HARLTON WEEKS LL

Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4408

Santa Clara Case No. 1-05-CV-049053 Assigned to the Honorable Jack Komar Dept. I

OPPOSITION TO RICHARD WOOD MOTION IN LIMINE 1 BY, LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40, CITY OF PALMDALE, LITTLE ROCK CREEK IRRIGATION DISTRICT, PALM RANCH IRRIGATION DISTRICT, PALMDALE WATER DISTRICT, QUARTZ HILL WATER DISTRICT, AND CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE **COMPANY**

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	252627	Public Water Suppliers oppose Richard Wood's motion in limine 1 as follows:
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I. INTRODUCTION

Richard Wood requests this court to exclude evidence of pumping by the small pumper class and individual pumpers. In so doing, he effectively is requesting that the Court render void the subject matter of the entire Phase 3 trial.

In order for this court calculate the sustainable yield, it must hear evidence of all outflows, which includes groundwater pumping from members of the small pumper s class. Wood's request is unreasonable and would thwart the purpose of this Phase 3 trial, the determination of the sustainable yield. Were this request to be granted, the Court could not entertain *any* evidence of outflows from small pumpers. Wood does not dispute the obvious fact that small pumpers, collectively, have a substantial impact on the amount of overdraft which is the focal point of this litigation; he does not dispute that without a measurement of that impact, the Court will be unable to determine the sustainable yield; he does not dispute that measuring the sustainable yield is what the Phase 3 trial is all about. Rather, Wood asks that the Court entertain no evidence at all, from any source, concerning this issue. Wood offers no explanation for how the Court is to determine sustainable yield without the evidence that Wood seeks to exclude.

II. THE ONLY BASIS OF THIS MOTION IS DUE PROCESS INTERPRETED UNDER CASE LAW

Mr. Wood's motion in limine does not claim that amount of water pumped by the small pumpers is irrelevant, as is contemplated by Evidence Code section 350. Nor does is it claimed that the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will consume undue time or create substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352.

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The sole basis of Mr. Wood's request to exclude this vital evidence is that to allow the introduction of this evidence would violate due process. The requirements of due process do not include advance payment of expert witnesses by someone other than the party or the party's counsel; due process means notice of the issues to be determined at the trial (which Wood has had for a long time), an opportunity to offer his own evidence relevant to those issues (an opportunity which Wood has enjoyed for many months but apparently not chosen to avail himself of), and an opportunity to be heard examining the relevant evidence and offering argument based upon it, before a fair and impartial finder of fact (which he will be afforded at the Phase 3 trial). Due process also requires that Wood have a meaningful opportunity to appeal an adverse judgment, which portion of his due process right is obviously not yet mature since no judgment as to these issues has yet been rendered.

Considering that the amount of water pumped by small pumpers is a necessary component of a determination of safe yield, by bringing this motion, Mr. Woods is effectively requesting this court reconsider it March 22, 2010 case management order, and every subsequent order wherein this court stated that the Phase 3 trial would determine safe yield.

NO AUTHORITY HAS BEEN PROVIDED THAT THE TESTIMONY OF A III. COURT APPOINTED EXPERT IS NECESSARY TO SATISFY DUE PROCESS

Mr. Wood has not cited any authority for the proposition that due process requires this Court hear the testimony of a Court appointed expert.

The cases cited by Mr. Wood, Hesse v. Sprint Corporation (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3d 581 and Hanlon v. Chrysler Corporation (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011, require that the class plaintiff adequately represent the class members, not the class plaintiff's attorney, as stated in the motion. In this case, the class plaintiff – Richard A. Wood, <u>not</u> Michael D. McLachlan – is the one whose ability to adequately represent the small pumpers at the trial is even implicated by the argument at

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bar. Nor is there any claim that Wood or Wood's counsel have been denied the opportunity to learn what that expert will say or that they disagree with those claims in any way that cannot be adequately addressed through normal trial procedures such as cross-examination.

