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11 12		SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
		COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES-CENTRAL DISTRICT		
	13	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER	THE TOTAL CONTRACTOR	
	14	CASES	Judicial Council Coordination No. 4408	
	15	Included Actions:	Santa Clara Case No. 1-05-CV-049053 Assigned to Hon. Jack Komar	
	16	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v. Diamond Farming Co., Superior Court of	Assigned to Holf, Jack Rollar	
	17	California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 325201;	TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE	
	18		STATEMENT OF TEJON RANCHCORP	
	19	Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40 v.	·	
	20	Diamond Farming Co., Superior Court of California, County of Kern, Case No. S-1500-CV-		
	21	254-348;		
	22	Wm. Bolthouse Farms, Inc. v. City of Lancaster, Diamond Farming Co. v. Lancaster, Diamond	Date: July 9, 2012	
	23	Farming Co. v. Palmdale Water Dist., Superior	Time: 9:00 A.M. Dept: Dept. 1 (Room 534 Los Angeles)	
	24	Court of California, County of Riverside, Case No. RIC 353 840, RIC 344 436, RIC 344 668	Dopt. Dopt. 1 (Room 33 v Los rangeles)	
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	27	TEJON RANCHCORP (Tejon) submits the following Trial Setting Conference Statement:		
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Trial Setting Conference Statement of Tejon Ranchcorp

P.O. Box 2205 Bakersfield, CA

93303

I. INTRODUCTION

The issues in these cases have been severed for trial. In Phase 1 the court determined the boundary of the Antelope Valley Area of Adjudication (AVAA). The court determined in Phase 2 that the water bearing formations within the AVAA are hydrologically connected and constitute one aquifer (Aquifer). In Phase 3 the court determined that (1) the Aquifer, as a whole, is currently in a state of overdraft, and (2) the safe yield of the Aquifer is currently 110,000 acre feet per year (AFY). The court now plans to schedule Phase 4 of the trial and has asked each party to comment on (1) the issues to be litigated in Phase 4, (2) the estimated time for the trial thereof, and (3) the proposed date of trial.

There are many issues that need to be resolved and the challenge is to identify issues that can be logically "bundled" and efficiently litigated in Phase 4. For example, the court should avoid, if possible, bundling factual issues to be resolved by the court with factual issues to be resolved by a jury. And, where possible, the court should defer the resolution of issues that may become moot based upon the resolution of other issues.

Under the circumstances, Tejon suggests that the court (1) develop a comprehensive list of issues that remain to be resolved, (2) determine which factual issues are to be resolved by the court and which factual issues are to be resolved by a jury, and (3) bundle issues in Phase 4 which, when resolved, will shed substantial light on the rights of the parties to extract groundwater from the Aquifer.

II. SOME REMAINING ISSUES

There are several classes of claimants in the AVAA, some of whom claim a priority based upon their status or their prior conduct. For example, (1) the United States claims a priority based on a claimed "federal reserved right," (2) some appropriators claim prescriptive rights based on their prior

conduct, and (3) Tejon claims that its right to extract groundwater from its land became vested before California was admitted to the Union in 1850 since its title is traceable to Mexican land grants confirmed by patents issued by the United States under the Act of 1851 (see *City of Los Angeles* v. *Venice Peninsula Properties* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1522). We believe the majority of the claimants have claims based on overlying or appropriative rights. This court, of course, must consider the respective water rights of the claimants in making any allocation of the safe yield among the claimants. (E.g., *City of Los Angeles* v. *City of San Fernando* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 293, n. 100; *City of Barstow* v. *Mojave Water Agency* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1248.) In general terms, overlying rights supersede appropriative claims except insofar as appropriative claims have ripened into prescriptive rights.

In light of the foregoing, some of the issues that remain to be resolved may be stated as follows:

A. Water Rights of the United States.

- 1. Did the federal reservation of any land for Edwards Airforce Base (EAB) effect a reservation of groundwater? (See, e.g., Leshy, *The Federal Role in Managing the Nation's Groundwater* (2004) 22 Hastings W-N.W. J Env. L & Policy 1.)
- 2. Is the claimed "federal reserve right" subject to and subordinate to the claims of the overlying landowners (see, e.g., *Cappaert* v. *United States* (1976) 426 U.S. 128, 131, n. 1) since such overlying rights were part and parcel of the land and appurtenant thereto (e.g., *California Water Service Co.* v. *Edward Sidebotham & Son* (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 715, 725) before the federal reservation?
- 3. Is the use of water at EAB an overlying use or an appropriative use which is subject to and subordinate to other overlying uses? (See, e.g., *Tehachapi-Cummings*

The issues are listed without regard to their relative importance or the sequence in which they should be adjudicated, settled, or otherwise resolved.

County Water Dist. v. Armstrong (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 992, 1000, n. 6 [state's use of groundwater for state prison is overlying use, not appropriation].)

4. What are the rights of the United States under state law, if any?

B. Mutual Water Companies.

5. Are the mutual water companies and like entities appropriators or agents for their shareholders in the exercise of overlying rights?

C. <u>Prescription</u>.

- 6. Has any appropriator, such as Los Angeles County Waterworks
 District 40 (District 40), established any rights by prescription, and, if so, which
 appropriators, what amounts and when?²
- 7. If an appropriator has established a prescriptive right, what was the safe yield of the Aquifer during the prescriptive period?
- 8. Is District 40 or any other appropriator estopped to assert any claim of prescription because of its past conduct?
- 9. Can a claim of prescription based on California law diminish rights established under Mexican law and recognized by patent issued by the United States under the Act of 1851?
 - 10. Has any prescriptive right been lost through nonuse?
- 11. How is Part 5 (commencing with section 4999) of Division 2 of the Water Code to be applied, if at all?
- 12. Are the rights and defenses of the overlying landowners to be determined on an ownership basis, a parcel-by-parcel basis, or some other basis?

Tejon demands a jury trial on prescription claims.

13. Has any appropriator effected a "take" of any water rights and, if so, which appropriator, whose water rights have been or are being taken, and what is or are the amounts of just compensation and attorney's fees?

D. Domestic Use.

14. Does any overlying landowner have a priority based on a domestic use" (see, e.g., Wat. Code, § 106), at least to the extent such use is a "natural use" as distinguished from an "artificial use" (see, e.g., Lux v. Haggin (1886) 69 Cal. 255, 406-409)?

E. Waste.

15. To what extent, if any, has water extracted from the Aquifer been wasted within the meaning of article 10, section 2, of the California Constitution and what is the effect of any such waste on the claims of the parties in the AVAA?

F. Return Flows.

16. Who has the right to recapture return flows from the use of imported State Water Project (SWP) water, the SWP contractor, the consumers who put the water to reasonable beneficial use, some other person, or no one because the right has been abandoned?

G. Quantification of Water Rights.

17. Is it appropriate to quantify the rights to extract water from those portions of the Aquifer, such as the West Antelope Valley Basin where there is no indication of overdraft, there are no appropriators, and the extractions therein have no effect on water levels in the balance of the Aquifer? (See, e.g.,

Tehachapi-Cummings County Water District v. Armstrong (1975) 49 Cal.App. 992, 1000-1002.)

III. ANALYSIS

The task at hand is to adjudicate those issues in Phase 4 which, when resolved, will shed substantial light on the rights of the parties to extract groundwater from the Aquifer. Tejon believes that Issues 5, 12, 13, 14 and 15 should be deferred to a later phase of trial since such issues may become moot upon resolution of other issues. The greatest impediment to settlement has been the exaggerated claims of the United States and the appropriators. Thus, Issues 1 through 4 or Issues 6 through 11 and 16, or all of such issues, should be adjudicated in Phase 4. Adjudicating Issues 1 through 4 and Issues 6 through 11 and 16 together may create logistical problems because of the division of fact - finding responsibility between the court and a jury and the length of a trial to adjudicate all such issues. A resolution of Issue 17 would reduce the complexity of the settlement discussions since if the court were to find that some portions of the AVAA constituted separate "basins" for adjudication purposes, the landowners within those portions could focus on resolving any intra-basin issues or not be bogged down with issues that pertain to other portions of the Aquifer.

IV. PHASE 4

Under the circumstances, Tejon believes that in Phase 4 the court should adjudicate either Issues 1 through 4 (Option 1) or Issues 6 through 11, 16, and 17 (Option 2). Option 1 should not require much discovery, the issues are probably all issues to be decided by the court, and the trial thereof could be scheduled this winter. Option 2 will require much discovery and trial preparation and the trial thereof should not be scheduled until mid 2013 to avoid calendar conflicts and the holiday season.

1	Counsel for Tejon has scheduled some vacation time from late October through late November and		
2	requests that the court not schedule any trial during such time.		
3	Dated: July 6, 2012	KUHS & PARKER	
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6 . 7		BY /s/ Robert G. Kuhs, Attorney for Tejon	
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KUHS & PARKER P.O. Box 2205 Bakersfield, CA	Trial Setti	ng Conference Statement of Tejon Ranchcorp	

Bakersfield, CA 93303

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PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Cindy Thorp, declare:

I am employed in the County of Kern, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and am not a party to the within action; my business address is Kuhs & Parker, 1200 Truxtun Avenue, Suite 200, Bakersfield, California 93301.

On July 6, 2012, I caused the foregoing document(s) described as **TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE STATEMENT OF TEJON RANCHCORP** to be served on the parties in this action, as follows:

- (X) (BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE) by posting the document(s) listed above to the Santa Clara County Superior Court website: www.scefiling.org regarding the Antelope Valley Groundwater matter.
- () (BY U.S. MAIL) I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing of documents for mailing. Under that practice, the above-referenced document(s) were placed in seal envelope(s) addressed to the parties as noted above, with postage thereon fully prepaid and deposited such envelope(s) with the United States Postal Service on the same date at Bakersfield, California, addressed to:
- () (BY FEDERAL EXPRESS) I served a true and correct copy by Federal Express or other overnight delivery service, for delivery on the next business day. Each copy was enclosed in an envelope or package designated by the express service carrier; deposited in a facility regularly maintained by the express service carrier or delivered to a courier or driver authorized to receive documents on its behalf; with delivery fees paid or provided for; addressed as shown on the accompanying service list.
- () (BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION) I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of facsimile transmission of documents. It is transmitted to the recipient on the same day in the ordinary course of business.
- (X) (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct, and that the foregoing was executed on July 6, 2012 in Bakersfield, California.
- () (FEDERAL) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Cindy Thorp