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8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
9	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES	
10	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES	RELATED CASE TO JUDICIAL COUNCIL COORDINATION PROCEEDING NO. 4408
11	This Pleading Relates to Included Action:	
12	REBECCA LEE WILLIS and DAVID	WILLIS CLASS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1
13	ESTRADA, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,	RE: EXCLUSION OF EXPERT REPORT OF TIM THOMPSON
14 15	Plaintiffs,	Date: August 3, 2015 Time: 10:00 A.M. Place: Los Angeles Superior Court
16 17		111 North Hill Street, Room 222 Los Angeles, CA 90012
18	LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40; CITY OF LANCASTER;	Judge: Hon. Jack Komar
19	CITY OF PALMDALE; PALMDALE WATER DISTRICT; LITTLEROCK CREEK	
20	IRRIGATION DISTRICT; PALM RANCH IRRIGATION DISTRICT; QUARTZ HILL	
21	WATER DISTRICT; ANTELOPE VALLEY WATER CO.; ROSAMOND COMMUNITY	
22	SERVICE DISTRICT; PHELAN PINON HILL COMMUNITY SERVICE DISTRICT;	
23	and DOES 1 through 1,000;	
24	Defendants.	
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TO THE COURT AND ALL INTERESTED PARTIES:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 3, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 222 of the Los Angeles Superior Court (or such other department that the Court shall designate), located at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, California, a hearing will be held on Willis Class' Motion in Limine Number One for an order excluding Court-appointed Expert Report of Tim Thompson.

The Motion is based on this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the attached Exhibit A, and such other and further evidence as the Court adduces at the hearing.

MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1

The Willis Class moves this Court for an Order in limine excluding the Court-appointed Expert Report of Tim Thompson. The Expert Report is fundamentally flawed and unreliable because Wood Class Counsel improperly participated in the actual conduct of the survey upon which Mr. Thompson based his conclusions. The case law and learned treatises are clear that attorneys **cannot** participate in the conduct of surveys relied on by independent experts because any results obtained will be biased and rendered unreliable. Further, the Thompson Expert Report should be excluded on the grounds that the data generated by the survey regarding class water usage are not reliable due to selection bias and due to improper statistical analyses.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Wood Class Counsel posted Mr. Tim Thompson's Expert Report ("Thompson Report") to the Court website on July 9, 2015 (Doc. #10116). Willis Class Counsel previously had served a Notice of Deposition of Mr. Thompson scheduling his deposition for July 7, 2015. For the convenience of the witness and counsel, Mr. Thompson's deposition was Re-Noticed for July 27, 2015, and did in fact take place on July 27, 2015.

During his deposition, Mr. Thompson testified that Wood Class Counsel (specifically, Mr. McLachlan) sent the mailings to Wood Class Members requesting their participation in a survey

regarding their water usage and that Mr. Thompson never saw the content of the mailings.¹ Thompson Depo. at 13:7-15 & 86:12-16 (attached as Exhibit A). When Willis Class Counsel requested copies of the mailings that were sent to potential survey participants, Mr. McLachlan asserted the attorney-client privilege and refused to produce copies of those mailings. Id. at 23:23-24:8. Later in the deposition, Mr. McLachlan started to describe the alleged content of those mailings, but did not agree to waive his earlier assertion of the attorney-client privilege as to Willis Class Counsel's request for an actual copy of the mailings sent to potential survey participants. Id. at 87:18-21. Mr. Thompson further testified that Mr. McLachlan spoke to Wood Class Members who had agreed to participate in the survey regarding the nature of the litigation proceedings. Id. at 85:9–86:3. Mr. Thompson was not present during these discussions with survey participants, was not informed by Mr. McLachlan regarding the substance of those discussions, and was not provided with a script, if any, that was used by Mr. McLachlan during those discussions. Id. at 86:4-11. Mr. Thompson also testified that Mr. McLachlan received all data from the Participating Class Members (PCMs) and then passed the data along to him. Id. at 13:7-12. Mr. Thompson then conducted the follow-up interviews with the survey participants and analyzed the data for his Expert Report. Id. at 13:12-14:9.