An analysis of the Hesse case readily demonstrates why it does not apply to the matter at bar. Hesse concerned itself with a settlement agreement by a prior class representative in a large consumer products case. The predecessor class representative did not share the same claim as Hesse. Thus, the prior class representative was not held to have adequately represented the new class, because the new class, represented by Hesse, presented a different set of injuries. Furthermore, the predecessor class representative had a conflict of interest with those members of the class of plaintiffs represented by Hesse.

The Hesse case does not apply to testimony of a court appointed expert. The representation discussed in Hesse requires that the class representative possess the same interest, suffer the same injury, and not have a conflict with the class he purports to represent. There is no claim at bar that Wood has different interests, different claims of injury, or conflicts, with other small pumpers. There is no claim that the evidence which Defendants' experts will proffer on this subject is in any way incorrect, prejudicial, questionable, or even necessarily adverse to the interests of the Wood class.

The Hanlon case, also cited by Wood, similarly required merely an absence of conflict of interest to determine adequacy of representation. In addition, the Hanlon Court stated that the named plaintiff and their counsel were to vigorously prosecute the action. Hanlon does not require the court hear the testimony of a court appointed expert. In Hanlon, the plaintiffs paid for their own experts. Woods argues today that this means that an expert must be appointed in every class action case, but offers no legal authority to support that proposition. Nor is it clear that the cost of the expert which might have been advanced by Woods' would not be reimbursable, particularly

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upon a showing that the result of the case to which that expert contributed was of substantial benefit to the class.

THE TESTIMONY REGARDING THE SELF HELP DEFENSE OF THE SMALL IV. PUMPER LANDOWNERS IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE PHASE 3 TRIAL

Wood seeks an expert to testify regarding the amount of water needed for members of his class to exercise the self help defense to the Public Water Suppliers' prescription claims.

The issue for this Phase 3 trial will be the safe yield, the calculation of which will necessarily include the amount was water pumped by the small pumpers represented by Wood. That number will be part of the larger Municipal and Industrial category of groundwater pumpers, which will in turn be a part of the larger category of groundwater outflows. Obviously, without an understanding of the total outflows, the amount of safe yield cannot be found by the Court.

The determination of this number will not limit or prejudice the ability of the small pumpers to exercise their self help defense. For example, the safe yield determination by this court will be the current safe yield of the basin. The members of the Wood class are persons who have ever pumped groundwater on their property. The class therefore would include persons who do not currently pump, and would thus not be included in the calculation of current safe yield.

V. **CONCLUSION**

This court's determination of safe yield at the Phase 3 trial is an intermediate ruling, and as has been often reiterated by this court, can be revisited by Wood at a later date. Additionally, a determination of safe yield will not limit Wood from proving his self help defense to any Public Water Supplier prescription claim.

CHARLTON WEEKS LLP 1007 West Avenue M-14, Suite A Palmdale, CA 93551 There has been no showing of prejudice to the Wood class. There has been no showing of any denial of due process. There has been no showing of irrelevant, cumulative, or prejudicial evidence being introduced to the trial of this matter. There has, however, been a request to exclude relevant, material, and critical evidence, the exclusion of which would render insubstantial whatever result the Court reaches at the trial. That request should be denied.

Dated: December 28, 2010

Respectfully Submitted,

CHARLTON WEEKS LLP

Bradley T. Weeks

Attorney for Quartz Hill Water District

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PROOF OF SERVICE

I am employed in the aforesaid county, State of California; I am over eighteen years of age and not a party to the within action; my business address is 1007 West Avenue M-14, Suite A, Palmdale, California, 93551.

On December 29, 2010, at my place of business at Palmdale, California, a copy of the following DOCUMENT(s):

OPPOSITION TO RICHARD WOOD MOTION IN LIMINE 1 BY, LOS ANGELES COUNTY WATERWORKS DISTRICT NO. 40, CITY OF PALMDALE, LITTLE ROCK CREEK IRRIGATION DISTRICT, PALM RANCH IRRIGATION DISTRICT, PALMDALE WATER DISTRICT, QUARTZ HILL WATER DISTRICT, AND CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE COMPANY

By posting the DOCUMENT listed above to the Santa Clara Superior Court website in regard to the Antelope Valley Groundwater Matter:

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 29, 2010

Gayle Fenald

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