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14	Coordination Proceeding	Judicial Council Coordination	
15	Special Title (Rule 1550 (b)),	Proceeding No. 4408	
16		[Assigned to the Honorable Jack Komar,	
17	ANTELOPE VALLEY	Judge Santa Clara County Superior Court,	
18	GROUNDWATER CASES	Dept. 17]	
19		Santa Clara Court Case No. 1-05-CV-049053	
20		UNITED STATES' PRE-TRIAL BRIEF	
21		FOR PHASE 5 TRIAL REGARDING THE FEDERAL RESERVED WATER	
22		RIGHT	
23			
24	The United States respectfully submits t	his pre-trial brief addressing the issues, facts and	
25	witnesses to be presented in the Phase 5 trial of this adjudication.		

In the Order After Hearing On January 27, 2014, re: Motion by Cross-Complainant Antelope Valley Groundwater Agreement Association ("AGWA") for Summary Adjudication re Federal Reserve, the Court "determine[d] that in fact there is a federal reservation for military

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purposes for all ten executive orders but there is no evidence presented to establish what quantity of water is necessarily reserved for military purposes nor what is used for secondary purposes, if any." *Id.* at 2-3.

Because the Court has ruled on the existence of the reserved water right, the United States will not recite the principles of the reserved water right doctrine. Two foundational cases included in the Court's analysis, however, are useful in establishing the scope of a federal reservation. In *Cappaert v. United States*, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the scope of the federal reserved water right for the Devil's Hole National Monument was for the amount of water (both surface and groundwater) necessary to maintain the level of an underground pool of water necessary to preserve its scientific value. The Court looked not only to the language of the 1952 Presidential Proclamation that established Devil's Hole, but also to the American Antiquities Preservation Act, pursuant to which the Proclamation was issued, and the Act establishing the National Park Service, which was particularly mentioned in the Proclamation. In other words, to ascertain the purpose of the reservation¹, the Court looked not just to the impetus for establishing the reservation - to protect an endangered fish - or the particular language of the document that made the reservation, but also the

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¹ As explained in prior briefing, the power to reserve water extends to acquired lands as well as lands reserved from the public domain. A federal reserved water right "does not depend solely on a formal reservation of land from the public domain, but rather on Congress' exercise of a constitutional authority such as the Property or Commerce Clauses, coupled with the Supremacy Clause." 6 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 328, 332-33 (1982). The federal power to reserve water extends to lands that are not reserved from the public domain, but rather acquired for specific purposes. In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963), the Supreme Court clearly recognized that the federal government's reservation of water is not restricted to federal lands reserved from the public domain. After acknowledging the broad powers of the United States to regulate navigable waters under the Commerce Clause and to regulate government lands under the Property Clause, the Court stated, "[w]e have no doubt about the power of the United States under these clauses to reserve water rights for its reservations and its property." *Id.* at 597-598 (emphasis added). Subsequent to and based on the formative Supreme Court cases, the Ninth Circuit held that reserved water rights attached to lands reacquired from private ownership and located within the boundaries of the Spokane Indian Reservation. See United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).

underlying constitutional and legislative authority to make the reservation and to carry out the federal purposes involved.

Similarly, in *United States v. New Mexico*, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), in deciding on the scope of the federal reserved water right for the Gila National Forest, the Supreme Court not only considered the document that established the reservation, but also reviewed the political history of the establishment of the national forests to include limitations Congress placed on the executive branch and various statutes enacted for the purpose of reserving federal land for national forests. Based on this history and legislative direction, the court limited the scope of the federal reserved water right to only that amount "necessary to preserve the timber or to secure favorable water flows for private and public uses under state law." *New Mexico* at 718. The court rejected a federal reserved water right for other purposes, such as aesthetic, recreational, fish-preservation, and stockwatering purposes, which were not within the "limited purposes for which Congress authorized the creation of national forests. . . ." *Id.* at 705.

The scope of a reservation for military purposes is broader. At its roots, a reservation for military purposes goes beyond the constitutional clauses (the Commerce Clause, Art. I, s 8, which permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Property Clause, Art. IV, s 3, which permits federal regulation of federal lands) that form the basis of a reserved right for a National Monument or a National Forest. Beginning with the Preamble of the United States Constitution, the nation was established in order to, among other things: "insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty. . . ." The Constitution goes on to enumerate several powers for the Congress and the President that form the basis for establishing and managing military reservations for military purposes.² Accordingly, the primary purpose of a military reservation is to carry out

² See e.g.,

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense.... [t]o declare war.... raise and support armies.... provide and maintain a navy.... make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.... provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel

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U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 4.

the common defense, protecting against invasion and ensuring domestic tranquility. "It is for the protection and interests of the states, their people and property, as well as for the protection and interests of the people generally of the United States, that forts, arsenals, and other buildings for public uses are constructed within the states." *Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe*, 114 U.S. 525, 541 (1885). To narrowly interpret the purpose of military enclaves, and therefore the scope of a federal reserved water right, would violate these Constitutional principles.

Courts have instructed that "'[m]ilitary purposes' is a general description" *Sharpe v. United States*, 112 F. 893, 897 (3d Cir. 1902). The federal Court of Claims interpreted the phase in a case examining property leased by the Veterans' Administration for a military purpose. "Military purposes" the court concluded "was intended to describe the use to be made of the premises and not to be restrictive." *Royce, Inc. v. United States*, 126 F. Supp. 196, 203 (Ct. Cl. 1954). In *United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Utility Dist.*, 109 F. Supp. 28, 65 (S.D. Cal. 1952), an

invasions.... provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States.... exercise exclusive legislation...over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings.... And [t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1 and 11 - 18.

