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8			
9	SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
10	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES		
11	Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b))	Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408	
12	ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER CASES	(Honorable Jack Komar)	
14	RICHARD A. WOOD, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others similarly	Case No.: BC 391869	
15	situated,	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVA	
16 17	Plaintiff,	OF CLASS SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES	
18 19	v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40; et al.	[filed concurrently with Declaration of Michael D. McLachlan; Declaration of Richard A. Wood]	
20   21	Defendants.	Date: August 3, 2015 Time: 10:00 a.m. Room: 222	
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25	TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:		
26	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 3, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon		
27   28	thereafter as the matter may be heard, at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles,		
20	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT		

1	California, in Room 222, Richard Wood will move for final approval of the Small $$		
2	Pumper Class Settlement. 1	Plaintiff brings this motion pursuant to California	
3	Rules of Court, Rule 3.769.		
4	The Motion is based on this Notice, the Memorandum of Points and		
5	Authorities, the Declaration of Michael D. McLachlan, the Declaration of Richard		
6	A. Wood, the various documents attached thereto, the records and file herein,		
7	and on such evidence as may be presented at the hearing of the Motion.		
8			
9	DATED: July 9, 2015	LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL D. McLACHLAN LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL M. O'LEARY	
11			
12		By:	
13		MICHAEL D. MCLACHLAN Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class	
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#### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

#### I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Plaintiff Richard Wood has entered into a Stipulation of Settlement ("Agreement" or "Settlement") with California Water Services Company, City of Palmdale, Desert Lake Community Services District, Littlerock Creek Irrigation District, Los Angeles, County Waterworks District No. 40, North Edwards Water District, Palm Rach Irrigation District, and Quartz Hill Water District (collectively, the "Settling Defendants"), all of whom are referred to as the "Settling Parties," subject to Court approval, notice to the Class, and a final approval and fairness hearing.

The Plaintiff requests that the court adopt the Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.

#### II. THE LITIGATION AND PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

## A. History of the Small Pumper Class Action

The court is familiar with the history of this action and the details surrounding the Wood Class (the "Class"). Briefly, Plaintiff Richard Wood ("Plaintiff") filed this action on June 2, 2008 to protect his rights, and those of other Antelope Valley landowners who have been pumping less than 25 acre feet year ("afy") of groundwater from the Antelope Valley Groundwater Basin ("Basin"). Plaintiff filed this action so that he and the members of the Class could continue to extract groundwater from the Basin for reasonable and beneficial use. This action was, in large measure, filed to contest claims of prescriptive rights asserted by public water suppliers operating in the Antelope Valley. The court certified the Small Pumper Class Action by Order dated September 2, 2008, in which the court defined the Class as:

All private (i.e., non-governmental) persons and entities that own real property within the Basin, as adjudicated, and that have been pumping less that 25 acre-feet per year on their property during any

year from 1946 to the present. The Class excludes the defendants herein, any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity in which any defendant has a controlling interest or which is related to or affiliated with any of the defendants, and the representatives, heirs, affiliates, successors-in interest or assigns of any such excluded party. The Class also excludes all persons and entities that are shareholders in a mutual water company.

Notice of the Pendency of the Small Pumper Class Action was sent by first class mail to all Small Pumper Class Members¹ who could be identified with reasonable effort on or about July 7, 2009 and a Summary Notice was published as instructed by the court. The deadline for putative Class Members to exclude themselves (as extended) ended on December 4, 2009. Throughout this process, the court made various orders allowing certain parties who had opted-out to rejoin the Class.

### B. The January 2014 Partial Settlement:

On January 7, 2014, the Court approved a partial settlement of the Small Pumper Class. Specifically, the Small Pumper Class settled with the City of Lancaster, Palmdale Water District, Phelan Piñon Hills Community Services District, and Rosamond Community Services District. The 2014 settlement was reached after hundreds of hours of effort, both in litigation and settlement negotiations.

# C. Current Small Pumper Class Settlement Agreement Background And Terms

Throughout the negotiations that led to the 2014 settlement, class counsel continued to negotiate, and litigate, the class claims against the remaining defendants. Those efforts have led to the current settlement.

