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5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Daniel M. O'Leary (State Bar No. 175128) LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL M. O'LEA 2300 Westwood Boulevard, Suite 105 Los Angeles, California 90064 Telephone: (310) 481-2020 Facsimile: (310) 481-0049 dan@danolearylaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff Richard Wood and	ARY	
12	SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES		
14 15 16	Coordination Proceeding Special Title (Rule 1550(b)) ANTELOPE VALLEY GROUNDWATER	Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408	
17 18	CASES RICHARD A. WOOD, an individual, on	Lead Case No. BC 325201 Case No.: BC 391869	
19	behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,	RICHARD WOOD'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DISCOVERY	
20 21	Plaintiff, v.	CONFERENCE BRIEF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE HEARING ON MARK	
22 23	LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40; et al.	RITTER'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT Date: January 21, 2016	
2425	Defendants.	Time: 1:30 p.m. Place: Telephonic (Courtcall)	
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Because the hearing on this Ex Parte Application and Informal Discovery Conference will likely not be reported, Richard Wood would like to briefly address in writing the primary position offered by Mark Ritter and The Ritter Trust in Opposition.

Ritter asserts that he has the right to seek amendment from the judgment to present a late claim that is not subject to discovery. He asserts that the adverse parties should have taken his deposition more than five months ago, presumably within the timeframes of the Case Management Order that he chose to ignore. (Opp., 2:10-16.)

Mr. Ritter's position can be fairly summarized as follows:

Notwithstanding his failure to timely file a Notice of Claim — something he still has not done — the adverse parties should have magically divined a year or more ago that Ritter would one day, post-judgment, become adverse. With that knowledge, the settling parties should have taken Mark Ritter's deposition as a prophylactic measure in the event he filed a motion to set aside the judgment, knowing that they would not be allowed to later take the deposition. In Ritter's world, he may be granted leave to present a claim of nearly 800 acre-feet per year, without having to supply any of the Court-ordered discovery that every other party was subject to prior to Phases 4 and 6 of the trial in this matter. If Ritter's approach works, it is a genius strategy; but grossly unfair to every other party.

On the threshold question of the right to relief, the Court has broad authority on a motion made under Section 473 to set the parameters of such relief. (*See Shapiro v. Clark* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1147-49 (relief may be conditioned "upon any terms as may be just.").) Such broad discretion certainly must include ordering necessary discovery when a moving party chooses not to disclose all of the facts relevant to the Court's determination of his entitlement to relief. Court's routinely require defaulted parties to pay the other party's

1	attorneys' fees as a condition for relief from default, yet Mr. Ritter has the nerve		
2	to complain about having to travel and attend a deposition necessitated by his		
3	own Motion. (Opp., 3:15-20; see C.C.P. § 473(b)-(c).)		
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6	DATED: January 20, 2016	LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL D. McLACHLAN LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL M. O'LEARY	
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9		By:	
10		Michael D. McLachlan Attorneys for Plaintiff Richard Wood	
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