawsuit?

MR. DUNN: It would not have the impact that you heard. The reality is that if there are separate actions for basin

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adjudication and these complaints continue, we would then have multiple complaints and cross-complaints involving same parties, same subject matter of the litigation, and more importantly the same contested rights.

Now, in the interest of justice, that would create a problem because you're going to have inconsistent findings. Each court would be free to make its own determinations. It's entirely possible that a court here in Riverside County could find X, Y and Z factually and a court in Los Angeles County could find A, B, C, and a court in Kern County could find yet something different, all adjudicating the same contested rights. So you have at a minimum a problem of inconsistent findings of facts and law. You have the fact that there would be multiple litigation involving the same parties in this case in other counties over the same issues.

You're going to have the attendant additional expense, the delay of all that's involved, but at the end of the day --

THE COURT: Wait a minute. You talk about delay. Isn't that their reason for objecting to all this?

MR. DUNN: No.

THE COURT: What's your time estimate for completion of your basin adjudication action?

MR. DUNN: Time in terms of court days or time until we get to trial?

MR. JOYCE: Time in terms of years.

THE COURT: The time in terms of date of filing to date of judgment.

MR. DUNN: I think you're looking at two to three years.

THE COURT: That seems rather optimistic, doesn't it?

MR. DUNN: Well, consider the fact that this case is

already five years old. There has been a fair amount of work

done to date. We are not starting from scratch. It's

obviously --

THE COURT: Hang on. You are not starting from scratch.

A great number of other parties will be starting from scratch.

MR. DUNN: They will start from scratch no matter where the adjudication takes place. If it is in a separate action or with a cross-complaint in this case, that's going to happen, but it should not be lost --

THE COURT: Let me ask this question: How many non-farming parties would there be in the basin adjudication action that are not in this action?

MR. DUNN: There would be two groups, primarily neutral water companies and --

MR. GARNER: The cities.

MR. DUNN: -- few others, City of Palmdale.

MR. MARKMAN: Maybe I can help the Court with that.

THE COURT: Please state your name again for the record.

MR. MARKMAN: James Markman representing the City of Palmdale. There are probably at least a dozen water purveyors serving families in the City of Palmdale. The waterworks district is one of them.

There are numerous mutual water companies, some of whom claim overlying rights because of the way they're structured, some of whom think that they're appropriators. None of them are engaged in this case.

The end result is -- I could describe this to the Court.

I think in the end these cases will come together, whether by way of this cross-complaint should the Court grant the motion or by way of coordinating and consolidating that case with this case.

Way of coordinating and consolidating that case with this case.

And I don't think Mr. Joyce will be able to proceed to judgment any quicker in either case.

The problem is, let's assume these were kept separate, which I can't imagine. Mr. Joyce obtains a judgment of priority based on the five years preceding the filing of this case against these defendants and their mutual water companies. He has no priority over and he hasn't correlated his rights with hundreds and hundreds of other overlying farming producers.

And then in the next case, based on a new five year period which starts when the next case is filed, which is a whole different period for purpose of determining prescriptive rights existence or nonexistence, we obtain a completely different result so that we have competing judgments.

That's what -- that's -- the City of Palmdale is not a producer, your Honor. The City of Palmdale's interest is seeing this resolved with finality to provide certainty to Mr. Joyce and his clients and everyone else pumping water in that basin as to what their source is, how sustainable it is, and what it's going to cost, because presently there's such chaos that we're not sur at the City of Palmdale whether presently approved projects, ver large projects, are going to receive water service or whether ou land use process has any viability. And that is going to remain the case until all these matters are resolved, not just this one involving these two farmers, but one that involves everybody.

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So I think should these -- should there be two cases and this motion be denied, you could get inconsistent results for -- if for no other reason than you're going to have different prescriptive periods to deal with and you're going to have parties who serve water to people, who don't serve water to crops, who are not present here, who could end up with or without priority as compared to Mr. Joyce's priority.

