Exhibit F

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3	DEPARTMENT NO. 56 HON. JACK KOMAR, JUDGE
4	
5	COORDINATION PROCEEDING SPECIAL TITLE (RULE 1550(B))
6	ANTELODE MALLEN ADDITION
7	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES JUDICIAL COUNCIL
8	INCLUDED ACTIONS: SCOORD NATION
9	LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40 V. DIAMOND FARMING CO., ET AL, NO. 4408
10	LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, CASE NO. BC325 201
11	LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICT CASE NO.
12	NO. 40 V. DIAMOND FARMING CO., ET AL, KERN COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, CASE NO. S-1550-CV-254-348
13	
14	WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC. V. CITY OF LANCASTER
15	DIAMOND FARMING CO. V. CITY OF LANCASTER STAMOND FARMING CO. V. PALMDALE WATER DISTS RIVERSIDE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT.
16	CONSOLIDATED ACTION. CASE NOS. RIC 353
17	840, RIC 344 436, RIC 344 668 AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS
18	DEDODTED 10 TRANSCOLOR
19	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
20	NOVEMBER 4, 2014
	ADDEADANADA
21	APPEARANCES:
22	FOR CROSS-COMPLAINANT/ CROSS-DEFENDANT: ALESHIRE & WYNDER LLP
23	BY: WESLEY A. MILIBAND, ESQ. 18881 VON KARMAN AVENUE, SUITE 1700
24	IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 92612
25	
26	(APPEARANCES CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE.)
27	JEANETTE COYLE, CSR #12665
28	OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

THE COURT: WE HAVE A CONSOLIDATED PROCEEDING
HERE AS WELL AS A COORDINATED PROCEEDING. AND THE
SETTLEMENT WAS APPROVED BINDING THE PARTIES TO THE
SETTLEMENT. BUT THAT SETTLEMENT HAS NO INDEPENDENT
STATUS IN TERMS OF PARTIES WHO WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE
SETTLEMENT. THAT WAS MADE VERY CLEAR.

AT THE TIME THAT THE COURT APPROVED THE SETTLEMENT, THERE WERE MULTIPLE OBJECTIONS TO THE SETTLEMENT BY THE NON-STIPULATING PARTIES UNTIL THE COURT STATED AS PART OF ITS ORDER THAT IT WAS BINDING ONLY ON THE PARTIES WHO WERE STIPULATING TO IT. AND NONE OTHERS COULD POSSIBLY BE BOUND BY IT.

MR. KALFAYAN: YOUR HONOR, LET ME JUST TELL YOU WHERE THE WILLIS CLASS IS COMING FROM HERE. THERE ARE CERTAIN DUE PROCESS ISSUES THAT I HAVE TO DEAL WITH. I HAVE A CLASS OF 65,000 LAND OWNERS THAT OCCUPY ALMOST TWO THIRDS OF THIS BASIN. AND THEY WERE JUST GIVEN NOTICE AND A JUDGMENT THAT SAID EVERYTHING IS FINAL WITH RESPECT TO THE PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS AND THE WILLIS CLASS.

THEY DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT A TRIAL
WITH RESPECT TO WILLIS VIS-A-VIS ANYONE ELSE. HERE IS
THE DUE PROCESS ISSUE THAT I HAVE THAT I PRESENTED A
FOUR OR FIVE PAGE LIMITED OPPOSITION THAT I WOULD REALLY
ENCOURAGE YOUR HONOR TO READ.

THE COURT: I HAVE READ IT, MR. KALFAYAN.

MR. KALFAYAN: OKAY. SO THE DUE PROCESS ISSUES
ARE THIS: THEY DON'T KNOW WHAT THE CLAIM IS BY ANYBODY

1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
2	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES CENTRAL DISTRICT	
3	HONORABLE JACK KOMAR, JUDGE	
4		
5		
6	Coordination Proceeding) Judicial Council Special Title (Rule 1550(b))) Coordination Proceeding	
7) NO. 44US	
8	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER) CASES) Lead Case No. BC 325 201	
9	RICHARD A. WOOD, an individual) on behalf of himself and all) Case No. BC391869	
10	others similarly situated.)	
11	Plaintiff, Plaintiff, SCHEDULE FOR PHASE FOUR VS.	
12) INTAL	
13	WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40;) Time: 9:00 a.m.	
14	et al.) Place: Department 1) (San Jose) Defendants.	
15	Derengants.	
16	000	
17		
18	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS	
19		
20	APPEARANCES:	
21	FOR PLAINTIFF RICHARD WOOD: Michael D. McLachlan, Attorney at Law	
22	Daniel M. O'Leary, Attorney at Law	
23	FOR PLAINTIFF REBECCA WILLIS:	
24	Ralph B. Kalfayan, Attorney at Law	
25	FOR ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER AGREEMENT ASSOCIATION: Michael Fife, Attorney at Law	
26	FOR DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES, LAWA:	
27	Janet K. Goldsmith, Attorney at Law	
28	FOR CROSS-DEFENDANT ANTELOPE VALLEY STORAGE: COPY Jennifer L. Spaletta, Attorney at Law	

that may take care of it. But either way I think it takes care of due process, it's a reasonable time frame, and it allows the parties all to see the other claims, assuming we get declarations on the return flows and on the Federal Reserve rights.

MR. ORR: Steven Orr for the City of Palmdale.

The Court should remain clear that any settlement put before the Court is a settlement among a number of parties to which the Public Water Suppliers are not a party and it would remain an issue. The parties may agree among themselves as to what their right is, but that's still subject to challenge, and will remain subject to challenge by the Public Water Suppliers.

THE COURT: That's clear.

Yes, Mr. Leininger?

