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12	DISTRICT NO. 40	
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14	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE	E STATE OF CALIFORNIA
15	COUNTY OF LOS ANGEL	FS - CENTRAL DISTRICT
13	COCIVIT OF EGSTAVGEE	ES CENTRAL DISTRICT
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17	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER	RELATED CASE TO JUDICIAL
18	CASES	COUNCIL COORDINATION PROCEEDING NO. 4408
10	Included Actions:	PROCEEDING NO. 4408
19	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No.	PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS'
	40 v. Diamond Farming Co., Superior Court of	SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN
20	California, County of Los Angeles, Case No.	RESPONSE TO WILLIS CLASS'
	BC 325201;	SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF
21		LODGMENT OF TIME RECORDS
22	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No.	DAME NAME OF STATE OF
22	40 v. Diamond Farming Co., Superior Court of	DATE: MARCH 22, 2011
23	California, County of Kern, Case No. S-1500-CV-254-348;	TIME: 10:00 A.M. DEPT: 1
25	C V -234-348,	JUDGE: HON. JACK KOMAR
24	Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of	JUDGE. HOM. JACK KOMAK
	Lancaster, Diamond Farming Co. v. City of	
25	Lancaster, Diamond Farming Co. v. Palmdale	
	Water Dist., Superior Court of California,	
26	County of Riverside, Case Nos. RIC 353 840,	
27	RIC 344 436, RIC 344 668	
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I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

On March 9, 2011, the Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 ("District 40") filed its brief opposing the Willis Class Fee Award (see "Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40's Brief Re Equitable Apportionment of Willis Class Fee Award" ["Opposition Brief"]). One day later, on March 10, 2011, Willis Class Counsel filed in a "Supplemental Notice Of Lodgment In Support Of Motion For An Award Of Attorney's Fees; Reimbursement Of Expenses; And Class Representative Incentive Award" ["Supplemental Fee Notice"]. The Supplemental Fee Notice presented new evidence not contained in their moving papers: time record entries for Mr. Zlotnick for the period identified as "Inception through December 31, 2008." As a result of their late filing, District 40 had no opportunity to examine the newly submitted billing entries or compare those entries with the entries provided by Mr. Kalfayan prior to the filing of its Opposition Brief. District 40 thus submits this Supplemental Brief regarding additional evidence demonstrating the inflated basis of the fees sought by Willis Class Counsel that were unnecessarily incurred in this Adjudication and are unreasonable.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Willis Class Should Not Be Awarded Fees That Have Been Inflated And That Bear No Reasonable Relation To The Representation Of The Class And Their Fee Award Should Be Considerably Reduced.

As a general matter, a fee award must be *reasonable* in terms of the number of hours expended and the amount of time billed for any single entry. (*Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 578-579.) A key role a court assumes in relation to any fee motion is to evaluate the value of the legal services performed relative to the skill of the attorney and the nature of the task at hand. (*Ibid.*) A court may exercise its discretion and discount or strike fees that are unreasonably inflated and/or cannot realistically be attributed to the type of work performed. (*See*, e.g., *Thompson Pacific Construction, Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 525, 554-58 [striking fees incurred from unnecessary and unjustifiable representation]; *see also The People ex rel. Dep't of Transportation v. Yuki* (1995) 31

Cal.App.4th 1754, 1767-76 [discounting fees unreasonably related to the representation].)¹ In the present case, a majority of the fees claimed by the Willis Class for time billed by Class Counsel (Messrs. Kalfayen and Zlotnick) is for legal work that bore no relationship to the time reasonably expended by attorneys of similar rank attending to like tasks.² This is demonstrated in numerous time entries; only a few examples are discussed herein.

1. Class Counsel Appears To Have Charged \$18,075.00 To Prepare A 3-Page Opposition Without Legal Authority.

The first example concerns work related to a Court hearing held on June 14, 2010 for the Public Water Suppliers' Motion and Proposed Order regarding the Court's jurisdiction over property transferees. The moving papers, which totaled a mere 9 pages and consisted of a 7-page Memorandum of Points & Authorities and a 2-page Proposed Order, contained cites to only 9 legal authorities (6 cases and 3 statutes). One of the 6 cases mentioned was the seminal water law decision: *Pasadena v. Alhambra* (1949) 33 Cal.2d 908—the principles with which any experienced water attorney would be very familiar. A few parties filed opposing papers, the United States included, all of which totaled 20 pages containing few legal cites, and five parties filed 1-page joinders. Mr. Kalfayen filed two opposing documents totaling 3 pages, *neither of which contained any legal authority*. Both Messrs. Kalfayen and Zlotnick appeared at the hearing by court call. How a 3-page opposition without any legal cites and one court call appearance consumed 39 hours of Mr. Kalfayen's time and generated \$15,560³ in legal fees is difficult to comprehend. (*See* Declaration of Jeffrey V. Dunn ["Dunn Decl."], ¶¶ 3, 5.) That together Mr. Kalfayan and Mr. Zlotnick charged \$18,075 to prepare, draft, and defend the Class position on