THE COURT: You want to address one narrow point?

Certainly, your Honor. MR. JOYCE:

This notion that the decisions would be based THE COURT: on the five years that preceded the filing of the action, what does that do to your res judicata argument?

MR. JOYCE: Well, your Honor, first and foremost, in order to establish the prescriptive claim, they have to make the demonstrable showing of the predicate five years of adversity with every other element of necessity having been satisfied evidentially. The case law clearly establishes it's the five years preceding the complaint. Once having filed my complaint I cut off that running of that period.

So of necessity, anything that has occurred after the October 1999 filing as to my purchase of property has no bearing upon determination of prescription as to that piece of property, because once in court, once I have protected myself by initiating the action, the statute no longer runs.

THE COURT: Would that protection --

MR. JOYCE: And it would --

THE COURT: Hang on. Would that protection exist let's assume for the moment that there's a separate basin

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adjudication filed next week. And let's further assume for the moment that somewhere down the line some judge somewhere orders these cases consolidated.

MR. JOYCE: Certainly.

THE COURT: Which -- which five year period applies to you? And is it a different five year period that applies to you that applies to everyone else in the case?

MR. JOYCE: Absolutely. Absolutely. If the Court were to force consolidation and/or coordination or otherwise, that's not going to affect the legal reality that I filed my action on October -- in October of 1999. That's when I cut off. That's never going to change no matter what.

THE COURT: But you can cut it off against those individuals for whom you name and serve.

MR. JOYCE: That's exactly correct. I'm not suggesting for a moment that someone else out there couldn't try to assert a different kind of a claim for different period of time that I have not as yet locked horns with. That could happen.

I can't suggest that I can define a perfect world of every conceivable outcome being addressed, but as between the parties that I have sued, that is the operative time frame.

If the Court will note in the proposed cross-complaint, they themselves even concede that there will be two distinct five years periods: The five year periods to address my claims predating October of '99 and a five year period which predates whatever date it is they get around to filing the proposed cross-complaint, either separately or as a cross-complaint.

THE COURT: But parties saying that are the ones that are

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clearly in this case, not the ones that aren't in this case. Who knows what they're going to assert?

MR. JOYCE: I understand. What I'm saying is that the prescriptive claims being advanced will be dependent upon two distinct different time frames. I have no interest in post-October 1999 events and/or production numbers and all the rest of it that's going to have an impact on everybody else out there because I've cut it off. I've locked it in time.

MR. ZIMMER: Mr. Joyce is right. That's why the defense is pointing out exactly why these cases should not be consolidated, why the cross-complaint should not be allowed because the Court will be dealing two separate time periods no matter what. You're going to be dealing with one time period which is cutoff by the filing of our complaint and a second time period for everyone else out there.

THE COURT: Well, counsel, if that's true, the question becomes: Is it better that one Court should deal with both time periods at the same time or two different Courts dealing with two different time periods?

MR. ZIMMER: I would say it's better with one Court dealing with the limited issues we have now because that will be binding between these parties.

Mr. Dunn points out that, you know, we have all these problems. If we have a judgment in this case, it's going to be confusing in the other case. If we have a judgment in this case, it's not going to have any binding effect in the other case. If that's true, why did we wait five years to raise that?

MR. JOYCE: Your Honor, --

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MR. ZIMMER: We have been litigating these issues between these individual parties for four to five years.

THE COURT: Well, I don't need much convincing for someone to say that there's a certain amount of reluctance on anyone's part to file and initiate a basin-wide adjudication action. Everyone has been playing chicken for more than five years --

MR. JOYCE: Well, your Honor, --

THE COURT: -- trying to avoid that. Now, I haven't even actually heard to a hundred percent certainty that they're still not playing chicken. I haven't heard that it's definitely going to be filed. You could have done that last week. You don't -- well, this idea that it may be a compulsory cross-complaint. There are other people in this room who could file a basin-wide adjudication. I mean, it could be done by any -- by a couple hundred people allegedly.