Mr. Thompson is a Certified Hydrologist. Mr. Thompson is not a statistician or an expert in conducting surveys.

ARGUMENT

California Evidence Code Section 801 provides in relevant part:

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According to the Thompson Report, four rounds of mailings went out to potential survey participants in the Wood Class. *See* Thompson Report at p. 2. Four hundred (400) mailings were sent out in Round 1, three hundred (300) in Round 2, and two hundred (200) in Round 3 for a total of nine hundred (900) mailings in the first 3 rounds. *Id.* Mr. Thompson did not know how many Participating Class Members (PCMs) were obtained in the first 3 rounds. Thompson depo. at 22:9-23 & 25:12-27:21. However, Mr. Thompson was aware that too few had responded in the first 3 rounds and that a fourth round was required to ultimately obtain the 86 PCMs. Id. at 30: 21-25. 217 mailings were sent out in Round 4. The recipients of the mailings in Round 4 had previously sent in responses to a mailing sent out by Wood Class Counsel in 2009. *See* Thompson Report at p. 2.

If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is: . . . (b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for his opinion. (Emphasis supplied).

California Evidence Code Section 803 provides:

The court may, and upon objection shall, exclude testimony in the form of an opinion that is *based* in whole or *in significant part on matter that is not a proper basis for such an opinion*. In such case, the witness may, if there remains a proper basis for his opinion, then state his opinion after excluding from consideration the matter determined to be improper. (Emphasis supplied).

The Central District of California's decision in *Gibson* provides a useful summary of generally accepted principles for surveys:

In *Pittsburgh Press*, the Third Circuit set forth the following standards for assessing whether a survey of individuals had been conducted in accordance with generally accepted principles: A proper universe must be examined and a *representative* sample must be chosen; the persons conducting the survey must be experts; the data must be properly gathered and accurately reported. It is essential that the sample design, the questionnaires and the manner of interviewing meet the standards of objective surveying and statistical techniques. *Just as important, the survey must be conducted independently of the attorneys involved in the litigation*. *Pittsburgh Press*, 579 F.2d [751,] 758; *accord Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States*, 816 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir.1987).

Gibson v. Cnty. of Riverside, 181 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1067-68 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (emphasis supplied.)

Again relying on the Third Circuit's decision in *Pittsburgh Press*, the *Gibson* court went on to describe the rationale for excluding an expert report that has been rendered unreliable by the attorney's participation in conducting the survey:

The Pittsburgh Press court found that the cover letter which informed the recipients of the questionnaires of the questionnaire's purpose irrevocably undermined the reliability of the survey's results: The respondents, who were all Club members and thus interested in the litigation, were told the precise nature of the litigation and the purpose of the survey. They consequently knew

which responses would be helpful to the [Plaintiff Club], and conversely, which would be harmful. Moreover, it was possible that a recipient of the questionnaire would fail to respond because he knew an honest response would be harmful to the Club's position. Thus the respondents might have contained a higher percentage of those who could answer in a way helpful to the Club.

It therefore appears that [Plaintiff Club's] survey suffers from a severe dearth of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.... The respondents were all interested in [Plaintiff Club] prevailing in the lawsuit. Yet they were expressly advised about the nature of the litigation and the survey, as well as which answers would benefit the Club. [Id. at 759.]

Because of these deficiencies, the Third Circuit held that it was beyond the district court's discretion to consider the survey and that the district court thus erred in considering it as admissible evidence. *See id.* at 759–60.

Gibson v. Cnty. of Riverside, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1068-69 (C.D. Cal. 2002)(emphasis supplied). A renowned and well-respected treatise author as well as The Federal Judicial Center's 2011 Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence agree that attorneys should have no part in carrying out surveys:

The only relevant limitation is that the attorneys do not *conduct* the survey. Once the relevant universe and relevant questions are defined between the attorneys and the survey director, the attorneys should then step aside and allow the expert survey director to carry out independently the survey in accordance with accepted survey methodology.

The Federal Judicial Center's 2011 Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence agrees with this treatise that attorney participation in survey design is needed but attorneys should not participate in the actual conduct of the survey:

A better interpretation is that the attorney should have no part in carrying out the survey. However, some attorney involvement in the survey design is necessary to ensure that relevant questions are directed to a relevant population [T]he interviews themselves are not directly visible and any potential bias is minimized by having interviewers and respondents blind to the purpose and sponsorship of the survey and by excluding attorneys from any part in conducting interviews and tabulating results. Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 374 (Federal Judicial Center 3rd ed. 2011).

6 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 32:166 (4th ed.) (emphasis supplied).

Appellate courts and learned treatises admonish trial courts not to admit expert opinions that are based on surveys in which attorneys were directly involved in the conduct of the survey. In this case, it is undisputed that an attorney (Mr. McLachlan) directly participated in the conduct

of the survey of Wood Class Members regarding the amount and purpose of their groundwater pumping. Even worse, the participating attorney (Mr. McLachlan) refused to turn over the content of what the survey recipients were shown in written form, i.e., the survey mailings, and did not reveal the content of verbal discussions with the survey participants with respect to the "nature of the litigation" to either the expert witness (Mr. Thompson) or opposing counsel. Survey recipients were likely to know or to be alerted to the fact that reporting high amounts of groundwater pumping could be harmful to their case because of allegations of waste or unreasonable and nonbeneficial uses or possible requirements for metering to monitor their future groundwater pumping.

Willis Class Counsel is not aware of <u>any reported cases</u> in which survey results and communications with survey participants were withheld based on the assertion of attorney-client privilege. The practical result of the assertion of attorney-client privilege is that the expert witness, opposing counsel, and this Court do not know the content of the survey mailings nor the content of the discussions with survey participants regarding the litigation and purpose of the survey. Previous courts at least were able to analyze the content of the communications between the attorney and the survey participants to determine the level of bias. Either way, surveys conducted by attorneys are <u>not</u> "of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates" under Evidence Code Section 801 and, therefore, the Thompson Report should be excluded by this Court pursuant to Evidence Code Section 803.

As Mr. Thompson recognized, there are many reasons why survey recipients may or may not want to voluntarily participate in a survey about their groundwater pumping, including their reasons related to their understanding of the case that they learned through the attorney. Thompson depo. at 91:6-92:2. In survey sampling, the bias that results from an unrepresentative sample is called **selection bias**. Some common examples of selection bias are described below.

- Undercoverage. Undercoverage occurs when some members of the population inadequately represented in the sample. A classic example of undercoverage is the *Literary* Digest voter survey, which predicted that Alfred Landon would beat Franklin Roosevelt in the 1936 presidential election. The survey sample suffered from undercoverage of lowincome voters, who tended to be Democrats. Undercoverage is often a problem with convenience samples.
- Voluntary response bias. Voluntary response bias occurs when sample members are selfselected volunteers, as in voluntary samples. An example would be call-in radio shows that solicit audience participation in surveys on controversial topics (abortion, affirmative action, gun control, etc.). The resulting sample tends to overrepresent individuals who have strong opinions.
- Nonresponse bias. Sometimes, individuals chosen for the sample are unwilling or unable to participate in the survey. This can be a big problem with mail surveys, where the response rate can be very low.

Because Mr. Thompson is not a survey expert, he does not have the expertise to account for these various types of selection biases resulting from the scant number of survey participants (86 out of 3400). Therefore, the results he obtained from the survey data collected by Mr. McLachlan and his follow-up interviews are not reliable because he could not quantify and account for the various forms of selection biases in those data.

Likewise, because Mr. Thompson is not a statistician, he lacks the expertise to reliably extrapolate the widely-divergent, non-Bell curve data from the 86 survey results to the 3400-Member Wood Class. Therefore, the conclusions he reaches regarding groundwater usage by the

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1	entire Wood Class are not reliable u	under Evidence Code Section 801 and, therefore, should be
2	excluded under Evidence Code Section	on 803.
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4	Dated: July <u>3/</u> , 2015	Respectfully submitted,
5		KRAUSE, KALFAYAN, BENINK &
6		SLAVENS, LLP
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9		Ralph B. Kalfayan, Esq. Lynne M. Brennan, Esq.
10		Class Counsel for the Willis Class
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