The previous briefs filed by various Public Water Supplies include several citations to case law. This supplemental brief does not repeat those citations and is focused on pointing out a few examples of the unreasonableness of the fees sought by Willis class counsel.

² Many of Messrs. Kalfayen and Zlotnick's time entries are block billed, and even though this makes it challenging to determine how much time has been devoted to the completion of each individual task where numerous tasks are listed, it is still clear that the total amount of time billed bears no reasonable relationship to the tasks identified. There are many instances, for example, where Class Counsel has devoted full billing days to time spent reviewing a few emails and making a few telephone calls.

³ Many of Messrs. Kalfayen and Zlotnick's time entries have been block billed, thereby making it difficult to discern with certainty the precise amount of time and fees generated in connection with their attendance at these "meetings."

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27 28 this single issue is unreasonable and therefore untenable. This example alone invites consideration of the fees generated, and the recompense now sought, throughout the entirety of the 4-year period for which the Willis Class claims fees.

Class Counsel Appears To Have Charged \$1720 For Preparing A 157-Word, Boilerplate Stipulation.

The second example concerns a Stipulation and Class Notice that Messrs. Kalfayen and Zlotnick revised on November 22, 2010. On this day, Mr. Kalfayen billed a total of 4.3 hoursmore than half a day—for the following work: (1) preparing a one-page boilerplate Stipulation regarding Class Notice; (2) making minor edits in a three-minute period to a 7-page Notice prepared by Best Best & Krieger; and (3) sending a 3-sentence, 31-word e-mail to Mr. Dunn regarding the same. (Dunn Decl., ¶ 3, 4.) Mr. Kalfayen thus billed 4.3 hours for work that arguably should have taken half the time. In short, Mr. Kalfayen's generous approach to billing is not a practice this Court should endorse.

3. Approximately 300 Meetings Appear In Class Counsel's Time Sheets And Only A Fraction Are Confirmed As Having Occurred.

Out of approximately three hundred meetings (both in-person and by telephone) between Messrs. Kalfayen and Zlotnick, only a fraction of those meetings are confirmed on both time sheets. For example, in the period "Inception through December 31, 2008" a total of 68 entries (\$57,375 in fees)⁴ alluding to meetings or conference calls with Mr. Kalfayen appear in Mr. Zlotnick's time sheets, but not a single one of those same meetings or calls appear in Mr. Kalfayen's time sheets.⁵ (Dunn Decl., ¶ 3; see Supplemental Fee Notice, Ex. 1.)

Overall, Mr. Zlotnick billed a total of 271 hours—amounting to \$121,950—for meetings

See footnote 3, supra. See Plaintiff's Supplemental Fee Notice, Ex. 1 (10/20/2006, 10/23/2006, 11/7/2006, 11/30/2006, 2/15/2007, 3/13/2007, 4/6/2007, 5/4/2007, 8/14/2007, 8/17/2007, 10/24/2007, 12/20/2007, 2/26/2008, 3/4/2008, 3/14/2008, 3/18/2008, 3/25/2008, 3/28/2008, 4/7/2008, 4/10/2008. 4/11/2008, 4/14/2008, 4/15/2008, 4/20/2008, 4/24/2008, 5/6/2008, 5/13/2008, 5/14/2008. 5/15/2008, 5/23/2008, 5/27/2008, 6/4/2008, 6/11/2008, 6/18/2008, 6/20/2008, 6/25/2008, 6/27/2008, 7/8/2008, 7/10/2008, 7/11/2008, 7/20/2008. 7/25/2008. 8/5/2008, 8/12/2008, 8/21/2008, 9/10/2008, 9/22/2008, 9/29/2008, 9/30/2008, 10/1/2008. 10/6/2008, 10/7/2008, 10/27/2008, 10/31/2008, 11/3/2008, 11/10/2008, 11/11/2008, 11/12/2008, 11/13/2008, 11/17/2008, 11/20/2008, 12/1/2008, 12/5/2008, 12/10/2008. 12/11/2008. 12/17/2008).

There are many inconsistent entries appearing throughout the time records submitted by Willis Class Counsel, and countless entries based on seemingly unjustified legal work that appears to have resulted in inflated fee amounts. The examples provided here in this Supplemental Brief are intended to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the fees sought and further justify the basis upon which a reduction in—or outright denial of—the total fee award is appropriate.

4. A Review Of Court Dockets In Other Lawsuits Raises Questions Regarding The Billing Practices Of Messrs. Zlotnick and Kalfayan.

The questionable billing practices exhibited by both Willis class counsel in this Adjudication seem more circumspect when considered in relation to cases simultaneously occurring. Thus, for instance, in *I-Flow Corp. v. Apex Medical Technologies, Inc.*, No. 3:07cv1200 (S.D. Cal. filed June 29, 2007) ["*I-Flow*"], a matter in which Mr. Kalfayen represented counterclaimant/defendant Apex Medical Technologies, Mr. Kalfayan billed in the Antelope Valley Groundwater Adjudication 8.6 hours on July 8, 2008, the same day that a claims construction hearing was held in *I-Flow* (Doc. 75); 9.8 hours on August 7, 2008, the same day as a mandatory settlement conference in *I-Flow* (Doc. 82); 8.3 hours on July 31, 2009, the same day as a pretrial conference in *I-Flow* (Doc. 263); and 8.1 hours on November 16, 2009, the same day as a mandatory settlement conference in *I-Flow* (Doc. 447). Likewise, in *Sobel et al. v. The Hertz*

⁶ This represents time record entries from the 4-year period 2006 through 2010. ⁷ *Ibid*.

⁸ See footnote 3, supra.

Corp., No. 3:06cv545 (D. Nev. filed Oct. 13, 2006) ["Sobel"], an action in which Mr. Zlotnick represented plaintiffs, on April 22, 2008, the same day as a status conference in Sobel (Doc. 44), Mr. Zlotnick also billed 8.6 hours in this Adjudication, and again on December 1, 2008, the day of a hearing on a motion to compel in Sobel (Doc. 74), Mr. Zlotnick billed 8.3 hours in this Adjudication.

All things considered, a billing day exceeding 8 hours is a high billing day by most attorney standards, particularly since those hours do not reflect the non-billable tasks that consume a large part of every day. It is questionable how substantial blocks of time could have been dedicated to this Adjudication on the very days in which court hearings and other important matters took place in other pending proceedings.

III. **CONCLUSION**

For the reasons stated herein, and previously stated in the oppositions filed by the Public Water Suppliers, District 40 respectfully submits that in the event the Court awards fees to Class Counsel, that the Court reduce the fee award to reflect only those fees that were reasonable and proportionate to the time expended by Class Counsel on necessary and relevant tasks.

Alternatively, given that the credibility of Class Counsel's bills are at issue, and to the extent the Court cannot discern whether block billed entries represent time reasonably spent in Counsels' representation of the Class, then District 40 asks that the Court continue the hearing on the Fee Motion to provide District 40 with additional time to conduct further discovery and investigation, including taking depositions of Class Counsel, into the basis of the fees sought by them. Moreover, District 40 requests that the Court order Class Counsel to submit billing records that reflect the actual amount of time spent on each individual task for which they seek fees.

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1 2	Dated: March <u>7</u> , 2011	BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP
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LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP 5 PARK PLAZA, SUITE 1500 IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 92614

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Kerry V. Keefe, declare:

I am a resident of the State of California and over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action; my business address is Best & Krieger LLP, 5 Park Plaza, Suite 1500, Irvine, California 92614. On March 18, 2011, I served the within document(s):

PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO WILLIS CLASS' SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF LODGMENT OF TIME RECORDS

×	by posting the document(s) listed above to the Santa Clara County Superior Courwebsite in regard to the Antelope Valley Groundwater matter.	
	by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereofully prepaid, in the United States mail at Irvine, California addressed as set fortbelow.	
	by causing personal delivery by ASAP Corporate Services of the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.	
	by personally delivering the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.	
	I caused such envelope to be delivered via overnight delivery addressed as indicated on the attached service list. Such envelope was deposited for delivery by Federal Express following the firm's ordinary business practices.	
I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.		
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.		
Executed on March 18, 2011, at Irvine, California.		
Korry V. Keers		

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