MR. JOYCE: And it could be done tomorrow. It could be done five years from now, but we have -- we have a pending action.

THE COURT: Okay. Hang on. I have one other topic here.

Sure. MR. JOYCE:

Are there any other lawsuits out there that THE COURT: are piecemeal -- attempts at piecemeal adjudication of water rights in this basin other than this one?

MR. DUNN: Not that we are aware of.

THE COURT: Not that you're aware. Go ahead. You were going to say something.

MR. DUNN: All right. There will be a basin

adjudication, to answer the Court's question. There's no game of chicken here. That statement is now on the record.

The question is: Is it going to take place for interest of justice and because it's compulsory cross-complaint in this case or are we going to have to go through what I have briefly described today, in more detail described in the motion and reply, a process by which multiple actions will be filed in other counties, a request to the Judicial Council to coordinate all of those cases?

THE COURT: Why -- why multiple actions? Why not just one additional action?

MR. DUNN: Because there are property holdings in both Los Angeles and Kern Counties. The plaintiffs who filed these lawsuits didn't each just file one. They filed a lawsuit in L.A. County and one in Kern County.

THE COURT: All right. So hang on. So you're saying the basin-wide adjudication action must of necessity start off in two separate counties at the same time?

MR. DUNN: Well, there are -- there are venue rules applicable to public entities as plaintiffs. And -- and basically we filed the action where -- where the events give rise to the cause of action. We would not file it separately here in Riverside County.

THE COURT: I didn't think -- no one would file anything in Riverside County.

MR. DUNN: Well, that's correct. But can --

THE COURT: But -- but -- but you are telling me it would be two lawsuits, one in Kern and one in Los Angeles.

It could be. MR. DUNN: 1 THE COURT: At least at the start of filing. 2

MR. DUNN: Just as these two plaintiffs started their

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THE COURT: And it would seem -- well, does it seem case. logical that if that were to happen, regardless of what I rule today, that if they were to file -- someone, maybe someone not a party to this case, filed a basin-wide adjudication action in Los Angeles; the other one filed in Kern, is it not eminently foreseeable that the request for coordination would be made; that the Judicial Council would then appoint a coordinating judge and that judge would in all likelihood get not only those two actions, but also this one?

Um-hum. MR. DUNN:

MR. ZIMMER: Hopefully be done with this action before then.

MR. JOYCE: That's possible, your Honor, but I guess --THE COURT: Hang on. Why would you think we'd be done with this one?

Because I think --MR. ZIMMER:

THE COURT: You've mentioned you had four days of trial. Let's point out the obvious. You didn't have four days of trial in front of me. And unless there's a stipulation by all sides, you're going to have to repeat those four days of trial.

Now, maybe you'll stipulate that I can read the transcripts and get caught up. That would be fine.

MR. JOYCE: We are more than happy to have the Court do that, your Honor, because we want to get this thing over with.

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THE COURT: I understand, but it requires stipulation from all sides.

MR. ZIMMER: The Court has ordered that the transcript that exists so far would be used in the ultimate action. Now, if the parties want to stipulate --

THE COURT: I haven't done that.

MR. ZIMMER: I understand, your Honor. The parties may very well stipulate to have you hear it, but even assuming the case — this Court heard this, with the limited action — the limited — the limited things that we have at issue in this case, in this limited quiet title case against these specific defendants, this case would be tried expeditiously. You're talking about —

THE COURT: Now, I haven't read the transcripts from the four days and I don't pretend to know anything what happened those four days, but I do know Commissioner Ettinger started off thinking that it would be limited in scope, couple days, get it done. And at the end of four days she threw up her hands and said, nope, can't do it. And she undid the bifurcation order.

MR. ZIMMER: I think -- I think what -- I don't think she said she couldn't do it. I think she realized -- the defendants had been asking for bifurcation claiming they had to determine the area of boundaries of a basin in order to litigate the issues before the Court.