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MR. LEININGER: Good morning, Your Honor. Lee Leininger for the United States.

Your Honor, I was also involved in these sessions at the liaison committee where we came up with this proposed schedule. And I would just like to give you our perspective on the reason for these dates and the dates proposed.

The idea of having one month in which parties could then file this declaration and perhaps agree in a stipulation is really that that will then be posted so that all parties can review the declaration/stipulation, so that we have proper notice of what parties are agreeing to here. And that would then lead to a period of approximately one

1	SUPERIOR	COURT OF THE STATE	E OF CALI FORNIA
2	P. FOR	THE COUNTY OF LOS	S ANGELES
3	DEPARTMENT 1		HON. JACK KOMAR, JUDGE
4			•
5	SPECIAL TITLE (RU	LE 1550(B)	
6	ANTELOPE VALLEY G	ROUNDWATER CASES) JCCP4408)
7) SANTA CLARA CASE NO.) 1-05-CV-049053
9	PALMDALE WATER DI	STRICT AND QUARTZ)))
10	CROSS-	COMPLAINANTS,)
11	VS.	:)
12	LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT NO. 40, 1))
13		DEFENDANTS.	,)
14	CN033-L	CLEADAIG 12.)
15	REPORTER	R'S TRANSCRIPT OF F	DDOCEDINGS
16		IDAY, NOVEMBER 9,	
17		TONI HOVEHOLD S	2012
18	APPEARANCES:		
19	FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS	LEMIEUX & O'NEILL	
20	DISTRICT 40, ET. AL.	4165 E. THOUSAND	OAKS BLVD, SUITE 350 CALIFORNIA 91362
21		(805) 495-4770	CULTLINATA A1205
22	FOR CITY OF PALMDALE:	RICHARDS WATSON & BY: STEVEN R. OR	
23		355 SOUTH GRAND A	VENUE, 40TH FL. FORNIA 90071-3101

- 2 IT MAY BE THAT BECAUSE THE NEXT PHASE IS
- 3 FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS OF PARTIES PUMPING -- AND WE
- 4 HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO TALK ABOUT THIS -- IT MIGHT BE
- 5 POSSIBLE, FOR SOME LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME, SEVER THE WOOD
- 6 CLASS DETERMINATION TO ALLOW THE OTHER DETERMINATIONS TO
- 7 GO FORWARD FIRST.
- 8 OBVIOUSLY, THERE'S GOING TO HAVE TO BE A
- 9 PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE. AND MAYBE THEY CAN GO LAST OR
- 10 THERE'S SOME KIND OF MECHANISM --- PROCEDURAL MECHANISM IN
- 11 PLAY THAT ALLOWS SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE WOOD CLASS
- 12 PERHAPS, IN A VACUUM, TO DO IT.
- 13 I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY PARTICULAR
- 14 URGENCY TO HAVE THEM DO IT UP-FRONT OR IN THE MIDDLE OR
- 15 WHATEVER. THERE'S JUST OVERALL A NEED TO DO IT.
- 16 I THINK THERE'S A WAY TO ACCOMMODATE
- 17 PROCEDURALLY TO ALLOW THAT TO HAPPEN.
- 18 THE COURT: WELL, I THINK THERE MUST BE.
- 19 BUT ONE OF THE THINGS THAT OCCURS TO ME, IN
- 20 PARTICULAR WITH REGARD TO THE WOOD CLASS, IS THERE WAS AT
- 21 ONE TIME A PROPOSED RESOLUTION BY THE PARTIES THAT, AS
- 22 BETWEEN THE PARTIES THEMSELVES, STRUCK ME AS A REASONABLE
- 23 AND FAIR RESOLUTION AT THAT TIME.
- 24 THE PROBLEM WITH THAT SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL
- 25 WAS -- AND WHY THE COURT HAD NOT PRELIMINARILY APPROVED
- 26 THAT SETTLEMENT -- WAS BECAUSE IT IMPACTED OTHER PEOPLE

- 27 WHO WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE SETTLEMENT IN A WAY THAT
- 28 WOULD HAVE MADE ADVERSE FINDINGS AS TO THE OTHER PARTIES.

- 1 AND THAT'S ESSENTIALLY WHY --- MY
- 2 RECOLLECTION IS ANYWAY -- THAT THE COURT DECLINED TO
- 3 APPROVE THAT SETTLEMENT. BUT WHAT I DON'T UNDERSTOOD IS
- 4 WHY NOTHING EVER HAPPENED AFTER THAT BY PARTIES WHO
- 5 REALLY WANTED TO SETTLE THE CASE.
- 6 SO WITHOUT ASKING YOU TO TELL ME WHY
- 7 NOTHING EVER HAPPENED, I JUST WANT TO SUGGEST TO YOU THAT
- 8 IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF COUNSEL WOULD TALK TO EACH OTHER
- 9 ABOUT SUCH THINGS, ESPECIALLY NOW, WHEN EVERYBODY IS
- 10 INVOLVED IN A GLOBAL DISCUSSION OF SETTLEMENT OF THE
- 11 CASE. OKAY?
- 12 THAT'S MY COMMENT. OKAY.
- 13 MR. KUHS: YOUR HONOR, ROBERT KUHS FOR TEJON AND
- 14 GRANITE.
- 15 THE COURT: YES, MR. KUHS,
- 16 MR. KUHS: WHAT SPECIFIC FACTUAL FINDINGS IS THE
- 17 COURT GOING TO MAKE AND HOW ARE THOSE FINDINGS GOING TO
- 18 BE BINDING ON THE PARTIES AS TO THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE
- 19 PLEADINGS?
- 20 THE COURT: I'M NOT SURE I UNDERSTAND YOUR
- 21 QUESTION.
- 22 MR. KUHS: WELL, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE'RE GOING

