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7	a California corporation	
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10	SUPERIOR COURT OF TI	HE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
11	IN AND FOR THE COU	UNTY OF LOS ANGELES
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13	Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550 (b))	Judicial Council Coordination No. 4408
14 15	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES	Case No.: 1-05-CV-049053
16	Included actions:	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
17	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 vs. Diamond Farming Company	PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 760.030; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
18 19	Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 325201	AUTHORITIES
20	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 vs. Diamond Farming Company	Date: December 2, 2005 Time: 10:00 a.m.
21	Kern County Superior Court Case No. S-1500-CV 254348 NFT	Dept: 1, Rm 534
22	Diamond Farming Company vs. City of	
23	Lancaster Riverside County Superior Court	
24	Lead Case No. RIC 344436 [Consolidated w/Case Nos. 344668 & 353840]	
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TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEY OF RECORD:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on December 2, 2005, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in the department and location to be determined by the Court, Diamond Farming Company will move, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 760.030(b), for an order of this Court directing the Plaintiff, Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 ("Waterworks") in the coordinated actions denoted BC 325201 & S-1500-CV 254348 NFT to amend each Complaint, so as to conform to and follow the provisions of Chapter 4 of the California Code of Civil Procedure sections 760.010 et seq.

The motion will be based on this notice of motion, on the memorandum of points and authorities set forth below, on the records and file herein, and on such evidence as may be presented at the hearing of the motion.

Dated: October 26, 2005 LeBEAU • THELEN, LLP

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BOB H. JOYCE

Attorneys for DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY,

a California corporation

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

California Code of Civil Procedure section 760.030(b) provides:

"In any action or proceeding in which establishing or quieting title to property is an issue the court in its discretion may, upon motion of any party, require that the issue be resolved pursuant to the provisions of this chapter to the extent practicable"

Waterworks in both actions, Complaints numbered BC 325201 & S-1500-CV 254348 NFT, through virtually identical allegations have chosen to stylize the pleading as a Complaint for Declaratory Relief under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1061. Although stylized as a Complaint for Declaratory Relief, the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth causes of action all involve and concern, and if adjudicated, would by judgment, affect and either confirm overlying landowners priority water rights or limit, modify or reverse those priorities, and are thus, an action or proceeding attempting to establish or quiet title to property or any interest therein as contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure sections 760.020 and 760.030. It is clear that Waterworks has chosen to stylize its Complaint as a Complaint for Declaratory Relief so as to avoid the pleading and procedural requirements of Chapter 4 of California Code of Civil Procedure sections 760.010 et seq. Most significantly, the core and most controversial claim pled by Waterworks is that claim which it attempts to plead in the first cause of action to reverse the common law priority premised upon a claim of a prescriptive taking. The California State Legislature, in enacting the quiet title statutes, Code of Civil Procedure section 760.010, made clear in section 761.020 that the sanctity of record title should be protected and that in an action seeking to establish a title premised upon "adverse possession," (prescription) the Plaintiff, Waterworks, is required to plead with specificity, and ". . . allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession."

"Under section 1061 of the Code of Civil Procedure the court may refuse to exercise the power to grant declaratory relief where the same is not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances. The availability of another form of relief that is adequate will usually justify refusal to grant declaratory relief. (Wieber v. Worton, 105 Cal.App.2d 626 [234 P.2d 114]; Pacific Electric Ry. Co. v. Dewey, 95 Cal.App.2d 69 [212 P.2d 255].) The refusal to exercise the power is within the court's legal discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse of discretion. (Cutting v. Bryan, 206 Cal. 254 [274 P. 326].)" [Emphasis added.] Joseph M. Girard v. David Miller (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 266

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The proceeding authorized by Code of Civil Procedure sections 760.010 et seq., is the legislatively declared preferred proceeding and clearly "... another form of relief that is adequate."