The Court came to the realization after listening to those few days of testimony that that was wrong, that that wasn't necessary at all. We have been advancing that the entire time. We said to the Court, we don't need to do this.

		with us that we did not need
1		The Court ultimately agreed with us that we did not need
2	to	The Court ultimatery against that reason, said we can do this, undid the bifurcation for that reason, said we can
3	tr	and in the remaining days of this
4		MR. DUNN: That's not what the Court decided.
5		MR. ZIMMER: You can look at the transcript. The
6	tr	canscript is pretty clear.
7		It didn't get desire
8	no	THE COURT: Whatever. Ow in the waning stages of 2004 in Department 7 and I haven't
9	1	and a word vet.
10		MR. JOYCE: Appreciate that, your Honor.
11		MR. ZIMMER: We'd like you to hear it.
12		THE COURT: There are many, many words you want me to
13	h	near.
14		MR. ZIMMER: And decide it.
15		THE COURT: But I he gave me what we're going to sa
16		is an optimistic estimate that a basin-wide adjudication can be
17		is an optimistic estimate that some optimistic assessment of resolved in three years. What's your optimistic assessment of
18		he resolved?
19		TOYCE: Your Honor, if this Court sets till
21		MR. JOYCE: 10df the next 60 to 90 days, we can have this case done if it is the
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2		are being extremely disingended
	3	suggest to this Court that a basin adjudication will be done is
	4	three years. They won't even have all the parties before the
	25	LANCE VERTS.
	26	MR. DUNN: Object to that, your Honor. There is no
	27	foundation for that statement.
<u>ر</u>	28	THE COURT: Counsel, don't interrupt.

MR. JOYCE: Every one of these gentlemen sitting behind me are currently participating in another groundwater adjudication that I got drug into late up in Santa Maria — involving Santa Maria up in San Jose. It's been going on nine years now.

MR. DUNN: That's not true either.

THE COURT: Counsel, do not interrupt.

MR. JOYCE: The long and short of it is that -- you know what, better yet, make him commit himself on the record he'll have everybody served within some defined period of time. Make him commit himself he'll have the trial tried and completed in three years. Not going to happen.

MR. ZIMMER: To answer your question, I think we can have our case tried in three weeks.

MR. BUNN: May I be heard on that, your Honor?

THE COURT: No. Does anyone think that there is -- let's assume for the moment that a basin-wide -- total basin-wide adjudication will take significantly longer than three years.

MR. ZIMMER: Ha-ha.

THE COURT: Is it possible and feasible that this case convert itself in some effort to reach some sort of interim solution that will allow the parties in this case to have some —derive some benefit from this case pending the basin-wide adjudication? Or is that unrealistic? I want to hear from the parties in this case on that question.

MR. BUNN: Yes, your Honor. I'm a party in the case, if I may.

THE COURT: All right. State your name.

MR. BUNN: My name is Tom Bunn. I represent Palmdale Water District and Quartz Hill Water District.

In terms of interim benefit, I think it's important to point out that until a judgment is entered in this case the plaintiffs are entitled to pump as much water as they can use on their overlying run -- their overlying land. So they're not in need of immediate relief.

I think -- to answer the Court's question directly, I think that the relief would have to await the total relief in the adjudication, but my point is that neither the plaintiffs nor defendants are prejudiced in the meantime.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask plaintiffs this then: Is there anything right now stopping you from pumping as much water as you can pump for the beneficial use of your property?

MR. ZIMMER: Your Honor, I'm not sure it's just a question of pumping. We will pump water reasonably as it's necessary to irrigate crops. It's not just a matter of pumping water. It is a matter of being able to plan farming operations. And when there's claims of prescriptive rights out there, it changes how you plan your farming operations, what ground you're farming.