<sup>1</sup> If not defined in this Motion, all capitalized references are defined in the Settlement Agreement. (McLachlan Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 1.)

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As a result of further, and extensive, negotiations, the Settling Parties ultimately agreed upon the terms that form the Small Pumper Class Agreement, which is attached in part to the Declaration of Michael D. McLachlan (¶ 5).

Class Counsel believes that the Small Pumper Class Agreement, and the terms provided therein, is fair to all concerned, including the non-settling parties, although the Agreement does not bind the non-settling parties. Several of the material terms agreed upon in this Agreement are: (1) members of the Small Pumper Class will have the right to pump up to three acre-feet per year (afy) of groundwater for reasonable and beneficial use without having to pay a replacement water assessment; (2) the Settling Defendants will not assert prescriptive rights to diminish the Small Pumper class-members' water rights; (3) the Small Pumper class will not challenge certain Settling Parties' right to recapture return flows from water that they import; (4) the Small Pumper class agrees to be bound by a basin-wide groundwater management plan, subject to court oversight; and (5) the Settling Parties will mutually release one another from claims asserted in this litigation.

This Settlement also settles claims between the Small Pumper Class and a number of parties—none of whom have been sued by the Class—that claim groundwater rights in the basin. This group of parties has all signed off on the Judgment and Physical Solution.<sup>2</sup>

None of the substantive terms concerning water rights or the potential physical solution are binding on the Court or any of the non-settling parties in these coordinated proceedings. In other words, the Agreement only impacts the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Second Amended Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Physical Solution is the operative global settlement document, and was filed on July 9, 2015, with a modified Exhibit 4 (Dkt. No. 10,106). The Proposed Judgment of Physical Solution was filed on March 4, 2015 (Dkt. No. 9,623). It remains the same other than the modified Exhibit 4.

rights existing between the Settling Parties, and does not in any way limit the
Court's ability to rule on the Class' ultimate water rights, the Settling Defendants'
water rights, or any element of a potential physical solution. By resolving the
prescriptive claims pending against the Class, the settlement substantially
reduces the risk faced by the class in the overall litigation, and as such presents a
clear benefit to the Class.

III. ARGUMENT

## A. Standard For Final Approval

There is an overriding public interest in settling and quieting litigation, especially class actions. (*Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle* (9th Cir. 1992) 955 F.2d 1268, 1276, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953.) Court approval is required before any action certified as a class action may be settled or compromised and subsequently dismissed. Cal Rules of Court, Rule 3.769. In deciding whether to approve a class action settlement, the court has broad discretion to determine whether a proposed settlement is fair under the circumstances of the case. (*Mallick v. Superior Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.)

In evaluating the fairness of a class settlement, courts consider the relevant factors, including "the strength of the plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, and the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (citation omitted).) The above factors are not exhaustive, and the court "is free to engage in a balancing and weighing of factors depending on the circumstances of each case." (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.)

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Generally, a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's length negotiations; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1802.) Ultimately, the Court must "satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the 'ballpark' of reasonableness," which requires receiving "basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise." (Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 133.)

## The Proposed Settlement Agreement Is Fair, Adequate and Reasonable.

The proposed Settlement Agreement is well within the "range of reasonableness" and thus merits approval. Although Plaintiff and the Class believe that their claims have merit, they recognize that, proceeding with this litigation carries considerable risk. It is, therefore, in the best interests of Plaintiff and the Class to settle with, and receive reasonable and prompt benefits from, the Settling Defendants. Indeed, the Court acknowledged this in approving the partial settlement in January 2014.

It is elemental that a settlement is a compromise and, thus, does not ordinarily provide a plaintiff with the full relief or recovery originally sought at the time the action was filed. (Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at 250 ("In the context of a settlement agreement, the test is not the maximum amount plaintiffs might have obtained at trial on the complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable under all of the circumstances.").) Even under the Agreement, however, the Class will benefit substantially by avoiding the prescription claims and limiting the scope of future challenges to their water rights. The Class is giving up very little; primarily, the recognition of the right of the Settling

Defendants to pump groundwater in reasonable amounts (all subject to Court determination in the future).

The Agreement represents a compromise and allows for dismissal of Settling Defendants' prescription claims. It also resolves as between these parties, many of the issues remaining to be decided, thereby limiting the risk for both sides and decreasing the contested issues before the Court.