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3	DEPARTMENT NO. 316 HON. JACK KOMAR, JUDGE
4	COORDINATION PROCEEDING)
5	SPECIAL TITLE (RULE 1550B)) JUDICIAL COUNCIL
6	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES) COORDINATION NO. JCCP4408
7	PALMDALE WATER DISTRICT AND) SANTA CLARA CASE NO.
8	QUARTZ HILL WATER DISTRICT,) 1-05-CV-049053
9	CROSS-COMPLAINANTS,
10	vs.
11	LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS,) DISTRICT NO. 40, ET AL,
12	CROSS-DEFENDANTS.)
13)
14	
15	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
16	TUESDAY, AUGUST 30, 2011
17	
18	APPEARANCES:
19 20	(SEE APPEARANCE PAGES)
21	
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23	
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27	GINGER WELKER, CSR #5585
28	OFFICIAL REPORTER

YOU TO THINK ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT PROCEED HERE IN ORDER TO MOVE THIS CASE OFF -- THE WOODS CASE OFF FIRST BASE AND -- OR HOME PLATE WHERE HE STILL SITS.

SO IF YOU WOULD ADDRESS THAT, PLEASE.

MR. DUNN: I WOULD BE HAPPY TOO, YOUR HONOR.
WITHOUT DIVULGING PARTIES' POSITIONS IN THE MEDIATION
WHAT WE ARE CURRENTLY INVOLVED WITH IS AN ALLOCATION OF
THE TOTAL SAFE YIELD. AND SO WHAT WE ARE INVOLVED WITH
IS COMING UP WITH NUMBERS FOR EACH OF THE PARTIES.

AND SO THE WAY THIS INVOLVES THE WOOD CLASS IS THAT ALTHOUGH WE WERE PREVIOUSLY BEFORE THE COURT WITH A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, THE COURT IDENTIFIED CERTAIN ISSUES WHICH WOULD -- WHICH WERE APPROPRIATE AT THE TIME IN TERMS OF -- THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF THOSE COMMENTS WERE THAT IT WAS AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WOOD CLASS AND PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIERS. AND AS SUCH IT CAN ONLY GO SO FAR.

THE COURT: CAN ONLY BIND THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT?

MR. DUNN: CORRECT. CORRECT. AND WHAT I'M TRYING

TO EXPLAIN TO THE COURT IS THAT IN THE CURRENT MEDIATION

PROCESS WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH -- ALL THE

PARTIES THAT ARE PARTICIPATING -- AND THERE ARE A LARGE

NUMBER. IN FACT, PROBABLY EVERYBODY THAT IS ON COURT

CALL TODAY IS PROBABLY IN SACRAMENTO OR ON THEIR WAY TO

BACRAMENTO TODAY.

BUT IT IS A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION AND SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE WOOD CLASS AND A NUMBER FOR THE WOOD CLASS.

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(LAUGHTER)

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MR. DUNN: IN ANY EVENT, I THINK THE COURT APPROVES WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO HERE.

THE COURT: WELL, I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION, AND IT MAKES SOME SENSE. AND THE -- ON THE OTHER HAND, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF I'M A LAWYER AND I'M REPRESENTING 3800 PEOPLE IN A CLASS OF PEOPLE THAT I HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO HAVE AS MUCH VALID INFORMATION AS I CAN GIVEN THE CURRENT STATUS OF THINGS IN ORDER TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS TO REALLY TRY TO RESOLVE THE MORE GLOBAL ISSUES.

BECAUSE YOUR AGREEMENT WITH THE WOOD CLASS OR COUNTY AGREEMENT WITH WOOD CLASS, IT SEEMS TO ME AS WE HAVE SAID MANY TIMES CAN ONLY BIND THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT. AND IF YOU ARE TRYING TO FOLD IN EVERYBODY ELSE, THERE HAS GOT TO BE SOME BASIS FOR DOING THAT. AND KNOWING WHAT THE ACTUAL PUMPING MIGHT BE -- AND WE KNOW THAT IS PROBABLY GOING TO BE AN ESTIMATE NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENS ABSENT PUTTING A MONITOR ON EACH WELL, WHICH IS NOT LIKELY TO HAPPEN RIGHT NOW.

IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT THE REASONABLE EXPENDITURE OF SOME FUNDS IN ORDER TO GET AN OPINION AND AN ESTIMATE THAT MR. MCLACHLAN CAN RELY ON WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL. AND I -- MY ONLY REAL CONCERN HERE IS THE ALLOCATION OF THESE FEES.