And I think that, to answer the Court's question, there is a benefit to be gained by a decision in this case because it will give us finality as to these prescriptive claims which is why the case was filed to begin with. It will give us finality as to whether they have these prescriptive claims or they don't. And it will allow us in the interim to be farming our properties and planning our farming operations accordingly.

THE COURT: Will it give you finality as to how much water you can pump now or in the future?

MR. ZIMMER: Well, it will -- it will give us finality that we will be able to pump up to the safe yield as overlying landowners relative with the other landowners out there, absolutely.

THE COURT: You don't know what that number will be until the basin-wide adjudication, do you?

MR. JOYCE: That's not wholly correct, your Honor, because procedurally they are going to have to release the way they approach these things. They are going to try to do the very same thing in this case is establish that quote-unquote safe yield number. That seems to be the preferred procedure.

THE COURT: But that number won't last. If I establish the safe yield number in this case, that number will have no viability going into the basin-wide adjudication.

MR. JOYCE: Your Honor, I will be the first one to concede that that number, not from a legal perspective, maybe just from a scientific perspective, is a moving target. It never stays the same, changes all the time.

MR. ZIMMER: What I will say to the Court, going back to your comment, is this: What it will do, either they have prescriptive rights, don't have prescriptive rights. The parties throughout the trial so far and throughout the discovery of it have obtained a rough idea of what's happening, you know, hydraulically in this basin and in this area and how much water is out there, how much the safe yield is approximately. And the overlying landowners are operating within that safe yield. So i

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does give them some comfort level by knowing that these prescriptive claims are not out there to potentially diminish those rights in the future.

MR. DUNN: Can I --

THE COURT: Let me put it this way: Let's assume for the moment that the basin-wide adjudication is going to take place five years from now. Up until that decision five years out, although you can't plan for the future between now and those five years, anyone going to stop you from pumping out whatever you can beneficially use on your property?

MR. ZIMMER: That's hard to say. So far no party has filed an injunction. But certainly a party could file an The county could go out tomorrow and file a request injunction. for injunction based upon some of the allegations that they've made in the case or a third party could do that.

THE COURT: And they could do that with or without this lawsuit.

MR. JOYCE: That's correct.

They could do that. MR. ZIMMER:

MR. DUNN: The answer to the Court's question to the plaintiffs, which they didn't answer, is: Under California law, you pump until the Court orders otherwise. That's how it works with groundwater.

So there's no order that stops them from pumping. has to be pointed out that as to the plaintiffs represented by Mr. Zimmer, they amended their complaint about a year ago and greatly expanded the scope of the litigation in terms of adding additional acreage. And that's been a process by both plaintiffs over the last several years.

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MR. JOYCE: Your Honor, that's misstatement. misstatement.

Counsel, I told him not to interrupt you. THE COURT: Please don't interrupt him.

MR. DUNN: The point simply is that this is an ongoing There has been settlement efforts. There has been increased pumping with no restriction. There's been increased land brought into this litigation for -- there is not going to be a situation where this Court is going to be able to define these two plaintiffs' water rights in a vacuum. If this case were to go forward even on the recently amended complaint by Bolthouse Farms, this Court would have to look at the entire basin; and in that examination look at all the water coming into that basin and all of the uses coming out.

Now, there's been reference made to the Mojave decision. The Mojave decision is very instructive because the ultimate lesson of Mojave, which started in the Riverside County Superior Court, the lesson from Mojave to courts throughout the state is You cannot try property -- excuse me -- water rights in ; vacuum without examining all of the other competing rights in th case. You cannot simply carve out a group and enter judgment in their favor at the risk of ignoring the other rights. And --

THE COURT: Counsel, you want to address the issue why it's taken you five years to come to that conclusion?

MR. JOYCE: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. DUNN: Because the parties decided, all of these parties decided that you can either litigate or try and get thi

THE COURT: Now, that's a terrible thing to say.

thing resolved or you can try to do both. What we decided to do with the Commissioner's encouragement and sometimes direction is to stop litigating and try to get this thing resolved.

Now, the moving papers present the chronology of all the events that have taken place since the filing of these complaints by the plaintiffs. But that record is very clear that there have been extraordinary efforts to try to get this thing resolved something short of adjudication.

The Court has correctly noted that you don't just wake up one morning and decide to adjudicate a groundwater basin. And that's particularly true if you are Los Angeles County Waterworks District where the decision is made by the County Board of Supervisors. This is a process that goes through extensive review, analysis, and study, but at the end of the day after extended effort on all sides to try to resolve this something short of adjudication, the need now arises to — to file this compulsory cross-complaint and move this basin-wide adjudication forward.

happen here or are we going to have this entire process where other cases are going to be filed, including cases by people who are not even in this courtroom as parties; and are we going to have to go through coordination and then consolidation process that will bring this case together with that separate action and in all likelihood would end up back here in the Riverside County Superior Court, because this is the lead —

MR. DUNN: It could because this is the case that starte

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it. And I'm telling the Court that in terms of the interests of justice and as well as it being compulsory in nature, this is going to happen. It is silly to put all parties through the delay and the expense of going through this: Separate lawsuits, coordination, consolidation.

THE COURT: Anyone want to be heard that has not had a opportunity to be heard?

MR. JOYCE: May I address the delay issue, your Honor?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. JOYCE: Your Honor, I think we made it pretty clear that if you look at the pleadings in this action, there is no issue that wasn't framed in the responsive pleadings. In fact, in July of 2000, the allegation was made by this moving party that they were missing indispensible parties, i.e., all other overlying landowners. Query: Why not then? Why didn't they file the cross-complaint in 2000? Why didn't they file the cross-complaint in 2003?

THE COURT: You keep asking that question. Do you have a answer that's somehow helpful to making me -- me making a decision?

MR. JOYCE: Yes, your Honor, I do. I have an answer. Because there is a -- within the quote-unquote water law world, especially the quote-unquote purveyor side of it, they have a theory. And the theory is -- is that you don't do an adjudication until you absolutely have to. Because the longer in time you can continue to pump, the greater in quantity of prescriptive rights you may be able to protect and perfect. And so they delay it inevitably.

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In fact, one of the leading California water lawyers. testified before the PUC two years, a year and a half ago, in_ order to justify the passing on of the legal fees incurred in the Mojave case to the rate payers. And one of the commissioners asked them: Why did you wait so long to file the adjudication? And his justification was because as purveyors you pump as much as you can for as long as you can before you have to adjudicate it so you can increase the amount of prescriptive rights you get. That's the motivation.

So don't assume for the moment that there's some great deal of soul searching and hand wringing, because that's not the case. The case is it is an intended ploy to maximize the benefits of prescriptive claims by waiting until the very last minute.

The only reason we're here today is because we said we're going to trial. This is more of a, no, we're not going to go to trial right away move than it was a -- than it was a, gee, we need to adjudicate the basin.

> I MR. DUNN:

There's nothing -- there's nothing before MR. JOYCE: this Court today that wasn't known to these parties in 2000. Just look at the answers to their complaints. Every single issue, the need for the other overlying landowners, the claims o prescriptions, the return flows of reported water, all those issues are already framed.

THE COURT: Are you suggesting if this case suddenly wer away, they still wouldn't file an adjudication?

MR. JOYCE: I can tell you if they thought they could co

a deal with us today, that would be the end of it and they would just wait until the next time they have to cross the bridge.

MR. ZIMMER: Your Honor, I'd just like to add to that briefly. If you look at all the huge cases that have been cited in water law, for example, Pasadena, what these — what these huge water lawyers and the counties have done is ground small farmers into the ground. They have outspent them. They have — they have caused litigation to go on and on and on 10 years, 15 years, before they — and eventually they spend so much money that they can't go on and they enter into deals like they did in Pasadena as to the fact that there was — there were prescriptive claims.

MR. DUNN: Your Honor, --

MR. ZIMMER: And they did exactly the same thing here. They knew — they knew when we filed this action exactly what was about. These guys are all well versed in water law. They' all in the water lawyers' club. They know exactly what was goi on. They knew exactly what was pled. They didn't demurrer to it. They didn't ask to file a cross-complaint at that time. They knew exactly what the issues are. We have been litigating the issues before the Court, having rulings on law and motion if ive years.

THE REPORTER: Counsel, you want to slow it down, plea:
I might get it on the record if you do.

MR. ZIMMER: For five years we have been litigating the issues in this case. We have been having arguments about what the issue is in this case. They knew precisely what was at is in this case. They knew precisely then that they could file

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if they believed that they couldn't -- if this lawsuit would not have any effect or that this lawsuit needed indispensable parties or that this -- what the judge decided in this lawsuit would not be -- would not result in the correct judgment, they could have corrected it five years ago.

But to wait five years until these parties have spent nearly \$1,000,000.00 and then say, okay, now we've decided that we need a basin-wide adjudication. We need to kick this off for another 10 or 15 years. We'll spin you guys into the ground. And we'll put off your ability to plan your farms and do what you need to do. That is not in the interests of justice. This is ploy done intentionally over and over. There is nothing new.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PFAEFFLE: May I have been heard, your Honor?

THE COURT: You have prompted the need for a response apparently. Go ahead.

MR. PFAEFFLE: Thank you, your Honor. And I'm not in twater club.

THE COURT: State your name.

MR. PFAEFFLE: My name is Fred Pfaeffle, Senior Deputy County Counsel with the County of Los Angeles. And Mr. Joyce absolutely correct: Our strategy has been to not file adjudication until we absolutely have to.

And there are many reasons for that. This is a very expensive process that's going to involve many people. As a as -- as the County and the Board of Supervisors is the gover Board of Water District 40, it also represents the community Antelope Valley. And I can guarantee you that filing a

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adjudication was not a decision that was taken lightly. We went into closed session with Board of Supervisors. We have engineering studies. It took a long time to come to that decision. There was a lot of soul searching. There's -- it's ar expensive process that will likely require for us to raise our rates to our water users.

And it's -- we did attempt earnestly, and not blaming anybody, to resolve the issue out of court. 2003 we had three day mediation and we could not resolve it. We did -- we finally came to the conclusion that proceeding in this case was not goin to have a meaningful result in light of what's happening out there; and that is, we have a basin in trouble that we have to address and we have to plan for.

THE COURT: You wish to second the notion which has been represented that this basin-wide adjudication action is getting filed or would be filed forthwith even if this case right here settled today?

MR. PFAEFFLE: That's what my five bosses, the Board of Supervisors of County of Los Angeles, have made a motion to do, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: They made a motion. Have they decided? D they take a vote?

MR. PFAEFFLE: They decided. Now, our motion, matter public record, is two-fold. One is to authorize us to file a cross-complaint in this action. But if that fails, they have authorized us to file a separate action for the adjudication. The costs have been taken into -- the effects of that have be taken into account.

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THE COURT: Even if this case settled, even if these two particular squeaky wheels got taken care of, basin-wide adjudication won't be put off another four or five years hoping for all the -- the reasons stated?

MR. PFAEFFLE: I don't believe that I -- without going back to the Board of Supervisors, I don't think that I have the ability to do that, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anyone else? All right.

MR. BUNN: Your Honor, when we get to scheduling I'd like to be heard, but my understanding you're just dealing with the motion then.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BUNN: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. The request to file the cross-complaint is denied on this basis: It appears to the Court that the appropriate way to have a basin-wide adjudication is to file a basin-wide adjudication in Los Angeles County and/or in Kern County.