This Court should defer to the Legislature's recognition of the sanctity of record title to real property, and given the status of Waterworks as a governmental entity, attempting to take private property for public use without compensation, order Waterworks to amend each Complaint so as to conform to the legislative directive set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure section 761.020(b), and specifically direct that in the Amended Complaints that it allege the specific facts constituting and supporting its claim of prescription.

In these cases, Waterworks pleads that it has prescriptive rights to pump water from the Antelope Valley basin, based upon the claim that Waterworks has "continuously and for more than five years and before the date of this action pumped water from the basin for reasonable and beneficial purposes and has done so under a claim of right in an actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, hostile and adverse manner." As noted above, Waterworks alleges that Diamond, and all other "Doe" landowner defendants have had "actual and/or constructive notice" of the District's "pumping," and therefore Waterworks' prescriptive rights are superior to Diamond's overlying interest.

As is more fully set forth in the concurrently filed Demurrer, Waterworks' claim is uncertain and that uncertainty is derivative of the method in which it has chosen to characterize the singular operative fact, its "pumping." Waterworks has chosen to characterize its pumping by a string recital of those adjectives which as ultimate conclusions have been recognized as constituting the description by conclusion of the elements for a claim of acquisition of title under a theory of prescription. There are no facts pled to support the pled conclusion of hostility, nor adversity. The pled claim of exclusivity is expressly contradicted within the pleading itself. The operative five year period is alleged to have preceded the filing of the Complaints but is otherwise uncertain, not fixed by date and otherwise undefined. Although Waterworks has pled that Diamond and all Doe defendant landowners have had "actual and/or constructive notice" of its "pumping," Waterworks has not pled that it gave notice or that any landowner, including Diamond, had actual and/or constructive notice of its claim of right or claim of adversity. Waterworks has not pled that it has trespassed upon or invaded the property of any

landowner. Waterworks has pled no facts that it has interfered with or otherwise prevented any landowner from exercising its priority usufructuary right of use. This Court, upon considering the concurrently filed Demurrer, will consider all issuable facts properly pleaded, but must disregard argument, contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law unsupported by the necessary predicate facts. (See *Darr v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

Diamond's right to its overlying interest to take groundwater for its own reasonable and beneficial use is an appurtenant incident of its fee title. Because Waterworks seeks to establish a prescriptive interest superior to Diamond's overlying right, as well as that of all other overlying "Doe" landowners, Waterworks should plead its case in accord with the principles of a quiet title action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 760.010 et. seq., which governs any action "to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property, or any interest therein." [Emphasis added.]

Waterworks' failure to plead in accord with the quiet title law has important consequences. A quiet title complaint must include all of the following averments: (1) a *legal description of the property* that is the subject of the action; (2) the title of the plaintiff, and the basis of the title, and, if title is based upon adverse possession, *the specific facts constituting the adverse possession*; (3) the adverse claims to plaintiff's alleged title; (4) the date as of which the determination is sought, and, if the date is different than the date of the complaint, a specific explanation of the reasons for a different date; (5) a prayer for determination of title.² Furthermore, a quiet title pleading requires that the plaintiff file a *lis pendens* in each county where the described real property is located, and that plaintiff name all defendants "that are of record or known to the plaintiff or *reasonably apparent* from an inspection of the property."³ Pleading the case in quiet title will have important consequences in that the required pleading of the

^{1 (}See *Pasadena v. Alhambra* (1949) 33 Cal.2d 908, 925 [the right of an owner of land to take groundwater is "based on ownership of the land and is appurtenant thereto"]; See also, e.g., *Schimmel v. Martin* (1923) 190 Cal. 429, 432; *Lux v. Haggin* (1886) 69 Cal. 255; *California v. Superior Court (Riverside)* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1019.)

^{2 (}Code Civ. Proc., § 760.020.)

^{3 (}Code Civ. Proc., § 760.06(b).)

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specific facts of the prescriptive claim will focus the pretrial efforts of the hundreds of parties to these coordinated proceedings.

