1 Bob H. Joyce (SBN 84607) Andrew K. Sheffield (SBN220735) 2 LAW OFFICES OF LEBEAU • THELEN, LLP 3 5001 East Commercenter Drive, Suite 300 Post Office Box 12092 4 Bakersfield, California 93389-2092 (661) 325-8962; Fax (661) 325-1127 5 Attorneys for DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, a California corporation, CRYSTAL ORGANIC 7 FARMS, a limited liability company, GRIMMWAY ENTERPRISES, INC., and LAPIS LAND COMPANY, LLC 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 11 Coordination Proceeding Special Title Judicial Council Coordination No. 4408 (Rule 1550 (b)) 12 ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER Case No.: 1-05-CV-049053 13 CASES 14 Included actions: **OBJECTION TO BLUM TRUST'S** MOTION FOR SUMMARY 15 Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. JUDGMENT/SUMMARY 40 vs. Diamond Farming Company ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES 16 Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 325201 17 Date: December 22, 2014 Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. Time: 10:00 a.m. 18 40 vs. Diamond Farming Company Dept. No.: TBD Kern County Superior Court Judge: Hon. Jack Komar 19 Case No. S-1500-CV 254348 NFT 20 Diamond Farming Company vs. City of Lancaster 21 Riverside County Superior Court Lead Case No. RIC 344436 [Consolidated 22 w/Case Nos. 344668 & 353840] 23 AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS. 24 DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS, GRIMMWAY 25 ENTERPRISES, INC., and LAPIS LAND COMPANY, LLC (collectively "Grimmway"), hereby object to the entirety of the Blum Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication of 27 28 Issues.

OBJECTION TO BLUM TRUST'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES

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If a summary judgment is sought, the notice of motion should name the party in whose favor and against whom the judgment is sought, . . . . A notice simply directed "to all opposing parties" is not adequate notice in a multiparty case such as this one, where different relief is sought by different parties as against different parties. (Weil & Brown, et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2014), Ch. 10-C ¶ 10:85.) Here, it is not entirely clear from the Blum Trust's notice of motion what is being sought nor precisely against whom. The Notice of Motion reads as follows:

"Cross-Defendant BLUM TRUST will and hereby does move the court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure. §437c for an order that summary judgment be entered in favor of Cross-Defendant **BLUM TRUST and against Cross-Complainants PUBLIC** WATER SUPPLIERS' First-Amended Cross-Complaint For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief And Adjudication of Water Rights, under the First Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief-Prescriptive Rights; Second Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief-Appropriative Rights; Third Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief-Physical Solution; Fourth Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief-Municipal Priority; Fifth Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief-Storage of Imported Water; Sixth Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief-Recapture of Return Flows From Imported Water Stored in the Basin; and Seventh Cause of Action for Unreasonable Use of Water; and against all other Cross-Defendants who claim against Cross-Defendant BLUM TRUST's groundwater rights in this coordinated action . . . . " [Emphasis added.l

No **Grimmway** entity is a cross-complainant as against the Blum Trust. As such, **Grimmway** objects to the extent that the Blum Trust's motion seeks an adjudication or determination of the interests and rights of any **Grimmway** entity in this litigation.

This objection is made on the basis that the Blum Trust lacks standing under Code of Civil Procedure § 437c to bring a motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication against Grimmway. There is no operative complaint or cross-complaint in the present consolidated action in which any Grimmway entity has alleged a cause of action or claim against the Blum Trust. Likewise, the Blum Trust has not alleged any cause of action or claim in any pleading as against Grimmway in this action. Grimmway has not sued the Blum Trust and the Blum Trust has not sued Grimmway. Thus, there is no cause of action which the present motion may adjudicate as between Grimmway and the Blum Trust.

 Summary judgment is granted when there is no triable issue as to a necessary material fact of the cause of action and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(o)(1), a defendant [cross-defendant] is entitled to summary judgment upon a showing that one or more elements of the <u>cause of action</u> cannot be established unless the plaintiff [cross-complainant] meets the burden of showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that <u>cause of action</u>. (*Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Superior Court* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1794; Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o)(1) and (p)(2).) The motion is directed to a pled cause of action.

The Blum Trust has made the motion for summary judgment in its stated capacity as a "cross-defendant," and specifically, a "cross-defendant" to the public water suppliers' first amended cross-complaint. The California Legislature in enacting and amending Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, expressly provided for and set out the threshold burden of a moving defendant/cross-defendant on a motion brought pursuant to that section. Specifically, Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(p),(2) provides as follows:

## "(p) For purposes of motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication:

(2) A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff or cross-complainant may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto." [Emphasis added.]

Although it is doubtful that the Blum Trust has met the threshold burden, no **Grimmway** entity is a plaintiff or cross-complainant as against the Blum Trust, and therefore has no burden under the statute to respond to the pending motion for summary judgment.

As stated previously, no operative pleading exists in this litigation in which there are causes of action, claims or affirmative defenses alleged as and between Blum Trust and **Grimmway**.

Absent any cause of action, the Blum Trust has no standing under Code of Civil Procedure § 437c to seek a determination of the interests or rights of **Grimmway** by the present motion for summary judgment.

Moreover, the Blum Trust seeks a judgment quantifying a fixed amount of groundwater that it can pump in the future, which is neither permissible nor possible in this matter as a matter of law. The Blum Trust moving papers establish that the property was acquired by the Trust in 1985. The moving papers are devoid of any evidence of any groundwater pumping on the property which predated its acquisition in 1985. The moving papers establish that the Blum Trust itself has never pumped any groundwater on the property. The property was farmed by Bolthouse from 2001 through 2009, but no groundwater was pumped on the property during the term of the lease. From 2009 to the present, the property has not been farmed and the Blum Trust has pumped no groundwater during that time and does not presently pump groundwater. Nonetheless, the Blum Trust seeks an order from this Court fixing a quantified right to pump groundwater in the future in the amount of 531 acre feet per annum. Under the law, a future or prospective use of groundwater cannot be quantified or fixed. *Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay* (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489, at 525.

Dated: December 8, 2014

LeBEAU • THELEN, LLP

By:

Attorneys for DIAMOND FARMING COMPANY, a California corporation,

CRYSTAL ORGANIC FARMS, a limited

liability company, GRIMMWAY

ENTERPRISES, INC., and LAPIS LAND

COMPANY, LLC

## PROOF OF SERVICE

1 ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES 2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL PROCEEDING NO. 4408 CASE NO.: 1-05-CV-049053 3 I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; I am over the age 4 of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is: 5001 E. Commercenter Drive, Suite 300, Bakersfield, California 93309. On December 8, 2014, I served the within 5 OBJECTION TO BLUM TRUST'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY 6 ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES 7 (BY POSTING) I am "readily familiar" with the Court's Clarification Order. Electronic service and electronic posting completed through www.scefiling.org; All papers filed 8 in Los Angeles County Superior Court and copy sent to trial judge and Chair of Judicial Council. 9 Los Angeles County Superior Court Chair, Judicial Council of California 10 111 North Hill Street Administrative Office of the Courts Los Angeles, CA 90012 Attn: Appellate & Trial Court Judicial Services 11 Attn: Department 1 (Civil Case Coordinator) (213) 893-1014 Carlotta Tillman 12 455 Golden Gate Avenue San Francisco, CA 94102-3688 13 Fax (415) 865-4315 14 (BY MAIL) I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. 15 Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Bakersfield, California, in 16 the ordinary course of business. 17 (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of 18 California that the above is true and correct, and that the foregoing was executed on December 8, 2014, in Bakersfield, California. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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