The Court fully anticipates that should such action be filed, that an appropriate coordination motion would be made. And the Court would not pretend to bind, of course, that coordination judge. As I understand the coordination process, it's two judges. The first judge is just picked to decide the issue of coordination. And then if that bench officer decides that the cases should be coordinated, then maybe it's same bench officer or different bench officer gets saddled with the chore of presiding over the coordinated trial. I will allow the coordination judge to decide -- when that case is to be

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coordinated, to decide whether those two cases should be coordinated with this case. It's not going to be this Court's decision. It will be the coordination judge's decision.

And I will state this though: I am not going to rush this case to trial if I am convinced that the filing of the separate action and the seeking to coordinate the actions is proceeding rapidly. I know coordination takes time. But if I become convinced that someone is dragging their feet just getting this matter — a coordination decision made, then I'll just set this for trial. I assume you can have a trial within 90 days of me saying we're going to have a trial.

MR. JOYCE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, so says one side. The other side will probably disagree. And we don't need to have that argument right now.

But we do need to set another date in which to monitor the progress of the filing and/or serving and coordination decision of the other case. So who wants to give me a rosy scenario now as to when that's going to take place?

MR. DUNN: I suggest we come back in 30 days.

THE COURT: And what do you think will have taken place in 30 days?

MR. DUNN: In 30 days the County will have filed at leasone separate action.

THE COURT: In Los Angeles County?

MR. DUNN: That's correct.

THE COURT: Anyone want to speak for Kern County?

MR. DUNN: We can do them both.

THE COURT: That would make sense. I mean, that would be a symptom of delay if you are only filing in one county, then just going to wait for someone else to file in Kern County.

MR. DUNN: Let me just be heard just ever so briefly on that. The fact that there's an adjudication action filed in both counties does not mean that they look identical because you have different property interests in both counties. You don't have the same people, not a set of clones in Kern County. So in one sense it is the same lawsuit, but in another sense it's part of the overall adjudication that if we're now going to break this thing up, there's going to have to be a piece broken off that is somewhat specific to Kern County.

But having said all that, when we come back in 30 days both actions will have been filed.

THE COURT: How long before a coordination petition gets filed?

MR. DUNN: I would say that would be filed before the end of the year, which is about six weeks from now, including holidays.

THE COURT: All right. I'll see everyone back here on January 14th at 10 o'clock with the expectation that I'll be briefed as to the status of the coordination petition. I assume this case will be included in that petition as well as the two basin-wide adjudication actions.

MR. DUNN: These -- all these consolidated cases will be included in that.

THE COURT: And again, it is the Court's intention not to proceed to trial in this case as long as I am convinced that --

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that that coordination petition is being pursued actively. If I become convinced it's being -- it's languishing, then we'll set this for trial. All right. Water District Number 40 to give notice. you back here January 14th, 10 o'clock. MR. DUNN: Thank you, your Honor. MR. JOYCE: Thank you, your Honor. MR. BUNN: Thank you, your Honor, (Proceedings were concluded for the day.)

DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, WILLIAM BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

RIC-344436

CITY OF LANCASTER, ANTELOPE VALLEY
WATER DISTRICT, PALMDALE WATER
DISTRICT, PALM RANCH IRRIGATION
DISTRICT, QUARTZ HILL WATER DISTRICT,
ROSAMOND COMMUNITY SERVICE DISTRICT,
MOJAVE PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT, LITTLE)
ROCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT, LOS ANGELES
COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICTS, et al.,

Defendants.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)

SS

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE)

I, Sharon A. Jones, Certified Shorthand Reporter Number 3022, do hereby certify:

That on November 12, 2004, in the State of California, County of Riverside, I took in stenotypy a true and complete account of the proceedings had in the above-entitled cause, and that the foregoing transcript, pages 1 to 34, is a true and accurate transcription of my shorthand notes, taken as aforesaid, and is the whole thereof.

DATED: Riverside, California, January 13, 2005.

Sharon A. Gones, C. S. R. 3022 4100 Main Street, Room 110 Riverside, CA 92501