The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices....

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2.

The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.

action brought to quiet title to the water rights for Marine base Camp Pendleton, the Court decreed a water right to the United States for use for: "military purposes, to-wit: to supply the domestic, municipal and quasi-municipal requirements of its armed forces, and the civilian personnel performing duties in connection with said armed forces" *Id.* at 65; see also *United States v. Fallbrook Public Utility Dist.*, 110 F. Supp. 767 (D.C.Cal. 1953) (findings, conclusions and judgment pursuant to decision in 109 F. Supp. 28), partially rev'd on other grounds, *California v. United States*, 235 F.2d (9th Cir. 1956). In other words, "military purpose" is a broad descriptive term covering the activities of the military, and is not restricted to a narrow particular use.

A military installation, once established for military purposes, may expand to fulfill evolving military needs. Edwards Air Force Base is a prominent example of a military installation with evolving military purposes, from an initial bombing and gunnery range to training facility to flight test center. In a case very similar to this one, the existence of federal reserved water rights for U.S. Army Fort Huachuca (in Arizona) was recognized by the presiding judge in the on-going general adjudication of all rights to use water in the Gila River watershed in Arizona (in which the United States was joined pursuant to the McCarran Amendment).

Fort Huachuca began as a remote cavalry outpost to protect settlers and is now a major military installation and the home of the U.S. Army Intelligence School, the Army Network and Enterprise Technologies Command, the 9th Army Signal Command, and the Army Electronic Proving Ground. In declaring that reserved rights exist on the military installation, Judge Ballinger stated "the Court is convinced that the Fort Huachuca reservation for 'military uses' is not static and includes water rights required to satisfy contemporary, direct, indirect and quasi-

³ The court in *Fallbrook* decreed the water rights to the United States based on state law, finding that use for military purposes is a beneficial use of water. 109 F. Supp at 65. If military purposes is an adequate basis for a determination of beneficial use, it should be an adequate basis for a federal reserved water right which provides the water necessary to carry-out the enclave's designated purpose.

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municipal needs that arise in conducting military and military-related functions important to local and national security." *Gila River*, contested case No. W1-11-605 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct., Ariz.)(Sept. 7, 2011)(order granting Special Master's motion to adopt Apr. 4, 2008 Report Regarding Fort Huachuca)(attached as Exh. No. 19 to the United States' Motion in Limine for Phase IV trial, filed March 29, 2013). Similarly, the water necessary to satisfy the military purposes at Edwards Air Force Base and Plant 42 must be sufficient to satisfy all the military needs and the important national security functions these installations serve now and in the future.

That water is reserved for future purposes cannot be disputed. In *Arizona v. California*, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963), the Supreme Court approved the Master's conclusion that the quantity of water intended to be reserved was for "the future as well as the present needs of the Indian Reservations. . . . " In that same opinion, the Court also stated:

The Master ruled that the principle underlying the reservation of water rights for Indian Reservations was equally applicable to other federal establishments such as National Recreation Areas and National Forests. We agree with the conclusions of the Master that the United States intended to reserve water sufficient for the future requirements of the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, the Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial National Wildlife Refuge and the Gila National Forest.

Id. at 601.²/ "[R]eserv[ing] water sufficient for the future requirements," therefore, is a fundamental characteristic of any federal reserved water right, including Edward Air Force Base and Plant 42's reserved water right.

²/The Supreme Court's recognition that future uses of water might be considered is also apparent in *United States v. The Dist. Court in and for Water Div. No. 5*, 401 U.S. 527 (1971). In dicta, the court listed various federal reservations within the geographical area covered by that water rights adjudication, to include: "The Department of the Navy administers certain naval petroleum and oil shale reserves which, if ever developed, would require water to accomplish the federal purpose for which the reservations were made." *Id.* at 529. *See also Sierra Club v. Lyng*, 661 F. Supp. 1490 n.10 (D.Colo.,1987) (concluding that federal reserved water rights under the Wilderness Act "includes any future wilderness area water needs.")

Both Fort Huachuca and Edwards Air Force Base illustrate the inherent uncertainty in having to predict future military needs and water use from a fixed point in time. Cavalry patrols in the Arizona desert could not presage the needs of a modern army, and the needs of a training range in 1940 could not predict the needs of a modern Air Force. Similarly, there will be uncertainty regarding the military mission and water demands ten, twenty, and one hundred years in the future. That uncertainty cannot prevent this Court from addressing projected future demand, but should guide the Court in deciding a sufficient quantity of water to be reserved for future use.

In sum, because of the courts historical deference to the Armed Forces' use of defense installations for military purposes; because "military purposes" is a broad purpose enabling military installations to grow and evolve to satisfy the military needs of today and in the future; and because a narrow interpretation of water use for military purposes would entirely defeat the purposes of the enclaves, the Court should view the evidence with the understanding that military uses at Edward Air Force Base and Plant 42 must be construed liberally, and the amount of water needed to satisfy past, present and future military uses should be broadly-interpreted.

At trial, the United States intends to present evidence of the historic formation of the military enclaves through reservation and acquisition, and the geographical area of the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction. The Court will also be presented with a brief history of the military missions at these installations, and the amount of water that was used to fulfill the missions. Finally, testimony will be presented with evidence that water is necessary to fulfill the military purpose of the facilities and that the amount of the federal reserved water right presented at trial is reasonable in light of past, current and reasonably foreseeable future uses on the federal lands.

1	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31 st day of January 2014.	
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3	_/s/ R. Lee Leininger R. LEE LEININGER	
4	JAMES J. DuBOIS	
5	ATTORNEYS FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	
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