AND, FRANKLY, THERE ARE SEVERAL WAYS OF DOING IT: ONE IS TO DIRECT THAT MR. MCLACHLAN INCUR THE

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I	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3	DEPARTMENT NO. 4 HON. JACK KOMAR, JUDGE
4	COORDINATION PROCEEDING
5	SPECIAL TITLE (RULE 1550B)) JUDICIAL COUNCIL
6	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES) COORDINATION NO. JCCP4408
7	
8	QUARTZ HILL WATER DISTRICT,) SANTA CLARA CASE NO.) 1-05-CV-049053
9	CROSS-COMPLAINANTS,
10	VS.
11	LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS,) DISTRICT NO. 40, ET AL,)
12	CROSS-DEFENDANTS.)
13)
14 15	
16	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
17	THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2011
18	
19	APPEARANCES:
20	(SEE APPEARANCE PAGES)
21	
22	
23	
24	
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27.	GINGER WELKER, CSR #5585 OFFICIAL REPORTER
28	OFFICIAL KEPOKIEK
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- 1	
1	CASE NUMBER: JCCP 4408
2	CASE NAME: ANTELOPE VALLEY
3	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2011
4	DEPARTMENT NO. 2D HON. ELIA WEINBACH
5	REPORTER GINGER WELKER, CSR #5585
6	TIME: 8:38 A.M.
7	APPEARANCES: (SEE TITLE PAGE)
8	
9	THE COURT: WE HAVE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO ARE ON
10	COURT CALL. HAVE THEY BEEN IDENTIFIED?
11	THE CLERK: YES, THEY HAVE, YOUR HONOR.
12	THE COURT: IF ANYBODY ON COURT CALL WISHES TO
13	ARGUE, COMMENT, OR ADDRESS THE COURT, MAKE SURE YOU
14	STATE YOUR NAME EACH TIME YOU SPEAK SO THAT THE REPORTER
15	AND I WILL KNOW WHO YOU ARE.
16	WE HAVE SEVERAL ACTIONS AND MATTERS TO TAKE
16 17	
	CARE OF THIS MORNING. THE PRIMARY ONE IS THE MOTION FOR
17	CARE OF THIS MORNING. THE PRIMARY ONE IS THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE WOOD'S CLASS SETTLEMENT
17 18	CARE OF THIS MORNING. THE PRIMARY ONE IS THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE WOOD'S CLASS SETTLEMENT PROPOSED. AND THE COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THAT
17 18 19	CARE OF THIS MORNING. THE PRIMARY ONE IS THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE WOOD'S CLASS SETTLEMENT PROPOSED. AND THE COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THAT
17 18 19 20	CARE OF THIS MORNING. THE PRIMARY ONE IS THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE WOOD'S CLASS SETTLEMENT PROPOSED. AND THE COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THAT APPLICATION AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF PARTIES WHO HAVE
17 18 19 20 21	CARE OF THIS MORNING. THE PRIMARY ONE IS THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE WOOD'S CLASS SETTLEMENT PROPOSED. AND THE COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THAT APPLICATION AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF PARTIES WHO HAVE FILED WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THAT.
17 18 19 20 21	CARE OF THIS MORNING. THE PRIMARY ONE IS THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE WOOD'S CLASS SETTLEMENT PROPOSED. AND THE COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THAT APPLICATION AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF PARTIES WHO HAVE FILED WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THAT. I WILL TELL YOU I HAVE SOME CONCERNS. AND I
17 18 19 20 21 22	CARE OF THIS MORNING. THE PRIMARY ONE IS THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE WOOD'S CLASS SETTLEMENT PROPOSED. AND THE COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THAT APPLICATION AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF PARTIES WHO HAVE FILED WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THAT. I WILL TELL YOU I HAVE SOME CONCERNS. AND I THINK WE NEED TO ADDRESS THOSE HERE THIS MORNING.
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	CARE OF THIS MORNING. THE PRIMARY ONE IS THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE WOOD'S CLASS SETTLEMENT PROPOSED. AND THE COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THAT APPLICATION AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF PARTIES WHO HAVE FILED WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THAT. I WILL TELL YOU I HAVE SOME CONCERNS. AND I THINK WE NEED TO ADDRESS THOSE HERE THIS MORNING. BEFORE I DO THAT, IS THERE SOMETHING AS MOVING PARTY,
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	CARE OF THIS MORNING. THE PRIMARY ONE IS THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE WOOD'S CLASS SETTLEMENT PROPOSED. AND THE COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THAT APPLICATION AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF PARTIES WHO HAVE FILED WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THAT. I WILL TELL YOU I HAVE SOME CONCERNS. AND I THINK WE NEED TO ADDRESS THOSE HERE THIS MORNING. BEFORE I DO THAT, IS THERE SOMETHING AS MOVING PARTY, MR. MCLACHLAN, THAT YOU WANT TO STATE?

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THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE FIRST CONCERN I HAVE RELATES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE CLASS MEMBERS AND THE DEFINITION THAT THE ALLOCATION FOR EACH MEMBER WILL BE AS TO PER HOUSEHOLD RATHER THAN TO THE CLASS MEMBERS AS THEY WERE DEFINED IN THE ORDER ESTABLISHING THE CLASS.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE IS POTENTIAL HERE FOR SOME CONTRADICTIONS IN TERMS. FOR EXAMPLE, A HOUSEHOLD MAY OWN SEPARATE PARCELS. EACH PARCEL OF WHICH WOULD HAVE OVERLYING RIGHTS. THAT IS MY FIRST CONCERN BECAUSE IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE DEFINITION OF THE CLASS.

AND AS I UNDERSTAND IT -- AND WE WILL TALK ABOUT THIS IN A FEW MOMENTS -- PART OF THE REASON FOR THAT IS TO ESTABLISH DOMESTIC USE. AND THAT IS ALSO NOT PART OF THE CLASS DESCRIPTION. AND IT IS NOT A LIMITATION OF THE CLASS DESCRIPTION. SO IT IS A NARROWER DESCRIPTION, IT SEEMS TO ME, THAN THE CLASS DESCRIPTION.

AND I GUESS WHAT I CAN DO IS JUST GO THROUGH THESE AND TELL YOU WHAT MY CONCERNS ARE, AND WE CAN START ADDRESSING THEM SERIATIM.

ON PAGE 11 OF THE AGREEMENT STARTING AT LINE FOUR, "THE SETTLING PARTIES AGREE THAT THE WOOD CLASS MEMBERS MAY EACH PUMP UP TO 3 ACRE-FEET PER HOUSEHOLD FOR REASONABLE AND BENEFICIAL USE ON THEIR OVERLYING LAND, " ET CETERA, ET CETERA. AND THAT IF THE COURT DOES NOT APPROVE THIS PROVISION, THIS AGREEMENT IS VOID.

THE PROBLEM THAT I HAVE WITH THAT IS NOT

THAT THE PARTIES WHO ARE SETTLING THE CASE CANNOT AGREE

AMONG THEMSELVES. THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT WHAT YOU ARE

DOING IS ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH, AS I READ THIS

AGREEMENT, THE 3 ACRE-FEET PER YEAR ALLOCATION AS A -
AS A STANDARD THAT IS GOING TO BIND ALL THE NONSETTLING

PARTIES. AND I DON'T THINK YOU CAN DO THAT.

YOU HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE FACT THAT AS TO OTHER PARTIES THE COURT HAS TO MAKE FINDINGS BASED UPON EVIDENCE. I CAN'T DO THAT BASED UPON AN AGREEMENT OF SOME OF THE PARTIES, BUT NOT ALL OF THE PARTIES.

AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THE CONCERN THAT YOU HAVE IS THAT YOU CAN'T SETTLE THIS CASE WITHOUT THAT KIND OF A FINDING BINDING EVERYBODY, BUT I CAN'T MAKE THAT KIND OF A FINDING WITHOUT EVIDENCE AND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PARTIES TO DISPUTE IT. IT MAY WELL BE REASONABLE, BUT I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING THAT AT THIS POINT.

LET ME JUST GO THROUGH HERE: YOU ARE
ATTEMPTING TO BIND A WATER MASTER AND A WATER MASTER
DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF ALLOCATION OF WATER RIGHTS
AND PREVENTING THE COURT AND THE WATER MASTER FROM DOING
ANYTHING OTHER THAN WHAT YOU HAVE AGREED AMONG
YOURSELVES.

WELL, AS TO YOURSELVES, THAT IS FINE. AND

IF YOU WANT TO AGREE THAT THE WATER PRODUCERS, PURVEYORS

HERE, WILL NOT TAKE A POSITION THAT YOU ARE NOT ENTITLED

TO A 3 ACRE-FEET PER YEAR, THAT IS FINE. THEY CAN DO

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THAT, BUT YOU CAN'T BIND THE OTHER PARTIES. THE ALLOCATION CANNOT BIND NONSETTLING PARTIES.

MR. MCLACHLIN: YOUR HONOR, THAT LAST COMMENT. IS THAT DIRECTED TO A PARTICULAR PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT? THE COURT: YES, IT IS - IT IS ACTUALLY DIRECTED TO WHERE I JUST POINTED TO.

MR. MCLACHLIN: PAGE 11?

THE COURT: YEAH, PAGE 11, STARTING AT LINE 4; BUT IT THREADS ITS WAY THROUGH THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT SO THAT THE COURT BINDS ITSELF DEPENDING UPON YOUR AGREEMENT AND NOT WHAT THE EVIDENCE MIGHT ESTABLISH UPON FURTHER PRESENTATION OR DETERMINATION BY THE WATER MASTER.

I THINK WHAT YOU ARE ATTEMPTING TO ACCOMPLISH CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY AGREEMENT, BUT I DON'T THINK YOU CAN DO IT IN THIS FASHION WHERE YOU ARE BINDING OTHER PARTIES.

STARTING ON LINE 16 ON THAT SAME PAGE, "IF THE WATER MASTER'S ASSESSMENT DETERMINES THAT COLLECTIVELY THAT THE WOOD CLASS IS USING LESS THAN AN AVERAGE OF 3 ACRE-FEET PER YEAR, THEN ANY UNUSED PORTION IN ANY GIVEN YEAR WILL BE REALLOCATED FOR USE BY OTHER OVERLYING OWNERS AS PART OF THEIR RIGHT TO USE THEIR CORRELATIVE SHARES OF THE BASE OF THE 85 PERCENT OF THE BASIN'S FEDERALLY ADJUSTED RATE OF SAFE YIELD; HOWEVER, SUCH REALLOCATION SHALL IN NO WAY DIMINISH ANY CLASS MEMBERS FOR -- FOR A REASONABLE AND BENEFICIAL USE."

WELL, YOU ARE BINDING THE COURT WITHOUT HAVING PRESENTED ANY EVIDENCE OF THE PROPRIETY OF THAT DETERMINATION.

THE -- LINE 26, "THE WOOD CLASS MEMBERS

PUMPING IN EXCESS OF 3 ACRE-FEET PER YEAR SHALL NOT BE

SINGLED OUT BY THE WATER MASTER FOR REDUCTION OF PUMPING

OR ASSESSMENT." WHAT YOU ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO IS

ESTABLISH AN EXEMPTION THAT PREVENTS THE WATER MASTER

FROM MAKING A DETERMINATION AS TO THE APPROPRIATE

ALLOCATION OF WATER TO THE CLASS MEMBERS.

AND YOU CAN, I BELIEVE, ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT THAT THE WATER PURVEYORS WILL NOT CONTEST THAT, BUT YOU CAN'T BIND NONSETTLING PARTIES TO THAT KIND OF A DETERMINATION.

YET YOU ARE DOING THE SAME THING ON PAGE 12, STARTING AT LINE 6. YOU ARE TAKING AWAY FROM THE COURT THE ABILITY AND THE WATER MASTER THE ABILITY TO MAKE DETERMINATIONS BASED UPON FACTS. AND, AGAIN, AS BETWEEN YOU AND THE WATER PURVEYORS IF THEY WISH TO AGREE NOT TO CONTEST YOUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO THAT, THEY CERTAINLY MAY DO THAT.

AND TO THE EXTENT THAT ALL THE OTHER PARTIES
IN THIS LAWSUIT WERE TO ENTER INTO THAT AGREEMENT AS
WELL, THAT WOULD BE FINE. BUT THAT IS NOT WHAT WE ARE
DEALING WITH HERE. WE ARE DEALING WITH SOME OF THE
PARTIES, AND YOU CANNOT BIND NONSETTLING PARTIES.

AGAIN, ON LINE 23 THROUGH 27, YOU ARE MAKING FINDINGS FOR THE COURT THAT BINDS THIRD PARTIES. AND YOU CAN'T DO THAT TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO DOMESTIC USE WITHOUT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT AND AN OPPORTUNITY

FOR NONSETTLING PARTIES TO CONTEST IT.

MR. MCLACHLIN: YOUR HONOR, AT SOME POINT HERE, I
REALLY WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A COMMENT TO SOME OF THIS
STUFF, PARTICULARLY THIS NOTION OF PRESENTATION OF
EVIDENCE. BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO BE A -- RUNNING THROUGH A
NUMBER OF THE COURT'S OBSERVATIONS ON THESE PAGES 11 AND
12.

THE COURT: WOULDN'T YOU LIKE TO HEAR THE REST OF MY COMMENTS?

MR. MCLACHLIN: YES, YOUR HONOR, I WOULD. I WILL HOLD MY THOUGHTS. CONTINUE.

THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE NOT HAPPY, BUT I
THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE A FULL HEARING ON
THESE ISSUES. YOU'RE ON PAGE 14, PARAGRAPH 2, STARTING
AT LINE 4, THE SETTLING PARTIES AGREE THAT THE PRIMARY
MEANS FOR ENFORCING THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT AND
MONITORING THE GROUNDWATER USE WILL NOT INCLUDE METERING
OF WELLS."

AND, AGAIN, YOU'RE ELIMINATING THE COURT'S DISCRETION WITH REGARD TO THIS ENTIRE BASIN. IT MAY WELL BE -- AND I DON'T KNOW IF THIS IS THE CASE -- THAT METERING WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

AS TO THIS AGREEMENT IF THE PURVEYORS WANT TO AGREE WITH YOU THAT THEY WILL NOT ASSERT A RIGHT TO HAVE METERING, THEY CAN CERTAINLY DO THAT, BUT THEY CAN'T BIND NONSETTLING PARTIES. THE SAME IS TRUE WITH THE PROVISIONS REGARDING THE REPLACEMENT WATER.

I GUESS THAT I CAN SIMPLIFY MY CONCERNS BY

TELLING YOU THAT TOO MANY OF THE PROVISIONS IN HERE DO
ATTEMPT TO BIND THIRD PARTIES, TIE THE COURT'S HANDS
WITH REGARD TO DECISIONS THAT IT WILL MAKE BASED UPON
THE EVIDENCE, AND I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU ADDRESS THOSE
ISSUES.

MR. MCLACHLIN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. I THINK
THAT THE FIRST COMMENT I'LL START WITH WAS THE COURT'S
COMMENT RELATIVE TO -- LET ME TAKE A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE.
LET'S SAY THE 3 ACRE-FOOT CONCEPT AND THE LACK OF
EVIDENCE, THE AGREEMENT IS -- WAS STRUCTURED IN THAT
FASHION BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S PRIOR RULINGS
REFLECTINGLY TIEING THE CLASS COUNSEL'S HANDS IN TERMS
OF THE COURT APPOINTED EXPERT. OVER A YEAR AND A HALF
AGO, THE COURT APPOINTED A COURT APPOINTED EXPERT THAT
WAS TASKED WITH THIS VARIOUS ISSUE.

AND -- BUT WE HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED FROM

USING THAT EXPERT TO ACTUALLY DO THE WORK TO ASSESS THE

CLASS'S WATER USE. AND UNDER APPLICABLE LAW -- BEFORE I

AGREED -- THIS IS GOING BACK A LITTLE BIT IN TIME, BUT I

THINK THERE NEEDS TO BE A LITTLE BIT OF AN UNDERSTANDING

OF WHAT IS GOING ON HERE.

BEFORE -- WHEN I WAS INITIALLY APPROACHED TO TAKE THIS CASE, I REFUSED FOR A LOT OF DIFFERENT REASONS. WHEN I DECIDED TO RECONSIDER IT, YOUR HONOR WILL REMEMBER IN MAY OF 2008 THERE WAS A HEARING. I SENT YOU A LETTER AND LAID OUT THE CONCERNS REGARDING THE EXPERT FOR THE CLASS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW IN CALIFORNIA THAT, UNFORTUNATELY, HAS A HOLE IN IT.

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IT DOESN'T ALLOW -- EVEN IF I WANTED TO

ADVANCE THOSE COSTS, IT DOESN'T ALLOW THOSE TO BE

RECOVERED. WOOD'S CLASS COUNSEL IS IN A VERY DIFFICULT

SITUATION.

THE AGREEMENT IS STRUCTURED TO DEAL WITH

THAT IN TERMS OF WE STAY IT -- IT IS NOT A 3 ACRE-FOOT.

IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT ANY PARTICULAR CLASS MEMBER -
LET'S JUST TAKE MR. WOOD WHO HAPPENS TO BE IN THE

COURTROOM FOR AN EXAMPLE.

HE IS NOT GETTING A GUARANTEED 3 ACRE-FEET.

WHAT HE IS GETTING IS THE RIGHT TO PUMP FOR A REASONABLE

BENEFICIAL -- BENEFICIAL USES FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES

ON HIS LAND, AND THE OTHER 3800 PEOPLE WOULD BE

EFFECTIVELY IN THE STATE BOAT. YOU CANNOT OBVIOUSLY

TREAT CLASS MEMBERS DIFFÉRENTLY.

AND THOSE WHO WOULD PUMP, LET'S SAY, MORE
THAN 10 ACRE-FEET AND HAVE SOME LIGHT AGRICULTURAL, THEY
COULD, OF COURSE, OPT-OUT AND HAVE THEIR OWN
REPRESENTATION AND PROVE UP THEIR SELF-HELP. AND THE
COURT COULD SAY, WELL, YOU KNOW, YOU GET X ACRE-FEET OF
WATER OR YOU DON'T AT SOME FUTURE POINT IN TIME.

THERE IS NO WAY FOR CLASS COUNSEL TO DEAL WITH THOSE VARIATIONS. WE DO KNOW — I KNOW OF NONE OF THESE PROPERTIES OTHER THAN ONE, A CAMP, A CHILDREN'S CAMP, THAT DOESN'T HAVE A RESIDENTIAL USE.

THAT IS THE ONLY REASONABLE WAY TO STRUCTURE

THIS. THE AGREEMENT ALLOWS THE WATER MASTER, ASSUMING

ONE COMES AROUND SOME DAY, TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE

CLASSES' WATER USE ON A WHOLE AND SET THAT. THIS IS
EFFECTIVELY THE SURROGATE FOR THE COURT APPOINTED
EXPERT:

AND THE WATER MASTER CAN MAKE THAT

ASSESSMENT AND SAY, LOOK, THE CLASS IS ONLY COLLECTIVELY

USING ABOUT 6,000 ACRE-FEET. SO WE ARE GOING TO TAKE

THAT ACCESS AND PUT IT BACK IN THE OVERLYING POOL, AND

IT CAN BE ALLOCATED IN WHATEVER MANNER THE COURT

DETERMINES IN THE FUTURE.

BUT I DISAGREE WITH THE NOTION THAT THERE
IS -- SOME OF THE COMMENTS ARE THAT THE -- THAT THE
AGREEMENT IS TRYING TO BIND THIRD PARTIES. IN SOME OF
THOSE, I WOULD AGREE WITH. BUT THE COURT HAS THE POWER
ULTIMATELY TO DECIDE ALL OF THESE ISSUES. AND RELATIVE
TO THE CLASS, THESE DECISIONS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE AT
SOME POINT IN TIME, AND THERE ARE -- I SEE NOTHING IN
HERE THAT -- OTHER THAN THE NOTION THAT THE CLASS IS
USING IT FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES THAT SETS EVERYTHING IN
STONE AND TIES THE COURT'S HANDS IN THE FUTURE.

THE COURT: WELL, WHAT ABOUT THE LANGUAGE THAT
ALLOCATES THE COST -- THAT LIMITS, I SHOULD SAY, THE
EXEMPTION THE COURT CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT? THE THREE
ACRE-FEET PER YEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, AS A STANDARD AND
THAT -- BUT IT IS NOT EVEN SO MUCH THAT AS IT IS THAT IT
BINDS A WHOLE LOT OF OTHER PARTIES HERE WHO HAVE -- WHO
ARE NOT PART OF THIS AGREEMENT.

MR. MCLACHLIN: THE COURT CLEARLY, I THINK, COULD DO THAT BECAUSE THE LAW SAYS IN CALIFORNIA THAT DOMESTIC

USE - WELL, LET ME STRIKE THAT.

THE AGREEMENT REFERS TO DOMESTIC USE FOR REASONABLE BENEFICIAL PURPOSES ON THESE PARCELS. SO TO THE EXTENT, LET'S SAY, THAT MR. WOOD OR SOME OTHER CLASS MEMBER DECIDES TO — OR IS ACTUALLY USING WATER THAT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THOSE STANDARDS, CLEARLY THE COURT, AND IF IT DELEGATES ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO A WATER MASTER, WOULD HAVE THE ABILITY TO CURTAIL THAT PERSON'S WATER USE AND, THEORETICALLY, DOWN TO ZERO ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.

REMEMBER, WE ARE DEALING WITH 3800 PARCELS
HERE. THERE IS NO WAY IN A CLASS CONTEXT TO DO THAT.

IT CAN'T BE DONE. IT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. BECAUSE
IF THAT IS THE -- IF THAT IS WHAT WE ARE REALLY DRIVING
AT, THEN THE CLASS VEHICLE IS THE WRONG VEHICLE TO BE
USING. ALL THESE PEOPLE SHOULD HAVE BEEN INDIVIDUALLY
NAMED AND SERVED AND MADE TO COME IN AS I THINK
BOLTHOUSE MAY HAVE STATED IN THEIR PAPERS AND PROVE UP
THEIR INDIVIDUAL WATER RIGHT.

OKAY. THAT IS WHY MR. GARNER'S DECLARATION
DELINEATES THE HISTORY AND THE USAGE OF THE DE MINIMUS
EXEMPTION. BECAUSE IF WE USE THINGS LIKE -- IF WE
HAVE -- LET'S SAY WE SPEND \$1,500 PER PARCEL TO PUT
METERS ON ALL THESE PARCELS AND THEN WE HAVE TO SPEND,
WHAT, THREE OR 400 OR \$500,000 A YEAR AT LEAST TO HAVE A
COUPLE OF PEOPLE GO READ THOSE MEETINGS.

WE START ADDING UP ALL THE COSTS OF THIS AND WE LOOK AT THE OPTIONS, OF COURSE, OF AERIAL ENFORCEMENT

WHICH IS -- A LOT OF THE WORK HAS BEEN DONE IN THIS

CASE, THE DATABASE ALREADY EXISTS. AND WE LOOK AT THE

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS, I REALLY THINK -- AND I BELIEVE

MR. DUNN AND THE OTHER WATER SUPPLIER COUNSEL ALL AGREE

THAT IF PENNY WISE AND POUND FOOLISH WE END UP SPENDING

A SMALL FORTUNE TO MONITOR WHAT IS A VERY SMALL AMOUNT

OF WATER --

28 l

THE COURT: MR. MCLACHLAN, I DON'T DISAGREE WITH YOU. I DON'T DISAGREE AT ALL WITH THAT CONCLUSION. THE PROBLEM IS HOW DO WE GET TO THERE. AND WE CAN'T GET TO THERE IN A LITIGATION AND IN AN ADJUDICATION THAT ENCOMPASSES ALL OF THE WATER USERS WITHIN THE VALLEY, BY AGREEMENT OF SOME OF THEM. THAT IS THE PROBLEM THAT I'M HAVING.

SEE, I DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH YOU AND THE WATER PURVEYORS AGREEING THAT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO CONTEST UP TO 3 ACRE-FEET PER YEAR THAT EACH ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THIS CLASS HAVE THE RIGHT TO PUMP. OKAY?

AND IT MAY WELL BE THAT WHEN ALL IS SAID AND DONE IF THAT IS THE AGREEMENT AND THE COURT THEN IS IN THE POSITION OF CREATING A PHYSICAL SOLUTION -- AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT FORM IS GOING TO BE -- THAT THAT ENCOMPASSES YOUR AGREEMENT AND EVERYBODY ELSE IS GOING TO BE BOUND BY THAT. BUT YOU CAN'T DO THAT AT THIS POINT. THAT IS THE PROBLEM.

AND WHAT YOU HAVE DONE IS, YOU HAVE ALSO PUT
IN LIMITATIONS ON THE COURT'S ABILITY TO CREATE A
PHYSICAL SOLUTION HERE. I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THAT

PHYSICAL SOLUTION IS GOING TO BE. I DOUBT SERIOUSLY AT THIS POINT THAT ANYBODY DOES.

WE DON'T EVEN HAVE THE STATEMENT OF DECISION
YET. I HAVE GIVEN A TENTATIVE DECISION. I HAVE A
PROPOSAL FROM THE PURVEYORS AS TO WHAT THAT STATEMENT OF
DECISION SHOULD BE. AND IT MOSTLY FOLLOWS THE TENTATIVE
DECISION THAT I RENDERED WITH A COUPLE OF EXCEPTIONS.

OF THE PARTIES ASKING THE COURT TO MAKE DETAILED
RESPONSES AS PART OF THE STATEMENT OF DECISION. WE WILL
TALK ABOUT THAT ANOTHER TIME. BUT AT THIS POINT, WHAT
YOUR AGREEMENT DOES IS IT TIES THE COURT'S HANDS, AND IT
CREATES A PROCESS THAT BINDS OTHER PARTIES WHO ARE NOT
PARTIES TO THE SETTLEMENT PLAN. AND I JUST DON'T THINK
I CAN DO THAT:

I DO THINK THAT THE NUB OF YOUR SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS SOMETHING THAT IF MODIFIED CAN BE APPROVED; BUT AT THIS POINT, I CAN'T APPROVE THE AGREEMENT AS IT STANDS FOR THE REASONS THAT I HAVE INDICATED.

AND IF YOU READ THROUGH THE AGREEMENT, I
THINK THAT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND WHY I CAN'T DO THAT. I
HAVEN'T HEARD FROM MR. DUNN.

MR. DUNN: WELL, I HAVE BEEN LISTENING TO THE COURT'S COMMENTS, AND IT SEEMS TO ME GIVEN WHAT THE COURT HAS INDICATED, AND I HAVE LISTENED TO COUNSEL'S COMMENTS AS WELL, I -- WHAT I WOULD SUGGEST IS THAT WE BE ALLOWED TO AFTER THIS HEARING, YOU KNOW, GO BACK AND SEE WHAT WE CAN DO TO -- I'M LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT

WORD -- TO REVIEW, REVISE, EDIT, WHATEVER, THE AGREEMENT
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE COURT'S CONCERNS.

THE COURT: WELL, I DO THINK THAT IT IS A WORKABLE

THE COURT: WELL, I DO THINK THAT IT IS A WORKABLE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SETTLING PARTIES, AND IT MAY WELL BE IF IT IS A REASONABLE AGREEMENT THAT OTHER PARTIES ARE GOING TO BUY INTO IT AND BE BOUND. BUT I CAN'T MAKE THEM DO THAT:

AND WHAT I -- I'M -- YOU KNOW, I HATE TO DO
THIS TO YOU, MR. MCLACHLIN, BECAUSE I KNOW HOW HARD YOU
HAVE WORKED ON THIS CASE, AND I KNOW HOW SINCERELY YOU
HAVE ATTEMPTED TO REPRESENT YOUR CLIENTS EFFECTIVELY,
AND I THINK YOU HAVE DONE A GOOD JOB.

THE PROBLEM IS THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS

INCONSISTENT WITH THE ABILITY FOR THE COURT TO APPROVE

IT AT THIS POINT. SO I'M SORRY. I TRULY AM SORRY THAT

I COULDN'T APPROVE IT.

NOW, THERE ARE A COUPLE OF OTHER THINGS. I HAVEN'T HEARD FROM ANYBODY ON THE TELEPHONE. DOES ANYONE WISH TO MAKE ANY COMMENTS OR ARGUMENT? ARE YOU STILL ON THE LINE?

(SEVERAL ATTORNEYS RESPOND, "YES, YOUR HONOR.")

THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT.

MR. SLOAN: YOUR HONOR, THIS IS WILLIAM SLOAN FOR U.S. BORAX.

THE COURT: YES.

MR. SLOAN: I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE AN OPPORTUNITY --