In sum, given the many risks faced by Plaintiff and the Class in pursuing this litigation, the Agreement represents a reasonable resolution of otherwise complex and strongly contested issues. Had the Class not settled, the resolution of those issues would likely have resulted in a longer and more expensive trial, and most importantly, would have put the Class at risk of a substantial adverse judgment on the prescription claims, resulting in diminished water rights. The Agreement is reasonable in light of these circumstances.

# C. The Settlement Is the Product and Informed and Arm's Length Negotiations

This Agreement is the result of years of discovery and contested law and motion proceedings, all of which educated counsel on both sides as to the strengths and weaknesses of their claims. Class Counsel reviewed and analyzed thousands of pages of documents produced by Defendants, and have engaged in extensive research in relation to the legal and factual issues central to Plaintiff's claims. Furthermore, after the Phase 3 trial, and the determination of overdraft, the risks of continuing litigation are no longer hypothetical.

As the Court is well aware, Class counsel has spent literally hundreds of hours mediating this Case both globally and individually over a period of seven years, through Mediators Dendy, Waldo, and Robie, as well as extensive direct negotiations run by the parties and their counsel. (McLachlan Decl. ¶ 4.)

Class Counsel also has experience in complex class action litigation. Class Counsel was thus well-informed and strategically positioned to negotiate an

appropriate settlement agreement, which was negotiated at arms-length over many years' time. Furthermore, Richard Wood has served ably as the representative for the Class, going beyond and above the typical "call of duty." (See Generally Wood Decl.)

### D. The Class Received Adequate Notice.

Notice of a class action settlement must "present a fair recital of the subject matter and proposed terms [and provide] an opportunity to be heard to all class members." (*In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Sec. Litig.* (1979) 603 F.2d 1353, 1361; *see also, Phillips v. Shutts* (1985) 472 U.S. 797, 812.)

The Court-approved Class notice adequately protected the due process rights of all Class Members and satisfied California Rules of Court, rule 3.766. The manner of giving notice and the content of the notice must "fairly apprise the prospective members of the class of the terms of the proposed settlement and of the options that are open to them in connection with the proceedings. (*7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.* (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1164 (citation omitted).) An appropriate notice will have a "reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class members." (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 251 (citation omitted).)

Mailed notice was sent to 4,310 Class members on April 3, 2015, by first class mail, after updating the existing class list through the national change of address database. (Keough Decl., filed on June 4, 2015, ¶¶ 5-6; McLachlan Decl., filed June 4, 2015, ¶ 3.) Published notice was transmitted in accord with this Court's order by publishing the approved notice by in the Los Angeles Times, Antelope Valley Press, and Bakersfield Californian on consecutive weekends at the start of the notice period. (McLachlan Decl. ¶ 3.) Another factor that may be considered at final approval is the reaction of class members to the settlement. (*Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801.) The reaction here has been very positive;

no objections have been received. (McLachlan Decl.  $\P$  9.) Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of final approval.

## E. The Order Approving This Settlement Is Final as to the Parties

The Settlement completely resolves all of the pending causes of action that Plaintiffs have brought against the Settling Defendants and is thus a final judgment subject to appeal upon entry of the order approving this Settlement. (*California Dental Ass'n v. California Dental Hygienists Ass'n* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 49, 60; *G.E. Hetrick & Assoc. v. Summit Const. & Maint. Co.* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 318, 325-326 (absence of cross-complaint by non-settling parties against settling parties renders judgment final); *C.C.P.* § 902.1.) Furthermore, a judgment that is otherwise final between the parties does not become interlocutory even though its terms may be subsequently modified by the Court. (*Marriage of de Guigne* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1353, 1359.)

### IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectively requests that the Court grant this Motion and enter judgment pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.769(h), retaining continuing jurisdiction pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 664.6 and 382.

Plaintiff will submit a request for an award of attorneys' fee and an incentive award for Richard Wood at a later date, to be heard after the Court has approved the Settlement.

DATED: July 9, 2015 LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL D. McLACHLAN LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL M. O'LEARY

By:
MICHAEL D. MCLACHLAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT