1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	JANET K. GOLDSMITH, State Bar No. 065 ERIC N. ROBINSON, State Bar No. 191781 STANLEY C. POWELL, State Bar No. 2540 KRONICK, MOSKOVITZ, TIEDEMANN & A Professional Corporation 400 Capitol Mall, 27th Floor Sacramento, CA 95814-4416 Telephone: (916) 321-4500 Facsimile: (916) 321-4555  ROCKARD J. DELGADILLO, City Attorne RICHARD M. BROWN, Senior Assistant City Attorney for Water and Power S. DAVID HOTCHKISS (Bar No. 076821) Assistant City Attorney JULIE CONBOY RILEY (Bar No. 197407) Deputy City Attorney 111 North Hope Street, Suite 340 P. O. Box 51111 Los Angeles, California 90051-0100 Telephone: (213)367-4500	©57 & GIRARD  Exempt from Filing Fee Pursuant to
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13	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
14	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES	
15	COUNTI	OF LOS ANGELES
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES  Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co.  Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co.  Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of Lancaster  Diamond Farming Co. v. City of Lancaster  Diamond Farming Co. v. Palmdale Water District	Case No. 105 CV 049053 Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408  Hon. Jack Komar  CITY OF LOS ANGELES' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL  Riverside County Superior Court Lead Case No. RIC 344436 Case No. RIC 344668 Case No. RIC 353840  Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 325201  Kern County Superior Court Case No. S-1500-CV-254348  Date: November 25, 2008 Santa Clara Superior Court Department 17
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	CITY OF LOS ANGELES' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS	AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

In a Case Management Statements filed November 21, 2008 (CMC Statement), a number of parties<sup>1</sup> requested a jury trial on all elements of causes of action including claims of prescription. A reading of the CMC Statements suggests that the only portion of the action as to which jury trial is not requested is the equitable issue of a potential physical solution and related management. In a comprehensive groundwater adjudication such as the instant case, however, it is not feasible to tease out the "equitable" issues from "legal" issues; they are inextricably intertwined, and both depend on facts and determinations in this action that have already been ruled upon by the Court following submission of evidence in the first two phases of the trial.

Even if the landowners had the right to a jury trial on some issues or claims at the outset of the trial, they have waived that right by their participation in the first two phases on the merits of the action without objection. It would be prejudicial to the other parties, inefficient, burdensome to the potential jury panel, and detrimental to the orderly conduct of the adjudication to require the remainder of the case be tried before a jury at this stage of the litigation.

The constitutional right of a trial by jury is a valuable privilege derived from the wholesome influence of Magna Carta, and should be preserved and enforced in all its efficacy. This right, however, should not be used as a means of delaying or obstructing the regular course of litigation. This privilege should be exercised with due diligence.

(Deberry v. Cavalier (1931) 113 Cal.App. 30 at 33.)

Although this adjudication is proceeding in separate "phases" of "trial," it is nevertheless a single consolidated case in which trial has already commenced. Landowners have not exercised due diligence in requesting a jury trial, have not preserved their record of any such

Bolthouse Properties, LLC; Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc.; Diamond Farming Company; Crystal Organic Farms, Inc.; A.V. United Mutual Group; White Fence Farms Mutual Water Company, Inc.; Antelope Valley Groundwater Agreement Association (AGWA); Service Rock Products Corp.; Sheep Creek Water Company; filed a Case Management Statement in which Wagas Land Company LLC joined, and Richard A. Wood and the Small Pumpers Class. Tejon Ranch Corp., also filed a demand for jury trial on November 21, 2008, in which Gertrude J. Van Dam, Delmar D. Van Dam, Craig Van Dam and Gary Van Dam joined, and Plaintiff Willis filed a similar Case Management Statement asserting the right to a jury trial. These parties are all collectively referred to herein as "Landowners."

request, and have therefore waived their right to try this case before a jury. Their request, at this late date in the proceedings will produce only delay, confusion, and frustration of the orderly progression of this litigation.

The Code of Civil Procedure provides that the right to a jury trial is waived by failure of the party seeking jury trial to announce that a jury is required "at the time the case is first set for trial, or within five days thereafter. (Code of Civil Procedure § 631(d)(4) (emph. added.)<sup>2</sup>

In this case, the Court has tried two of the issues essential to a determination of the landowners' water rights. In Phase I of this case, the identification and extent of the groundwater basin in which the landowners assert rights was tried to the Court without objection. In Phase II, again without objection by the landowners, the determination of any sub-basins in which the landowners might assert separate groundwater rights was tried before the Court. Fifty-two pages of reporter's transcript document detailed argument before the Court concerning *in limine* motions and the conduct of the Phase II trial, but not one word was said concerning a jury trial. (6 Oct RT 1-52.) No party requested a jury trial at any time prior to the hearing of evidence, and all parties now requesting a jury trial fully participated in the Phase II trial to the Court.

As established by the state's Supreme Court in *Taylor v. Union Pac. R. Corp.* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 893,

[I]t is well established that '... a party cannot without objection try his case before a court without a jury, lose it and then complain that it was not tried by jury. (Citation.)' (Pink v. Slater (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 816, 817, 281 P.2d 272, 273; see Tyler v. Norton (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 717, 722, 110 Cal.Rptr. 307; De Castro v. Rowe, supra, 223 Cal.App.2d 547, 552, 36 Cal.Rptr. 53; Glogau v.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>/ § **631**. (a) The right to a trial by jury as declared by Section 16 of Article I of the California Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. In civil cases, a jury may only be waived pursuant to subdivision (d). (d) A party waives trial by jury in any of the following ways:

<sup>(1)</sup> By failing to appear at the trial.

<sup>(2)</sup> By written consent filed with the clerk or judge.

<sup>(3)</sup> By oral consent, in open court, entered in the minutes.

<sup>(4)</sup> By failing to announce that a jury is required, at the time the cause is first set for trial, if it is set upon notice or stipulation, or within five days after notice of setting if it is set without notice or stipulation;

<sup>(5)</sup> By failing to deposit with the clerk, or judge, advance jury fees as provided in subdivision (b);

<sup>(6)</sup> By failing to deposit with the clerk or judge, at the beginning of the second and each succeeding day's session, the sum provided in subdivision (c).

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Hagan (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 313, 316, 237 P.2d 329.) As stated in the recent Tyler case, wherein defendants proceeded to try the case before a judge without objecting to the absence of a jury, 'Defendants cannot play 'Heads I win, Tails you lose' with the trial court.' (34 Cal.App.3d p. 722, 110 Cal.Rptr. p. 309.)

Further, once a jury trial has been waived, the waiver cannot be withdrawn except in the discretion of the trial court. (Taylor v. Union Pac. R. Corp. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 893, 898.)

The *Taylor* decision was expressly upheld two years later in another case involving similar "forum shopping." In Nork v. Gonzales (1978) 20 Cal.3d 500, the Court reiterated its disapproval of tactical efforts to change the decision-making horse in mid-stream. In that case, defendant Nork had waived a jury trial. Another party had requested a jury and paid the jury fees, but part way through the trial, the Court noted that the issues being tried had no relation to the party paying for the jury, and that party then also waived its right to jury trial. Thereafter, before the jury was officially discharged (but out of its presence), all parties argued the disputed issues to the court, after which defendant Nork unsuccessfully sought relief from his prior waiver. On appeal, Nork alleged that his right to a jury trial had been wrongfully abridged. The Supreme Court noted all the circumstances, and disagreed, upholding the lower Court's ruling. It observed:

> Nork's belated motion raised the suspicion that Nork's counsel sensed that the judge was about to rule against them - as indeed he did shortly after denying Nork's motion for relief from jury waiver. Apparently Nork's counsel merely wished to reargue the special defenses before a different, hopefully more receptive, trier of fact.

(Nork v. Gonzales (1978) 20 Cal.3d at 505.) It added, further,

In the language of the Court of Appeal in Cloud v. Market Street Ry. Co. (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 92, 104 "the case presented was no different from any other in which a plaintiff after first waiving a jury because he had decided that it was preferable to try his case to a court, afterwards changed his mind and sought relief from his waiver. If the denial of the motion under such circumstances is an abuse of discretion, then every litigant who changed his mind about a jury trial after first waiving one would equally be entitled to be relieved upon a like motion."

(Nork v. Gonzales, supra at 508.)

Even where a party has previously made known to the Court their desire for a jury trial, the right to jury trial is waived where the party proceeds to trial before the Court without

1	formal objection. In Frazure v. Fitzpatrick (1943) 21 Cal.2d 853, appellant had filed a	
2	counterclaim and "deposited jury fees and made a written request for jury trial in advance of th	
3	trial date and in due form." In that case proceeded first on the equitable suit before the	
4	counterclaim was heard. Appellant's attorney then proceeded without objection to put on his	
5	evidence relating to the counterclaim, which was tried before the court. On appeal, appellant's	
6	contention that he had been improperly deprived of a jury trial was rejected, the appellate court	
7	noting, "	
8 9	Under the circumstances, it must be held that appellant waived his right, if any he had, to a jury to hear that phase of the case, and he cannot now complain.	
10	(Frazure v. Fitzpatrick, supra, at 861.)	
11	As observed by the Supreme Court in <i>Taylor</i> , "A party must preserve his record."	
12	(Taylor, supra, at 898.) In this complicated, multi-phased adjudication of the Antelope Valley,	
13	the Landowners have not preserved their record. Having proceeded to trial before the Court,	
14	without objection, they must be deemed to have waived their right to jury trial.	
15	Dated: December 31, 2008	
16 17	ROCKARD J. DELGADILLO, City Attorney Richard M. Brown, Senior Assistant City Attorney for Water and Power	
18 19	KRONICK, MOSKOVITZ, TIEDEMANN & GIRARD A Professional Corporation	
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21	By Janet K. Goldsmith	
22	Attorneys for Defendant CITY OF LOS ANGELES	
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CITY OF LOS ANGELES' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

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## PROOF OF SERVICE

I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Sacramento County, California. I am

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Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard is 400 Capitol Mall, 27th Floor, Sacramento, California 95814. On December 31, 2008, I served

a copy of the within document: CITY OF LOS ANGELES' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS

AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL via electronic posting to the Santa Clara Superior Court E-Filing website,

over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address

http://www.scefiling.org/cases/casehome.jsp?caseId=19 ."

I, Lorraine Lippolis, declare:

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on December 31, 2008 at Sacramento, California.

Lorraine Lippolis

PROOF OF SERVICE