Obviously, the requirements for pleading a quiet title action are much more strict than plaintiff's current effort to state as conclusions its case merely in declaratory relief. Plaintiff has failed to plead "the specific fact constituting the adverse possession" as required. The quiet title pleading requirements have important consequences and benefits in this case. Pleading the description of the property involved and the precise adverse claims is necessary to ensure that all parties are properly joined, particularly since Waterworks requests determination of its rights *inter se* as against all overlying landowners. This court should ensure that all affected parties are brought before it, to meet the requirements of due process to affected parties as envisioned by the quiet title law, including potential service by publication. Specific property descriptions and identification of all known affected defendants could also have important consequences to these coordinated proceedings, since this court can take judicial notice that the property overlying the Antelope Valley basin is located in both Kern and Los Angeles counties, and may involve hundreds of ascertainable defendants.

The legislatively declared quiet title pleading requirements would mandate that plaintiff state its claim of prescription by specific facts, and not rely upon general conclusions and averments, and would potentially allow the court to consider the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's claim before substantial litigation ensues by discovery to determine evidentiary facts in this obviously complex litigation.

These actions are *in rem*. The quiet title requirement of a *lis pendens* also ensures that the court retains appropriate jurisdiction. The main purpose of a lis pendens is to preserve the court's jurisdiction over property: if a party to litigation were able to transfer clear title during the litigation, the court would be unable to render an effective judgment. The lis pendens prevents "the defendant property owner from frustrating any judgment that might eventually be entered by transferring his or her interest in the

property while the action was still pending."⁴ The same is necessary to preclude the intervention before judgment of potential bona fide purchasers for value.⁵

Also, a pleading in quiet title makes it manifest that the plaintiffs standard of proof will be "clear and convincing" evidence. The owner of legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of full beneficial title, and this presumption may be overcome only upon "clear and convincing proof."

Code of Civil Procedure section 760.030 provides that the action to quiet title "is cumulative and not exclusive of any other remedy or right of action...." However, that same section provides that in other actions or proceedings "in which establishing or quieting title to real property is in issue" the court in its discretion may, upon motion of a party, require that the issue be resolved pursuant to the quiet title statutes "to the extent practicable." This Court should order Waterworks to amend these Complaints and proceed as required under Code of Civil Procedure sections 760.010 et seq.

Dated: October 26, 2005 LeBEAU • THELEN, LLP

By:

Attorneys for DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY,

a California corporation

^{4 (}Lewis v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal. App. 4th 1850, 1860.)

^{5 (}Civil Code §§ 1107 and 1214.)

^{6 (}Evid. Code, § 662.)

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PROOF OF SERVICE

ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES JUDICIAL COUNSEL PROCEEDING NO. 4408 CASE NO.: 1-05-CV-049053

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is: 5001 E. Commercenter Drive, Suite 300, Bakersfield, California 93309. On October 27, 2005, I served the within NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 760.030; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ■ by placing □ the original □ a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows: PURSUANT TO THE SANTA CLARA SUPERIOR COURT E-FILING IN COMPLEX LITIGATION DEPARTMENT 17, A PROOF OF SERVICE IS GENERATED BY THE E-FILING SYSTEM (BY MAIL) I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Bakersfield, California, in the ordinary course of business. (OVERNIGHT/EXPRESS MAIL) By enclosing a true copy thereof in a sealed envelope designated by United States Postal Service (Overnight Mail)/Federal Express/United Parcel Service ("UPS") addressed as shown on the above by placing said envelope(s) for ordinary business practices from Kern County. I am readily familiar with this business' practice of collecting and processing correspondence for overnight/express/UPS mailing. On the same day that the correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service/Federal Express/UPS in a sealed envelope with delivery fees paid/provided for at the facility regularly maintained by United States Postal Service (Overnight Mail/Federal Express/United Postal Service [or by delivering the documents to an authorized courier or driver authorized by United States Postal Service (Overnight Mail)/Federal Express/United Postal Service to receive documents]. (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the offices of the addressee(s). Executed on _____, 2005, at Bakersfield, California. (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct, and that the foregoing was executed on October 27, 2005, in Bakersfield, California.

DONNA M. LUIS